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EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF FOOD AND CONFLICT, 1840–1990

EDITED BY JUSTIN NORDSTROM

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CONTENTS

Series Editor’s Preface
Acknowledgments

Introduction:
Geography and Chronology in Food and Warfare
Justin Nordstrom

I Expanding Geographic Boundaries

1 Yankee Pigs and Dying Cattle: Military Logistics, Animal Disease, and Economic Power in the U.S. and Colonial Africa in the Nineteenth Century
Erin Stewart Mauldin

2 The Decisive Weapon? Rations and Food Supply in the Boer War of 1899–1902
Matthew Richardson

3 Food and Anticolonialism at Gandhi’s Intentional Communities in South Africa and India
Karline McLain

4 The Making of Indian Vegetarian Identity
Mohd Ahmar Alvi

5 Hungry Empire: Manchuria and the Failed Food Autarky in Imperial Japan, 1931–41
Jing Sun

6 “We Don’t Need Red Tape, We Need Red Meat.” A Comparative Overview of the Fight against Black-Market Meat in Australia, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States during World War II
Leslie A. Przybylek
7 Food in the Counterinsurgency of the Malayan Emergency: Security, Hawking, and Food Denial
Yvonne Tan

II = Expanding Chronological Boundaries

8 “To Calm Our Rebellious Stomachs,” U.S. Soldiers’ Experience with Food during the U.S.–Mexico War
Christopher Menking

9 Food, Hunger, and Rebellion: Egypt in World War I and its Aftermath
Christopher S. Rose

10 Tasting Recovery: Food, Disability, and the Senses in World War I American Rehabilitation
Evan P. Sullivan

11 Culinary Nationalism and Ethnic Recipe Collections During and After World War I
Carol Helstosky

12 Still Poor, Still Little, Still Hungry? The Health and Diet of Belgian Children After World War I
Nel de Mûelenaere

13 Planting Pan-Americanism: The Good Neighbor Policy and the Visual Culture of Corn, 1933–45
Breanne Robertson

14 “Six Taels and Four Maces (Luk-Leung-Sei)”: Food and Wartime Hong Kong, 1938–46
Chi Man Kwong

15 Selling Out the Revolution for a Plate of Beans: Social Eating and Violence in Peru’s Civil Conflict of the 1980s and 1990s
Bryce Evans

Contributors
Index
On Thursday, October 24, 1918, sixteen people—eleven women, four children, and a police officer—were killed in a stampede at the cereals market in Rod-el-Farag, Cairo. Rod-el-Farag, the main grain port on the Nile, was an obvious site for the Cereal Merchant’s Association’s twice-weekly market. Normally held Thursdays and Saturdays, the association had voted to reduce the market frequency to once per week—on Mondays—effective October 28. The public market’s manager, Barakat Bey, mistakenly believed that the change took effect immediately and had not telephoned as usual to ask for additional police officers to assist with crowd control. As an estimated crowd of five thousand people—mostly women, many accompanied by children—gathered and waited past the normal start time, rumors about the market’s closure began to circulate. Because of recent scarcity in the availability of wheat, the primary staple of the Egyptian diet, people were anxious about whether there would be enough for everyone waiting and when the gates finally opened, panic ensued. The crowd surged forward, trampling those that fell and crushing the police officer to death against a wall. The tragedy earned significant public attention: the press denounced Barakat Bey, the government took direct control of grain distribution, and collecting funds for the families of the victims became a cause célèbre among the Egyptian elite. The Rod-el-Farag incident attracted attention because it involved fatality, but it was not an isolated incident. Egypt’s major cities had been experiencing a shortage of wheat throughout the summer and fall, contributing to widespread unrest that culminated in a nationwide
uprising the following year (a point addressed later in this chapter). The Rod-el-Farag riot demonstrated the anxieties among poor Egyptians over the availability and affordability of food during World War I—a problem largely ignored by the Anglo-Egyptian government.²

