The Impacts of Marginalization on American Muslim Radicalization to the Islamic State

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In the summer of 2014, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant [ISIL], also known in the Islamic culture as Daesh and in western media as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria [ISIS], launched their military incursion on northern Iraq with the hashtag #AllEyesOnISIS (Singer & Brooking, 2015). With this tweet, they began the path that would set their extremist organization apart from previous groups such as Al Qaeda or Hamas who had only dipped their toes into what could be the power of social media in terms of radicalization (Singer & Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, 2018, p. 5). Their stated goal was the restoration of the Islamic Caliphate system, essentially a single governing body over the whole of the Muslim world, that lasted in various forms from 632 AD to 1924 AD (Jabour, 2020).

Over the next several years, while running a campaign of terror and war across Iraq and Syria, ISIL revolutionized radicalization in a way that could not have previously been imagined or researched. While radicalization has been studied in depth since 9/11, the fear and awe at the widespread implications of ISIL’s social media success generated a wave of new studies looking at the online radicalization process to identify what makes seemingly average people susceptible to this process. This review will examine literature studying what, if any, impact marginalization has on an individual’s susceptibility to online radicalization.

**Terminology**

To dissect this topic, it is imperative to first start with common terminology. Terrorism, and its affiliated vocabulary, have broad and sometimes extremely different definitions. While there is the concept that one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter, even within those agreeing on who the terrorists are, not everyone defines terrorism the same way. For this reason, this review will utilize the definition as set out in the United States legal code:
International terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups who are inspired by, or associated with, designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored). Domestic terrorism: Violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature (18 USC Ch. 113B: TERRORISM, 2020).

A key takeaway from this definition is that terrorism is not unique to any specific belief system, whether religion, political ideology, or otherwise. While this review examines the specific impact of marginalization on Muslims in western nations and primarily the United States, it is important to keep in mind that any number of belief systems could lead to terrorist ideology if taken to extremes.

While defining terrorism is relatively straightforward, from a legal perspective, radicalization is significantly more difficult. As Rahimi and Graumans (2016) outlined in their article, there are a wide variety of definitions of radicalization including: “socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism” (Alonso, et al., 2008); “the strategic use of physical force to influence several audiences” (Della Porta & LaFree, 2012); and “what goes on before the bomb goes off” (Neumann, 2008). From the perspective of one set of researchers on this topic, “the only thing that radicalization experts agree on is that radicalization is a process” (Agostino, Caluya, Garnham, & Nasser-Eddine, 2008). This review will combine parts of the above definitions to classify radicalization as follows: the process by which an individual is socialized toward extremist ideology resulting in providing material or ideological support to a legally defined terrorist organization.
Compared to radicalization, defining marginalization is much simpler, though the definition can appear complicated. According to the Oxford Dictionary, marginalization is the “treatment of a person, group, or concept as insignificant or peripheral” (Oxford Dictionary, 2020). This straightforward definition, when applied to our topic is simply the treatment of American Muslims as insignificant or peripheral within American society. The definition appears more complex when using the American Psychological Association’s (2020) definition which is “a reciprocal process through which an individual or group with distinctive qualities, such as idiosyncratic values or customs, becomes identified as one that is not accepted fully into the larger group” but the concept remains the same.

The final key definition is Islamic Extremism. A common factor that leads to marginalization in western nations is the idea that extremism and/or terrorism is a key component of Islam and therefore extremism and Islam are somehow intrinsically linked. This concept is wholly untrue and detrimental to those who subscribe to this religion, potentially leading to increased feelings of marginalization. Like radicalization and marginalization, Islamic Extremism is its own unique and niche concept and both words in this term have meaning. Breaking it down into its parts, extremism is “the holding of extreme political or religious views or fanaticism” (Oxford Dictionary, 2020) and Islamic extremism is, therefore, the holding of extreme or fanatic Islamic views. In other words, simply holding regular Islamic views and beliefs could not be compared to being fanatic any more than any other general religious or political belief. Prinsloo’s (2018) article on the etymology of the term better defines Islamic Extremists as “those reactionary actors who seek immediate and major political change within the Status Quo through illegal and violent means”. Regardless of the definition used, extremism is the key term with Islamic acting only as a modifier explaining the type of extremism.
Examining Marginalization

Using the above definition, are American Muslims marginalized and, if so, how? A 2007 poll in the United States found that “four in 10 Americans have an unfavorable view of Islam, five in 10 believe Islam is more likely than other religions to encourage violence, and six in 10 believe Islam is very different from their own religion” (Read, 2008). The same poll found that “Americans rank Muslims second only to atheists as a group that doesn’t share their vision of American society” (Read, 2008). While there are thousands of articles, books, and videos outlining this same mentality, this single study sums it up well. Americans, for the most part, see their Muslim citizens as different from their concept of a “normal American.”

