MUNICIPAL DECONCENTRATION IN SPAIN: THE COMPARATIVE CASES OF MADRID AND BARCELONA

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ABSTRACT
The model of Local Governments of Spain has suffered from its own problems that have been kept away from the political debate and also from the scientific and academic one. The cities of Madrid and Barcelona have a special status through special laws, and due to their size and importance they have specific problems. Hence the importance of comparing the 2 cities in their infra-municipal organization and how their districts have been established for political representation, citizen participation and public policy. In order to study this phenomenon of administrative organization at the local level of Spain, the two models of deconcentration in their districts are compared and how they are organized according to legal regulation.

KEYWORDS
Local government, local governance, districts, citizen participation, participatory democracy

SUMMARY
1. Introduction. 2. The districts in the big cities. 3. Deconcentration in Madrid. 3.1 the reform of the territorial council of 2008. 4. Deconcentration in Barcelona. 5. Points of divergence and convergence. 6. Conclusions. 7. Bibliography

ABSTRACT
Spain's Local Government model has suffered from problems of its own that have been left out of the political debate and also from the scientific and academic ones. The Cities of Madrid and Barcelona have a special status through special laws, and due to their size and importance they have specific problems. Hence the importance of comparing the 2 cities in their infra-municipal organization and how their districts have been established for political representation, citizen participation and public policy. In order to study this phenomenon of administrative organization at the local level in Spain, the two models of deconcentration in their districts are compared and how these are organized according to legal regulations. With the comparison we can see how the latest reforms are only in terms of citizen participation,
KEYWORDS
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CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION

As I said in the scientific congresses in which I have participated with this line of research, the result of which this work is, when the current Spanish democratic system has exceeded forty years of operation, and is routinely put through the opinion published by one of its most representative bodies in question and in constant evaluation, the reform of our local government plant has been pending and forgotten, as one of the needs for administrative rationalization, which always remains in a drawer. Bringing local politics closer to citizens is a challenge in Spain, and it would serve to establish spaces for deliberative democracy, among other advantages, since, if this were to be the one that most interests citizens, and therefore the one with the most participation had, it has been possible to verify one of its indicators, electoral participation, which arouses less interest after successive electoral processes. Thus, we wonder how the models of citizen participation in the local policies of the two large Spanish cities are being managed, -which also enjoy a special regime-, and how their models are organized in the comparative analysis presented in this article. Local Governments and spaces for participation in large cities in Spain have been studied by different authors such as Vallés and Brugué, 2001, Montañés Serrano, 2013, Valero López, 2013, Pineda Nebot and Pires, 2014 and Martín Baeza, 2014 between others. However, The area of infra-municipal participation spaces and local deconcentration in favor of the districts of large cities in Spain is the area that leaves us with the most field of study with unknown areas that require the study of Administration Science, especially in the the case of Madrid and Barcelona, the two large cities in Spain due to their political, economic, and demographic magnitudes; and that they are the two main metropolitan regions in Spain, preserving their preponderant role in the city system, as recognized by Díaz Orueta et al. (2018). The two have deconcentrated that of political representation and administrative management with two differentiated models, after the municipal plant that emerged from the 1978 Constitution and the 1985 Law Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime.

The field of study of municipal deconcentration leaves us much space for research, in which we must insist on the need to differentiate between decentralization and deconcentration, to differentiate between Government Units with elected authorities, and government subunits with delegated authorities. among other topics as authors such as Martí Costa et al. (2018). Currently, large cities need a deconcentration model that is as effective as possible, to bring public policies closer to citizens, and the possibility of their direct intervention in those issues that affect them the most. In Spain there is no single model, and each large municipality has developed it independently with more or less success.
The fundamental methodology of this work is one of the most appropriate in Political Science and Administration, Comparative Politics or comparative methodology, bringing for this work two pertinent case studies due to their characteristics for comparison, such as Madrid and Barcelona, according to criteria such as those of Laiz and Román Marugán (2003). With this framework, an analysis is studied compared to the different features that make up each model: number of districts, configuration of political representation in them, number of district plenary sessions per year, number of residents per district, and types of organs. neighborhood participation, as the main characteristics.

