The Definitive How, Where and When of 9/11
by Anthony C Heaford

Background information

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terror cell initiated the 9/11 plot on Wednesday 24 September 1997 when based in a secure front company in Yemen. That happened two days after a visiting service technician had first spoken to them of the danger of a civilian airliner departing Logan airport Boston being hijacked and used as a missile to strike New York’s World Trade Centre.

I was that visiting service technician, an unwitting CIA patsy.

Unbeknown to me, my employer (my Father) - a British manufacturer and exporter of printing machinery - was working with people associated with the United State’s Central Intelligence Agency. My employer’s US salesman, Dave Dean of Dean Printing Systems in Chicago, was a US military Special Forces veteran of Vietnam (MACV-SOG), trained by infamous CIA contractor Billy Waugh. Waugh admits training al Qaeda fighters in 1990s Yemen and I can prove Dave Dean setup the machine sale for my Father’s company at a trade show in April 1997 Chicago, one intended to furnish known terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s front company in Yemen.

![Dave Dean, Vietnam veteran & US sales agent for chemicals, electronics & printing](image1)

During the Vietnam War Dean & Waugh served together in the top secret Studies and Observations unit (MACV-SOG) that operated illegally in Laos and Cambodia, directing bombing and harassing the Ho Chi Minh trial. Waugh admits training Libyan Special Forces in the 1970s on a mission that also supplied Colonel Gaddafi with tons of C-4 high explosives.

I suspect my Father’s relationship with Dean and the CIA began in 1986, when he sold a money printing machine to the El Salvadorian government mint, a sale that help his company win a Queen’s Award for Export Achievement in 1987. My reasoning is the El Salvadorian government of the 1980s was a brutal, rightwing, CIA backed junta. My Father told me that upon his arrival in el Salvador a government driver had driven him past a freshly executed young man on their way to the government mint factory. When I asked my Father how he knew the young man had been executed he described seeing fresh blood seeping on to the pavement from a head wound.

People familiar with CIA covert operations have since informed me that such intimidation tactics are a common procedure when recruiting ‘Intelligence assets’, as was the Italian honey trap / blackmail plot my Father was subjected to in the early 1990s, likely setup by Dave Dean.
The CIA's collusion with America's enemies

Billy Waugh and Dave Dean were providing material support to al Qaeda and 9/11 terrorist Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s (KSM) terror cell long before my September 1997 visit to Yemen. Waugh freely admits to training al Qaeda fighters, sometime in 1990s Yemen according to his 2004 autobiography ‘Hunting the Jackal’. My employer’s first machine sale to Yemen, installed by Dave Dean’s technician, was in 1993 and I’ve strong evidence that that machine was also used in an al Qaeda front company. My employer received their second Queen’s Award for Export Achievement in 1995, something the 1993 sale to Yemen would have influenced heavily.

Based on a US embassy ‘Export Opportunities’ document and Dean’s chemical supplies business, I also suspect Dean was involved in supplying TNT explosive component chemicals to KSM’s terror cell in August 1996. Given the presence of two chemistry graduates in KSM’s front company in September 1997, I believe it’s very likely that TNT was very likely used in the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

April 1997 — My introduction to KSM’s financiers

Chicago, USA: Executives from a London based company called Longulf Trading (the London office of the multi-billion dollar Hayel Saeed Anam Group global conglomerate) went on a remarkable shopping spree at the Converting Machinery Manufacturer’s international trade show being held in Chicago’s McCormick Place exhibition centre. The Longulf executives ordered about $3-million worth of top-end graphics, printing and packaging equipment in total, all for an ill-defined end-customer in Yemen whose company name they made-up on the spot and for whom they refused to give a delivery address.

I was demonstrating a machine on my employer’s exhibition stand at the exhibition when the Longulf executives enquired about purchasing one. Within half-an-hour I’d shown them the practical bits and the salesmen were holding a signed contract for a $100,000 deal; they paid list price without negotiating, with payment to be made upfront and in full. The Longulf executives said the end customer was in Yemen, but they were very vague about the end-customer's name. First they said it was GenPak but after being told GenPak was an existing multi-national company they changed it to GemPak. When installing the machine in Yemen in September 1997 I was told the company name was YemPak – short for Yemen-Pakistan.
No delivery address or machine specifications were given and one salesman (Jerry Stephens, a British military veteran of counter piracy operations in the South China Sea) immediately referred to the sale as very suspicious. The other salesman, my brother Nigel Heaford, responded by saying:

“Don’t ask any questions, they just paid list price for our top machine."

Although present at the exhibition the company’s managing director (my Father) and his US salesman, Dave Dean, were away from our exhibition stand for the duration of the Longulf executives’ visit, watching from a cafe overlooking the exhibition hall. Dean had pulled my Father away from the stand about twenty minutes before the Longulf executives arrived. Upon their return, shortly after the Longulf executives had left the stand, my father did not appear at all surprised by the $100,000 sale we’d made during his absence. Very unusually Dean also declined to accept the sales commission of several thousand dollars that he was entitled to for the machine sale on his territory, a deliberate effort to avoid any documented link between Longulf Trading and himself I now think.