How do some Americans react to this difference? Between 2001 and 2011, the United States Department of Justice (2011) “investigated more than 800 incidents involving violence, threats, vandalism, and arson against persons perceived to be Muslim or to be of Arab, Middle Eastern, or South-Asian origin”. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (2020) provides even more recent information with 1,164 hate crimes committed against Muslims between 2014 and 2019 and an additional 506 incidents against mosques during the same period. While Islamophobia is not unique to the United States and is commonly recorded through much of Europe as well (Open Society Foundations, 2019), in a country that professes to be a welcoming melting-pot of cultures where immigrants come to gain freedom from oppression, these actions particularly stand out.

It is only natural that in response to the reaction of certain prejudiced persons, there would be an emotional response on the part of the Muslim citizenry. A Pew Research Center (2017) survey of American Muslims showed that 75% of surveyed Muslim citizens felt there was “a lot of discrimination” against them and 68% felt that the sitting U.S. President made them
feel, whether through word or deed, worried about their place in American society. Even more concerning is that of those polled, 94% said they feel being Muslim in America has either not gotten easier or has become more difficult over the last several years. Studies have linked these feelings of marginalization with depression, anxiety, subclinical paranoia, and alcohol use. Also, while there is limited data on the community prevalence of psychiatric disorders among Muslim Americans, of those that seek treatment 43% present with adjustment disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2018). When combining the above statistics, it suggests a likelihood that marginalization contributes to mental health concerns in Muslim Americans.

**Alternative Argument Against Radicalization**

For objectivity, before delving into the impact of marginalization on radicalization, it is important to note that organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU] believe that radicalization does not even exist in the first place, and therefore nothing can contribute to it (American Civil Liberties Union, 2020). The ACLU believes the lack of a singular definition makes the topic implausible and unscientific and argues that the concept lends to racist ideology against Muslim communities. To back their argument, they cite a Brennan Center for Justice article discussing the need to reevaluate the process of radicalization; however, it is important to note their cited article does not state or even imply radicalization is non-existent (Patel, 2011). While the ACLU does have a point about the complicated definition making the concept difficult to study, any argument that radicalization does not exist would be hard to prove, as that assumption would by default require a belief that people are naturally inclined to conduct terrorist-type activities rather than being shifted into that mindset over time. As to the racial implications assumed in radicalization, the same process outlined for radicalization to the Islamic extremism ideology is used for most other radicalization as well, such as that used to radicalize
Caucasians into a right-wing extremist ideology (Koehler, 2014). This commonality between Islamic Extremist and Right-Wing Extremism, two groups who seem opposites, will be a recurring theme throughout this review.

**Examining Radicalization**

When researching this topic, it became extraordinarily clear that this is a highly researched and discussed topic with over 900 published scholarly documents in the last 30 years (University of North Dakota, 2020). The overwhelming majority of these publications have occurred in the past 19 years following the events of 9/11 with another large bump in 2014 following the global fear driven by ISIL.

The reason behind this increase is not hard to deduce given the shock and awe campaign ISIL initiated with a horrific wave of violence that had not been seen on that scale since the revelations of human experimentation and genocide following World War II. Throughout what ISIL declared as their caliphate, they conducted systematic and widespread killings, sexual violence and sexual slavery, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment, forced conversions and forced displacement (United Nations, 2016) – all in front of the world, put on display by social media. At the same time ISIL conducted these horrific acts, they also launched a massive online recruiting campaign aimed at radicalizing recruits across the globe (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Naturally, scholars sought to understand what type of person would sign up for this type of organization.