At the outbreak of the war in 1914, the Anglo-Egyptian government introduced policies intended to control inflation in the price of foodstuffs and to ensure a constant supply for the civilian market.³ The policies were an abject failure, accomplishing neither goal and exacerbating the already precarious financial situation of the peasantry (often referred to as fellah-heen).⁴ Wartime inflation in the cost of basic commodities far outpaced the rise in wages. Most Egyptians could not afford to buy enough food by the end of 1916, and supply shortages became common in early 1918. The war’s end did not bring economic relief; wholesale and retail price indices continued to rise throughout the winter of 1918–19. Additionally, malnutrition presented a public health issue during the war; between December 1914 and December 1918 nearly two hundred thousand people died of infectious diseases. Even if only a small percentage of these deaths can be attributed to complications from hunger and malnutrition, they would still surpass the death toll from combat actions (just under fifteen thousand).⁵

In March of 1919, a nationwide uprising brought the country to a standstill for two months, with riots in major cities, the destruction of rail and telegraph lines, and attacks on British troops and government infrastructure throughout the Nile Valley. A British parliamentary commission convened under Lord Milner acknowledged “unfortunate incidences” during the period of the war that “shook for a time” Egyptians’ “confidence in our justice and good will, and were pre-disposing causes of the savage outbreak of anti-British feeling in the spring of 1919.” However, the commission’s conclusion—in particular, the recognition that there were multiple contributing factors—was supplanted by an official national historiographical project sponsored by the Egyptian monarchy, which attributed the Egyptian Revolution of 1919 to the thwarting of nationalist aspirations by the British government ahead of the Versailles conference, and to a widespread rally of patriotic support in support of independence from Britain.⁶

Over the past several decades, Egyptian and foreign historians have questioned this narrative, noting that the peasantry—normally (if simplistically) considered an apolitical demographic—widely participated in the uprising. While agents representing national political movements did
organize in rural areas, peasants frequently attacked rail and telegraph lines, and a number of independent or autonomous rural collectives were declared during the uprising. As Kyle J. Anderson has pointed out, this behavior suggests more of a desire to sever ties with the nation rather than to reify it. The peasantry was largely illiterate and left few written records of their own, leaving Egyptian and colonial government archival records, the (censored) wartime press, and accounts written by urban political elites as the primary sources through which a history from below must be constructed. Projects have so far examined organized labor, guilds, and the urban poor, but the rural peasantry has only begun to emerge with the environmental-medical turn in scholarship.

In 1992, Ellis Goldberg suggested that peasant participation in the uprising could be partially attributed to the food scarcity that occurred in 1918 and the fear that hunger would continue in 1919. While witnesses to the Milner Commission acknowledged food scarcity as a source of discontent among the peasantry, Goldberg’s remains the only scholarly study to examine it. In this chapter, I argue that the situation was more dire than Goldberg described. Food supply issues began within the first few months of the war, and peasant families were unable to afford enough food to subsist by the winter of 1916—two years earlier than originally proposed. As noted above, while the stampede at Rod-el-Farag was the only food riot to involve fatality, it was not an isolated incident; there was considerable anxiety over food security in the summer and fall of 1918. When political organizers ventured into rural areas the following spring, they almost certainly had their work cut out for them as they found the peasantry simmering with anger over five years of inflation, food scarcity, and hunger.

The “Primary Needs” Tariff

Egypt, nominally an Ottoman province, had been under the control of British advisors since 1882 to ensure its financial solvency. It became a British protectorate in December of 1914, after the Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of the Central Powers. The Anglo-Egyptian government implemented a tariff regime on “primary need commodities,” intended to prevent profiteering and guarantee supplies by fixing an official price for which goods had to be sold in the market. The tariff system was ineffective for three reasons. First, the government did not develop mechanisms to ensure the distribution and availability of the
goods on the tariff list throughout Egypt; they relied instead on existing local organizations to carry out the work. When fluctuations in price occurred, these local organizations tended to sell to the markets that earned them the most profit.\textsuperscript{10} Second, prices on the official lists did not take into account the cost of raw materials, even if those materials were also tariffed. Profiteering was widespread, but vendors found to be selling at elevated prices were fined so lightly that prosecution did not serve as a deterrent.\textsuperscript{11} Third, commodities whose costs were unresponsive to price controls—as was the case with wheat and bread from the beginning, and with meat and sugar from mid-1916—were usually removed from the tariff list and their prices allowed to float, exacerbating market volatility. While the tariff system reflects E. P. Thompson’s laissez-faire model of the moral economy, the situation was not, in fact, laissez-faire: colonial records make clear that the government’s primary concern was provisioning the hundreds of thousands of Imperial and Dominion troops that began arriving in Egypt in December of 1914, with civilian needs considered a far lesser priority.\textsuperscript{12}