2. DISTRICTS IN GREAT CITIES

The districts, territorial divisions endowed with decentralized management bodies, fulfill 3 fundamental functions: deconcentration of management, representation, and neighborhood participation, and are integrated into a framework in which "they acquire a new protagonism and revitalize their role not only as providers of public services, but also their political role as organizations for education, participation and political democracy" (Canales Aliende, 2011: 42). Understanding these as a tool to channel the needs of the new forms of urban governance, integrated into the respective unique legal personality of each city council as collected by Carrillo Barroso and Bañón i Martínez, (1997) and Brugué and Gomá, (1998). In addition to the fact that, in large municipalities, they should be the epicenter for administrative modernization, which "includes three connected but independent planes: organizational flexibility and streamlining of relations with citizens / clients; the redefinition of the territorial distribution of power both at the national level and in the European space; and adaptation to community guidelines and agreements" (Bañón i Martínez, 1993: 9). Epicenter that could be if in the set of each municipality, they handle a significant percentage of the total budget of the city council, this being one of the main objectives that will have to be raised so that they can be effective bodies. the redefinition of the territorial distribution of power both at the national level and in the European space; and adaptation to community guidelines and agreements” (Bañón i Martínez, 1993: 9). Epicenter that could be if in the set of each municipality, they handle a significant percentage of the total budget of the city council, this being one of the main objectives that will have to be raised so that they can be effective bodies. the redefinition of the territorial distribution of power both at the national level and in the European space; and adaptation to community guidelines and agreements” (Bañón i Martínez, 1993: 9). Epicenter that could be if in the set of each municipality, they handle a significant percentage of the total budget of the city council, this being one of the main objectives that will have to be raised so that they can be effective bodies. the redefinition of the territorial distribution of power both at the national level and in the European space; and adaptation to community guidelines and agreements” (Bañón i Martínez, 1993: 9). Epicenter that could be if in the set of each municipality, they handle a significant percentage of the total budget of the city council, this being one of the main objectives that will have to be raised so that they can be effective bodies.

The Regulatory Law of Bases of Local Regime, refers to the districts, within Title X of the Organization Regime of the municipalities with a large population (understood these for reasons of population, capital status and special reasons) in article 128, establishing in the point 1 that "city councils must create districts, as their own territorial divisions, equipped with decentralized management bodies, to promote and develop citizen participation in the management of municipal affairs and their improvement [...]". And while it indicates to us in its point 3 that "The presidency of the district will correspond in any case to a councilor", the powers that a district president must have remain for the respective Organic Regulations, Therefore, councilors could then be established as presidents of different political majorities in each district, without affecting the global governance of the city council, adequately regulating the respective competencies, this being the main political aspect of the district that has, in essence, two options: give the
district's political representation body a projection of the political representation that the
city council has, applying it in a homogeneous way to all districts; or on the contrary, give
each district the electoral representation that it has had in each one of them. give the
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city council has, applying it in a homogeneous way to all districts; or on the contrary, give
each district the electoral representation that it has had in each one of them.
3. DECONCENTRATION IN MADRID

The city of Madrid articulates its territorial deconcentration around 21 districts. The sources that affect its entire organization are, in addition to the Spanish Constitution itself, Law 7/1985 Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime, Law 22/2006 of Capital and Special Regime of Madrid (which in this case results in what is established in the LRBRL), three Organic Regulations: the OR of the Government and Administration of the Madrid City Council, the OR of the Districts of the City of Madrid, the OR of Citizen Participation of the Madrid City Council, the Operating Regulations of the Councils Territorial of the Districts, and finally by the Regulation of the Local Forums. Minimum legal regulation that in the opinion of Prieto Romero is “sufficient, since the municipal organization in districts,

For the convergence of the policies of the districts, the Madrid city council, in the Delegated Area of the Vice Mayor's Office, has the Territorial Coordination Area, directed by a councilor, under which is the General Directorate of Territorial Coordination, which deploys two General Secretariats Techniques: Territorial Coordination of Districts and Planning and Support, each of which is in charge of four management areas.