**Who Is Radicalizing (Males)?**

The next step in identifying a causal relationship in radicalization is to identify the types of individuals who are radicalizing. In 2015, following the initial ISIL campaigns in Iraq and Syria, three key studies (Berger & Morgan, 2015; Long, 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015) used
social media to examine who is joining ISIL. These studies primarily looked at individuals joining ISIL as either fighters or “lone-wolves”, even though ISIL also recruited individuals to provide support, including recruiting women who would serve as wives to their fighters. The results were surprising. Instead of a devoutly religious, less-educated individual, the average ISIL recruit is a middle- to upper-middle-class male in his 20s. He uses Android phones and is active on Twitter more than the average person but does not take “selfies”. He is more likely a second or third-generation immigrant living in a western nation and, unlike commonly assumed, is not devoutly religious before radicalization. While on average the ISIL recruit may not have experienced personal racism, he has at least observed it against his community and is angry about it. Also, he feels out of place in both his traditional and western cultures (Berger & Morgan, 2015; Long, 2015; Vidino & Hughes, 2015).

Who Is Radicalizing (Females)?

What about the women leaving western nations to join ISIL or providing support from within the United States? Do they align with the same demographics as their male counterparts? That answer is more complicated and requires examining both the women who join and the roles they play. Western female ISIL supporters’ average age range varies from 16-24 years old (Perešin, 2018), with the youngest potentially being only 12 years old (Daftari, 2016). Compared to their male counterparts, they’re more likely to be underage (Cook & Vale, 2018). They come from a broad spectrum of education, family background, social or financial status, and ethnic or political affiliation. Some are raised in Muslim households while others are converted during the radicalization process (Perešin, 2018). On social media, many of the women discuss a feeling that Muslims are under attack in the west and that they feel an overwhelming sense of discrimination (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015; Petrou, 2015). While some younger women
have been observed joining for the excitement (Nacos, 2015; Petrou, 2015), many truly believe they are moving from a place where they are unwelcome outsiders to an Islamic family where they belong and contribute. They believe in what they are doing and have been radicalized in the same way as the male counterparts, with the primary difference being the propaganda used to draw them (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015; Nacos, 2015; Peresin, 2015).

Approximately 550 western women have made the journey to join ISIL with an estimated 10-15% of foreign-recruited ISIL members being western females (Hoyle, Bradford, & Frenett, 2015; Perešin, 2018; Petrou, 2015). That percentage holds with the percent detained as well. As of July 2016, 13% of legal cases related to ISIL in the United States were female (Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 2016). These women are not allowed to fight directly in battle but they are essential to the ISIL cause. In addition to serving as morality police for other women, intelligence gatherers, and domestic workers, the women of ISIL provide an important publicity function. Women are a key demographic to ISIL because they, and their children, provide the basis for ISIL declaring itself a caliphate rather than just a terrorist group (Petrou, 2015).

**Why Are They Radicalizing?**

Now that we know who is joining ISIL to fight, we can examine the literature explaining why the average fighter joins ISIL rather than taking a more measured approach to activism. To over-simplify it, ISIL recruits feel marginalized in their home nations with little hope for the future or purpose in life, and ISIL provides that purpose (Jabbour, 2020). Dr. Nabeel Jabbour (2020) of Columbia University’s Zwemer Center for Muslim Studies provides a set of 10 reasons why people join ISIL that will serve as a baseline in examining this topic, though
several can be grouped into the rationalizations ISIL provides its recruits to justify their actions to themselves.

**ISIL Has Demonstrated Success**

While ISIL may appear to be a haphazardly assembled group of fighters, their military strategy is well thought out and has been successful in many instances where no one thought they would succeed. Over the course of their campaign, ISIL has, possibly inadvertently, followed the principles laid by the 19th-century Prussian military theorist Karl von Clausewitz: mass, objective, offensive, surprise, the economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security and simplicity (Hein, 2015). Even as of 2020, after spending 5 years fighting a coalition of 13 nations providing combat operations and 48 nations providing non-combat support, ISIL continues to hold ground in Iraq, Syria, and a few other nations (Combined Joint Task Force Operation Inherent Resolve, 2020). This continued success in the face of a massive overwhelming international effort to stop them provides a sense of staying power that continues to enable the recruitment of supporters (Jabbour, 2020).