As said, Longulf Trading is a London based subsidiary of the Hayel Saeed Anam Group whose long and documented links to terrorism financing are detailed at the end of this report.

11/12 June 1997 — 9/11’s conception and my first warning

I was travelling in the USA on business again, installing printing machinery at various locations. On Tuesday 11 June I was flying from Logan airport Boston to Toronto, Canada. From exiting a taxi on a public road outside Logan airport, to arriving at the aircraft door, I’d not been through any security checks. Other than showing my credit card in exchange for my boarding pass there were literally no security checks - nothing, none, nada. I did pass a luggage X-ray machine and a full body metal detector but they were both unmanned and unplugged.

I stopped at the aircraft door and cautioned the crew-member checking boarding passes. I said there’d been no security checks whatsoever in the airport. She smiled and told me:

“Don’t worry, that’s normal”

Twenty minutes later, sitting a few metres away from the unsecured cockpit door on a nearly empty 767 aircraft I realised how easily it would be to smuggle weaponry aboard and take control of the aircraft. I remembered the 1994 Air France hijacking and the alleged plan to crash the plane in to the Eiffel Tower; the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centre was fresh in my memory too. I then thought of those buildings’ proximity to Logan airport and in that moment I conceived with horror the opportunity for and likelihood of a 9/11 style attack.

The next morning I was attending a service visit at a customer in Toronto but I refused to start work until the Sunworthy Decorative factory manager, Bob Wilton, had given me an assurance that he’d pass on my airport security concerns to Canadian security services with a sense of urgency. My urgent warning on 12 June 1997 was:

“I think the same terrorists who attacked the WTC in 1993 will try again, but next time they’ll use a hijacked civilian airliner departing Logan airport as a kamikaze piloted missile.”

Mr. Wilton said he’d passed my warning and my details to a contact he had in the security services, but there was no feedback and I was never contacted back either. No one appeared interested or to care.
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September 1997 — My business trip to Yemen

Three months after my very specific warning of a terrorist attack on the World Trade Centre my Father asked me to travel to Yemen to install the machine sold at the April trade show in Chicago. Admittedly I wasn't his first choice – another service technician checked the British Foreign Office travel advice for Yemen and refused to go after seeing the high risk of kidnapping and terrorism there. My Mother, also a company director, insisted my Father seek some assurance for my safety before I travel there. I was present in their home when he received that reassurance in the form of a phone call from Yemen. He would not say who he'd spoken to but said with a broad smile that my safety was absolutely guaranteed.

In retrospect I think that phone call may have been from the President of Yemen’s own brother-in-law, General Ali Mohsen. General Mohsen was a friend of Osama bin Laden, recruiting fighters for the 1980s Afghan Mujahideen cause and even travelling to Afghanistan and meeting with bin Laden there. It's widely reported that bin Laden later gave General Mohsen $20-million to fund the resettlement of Arab Mujahideen forces in Yemen after they’d finished defeated the Soviet Union’s occupation of Afghanistan. A second candidate for that guarantor of my safety was the Director of Security for Taiz province, Rashad al-Alimi, appointed in 1996. Today (July 2022), Rashad al-Alimi is the Saudi backed Chairman of the [Yemen] Presidential Leadership Council. My principle reasoning for this claim is a scheduled international flight being delayed solely for me on my last day in Yemen, as detailed later in this report. Until 2021 General Ali Mohsen was the Saudi backed Vice President in exile, an enemy of the Ansarullah / Houthi forces that are defending Yemen from the Saudi / US / UK / UAE coalition's brutal attacks.

Two days into my business trip to Yemen the Pakistani chemistry graduate I was training asked about my travels in the USA and specifically about visiting New York and the World Trade Centre. My response was very specific:

"Don’t visit the World Trade Centre and take care whilst flying - I think the same terrorists who attacked the towers in 1993 will try again, but next time they’ll use a hijacked civilian airliner as a missile."
We discussed my warning for a few minutes - I explained how I thought it could happen based on my experience at Logan airport in June. I said I could have carried a sub machine gun on board without detection. I don’t recall an extended conversation about it; it was just a travel warning, one I’d given whenever the topic of travelling to the USA was raised.

The next day, Tuesday 23 September, the second machine operator I was training (another Pakistani chemistry graduate) asked me about my travel warning:

**Q. What if the hijackers couldn’t smuggle guns aboard?**

**A.** I pointed to the box cutters in my tool wallet, highlighting their potential use as a weapon and saying I’d accidentally carried them on several internal US flights without being stopped

**Q. Where would they put the bomb?**

**A.** I said a fully fuelled 767 was the bomb

The next day was a typical day for me, ten hours inside a windowless factory building. The Pakistani machine operators were absent for most of the day but I did spend a few hours training the factory mechanic, a man they called Dino and who I now know was Ahmed al-Darbi, a Guantanamo detainee released to Saudi custody in 2018. There were no questions about visiting New York from Dino though, and no repetition of my travel warning that day.

I now suspect Wednesday 24 September 1997 was the day the 9/11 plot was initiated, inspired by my travel warning conversations with the two Pakistani machine operators. Supporting evidence for this assertion comes from the 9/11 Commission Report of 2004. It says:

"In September 1997, Jarrah [a 9/11 hijacker/pilot] abruptly switched his intended course of study from dentistry to aircraft engineering at the Technical University of Hamburg-Harburg. His motivation for this decision remains unclear."