While demand for agricultural products remained steady, agricultural production dropped an average of 2.8 percent each year between 1914 and 1918. This decline is attributable to the collection of both human and animal labor for the Egyptian Labor Corps (ELC), the suspension of outside investment in agricultural projects and the halting of projects in progress, and the near cessation of Mediterranean trade due to the German U-boat campaign. ELC recruitment began in 1915 with fairly modest numbers but was ramped up in the spring of 1917 for the beginning of the Palestine campaign; an estimated 325,000 Egyptians worked in military service between March of 1917 and June of 1918.\textsuperscript{13} The majority of recruits came from the agricultural sector, but “men were taken wholesale without any regard as to whether they were more use at home or not. Labour from poorly inhabited districts was taken where it could not be spared.”\textsuperscript{14} The ELC’s consistent year-round wages proved attractive for laborers, especially those from middle and upper Egypt where agricultural work was more seasonal. While agricultural labor wages held somewhat steady during the war, the minimum ELC wage was raised 25 percent in 1917 and most recruits earned more than the minimum based on their skill and where they were stationed. Private and industrial landowners throughout Egypt complained that workers were leaving in the middle of the agricultural season to join the ELC.\textsuperscript{15} In 1917, the government acknowledged that civilian wages had not risen in line with
inflation and that “the rise of wages has so far not been sufficient to enable the [peasant] to live and clothe himself and his family, as he was able to do before the war.”

Agricultural products and food were transported longer distances by railroad, however, beasts of burden—camels, donkeys, mules, and horses—were necessary for the critical stage of transportation from the farm to the local market and thence to the train station. The military began requisitioning pack animals from villages to move supplies and troops; the number of camels in rural Egypt dropped by 15 percent between 1914 and 1916. The requisitioning of rail stock, watercraft, and the restriction of civilian navigation on the Nile further increased the cost of transporting food to market. The increase in demand coupled with the decrease in available labor and imports led to inflation, which at first rose gradually but then began to increase exponentially at the end of 1916. The retail index based on the average price of a basket of commodities more than doubled over the cost of the war; most foodstuffs doubled or tripled in price. Further, the official indices obscure the fact that many commodities could not actually be purchased at the officially tariffed price.

The majority of the Egyptian population were peasants employed in agriculture, of whom at least one-third owned no land; the majority of landowning peasants held less than five faddans (roughly five acres). Such small plots were insufficient to shield their owners from inflation and food scarcity; British officials calculated that peasants who worked three or less could not produce enough food or income to support a family, and had to either rent more land or send part of their family to work on a large estate in order to make ends meet. Most small landowners were indebted to private lenders specializing in high-interest short-term loans used to purchase seed, which were repaid with the sale of the seasonal harvest. Any personal subsistence farming would have to come at the expense of raising more lucrative cash crops. This was encouraged by the Ministry of Agriculture, for whom cotton production was the basis of Egypt’s financial solvency. The debt situation was amplified in the spring of 1915 when the seasonal cotton sale was delayed while buyers waited for coin to be shipped out from England. The Ministry of Finance decided to deal with its own cash shortage by proceeding with the annual tax collection, despite the fact that most peasants usually paid their taxes with cotton revenues. Most peasants had to take out a second seasonal loan to pay their taxes in 1915, which erased most of their income.
for both that year and the next. The press lamented that “a few months ago [the peasant] was one of the most contented souls in the land, but to-day he is a man with a grievance.”