**ISIL Has Fully Embraced Modern Social Media**

In 2014, before beginning their military offensive in Iraq and Syria, ISIL had between 46,000 and 70,000 active supporters on just the social media site Twitter (Berger & Morgan, 2015). Not only was ISIL pervasive on social media, but they also conducted a highly targeted social media recruitment campaign through a centralized and controlled message of “brutality, mercy, war, victimhood, belonging, and utopianism” (Farag, 2017, p. 852). Their social media machine not only produced tweets and posts but also high-quality videos that drew in their 20-something male targets in the same way as the video game Call of Duty, utilizing videos of intense and heroic-appearing military actions. In targeting their western recruits, ISIL focussed
their message on “how Muslims are unwelcome in the West, but they can defend their faith by joining the caliphate” (Farag, 2017, p. 860; Jabbour, 2020).

Not only did they centralize and organize their produced media, but ISIL also standardized their recruitment and radicalization with a five-part process that involved (1) discovering a potential recruit; (2) creating a new micro-community around the potential recruit; (3) isolating a potential recruit from his/her community; (4) shifting the conversation to private communications; and (5) identifying and encouraging action (Farag, 2017, p. 860). Throughout this entire process, the recruiters utilized social media tools that enabled continuous virtual contact without ever having to engage a recruit one-on-one in the physical world.

**ISIL Provides Belonging**

As previously identified, many American Muslims feel that they are discriminated against due to their religious beliefs and that there is little hope that their situation will improve soon (Pew Research Center, 2017). Dr. Jabbour (2020) believes the sense of marginalization in the west, combined with a lack of purpose in life due to a lack of hope for a better tomorrow, encourages young western Muslims to travel to Iraq and Syria where they will be “accepted as brothers and sisters who are warriors and heroes”. In his examination of ISIL’s “brand marketing”, Simons reinforces this notion by demonstrating that the sense of belonging and purpose is the key element throughout ISILs marketing and recruitment campaigns. He believes ISIL create(s) a relationship of fear and avoidance with their enemies or to create a relationship of attraction through a sense of belonging and purpose among their supporters and recruits. Emotions and intangible aspects are an important part of both sets of positive and negative relationships (Simons, 2018).
ISIL does more than just use lofty notions for this sense of hope and purpose, they create and mold a sense of community where these ideas seem real and tangible. In the words of one counter-terrorism analyst, they “share memes and inside jokes, terms, and phrases you’d only know if you were a follower” (Singer & Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, 2018, p. 170). The idea of a distinctive language is not unique to ISIL though. This is a common group-cohesion tool used by various extremist organizations, including more recently the Alt-Right movement in the United States, and even most of the world’s militaries. In their variation, the Alt-Right, who favor the social media platforms Reddit and 4chan, change their terminology frequently when those outside their group start picking up on the meaning (Anonymous, 2019) or when organizing specific events to emphasize to their followers whether to focus the propaganda of protests and demonstrations on Nazi propaganda such as “Swastikas and call(s) for the annihilation of Jews” or less offensive topics that make them appear more mainstream such as “freedom of speech and Southern heritage and addressed fears of immigration and the loss of cultural identity” (Ebner, 2019, p. 171). This unique language allows the members of these groups to feel a part of a closed community where their understanding of something others do not emphasizes the sense that they are a part of a community and lessens the internal feelings of marginalization.

**Talented And Compelling Recruiters**

Unlike organizations like Al Qaeda who use South-Asian raised, wealthy and powerful spokespersons such as Osama Bin Laden, ISIL’s recruiters and spokesmen are identifiable to young western recruits. One such recruiter, Anwar al-Awlaki was born in New Mexico of Yemeni parents and preached at a Mosque in Virginia. He was fluent in the American dialect of English from being raised in the United States and technically capable enough to understand how
to use technology to his advantage (Jabbour, 2020). As part of his modern approach to recruitment, al-Awlaki maintained a blog, a Facebook page, and posted numerous YouTube videos. Even before moving to ISIL, al-Awlaki maintained the al-Qaeda magazine Inspire, which at that time was also groundbreaking (Madhani, 2010).