There’s a very good chance that future hijacker/pilot Ziad Jarrah made his abrupt course change application on Wednesday 24 September 1997 or very soon after, confirmation of which would provide very strong documented evidence in support of my claims.

**Three unusual meetings**

Thursday 25 September started normally enough and around midday I was pleased to see the managing director in the factory for the first time. He was on the far side of the shop floor, looking at me but speaking with a man I now know to have been Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

The managing director approached me alone and casually confirmed the travel warning I’d given to the machine operators. I confirmed this saying how crazy the lack of security in US airports was. He nodded in agreement. He then gave me the afternoon off, saying a dinner companion not connected to the factory would join me that night and I should expect him at my hotel around four o’clock. He didn’t tell me my dinner companion’s name but I did get an emergency contact name and number from him in case I had any problems when out and about in Taiz. That name and number were: Shawki Alaraki, 9674 216301. I also asked the machine operators the managing directors name: they told me he was called “the Chief”.

As planned a man arrived at my hotel (photo eighteen below) on schedule, introduced himself as Yousef and suggested we walk to a viewpoint (Cairo Hill) overlooking the city before dinner.
The walk and dinner with Yousef were interesting and pleasant distractions but I now realise he was vetting me before two further meetings already planned for the next day.

Yousef and I spoke about my 9/11 style attack fears and I noted the genius of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing was that it hadn’t been attributed to any specific country or group (the 1993 WTC bombing was claimed by an unknown group, the Liberation Army 5th Battalion). Yousef raised the possibility of more than one plane being used in the new attack method we were discussing and we both speculated on likely reactions. Yousef specifically lamented the murder of an Israeli too, the political assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995. He said it was a lost last chance for a negotiated resolution between Israel and the Palestinians. Yousef left by about eight o’clock and I went to my room to prepare for my journey to Sanaa and my return flight home the next day.

Using facial recognition software I have found a ‘100% match’ for Yousef; it is 9/11 accused Guantanamo detainee Ramzi bin al Shibh. A police facial recognition expert I asked about this match speculated that Yousef and Ramzi bin al Shibh are very likely brothers or cousins.
On Friday morning (26 September) the general manager Mohamed collected me from my hotel and we went to the YemPak factory to complete my paper work. Frustratingly I was left alone in the factory building for some time and I became anxious that I’d miss my flight. The machine operator and mechanic stopped by, time enough for me to take a photo of the machine installation, but then left me alone again. Eventually the Chief came to fetch me, saying the paper work was in the main office building on the other side of the compound. Before leaving the factory I ask the Chief his name for my customer database. He said ‘Saeed Alrobaidi’ but as I entered this into my palmtop computer I said “the ‘Al’ just means ‘the’, right?”. Mr. Alrobaidi said yes and I just recorded ‘Saeed Obaidi’ in my notes. Comparing those notes with ones I’d made before my visit, data given to me by my works manager Tony Preece, I now realise the correct spelling is Saeed Alrobaidi. When I asked where he was from he hesitated before saying Oman; I now suspect he was actually from the United Arab Emirates but was referring to the historical boundaries of Oman when he replied to me.

The factory mechanic, Dino, was even more evasive when I asked where he was from. I recall he said Arabia but when I asked if he meant Saudi Arabia he said no, definitely not. Only the machine operators told me their home country without hesitation; saying they and the numerous security guards in the compound were all from Pakistan. In retrospect I wonder if they were of Baluchi heritage (a rebellious province in Pakistan with strong British links), as KSM is. My dinner companion Yousef’s nationality never came up in conversation but I assumed him to be Yemeni. I’m not sure of Mohamed the general manager’s nationality, but have speculated (on a hunch) that he may have been Yemeni, or possibly an Arabian (Saudi) or Emirati national.

Meeting Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

I followed the Chief from the factory to the main office block and into an upstairs office where Dino, Mohamed and Mohamed's assistant were waiting. I could see my paper work on a table in the corner but it soon became apparent they wanted a group photo before letting me leave. At this point Mohamed and Dino began trying to dress me in local style clothing and after initially protesting I allowed them to do this thinking it was the quickest way to begin my journey to the airport and the flight I was already going to be late for. They produced a jambiya (a local style dagger) for me to wear too, but I had bought one the day before and chose to wear that instead.

It was at that point an office side door opened and the man I’d seen the Chief speaking to in the factory the day before entered the office and the room hushed. The Chief said:

“This is the Engineer”

As a visiting service technician I asked why we’d not been introduced before. The Chief replied:

“He’s working on other projects.”
Without further ado the group photo was convened. Two shots were taken, first by the Chief and then by Mohamed’s assistant, using both my camera and one belonging to them. Despite putting his arm around me for the photo, ‘the Engineer’ didn’t speak to me or shake my hand. He disappeared as soon as the photos were taken. I was finally handed my paper work and within a few minutes I was in a jeep with Mohamed on my way to the airport in Sanaa.