The districts exercise powers in local matters that have been delegated to them by the mayor and, according to the Organic Regulations (hereinafter RO) of the Districts of the City of Madrid, some such as: parks and landscaping, mobility, education, authorization of civil unions, culture, security, social services and others.

For the which each district has the following structure: the Municipal Board of the district, which articulates political representation through the vocals, both neighbors and councilors, with the district councilor-president at the head, appointed and dismissed by the mayor; the vice president of the municipal board, who replaces the incumbent councilor, the district coordinator (formerly manager), appointed by the Governing Board to promote political work, a figure that was reformed in 2016 and is now called coordinator in instead of manager without having had great significant changes in practice, under the orders of the councilor-president; the district secretary, who works by delegation from the city council secretary; the Board of Spokespersons, made up of spokespersons and deputy spokespersons for each political group with municipal representation who join the presidency; and the Security Board, chaired by the councilor-president constituted as a coordinating body in matters of security in the district in which the Commissioner of the National Police head of the National Police Station in the district and the Head of the Unit formally sit. of the Municipal Police in the district. These being the governing bodies, and as participation bodies in Madrid we find two (three if we study the already extinct Coexistence Tables): the District Territorial Council, in which the participation of the associations located in the district is articulated, that every four years they elect their associations by type so that those with the greatest support have a representative on the Council; and the Security Council; instrument of participation for citizens directly and through associations, projection of the Security Board, and which is a Council created by agreement with the Ministry of the Interior in 1997 in which they participate under the presidency of the councilor-president of the district, the Commissioner of the National Police of the Police Station located in the district, the Head of the Municipal Police Unit of the district, a representative of the Security Area of the City Council, the representatives of the political parties, and the neighborhood associations domiciled in the
district that request intervention in order to interpellate those responsible for the Security Forces in the policies and actions that they are carrying out and are going to carry out to improve the crime rates in the district.

The Territorial Councils, based in the Districts, were the star participation bodies during the mandates of the mayors Alberto Ruiz-Gallardón Jiménez and Ana María Botella Serrano (exhausting the last mandate of the latter), with capacities for information, consultations, and collection of proposals on municipal policy developments, allowing neighbors represented by their associations or directly to approach them. Its main goal was that the administration and citizens of the District converge in this space as a governance center with associations, neighbors and municipal authorities as the main actors of the same, in order to intervene in the actions of Districts and especially neighborhoods, to that the voice of the residents was not limited to express yourself once every four years.

In the twenty-one districts of the city, until the reform of 2016, one of these Councils existed under the Presidency of the District Councilor, and its elimination advanced that each side of the political representation has its own model of participation, so the study of the respective figures help us to better understand this problem. Its operation was included in the Citizen Participation Regulations.

In the twenty-one districts there was a Territorial Council until 2017 under the direction of the district councilor, and with ordinary convocation every three months. Its regulation was included in the City Council's Citizen Participation Regulations. All this is of current importance because the new reform planned for 2021 is based on this previous design with updates and modifications.

According contained in article 55 of the OR of Citizen Participation of the City of Madrid, the three origins or basic types of members of the Territorial District Council are: the neighboring members representing political groups (maximum 8), The neighbors chosen randomly through of the Electoral Census of the District (4), the representatives of citizen entities (maximum of 24). After this, it can be said that the Territorial Councils met regularly once every three months, but that they continue to function in the form of Permanent Commissions, and it will be these commissions that elevate their work to the plenary of the Council. The usual thing is that these commissions were chaired by a political member, that is, a neighboring vowel, well, for the present legislature in the District of Tetuán,

3.1 THE 2008 TERRITORIAL COUNCIL REFORM

After four years since its launch, and given the renewal of the elections of March 31, 2008, in the sector of representation of citizen entities, the Plenary of the City Council approved significant reforms to improve the model of citizen participation.