ISIL takes it a step further though, beyond just using naturally identifiable recruiters. They train their recruiters much as a military or corporate entity would, through the use of a formal manual entitled “A Course in the Art of Recruiting” (Callimachi, 2015). These recruiters are taught to seek out marginalized individuals and mold them into the ideal recruit. Marginalization is so key to these recruiters that the individuals they approach do not even need to subscribe to Islamic ideologies, so long as the need for belonging is strong enough. In 2015, ISIL recruiters online were able to approach and radicalize a 23-year-old Christian Sunday school teacher from rural Washington State who felt alone and separated, both geographically but also due to effects of fetal alcohol syndrome on her mental development leading to repeated educational and professional failures (Callimachi, 2015; Singer & Brooking, LikeWar: The Weaponization of Social Media, 2018, p. 170). ISIL recruiters, fluent in English and Christianity and sprinkling in enough grammatical errors to make her feel comfortable, slowly guided her through a conversion from Christianity into Islam, and then into radicalization. In the words of one recruiter who left Islamic extremism to join the Canadian intelligence services, “we look for people who are isolated, and if they are not isolated already, then we isolated them” (Callimachi, 2015).

Additional Justifications Common in Radicalization

Dr. Jabbour (2020) provides a variety of other reasons why people join ISIL to include the United States’ support of Israel, the idea that the west is corrupt and immoral, the draw of
ISIL’s money and opportunities for violence, and historical Islamic dogma such as the Sunni/Shi’a split and the restoration of the Caliphate. Each of these are just components of ISIL’s marketing campaign that help recruits internalize and self-justify the motivation for why they are drawn to groups like this. Nearly the same rhetoric is seen in white nationalist dogma such as the United States’ support of Israel, the idea that other races are corrupt and immoral, and the restoration of white power (Koehler, 2014; Weinberg, 2011). These groups even use the same type of religious integration such as declarations that the first “Aryans/Whites were the descendants of Adam and Eve and are thus the descendants of the Biblical tribes of ancient Israel” – similar to the concept of the Islamic Caliphate – and that “Jews are the children of Cain, the product of Satan’s seduction of Eve” – similar to the Sunni/Shi’a divide (Blessing & Roberts, 2018). ISIL does not provide a unique justification, but they effectively co-opted a successful one for their uses.

**Alternative Argument Against Marginalization**

Graumans and Rahimi (2016) published a review of literature on this topic, challenging the standing assumption of the relationship between integration and radicalization. While using many of the same sources on the subject as other reviews and studies, they take a unique stance, arguing that there is a lack of quantifiable evidence linking marginalization and radicalization. They proposed that not only is the notion of failed integration’s association with radicalization a “distal factor” but it is also potentially dangerous because it can “lead to ineffective, or worse, counterproductive interventions that may damage inter-communal trust and push certain groups to their limits of resilience” (Graumans & Rahimi, 2016). Much of the basis for their argument rests on the notion that because not everyone who experiences marginalization moves into radicalization, or is radicalized to non-violent tactics, there is no solid link between
marginalization and radicalization. This seems reasonable until you compare the psychological impacts of marginalization to the impacts of severe trauma resulting in trauma disorders. For instance, while two Soldiers fighting together in a war can experience identical scenarios, they will not necessarily both leave the event with a trauma disorder. One likely cause for this is a predisposition, which is a thoroughly researched element in the pathology of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Admon, et al., 2009; Emery, Emery, Shama, Quiana, & Jassani, 1991; Yehuda & LeDoux, 2007) and may, with additional research, be a key factor in the pathology of radicalization as well. Considering this, it is a strong leap to argue that marginalization and radicalization are not connected based solely on the lack of constant causality. Graumans and Rahimi’s secondary argument for the lack of a link between radicalization and marginalization is rooted in the same ideology used by the ACLU when they argue against the notion of radicalization. They use the same contention that the lack of a single definition for radicalization, as well as that of integration, makes “existing research incomparable” (Rahimi & Graumans, 2016). As previously discussed regarding the issues of terminology and its implications, arguments against pathology based on terminology can be easily remediated through the comparison and consolidation of definitions. Finally, though published in 2016, Graumans and Rahimi never address ISIL and the distinctiveness of the radicalization already observed and documented in that organization at the time of their publication. When combined, the faults in their arguments and missing elements, raise questions regarding the validity of their alternative argument.