The only copy of those photos I kept are thumbnail sized prints and although not clear, I am confident of the identities of the individuals I’ve identified below:

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**26 September 1997**

- *My introduction to and photo with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the Guantanamo Bay prisoner accused of Masterminding 9/11*

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General Manager Mohamed A. Salem is listed as a United State’s Embassy contact for the supply of TNT component chemicals in August 1996.

Location:
Hayel Saeed Anam Group Headquarters
PO Box 5302
Taiz, Yemen

Mohamad, the General Manager
Saeed Alrobaidi
‘THE CHIEF’
Me, Anthony Heaford
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
Ahmed al-Darbi

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Visiting Al Qa’idah Al Askariya

Mohamed the general manager and I left the Hayel Saeed Anam Group headquarters compound in Taiz at about ten o’clock on Friday morning. It was a five-hour drive to Sanaa and my flight was scheduled to depart about two o’clock in the afternoon. I anticipated an awkward journey because I’d upset Mohamed on my arrival in Yemen six days earlier. There’d been a driver waiting for me at Sanaa airport on my arrival, but his sign had the name of the technician who’d refused to travel to Yemen due to the British Foreign Office warning. Not recognising the other technician’s name on the sign I walked straight past him and to the taxi rank outside. Despite not having the factory address I decided to chance it and take a taxi to Taiz myself.

The taxi driver and his mate (in photos fifteen and sixteen on page six) were gentlemen and took great care of me. Upon arriving on the outskirts of Taiz they stopped and asked an elderly local if they knew where the ‘GemPak’ factory was. Despite even the name GemPak being wrong the local knew where we were heading. After look at me in the rear seat of the taxi they said “That’ll be the foreigners’ compound” and proceeded to give us precise directions to the Hayel Saeed Anam Group headquarters compound. Upon our arrival and after some confusion and trepidation amongst the uniformed Pakistani security guards it was Mohamed who came to meet me at the gate. Of note was an none-uniformed figure that appeared briefly from behind the security fence, brandishing an assault rifle. When Mohamed invited me in and walked me to the main office block he didn’t mention that I’d missed my ride from Sanaa airport, but he was clearly put out by my actions.
Now in a jeep with Mohamed on our way to Sanaa and my flight home he remained distant and incommunicative with me, for the first fifteen minutes or so anyway. Out of the blue Mohamed announced that he was taking me to a meeting. I immediately said no, stressing I mustn’t miss my flight. For the first time he looked at me with a smile, saying: “The plane will wait for you”, just before turning right between some buildings and on to a dust track running through open fields.

I briefly considered throwing the car door open to force Mohamed to stop the jeep but soon realised the futility of such a gesture. Mohamed was clearly enjoying the ride, turning and grinning at me intermittently, but to me it felt like a roller coaster ride. With each turn and further digression from the main road my stomach was turning and my hands clenching tighter. We appeared to be following the line of the steep cliffs to our left and just as I saw the ground rising to our right we turned into a hidden driveway. I saw buildings to our front that marked the end of our journey; Mohamed stopped just short of them before jumping out of the jeep without a word.

There were two men in local dress that appeared to have been awaiting our arrival. There was a moment’s pause before one of them gestured to me to get out of the jeep, which I did. Without a word he led me to a large room in the first building. I tried to step outside to assess my
surroundings but again without a word being said he stopped me and indicated I should wait in
the room. I only had one thought in my mind - getting to the airport for my flight home.

This secluded valley, one mile from Al Qa’idah town, is where the HSA Group
HQ General manager Mohamed A Salem took me to attend a third meeting,
 thirty minutes after the group photo with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed

The zoomed in image of the collection of buildings
again shows my route with a red dashed line, and
the meeting location, inside the first buildings on
the right hand side.

Within a few minutes about ten men entered the
room in procession and again without a word being
said they sat down besides me at a long bench
table, the only furniture in the room. They were
dressed in more practical clothing, resembling the
Afghan Mujahideen I’d often seen on the news.
Food was served – individual plates of vegetables
and a large roast meat dish in the centre. There
was some hesitation before the men began eating
the vegetables. Initially I followed their lead before
deciding the quickest way for me to continue my
journey would be for me to help myself to the
central meat dish. As I place the self-served and
generous portion of meat on my plate the room
froze. The tall middle-aged man besides me at the
head of the table stood up abruptly. They all
followed his lead and exited the room with the
same processional aplomb they’d entered with.
Looking at the location today (grid reference 13.744,44.154) the collection of buildings I visited is at the entrance of a semi-enclosed valley with three more such settlements. Based on my experience there and subsequent research I believe this valley is the ‘Al Qaidah Al Askariya’ referred to in the notes taken during a meeting in Peshawar, Pakistan in August 1988. An approximate translation of Al Qaidah Al Askariya is “The soldier’s place by the military base”, but in the context of its location I think a more accurate translation is “The soldier’s place by Al Qa’idah town”.

Osama bin Laden attended the August 1988 meeting and his links to Yemen and this site are compelling. As well as his relationship with Yemeni General Ali Mohsen, bin Laden’s Father was Yemeni, as were his primary mentors. Bin Laden is known to have requested to visit Yemen in 1987, when I think this base was established, and in 2000 he married a Yemeni woman from a prominent family in Ibb governorate, where this valley and Al Qa’idah town are located.