Food Security

In the early years of the war, most complaints about food prices were lodged by vendors who felt that they were being deprived of profits as a result of the tariffs. In June of 1915, there were complaints that the price of bread was rising, even though the cost of flour was falling. Concerns were also raised about the availability of fruit, normally imported from Syria (now in enemy territory), and, indeed, by the spring of 1916, some fruits were selling for more than twice the average daily wages of an agricultural worker. In mid-September of 1916, the Anglo-Cypriot government banned the exportation of livestock, cutting off the supply of mutton to Egypt. Supplies of cattle and sheep were available in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, but transport problems and required quarantine inspections posed problems, especially after the appearance of foot-and-mouth disease in 1916. In October, the official tariff on meat was raised by 20 percent. This increase was unpopular with wholesalers and butchers; in late October a number of Alexandria butchers went on strike, complaining that wholesale prices (which were unregulated) were so high that they could not earn a profit selling meat at the official tariff price. In a lengthy editorial to the Egyptian Gazette, an anonymous “major meat supplier” asserted that “talk of a meat famine is nonsense.” The writer dismissed the idea of “hardship to the [peasant],” stating that “meat is certainly not his staple food.” However, a thriving black market in proteins developed in the major cities during the war. Meat from overworked or diseased animals that had already died was sold into the black market from military bases or slaughterhouses. In the fall of 1918, the legal sale of horsemeat was authorized in Alexandria as a stopgap measure to address the high cost of meat.

Supplies of cooking oil were constantly short throughout the war. Most Egyptians used cotton seed oil, which was produced in plentiful quantities locally, for cooking. In the spring of 1918, with the U-Boat campaign in the Atlantic and a boll weevil infestation in the Carolinas having an adverse effect on English oil supplies, the British government requisitioned the entirety of Egypt’s cotton seed production. When the British High Commissioner in Egypt protested on the grounds that the
oil was needed for civilian use—one of few such instances during the war—the Foreign Office relented “on the understanding that arrangement may be cancelled at any time and that cotton seed so delivered to local crushers shall consist as far as possible of lower grades of quality.”

Despite this, cotton seed oil became scarce and prohibitively expensive by late spring 1918: “It must be understood . . . that people are unable to purchase the oil tariffed as above even at double the prices.” Industries that also depended on the cotton seed production were heavily impacted. The price of soap suffered the most, with prices increasing more than 300 percent between 1914 and 1918.

Most concerning was volatility of the cost of wheat, which constituted the main staple of the Egyptian diet; the average Egyptian consumed over 80 percent of their daily calories in the form of bread. With the Anglo-Egyptian government’s focus on profit, locally grown wheat was exported for sale, while cheaper and lower quality wheat was imported for domestic consumption, usually from India. With the onset of the war, imports plummeted, but a record amount of wheat was exported from Egypt in 1915. After objections were raised, the export of wheat was prohibited, but wheat defied attempts at price control. It was included in the initial tariff system introduced at the onset of the war, then removed in early 1915 following complaints that prices were too high. It was then added again in early November of 1916 amid a four-day strike by Cairo’s bakers, who complained that they were losing money on the sale of bread. When Cairo’s municipal commission acquiesced to the bakers’ demands, bakers in Bani Suwayf and Alexandria also threatened to strike, resulting in the tariff being canceled yet again.

The Supply Control Board

By early 1918, it had become clear that more centralized oversight was needed to overcome the labor, transportation, and distribution issues that were believed to be causing inflation and scarcity in the food market. The government established the Supplies Control Board (SCB) to assume control over the tariff list, to oversee the collection of crops by the Ministry of Interior, and to run district markets in order to guarantee the availability of commodities at the official price. The SCB stumbled right out of the gate. When proposing amounts to be requisitioned from each governorate and district for the spring 1918 harvest, calculations were made based on the expected productivity of each area based on the previous year’s
production but were not revised based on actual production. The governor of Cairo, Mahmoud Sidqi, explained the complications this caused:

Specified amounts were collected . . . and in many cases a village was ordered to produce a larger quantity than it possessed, with the result that the inhabitants had to make up the deficit by purchasing at a higher price than what they were paid by the Army, thus incurring great loss.42