Another assessment that does not specifically conflict with the idea of marginalization, but rather inflates Muslims’ role in their marginalization, is Benmelech and Klor’s (2017) assessment that the best way to stop ISIL radicalization is to promote cultural assimilation.
amongst Muslims in western nations. Cultural assimilation, as explained by Banks in the Encyclopedia of Diversity in Education (2020), is:

the process by which an individual or group acquires the cultural characteristics of a different ethnic or cultural group. Because the dominant racial, cultural, ethnic, or religious group controls most of the social, economic, and political institutions within a society, members of ethnic minority groups must acquire its cultural characteristics in order to experience social class mobility and structural inclusion in society.

While similar to the concept of marginalization, Benmelech and Klor (2017) proposed that it is the Muslim failure to assimilate, rather than the marginalization of Muslims by external forces, that leads to radicalization. They argued that instead of the nation accepting the cultural differences of Muslims into their own rather than marginalizing them, the way to stop the impact of marginalization on Muslims is for Muslims to change their culture to fit that of the dominant group within the society. This has been a common historical argument used whenever a large group began a mass migration to the United States or became a significant percentage of the recognized population, to include the Irish (Klein, 2019), Chinese (Kim & Min, 2000), and even the Native American (Colwell & Montgomery, 2020). Each time the forced assimilation has resulted in abuses by those in power against the assimilating group and in some instances long term psychological and sociological impacts on their society as a whole, such as the large scale instances of substance dependence, affective disorder, conduct disorder and PTSD in the Native American community (Ehlers, Ellingson, Gilder, Gizer, & Yehuda, 2014).
Future Research

While there are hundreds of articles discussing this topic, little to no experimental research has been conducted using the actual individuals involved. Research on this topic would need to be conducted using the pool of individuals arrested and convicted of terrorist acts or support acts as the experimental group, with control groups coming from within, and potentially outside, the American Muslim community. While the exact number in this experimental group is difficult to pin down, as the last comprehensive legal studies are at least 4 years old, as of 2016 there were 101 individuals charged in federal court with supporting ISIL (Center on National Security at Fordham Law, 2016).

Impacts of Marginalization on American Muslims

To study the impact of marginalization, I would propose a series of in-depth interviews of the Americans convicted of providing material support to ISIL. The interviews would consist of a questionnaire similar to that used by John Douglas and Robert Ressler when conducting their initial serial killer interviews (Ressler & Shachtman, 1993). The questionnaire would cover the individual’s personal history including periods of religious participation, instances of marginalization – both personal and observed within their community, the initial trigger leading them to engage with ISIL, and the radicalization process. While these studies have likely been conducted by United States government intelligence and law enforcement personnel, the results have not been publicly disseminated and therefore are not part of academic knowledge. Through the examination of self-reported motivations, we could identify the key motivating factors precipitating radicalization.

Impact of Predisposition on Radicalization
Studies on the alternative theory of genetic or social predisposition to radical behavior would align with those conducted on violent and criminal behavior as the actions taken by those radicalized individuals who join groups like ISIL are both criminal actions, at least in most countries where they are committed, and exceedingly violent in many cases. Previous research has indicated that variations in the genes Monoamine oxidase A (MAO-A), dopamine transporter (DAT1), and the D2 dopamine receptor can lead to increased aggressiveness and violent behavior (Garcia-Arocena, 2015) which may increase the likelihood of an individual exposed to radical behavior to participate in said behavior. Also, the study could evaluate potential non-genetic triggers such as prenatal and postnatal nutrition, tobacco use during pregnancy, maternal depression, birth complications, traumatic brain injury, lead exposure, and child abuse as potential risk factors (Liu, 2012). Through researching both genetic and non-genetic triggers, the study could potentially identify the viability of this theory as either an alternative or cooperative pathology with the psychological impact of marginalization.

**Conclusion**

Additional research into this topic is needed before any definite conclusions can be made but there is evidence for the argument that there is a strong correlation between marginalization and radicalization. As it currently stands, while the world is seeing a down-turn in media coverage of ISIL, potentially due to the attention span of viewers on a single topic for an extended period, there are indications based on ongoing military activities that this will be a topic that can and should be studied for a long time to come. Only through understanding the point of view of the young western Muslim who is attracted to radical groups can we hope to prevent their radicalization continued support of this or future extremist groups.
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