My theory about Al Qa’idah Al Askariya being just one base named after the nearby town is supported by these statements issued by bin Laden in the aftermath of 9/11:

“So the situation isn't like the West portrays it, that there is an 'organisation' with a specific name (such as 'al-Qa'idah') and so on. That particular name is very old. It was born without any intention from us.”

“We used to call the training camp Al Qa'idah. The name stayed.”

My evidence-based speculation about Al Qa’idah is that as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan was drawing to a close (not long after the first successful use of a Stinger anti-aircraft missile in September 1986), bin Laden visited General Ali Mohsen in Yemen looking for help relocating the Arab Mujahideen who would soon be returning from Afghanistan. I think it’s highly likely that General Mohsen offered bin Laden this location, an idyllic valley near a hugely significant historical site – the military base established by Saladin’s brother in 1174 during his conquest of southern Arabia. The widely reported $20-million that bin Laden gave to Mohsen would have been used to finance this project.

Was Al Qa’idah Al Askariya a military base preparing for a global jihad, or was it a sanctuary for the demobilisation of Arab Mujahideen returning from defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan? There was likely a crossover but my intuition favours the latter. The proximity of Taiz’s international airport makes the valley’s use as a military training area highly unlikely. There’s little evidence of bin Laden’s involvement in any military activity until after his forced exile from (Saudi) Arabia due to his objections to USA military deployments there in 1991, and following his forced expulsion from Sudan in 1996. Even the mainstream western media was making that assertion, such as this report from December 1993:
My speculation is that from 1987 to at least 1991 Al Qa’ida Al Askariya was primarily a sanctuary for demobilised Arab Mujahideen. But with bin Laden out of the way (exiled to Sudan in 1991) and causes such as opposition to the 1991 annulment of election results in Algeria, the start of the Bosnian conflict in 1992 and the 1994 civil war in Yemen, those demobilised Arab Mujahideen will have quite reasonably seen taking up arms again as their duty.

And this is where it becomes convoluted and confusing because it is in that same period that CIA contractor Billy Waugh (my work colleague Dave Dean’s trainer) claims he was training Al Qa’ida fighters at the CIA’s behest in Yemen. There’s also strong evidence that the CIA facilitated and encouraged the conflicts in and the demise of Yugoslavia too. Please read ex-CIA officer Robert Baer’s interview “Confession of a CIA Agent: They gave us millions to dismember Yugoslavia” to understand this more.

But my wider speculations about Al Qa’ida Al Askariya are just that, theories built from second hand reports, and so I’ll return to the factual narrative of my prediction, warnings and conversations about a 9/11 style attack and my subsequent experiences in Yemen and beyond.

Following the abrupt end of my meeting in the valley besides Al Qa’ida town in Yemen I was driven to Sanaa but by another driver, not Mohamed the Hayel Saeed Anam Group general manager who’d taken me to the meeting.

My flight’s departure had been delayed solely for me and after being whisked through Sanaa airport like a VIP the plane took off as soon as I sat down. It is that delayed international flight that’s the basis for my theory that my Father’s guarantee of my safety in Yemen came from General Mohsen or a similarly senior figure there. If my meeting by Al Qa’ida town had not been cut so abruptly short, the only way I could have reached Sanaa in time would have been a plane or helicopter ride from the nearby Taiz international airport. How many people could have both delayed the departure of an international flight from Sanaa or arranged an impromptu flight for me from Taiz? Only a very small selection of the most senior and powerful people in Yemen.

Voicing my first suspicions

I tried to raise my concerns about the customer in Yemen with the first person I spoke to on my return to Manchester, my works manager Tony Preece on Saturday 27 September 1997. I said:

"There's something very suspicious about the Yemen customer"

He replied: "Don't worry they've already paid in full"

I said, "No, really, there was... “

He shooed me out of his office, saying, “It doesn't matter"

I tried to raise my concerns a second time with my employer a few weeks later, asking the senior service technician David Hughes where I could report my concerns about US airport security and the potential for a kamikaze hijacking terrorist attack. It was a short conversation with him advising:

“Oh God, never say anything like that. Your card will be marked by airport security if you do. Don't worry about it, there’s people whose job it is to look out for stuff like that."

I would describe David Hughes and Dave Dean’s (our ex-Special Forces US salesman) relationship as “being as thick as thieves” and reflecting back on conversations we were all party to I’ve little doubt that Hughes knew of Dean’s CIA linked extra-curricular activities.
Late 1997 — Hamburg Cell activated

Lead 9/11 hijacker/pilot Mohammed Atta and his second-in-command Yemeni Ramzi bin al-Shibh disappeared from Germany for a few months in late 1997, coinciding with hijacker/pilot Ziad Jarrah switching from studying dentistry in Greifswald to studying aircraft engineering in Hamburg. Atta and al-Shibh had a party upon their return to Hamburg in early 1998, which is when I suspect they confirmed their intention to hijack a civilian flight leaving Logan airport using box cutters and crash it into the World Trade Centre.

The 2004 9/11 Commission reported sightings of Atta and Shibh in Afghanistan that winter, but I think their real destination will have been KSM’s front company in Yemen, the training camp I visited besides Al Qaeda town, and Dubai for reasons detailed below.