Profiteering remained widespread. George Reisner testified to the Milner Commission that market prices were higher than the requisition prices, so village overseers (‘umdas) were anxious to collect as much grain as possible in order to resell the excess for their own benefit.43 In parts of upper Egypt, some planters refused to sell grain at the tariff rate on the grounds that they were losing money, resulting in a standoff with government officials, who eventually seized the crop by force.44

The failure of the SCB’s first harvest season had more devastating effects when, for the first time during the war, the supply of wheat to Egypt’s major cities faltered in mid-1918. Cities were entirely dependent on wheat imports from outside; until the SCB was established, these markets had fetched the highest prices (usually in contravention of the tariff), but with the new oversight system in place, vendors looked for buyers who were willing to pay higher prices. Despite constant reassurances from the SCB that there was an ample supply of wheat, reports of shortages and price gouging were often published adjacent to the SCB’s statements. In September of 1918, a “bread famine” was reported in Alexandria; Al-Ahram newspaper reported that the city had received less than a quarter of the flour needed to meet the its consumption needs.45 Al-Ahaly reported that the wheat market in Behera governorate—which supplied Alexandria’s eastern suburbs—was also empty.46 The SCB blamed profiteers for the supply shortage; the press observed that wheat was being diverted to Alexandrine bakers who “are in a position to pay special prices,” while poor, and even middle class, neighborhoods did not get enough flour to meet demand.47 One paper reported that “Alexandria, as regards its bread, is now living from hand to mouth.”48

In early October, the supply of grain to other major cities, including Cairo and Suez, also became unreliable.49 SCB Director Ross Teller shuttled back and forth between Alexandria and Cairo to try to manage the crisis; in both cities, the local cereal merchants’ associations passed resolutions (in Teller’s presence) to expel any member from their ranks
who was found to be profiteering. On October 8, 1918, the SCB took full control of distribution in Alexandria, requiring that all grain be imported to and distributed from the Mina al-Basal market; violators were threatened with severe punishment. On October 17, the Qalyubiya district (in the Nile delta) followed suit, making it a felony to export grain from the governorate without permission, and threatening violators with a military trial. In Cairo, where local markets were still under the control of the Cereal Merchants’ Association, bakers tried to deal with the crisis by producing smaller loaves of bread in order to serve more customers. The SCB directed the Giza district to supply Cairo with additional wheat; Giza replied that it had been without wheat for days, and was itself unable to purchase additional wheat from neighboring Bani Suwayf. The SCB announced a centralized distribution system for Cairo, modeled on that of Alexandria, to take effect on October 28; in a twist of tragic irony, the notice was published the same day that the fatal stampede took place at Rod-el-Farag. Public reaction toward the SCB and the market’s owner (who was never charged over the incident) was furious. Even after the tragedy, the Cairo press reported in early November that grain supplies had not been delivered “for the past several days,” and two more governorates in the Nile delta completely ran out of wheat.

In late October, an apparent slowdown by bakers frustrated over the strict enforcement of the tariff and the resultant slim profit margin abruptly brought the bread crisis back to Alexandria, although the city had ample grain. For several weeks, bakeries were “besieged by large numbers of men, women, and children, for the most part natives, and in front of every bakery there were disturbances owing to the rush of the people to get served.” Some bakers began selling unprocessed flour to allow customers to make their own loaves at home, resulting in long lines at communal ovens. The supply crisis did not ease until the end of the year, by which point public confidence in the SCB had mostly evaporated. If the end of the war had brought expectations that the situation would start to improve as imports resumed from abroad and business returned to prewar norms, these were dashed as prices continued to climb throughout the winter and into the spring of 1919, with no relief in sight.

