Since the discovery of the Laws of Hammurapi in December 1901–January 1902,1
the dependence of biblical law upon Mesopotamian law has been hotly debated. Among
the most contentious issues is the abjudication of homicide, and the discussion has focused
on particular odd cases in biblical law, such as an ox that gored or assault on a pregnant
woman, that appear to have been borrowed from Mesopotamian law.2 The more
common occurrences of fatal assault and the procedures to remedy them, however, have
been largely ignored. What institutions insured that homicide was punished in biblical law,
and what relationship did they have to Mesopotamian legal process? I will argue that the
institutions that insured that a homicide would be investigated and remedied in biblical law
were vastly different from those in Mesopotamian law and that the difference originates in
disparate conceptions of the organization of society. Mesopotamian texts reflect the extensive
involvement of the state in the process of remedying homicide. The members of the
victim’s family participated in the process insofar as they had the right to make a claim on
the slayer, but there does not seem to be any apprehension generated by the possibility of
a blood avenger waiting to strike down the killer. By contrast, blood feud operated in biblical
law, and places of sanctuary were needed to protect the killer.