November 1997 — The first 9/11 reconnaissance

Saudi national Hani Hanjour had spent six months in the US in 1991/92 studying English language and returned in 1996 for six months when he started flying lessons but dropped out and returned home in November 1996 citing financial pressures. On 16 November 1997, fifty days after my visit to Yemen, Hanjour re-entered the US and resumed his English classes and his flying lessons. He lived with future 9/11 hijacker Nawaf Hazmi, a Saudi veteran of the Afghan and Bosnian conflicts. I believe this was the first reconnaissance mission specifically for the 9/11 plot, performed by two of the most capable and qualified men within KSM’s wide circle of contacts.

KSM established that network of contacts while working for Afghan Warlord Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s ‘Service’s Office’ from 1988-92. Sayyaf is worth an entire study himself, but other than him employing and mentoring KSM there are these points of note:

- He is a Saudi sponsored Wahhabi, virulent misogynist and
- Sayyaf sent the assassins who murdered Ahmad Shah Massoud on 09 September 2001
- The CIA paid Sayyaf a $100,000 retainer in October 2001
- Sayyaf ran for the Afghan Presidency in 2014, gaining 7.1% of the vote
- NATO expressed their ‘strong support’ for Sayyaf in 2019
- Sayyaf is now (2022) based in NATO member country Turkey from where he is managing an insurgency against the Taliban government in Afghanistan

Early December 1997
My last 9/11 warning, given in New York

On 2 December 1997 (during my last visit to the United States) I gave my clearest and most specific 9/11 warning. I gave that warning to a business owner in Brooklyn, New York during a machine installation. Mr Dan Barkochba of Ultra Flex Packaging at 975 Essex Street said he had good security services contacts and that he would pass my warning and business card on to them. My very specific warning given to Mr Barkochba was:

“I think the same terrorists who attacked the WTC in 1993 will try again, but next time they’ll use a hijacked civilian airliner departing Logan airport as a missile.”
In the course of my research I searched the internet for my Ultra Flex Packaging contact’s last name, ‘Barkochba’. This Israeli newspaper’s article about the Jewish extremist Bar-Kochba revolt against the Roman occupation of Judea was the top result:

‘Bar Kochba’ is Aramaic (the language spoke by Jesus) and translates as “Son of a Star”, hinting at divine heritage. I suspect Mr Dan Barkochba’s use of the name is as a ‘nom-de-guerre’. Given that I didn’t see any other printing machinery at Ultra Flex packaging, other than the small ancillary machine I was installing, and the fact this visit was setup by Dave Dean, it raises many questions. As at the YemPak factory in Yemen, the Ultra Flex employees I was training asked me specifically about the World Trade Centre. They asked if I would be visiting the buildings and I replied with an emphatic “No!” before explaining my fears of a 9/11 style attack. I then asked if they knew anyone in the security services I could pass my warning to - that’s when they suggested my telling Mr Barkochba, which I did when they had called him and asked him to visit the room we were working in. Those Ultra Flex employees, Mr Barkochba’s face book entry & my customer database entry are pictured below.

These two New Yorkers were employees of Mr Barkochba. They both heard my warning and both witnessed my conversation with Mr Barkochba.
After finishing at Ultra Flex I visited the Empire State building before my flight the next day. I photographed the World Trade Centre whilst pondering the horror and impact of a 9/11 style attack and hoping and praying that someone would pay heed to my warnings. But I was never contacted back, ever, by anyone. No one appeared to care.

Late December 1997
An unusual business trip to Dubai

Close to Christmas a customer in Dubai’s Jebel Ali Free Zone (JAFZ) specifically requested that I install their recently purchased machine. My accountant sister lived in Dubai and I had visited her there before (1991 & 1994), but I did not know this customer or why they should specifically request that I attend.

There was nothing unusual about the visit that I recall, except in hindsight: the customer’s address (PO Box 16797, JAFZ) is very similar to an address (PO Box 16958, JAFZ) used by 9/11 accomplice and Guantanamo detainee Ammar al-Baluchi. In October 1998 Baluchi used that address to register a bank account for transferring funds from bank accounts in the United Arab Emirates to the future hijackers already in the USA. The addresses are similar enough - 16797 and 16958 - that they are very likely to have been in the same building or the same block of buildings.

The cropped image below is from Ammar al-Baluchi’s Wikipedia entry and details his activities in Dubai in 1998:

**Preparation for 9/11**

According to a U.S. government biography, Baluchi "volunteered his services" to uncle KSM in 1997.[12]

On 10 October 1998, Baluchi used his passport to open a bank account with the Emirates Bank International, using the name "Ali" based on his kuña name Ibn Abdulaziz Ali and listing his employer's address with **PO box 16958, Jebel Ali, Dubai.**
Late 1997 — The first formal 9/11 warning

A dissident Qatari official, the former minister of the economy and ex-chief of police, Hamad bin-Jassim bin-Hamad al-Thani tells recently retired veteran CIA field agent Robert Baer that:

"Khalid Sheikh Mohammed is going to hijack some planes."