The Hungry Peasant

Dr. W. H. Wilson from the Egyptian School of Medicine presented a memo to the Milner Commission in 1919 that described the challenges
of the cost of living in wartime Egypt. Wilson had set out to investigate the question of whether "a man in regular employment at the ordinary rate of wages" would be able to "provide sufficient food for himself and a small family, taking as the basis of the necessary expenditure on food the official retail prices of foodstuffs" as of May 1, 1918—the date the SCB tariffs became effective. Wilson determined the maximum amount that a hypothetical man who supported a family of four making a slightly-higher-than-average wage could afford to pay for enough wheat and durum (semolina) to provide his family with adequate nutrition. The SCB's initial tariff set the cost of wheat 80 percent higher than Wilson's threshold, and the cost of durum 73 percent higher. At the height of the wheat crisis in the summer of 1918, vendors were selling wheat for 121 percent above Wilson's threshold and durum for 96 percent above, both in contravention of the tariff. The price of wheat and durum increased another 30 percent between April of 1918 and May of 1919. However, price data from the government statistics reveals that the officially tariffed prices had been unaffordable for most Egyptians for two years. In November of 1916, wheat prices were already five percent above Wilson's threshold; in December of 1917, the price was 162 percent higher. While Wilson considered the SCB's tariff controls a direct cause of the 1919 uprising, it is clear that neither of the wartime price control systems guaranteed affordable commodities to the poorest Egyptians, as they were theoretically designed to do.

Wilson further suggested a link between malnourishment and the high incidence of infectious diseases during the last year of the war, noting that

underfeeding lowers the resistance to disease in as admitted fact, and in it may possibly be found an explanation for the very high mortality from influenza during the past year (1918–1919) and for the excessive death-rate in Cairo and Alexandria, where . . . the deaths in many weeks of 1918 and 1919 considerably exceeded the births in number.

During the war, reported cases of most epidemic diseases in Egypt increased substantially over pre- and postwar levels, and at exponentially higher rates than combat-related deaths. The Spanish influenza pandemic alone killed over one percent of the population of Egypt between October and December of 1918, when food supplies were at their scarcest and most expensive.
Rebellion

In early March of 1919, when demonstrations in Alexandria began over the arrest and exile of three nationalist leaders who had demanded Egypt’s right to represent itself at Versailles, a spark was lit. Years of frustration exploded in the fields and streets of nearly every settlement in the Nile valley, directed squarely at the Anglo-Egyptian government. As the uprising began in March of 1919, Zifta, a small agricultural village in the delta, declared its independence from the rest of Egypt; it was one of the districts that had run out of wheat in the fall of 1918. Zifta’s independence lasted barely two weeks and was forcibly ended by Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) troops. It and other areas that declared autonomy are usually treated as historical anomalies. However, these rebellions, along with peasants who attacked rail and telegraph lines throughout Egypt, can be seen as an attempt to sever the tentacles through which the state was able to actively intervene into their lives.

It took the appointment of Field Marshall Edmund Allenby as Special High Commissioner and the abolition of martial law in early May to bring the violence of this period to an end. In December 1919, a parliamentary commission under Lord Milner was appointed to find the causes of the uprising. Commission member Sir Owen Thomas observed that

> the chief cause of the recent trouble in Egypt is an economic one . . . the ground was prepared therefore for the political agitator in the towns by the scarcity and dearness of food . . . the price of food to a townsman who is dependent upon a wage which has not increased in proportion to the cost of living is sufficient cause for rebellion in most countries.

In the Anglo-Egyptian government’s parliamentary report for 1920, Sir Paul Harvey, the financial advisor, admitted that the wartime price control systems had done “rather more harm than good” but, like Thomas, insisted that the peasantry were an apolitical class led astray by agitators using economic instability as a rallying cry. Likewise, in his memorandum to the commission, Judge J. F. Kershaw partially laid blame on the peasants themselves:

> I need not enter here into the causes of discontent of the fellaheen . . . They are temporary and directly caused by the War. The Army had to be fed and supplied. The fellah, having no national feeling, was not willing to make sacrifices for national defense.
A number of witnesses identified the failure of the Anglo-Egyptian government to adequately provide for the civilian population during the war as one of the chief causes of the 1919 uprising; most, however, continued to blame intermediaries or agitators. R. S. Patterson observed that the method of food collection “was to requisition five times as much as the army required, and to sell back the surplus at enhanced prices to the original vendors,” although he attributed this to “to the country having been denuded for military purposes of its English inspecting staff, [so that] the collection of cereals had to be left in the hands of native officials, with the result that corruption was rife and large fortunes were illicitly acquired.”