Mr Baer passed the warning on to the CIA in early 1998 and repeated it after 9/11 but he said no one was interested. Later that year, 1998, the dissident Qatari whistleblower was kidnapped, renditioned to Qatar and imprisoned there for the next ten years. To add irony to this fact, one of the FBI agents who was supposed to stop attacks like 9/11 quit the FBI in 2005. He went to work for the Qatari government as a security advisor, employing a host of other ex-US Intel agents to help him. Throughout that time Qatar was still imprisoning their ex-chief of police, Hamad bin-Jassim bin-Hamad al-Thani - the first man of any authority who had tried to warn the USA of the impending 9/11 attacks. That ex-FBI agent is Ali Soufan, who’s now a news media pundit and claimed author on the very terrorism he first failed to stop and then went to work for those who had hosted and funded 9/11 Mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

Early March 1998 — My second unusual visit to Dubai

Supposedly choosing to come out of retirement whilst on a family holiday to Dubai (visiting my accountant sister), my Father (‘JMH’ in my customer data base entry pictured on page fifteen) decided to visit the customer I’d attended at the industrial Jebel Ali Free Zone three months earlier. He returned from the holiday and told me that he had seen operator problems and I needed to visit this customer again, except at our cost. I protested, saying there was nothing wrong with the work I’d done but my Father treated it very flippantly. He said not to worry and just to treat it like a holiday.

I attended the Dubai customer’s factory again on what was a very strange (unnecessary) visit marked by what appeared to be the company’s entire management team greeting me and giving me their contact details. In retrospect I believe both visits to Dubai (December and March) were in connection to my meetings and conversations in Yemen in September 1997. I think members of the Hamburg Cell will have used the opportunity to observe me, given that I had unwittingly told them exactly how to carry out an attack on the World Trade Centre.
Mid March 1998 — An very unusual meeting in London

Coming out of retirement once more my Father called me at work and said he’d set up a business meeting for me in London the next day; I was in the north of England at the time on a planned sales trip. He told me the customer was a Mr Jones of Printo Wrappings who wanted to sign a contract for the purchase of a £40,000 machine. They - my Father and Mr Jones - wanted me to drive to London and hand the contract to him personally the next morning.

That summons from my retired Father was very unusual in itself, as was the meeting with Mr. Jones the next day. He had no interest in discussing the machine he was buying but he did ask me about my travels.

I recall I was abrupt in my answers as I was perturbed by such intrusions and it ended up being a short meeting. But I had my contract signed and thought little more of this unusual meeting until very recently. I now suspect Mr Jones was my Father’s MI6 handler or contact wanting to know more about my meetings and conversations in 1997 Yemen and more recently in Dubai.

Early 2000 — Manchester, England

I was made redundant from my Father’s business in April 1998 in a political and acrimonious move by a new managing director, his brother Mike Heaford. And so in early 2000 it was very unusual when Mike approached me to ask if I could explain a $1,000,000 ‘gift’ their business had received from a printing company in Britain. I couldn’t explain it then but now I suspect that payment was made by Cepac Limited – Britain’s largest cardboard packaging company established in May 1997 and ‘coincidentally’ owned by the Hayel Saeed Anam Group. My Father’s business’s online accounts do reflect this assertion; the table below shows their annual bank balances in British pounds from 1994 to 2005, as recorded with HMRC:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Balance (£)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>231,666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>536,549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>185,184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>87,625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>393,261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>174,253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>981,274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>711,233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>166,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>350,945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>227,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>345,330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
My conclusions

I have no doubt that 9/11 was initiated by my travel warnings unwittingly given to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terror cell in September 1997 Yemen. I know they had talked of crashing a cargo aircraft loaded with explosives into the White House before, and countless variations on that no doubt. But Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terror cell had previously focused on the manufacture of very technically advanced bombs and remote detonation systems. The 9/11 plot that clearly began in late 1997 marked a stark departure from those tactics.

I’ve also got no doubt my business trip to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s terror cell’s front company in Yemen was a direct result of my Father’s relationships with British and American elements of the so called Security Services. His employing Dave Dean, a former US Special Forces soldier trained by CIA contractor Billy Waugh, as his US sales agent is my principle reasoning for saying this. Whether it was through intimidation, blackmail or just merciless ambition, my Father did allow me to be used as a patsy of the Deep State. The extent of his knowledge of or complicity in said activities is still unknown to me, but I do know my own family has made the very greatest efforts to discredit, attack and malign me since I began to raise questions about my 1997 business trip to Yemen for the family firm.

Appendix

These are my two database entries for YemPak. I completed the first before my visit to Yemen based on information given to me by my works manager Tony Preece. The second entry I compiled whilst on site in Yemen, using information given to me by the customer’s employees:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genpak / Gempak - the fake company name given by the Longulf Trading executives during the machine purchase in April 1997 Chicago</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company: Genpak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address: Sa'ana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts: 9/97 Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahmed Alrobaidi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery: 3392 Gravure PP</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The only location information the customer would provide

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contact name collected in 1993 or possibly in Chicago 1997</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Company: Yempak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country: Yemen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Address: Saana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacts: 9/97 Install. Arranged R/Bak Sample &amp; sale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Said Obadi ~ Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mr Dino ~ Man</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiz~Shawki Alariki ~9674 216301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery: 70153 WW Viper</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment: Bielloni 6/8 col ~ install eng Nicolas</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s correct front company name, an abbreviation of Yemen/Pakistan

Managing director Saeed Alrobaidi (spelt wrong by me)
The ‘maintenance man’, Ahmed al-Darbi (ex-Guantanamo detainee)

The s/n of our machine installed in 1993

My emergency contact’s details

The name of a visiting Italian engineer I met on site at YemPak. Nicolas raised suspicions about this customer with me before he left site on 22 September
Appendix (continued)

The Hayel Saeed Anam Group, Pacific Interlink and al Qaeda

My employer's machine sale was made at a Chicago trade show where both Dave Dean and I were present in April 1997. The sale was made via a London based purchase agent called Longulf Trading. Longulf Trading is a subsidiary of the multi-billion dollar Yemeni Hayel Saeed Anam Group, in whose Yemeni HQ compound KSM's front company was located. KSM's front company was called YemPak - an abbreviation of Yemen-Pakistan they told me.

Since the Hayel Saeed Anam (HSA) Group founding in the British Protectorate of Aden in 1938 (coinciding with the demise of the British East India Company), business has flourished for them.

But the HSA Group suffered with the decline of the British Empire; after the British Empire's ignoble exit from Aden in 1967 the new socialist republic government is alleged (by HSA's founder, as recorded in his Wikipedia entry) to have confiscated all of HSA's properties and assets in Aden. The group moved their headquarters to Taiz in response.

The HSA Group opened its London office Longulf Trading in 1977. In 1997 they purchased three British printing companies and created Britain's largest cardboard packaging company, Cepac limited. They also started using the British Cayman Islands tax haven in March 1997, as recorded in the Paradise Papers, using their PO Box 5302, Taiz address – where I met KSM in September 1997.

In 1982 one Saeed family member and a HSA director - Abdul Rahman Hayel Saeed - gave his power of attorney to a known terrorist fund-raiser, Ahmed Idris Nasreddin. In 2001 the UN described Nasreddin as:

“… a supporter of terrorism… " involved in "... an extensive financial network providing support to Al Qaeda and other terrorist-related organisations."

Just two months before the group we now know as al Qaeda was formed in August 1988, the HSA Group established Pacific-Interlink, a shipping company based in Malaysia with a global footprint matching al Qaeda’s almost exactly. The timing coincidence (two months apart) and the logistical match make al Qaeda and Pacific Interlink being parallel organisations possible.

HSA's terrorism funding link via Ahmed Idris Nasreddin and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed’s presence in their headquarters (ten miles from al Qaidah town) in 1997 make it a close certainty that Pacific Interlink is a legitimate business providing logistic support to the group known as al Qaeda since its very inception.

Terrorism and the Queen’s Award for Export Achievement

My Father won his first Queen’s Award in 1987, one year after selling a money-printing machine to the junta that was ruling El Salvador. His second Queen’s Award won in 1995 was given two years after my brother Paul had completed the family business’s first machine sale to the Hayel Saeed Anam Group. I think the nature of those sales and the subsequent Queen’s Awards for Export Achievement are very likely linked via a Deep State apparatus that rewarded their assets (such as my Father) for providing unquestioning material support to some very suspect customers - such as the 9/11 terrorist cell and their financiers in 1997 Yemen.
I think the last time I saw Dave Dean was in April 1997 at the Chicago Trade show. I travelled regularly in the USA in 1997, my last visit there being my December 1997 business trip to Mr Dan Barkochba’s Ultra Flex factory in Brooklyn, New York. It is reasonable to assume Dean was busy in other locations during my later visits in 1997, so that may not have been unusual. But my suspicions about Mr Barkochba (likely an Israeli Mossad operative) and Dave Dean (likely a CIA sub-contractor) do make me question everything now a days.

Is it a coincidence that after I gave my last and most specific 9/11 warning to Mr Barkochba in December 1997, I was never asked to travel to the USA again? Possibly. And possibly not.

In the course of my research I finally found a photo of Dave Dean in 2019. Prior to that, since I first met Dean in 1988, he had studiously avoided letting anyone take his photograph - something I remember senior service technician David Hughes found very amusing.

Here’s the photo I found of Dean in 2019, when he was working for a Czech Republic company:

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**SOMA strengthens US market presence**

Czech Republic based SOMA, producer of flexographic printing presses, slitter rewinders and laminators has strengthened its presence in mid-west US by appointing a highly experienced area sales manager.

As part of its long-term strategic plan to build presence in the US, David Dean joins the sales and service team located in Long Island, New York. He brings with him many years’ experience in the US flexographic industry.

Dean previous work experience in the printing industry include companies such as Standard Process Corporation in Chicago, IL – a manufacturer of rotogravure cylinders, electro-plating equipment and cylinder finishing equipment; J. M. Heaford, a manufacturer of Rotogravure and Flexographic proofing presses and his own company Dean Printing Systems, offering equipment, chemistry, electronics and supplies for the rotogravure industry.

Dean joins the team from Chicago and will play a significant role in developing SOMA’s operations in the US, confirming its commitment to bringing the latest flexo technology to the US.