Mahmoud Sidqi, the governor of Cairo, theorized that

Had British control been stricter, a potent cause of the unrest among the fellaheen could have been removed. . . . Similarly, in 1918 . . . in connection with the shortage of wheat, which threatened to cause of famine in the cities . . . if the Egyptian officials had secured the Army requirements from the rich cultivators instead of the poor (or had followed any other just system of collection) the fellaheen would not have been tempted to show their discontent.

Sidqi suggested that the government subsidize the purchase of supplies for large landowners, to be paid for with an incremental tax: “Such a measure would ease the burdens of the fellaheen. The result of this will be that the Egyptians will become contented.”

This is, in fact, how the crisis ended in 1920. When the SCB began to guarantee wheat prices by using government subsidies, rather than relying on artificial price controls, inflation fell sharply, with prices finally returning to prewar levels the following year. The memories of wartime suffering endured, with politicians airing grievances over Anglo-Egyptian neglect of public health and welfare well into the 1920s, but were dampened as memories faded and the official history was incorporated into the national educational curriculum beginning in the 1930s. Examining the politics around food and its environmental-medical effects allows us to understand the wartime experience of the poorest Egyptians and allows historians to gain a more complex understanding of early twentieth-century Egyptian history.
NOTES


4. The peasantry is often referred to interchangeably as *fellāhin* (“tillers”). Since the latter is technically an occupational title, I use “peasant” to clarify that I am referring to members of the lowest socioeconomic class, regardless of their employment.


16. Henry Haines, “Note to Wingate,” September 23, 1918, FO 141/667/5, TNA.


22. Owen Thomas, “Agriculture,” December 13, 1919, 2, FO 848/5, TNA.


31. “Egypt’s Food. Horse-Flesh at Alexandria.”


33. Gen. Reginald Wingate, “Note to Foreign Office,” March 9, 1918, FO 368/1899 /41268, TNA.

34. Oil Consumer, “Egypt’s Food. The Oil Crisis,” Egyptian Gazette, July 19, 1918, 6.

36. W.H. Wilson, “Cost of Living to the Poorer Classes in Egypt. Memorandum,” April 19, 1918, 8, FO 848/4, TNA.
42. Sidqi Pasha, “Memorandum to Milner Commission,” n.d., 2, FO 848/4, TNA.
45. “Akhbār Al-Iskandariyya,” Al-Ahrām, September 26, 1918.
48. The expression “from hand to mouth” appeared both in Arabic and English, in “Akhbār Al-Iskandariyya,” Al-Ahrām, October 2, 1918; and “Egypt’s Food. Alexandria Bread Crisis,” Egyptian Gazette, October 2, 1918.
50. “Niqābat Tujjār Al-Ghilāl,” Al-Ahrām, October 14, 1918.
51. “Al-Ḥabūb Fi al-Iskandariyya,” Al-Ahrām, October 8, 1918.
52. “Al-Mudīrūn Wa al-Tamwīn,” Al-Ahrām, October 18, 1918.
55. Maktab Tawzi’a Al-Ghilāl,” Al-Ahrām, October 25, 1918.
60. Wilson, “Cost of Living.”
62. Wilson, “Cost of Living,” 15, table VII.
63. Wilson, “Cost of Living,” 12, tables I and II.
64. Wilson, “Cost of Living,” 11.

FOOD, HUNGER, AND REBELLION 175
66. Rose, “Implications of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic (1918–1920) for the History of Early 20th Century Egypt.”
70. Thomas, “Agriculture,” 2.
72. J. F. Kershaw, “Note on the Unrest,” June 17, 1919, 2–3, FO 848/4, TNA.
73. R. S. Patterson, “Memorandum on the Grievances of the Egyptians,” August 1919, 1, FO 848/4, TNA.
76. Gallagher, Egypt’s Other Wars, 19.