It was included in the reformed OR of Citizen Participation in its article 17 the following: “The Territorial Council may approve in each ordinary session the elevation to the Municipal District Board of a maximum of three proposals, which will be successively included in the agenda of this at the rate one per session, for which purpose the Territorial Council will establish the order of priority of the sessions ”. Which was decided between him or her
respective councilor and the vice president of the council at the time representing one of the district associations, this happening unevenly among the 21 of the city. There was also an effective restriction so that the matters in question were the pertinent competence of the respective District, or in a more flexible approach, that at least were the competence of the City Council, in order to leave regional policy issues for other spaces for debate. national or other areas.

Other articles are reformed in the OR of Citizen Participation, which mainly affect citizen entities, and significant is the reform of article 55, which increased the maximum number of members of the Territorial Council to 51 (previously the maximum was 40), giving new places representing children and adolescents and the Municipal Centers for the Elderly and expanding representatives of citizen entities according to the typology of their representation.

And it was also modified at the end of 2008 so that the OR for the Functioning of Territorial Councils was effective in practice after the elections mentioned before March 31. In the first place, to adapt its text to the reforms of the Participation OR, to make the Secretary of the Council be the Secretary of the District, to give an alternate to the Speaker of the Council, the forms of its convocation, reflecting in the amended text the use of new technologies for this, and the regulation of Board committees is modified with the limitation to four the maximum number of permanent committees.

In addition, the regulation established that the committees of the Territorial Council “will be made up of a president and, in addition, by a maximum of 12 members of the Council, who state that they want to belong to it and commit to participate in its work. The Chairman of the Committees will be the Chairman of the Board or a person delegated by him. At least half of the Presidencies will be delegated to members of the Council who do not belong to the municipal Political Groups “, the latter to give more importance to the representation of citizen entities, without receiving any remuneration for it.

The importance of the study of the Territorial Council lies in the fact that it was the model of the Popular Party in the city of Madrid, inclined towards the center right, and as we said, it is the basis for the model that is currently being drawn up, since the change of political color in The Madrid City Council for the 2015-2019 mandate launched new mechanisms for deliberative democracy and participatory budgeting. The so-called “Local Forums” were established in each District with a perspective of self-management and with great influence from the associations based in each District. The areas in which they could work were not delimited and what was requested for their constitution is that they have a minimum of 5 members in relation to the District. They had the support of a Facilitator. What's more, The “Madrid Decide” Platform was set up with which a small part of the public budget was reserved for the development of initiatives proposed by citizens. Through the platform, a series of phases such as launching of proposals, feasibility study, gathering of support, voting and final results were announced. In the launching of proposals, they were collected asking that they have special incidence for the local scenario, so this was the limit (they could not propose matters of the regional, national or supranational governments); The feasibility study looked at all those that, for example, overlapped with other proposals, with projects already underway, or that were impossible to carry out in addition to those that were copied from other cities or districts and whose need or impact would be very different; in the collection of support, all the proposals that passed the filter were posted on the web page so that the registered users of the District could support them or not; and in the voting phase the most important ones were voted so that they could be put into operation or
vote between alternative projects for example the reform of a public space such as a square. For all this, a last reform of the OR of Citizen Participation was approved with a partial modification, approved by the Plenary of the Madrid City Council on April 24, 2018 after going through the phases of public consultation and approval in the Governing Board of the Town.

With the new political color change with a local coalition government since 2019, a new model of incentive participation is expected in which those known as local promoters will disappear and will be replaced by participation technicians, all with the base of the Territorial Council studied here. It is planned for the beginning of 2021 (depending on the evolution of the pandemic since the Regulation requires that it be done in person) to set up the new local participation tables, which will be called from now on on proximity councils, in each District of the 21 that will function sectorally by the delegated areas of Government, and in which the Neighbor Members will have more weight (a figure that resembles that of a Councilor,

There are also city-level councils to articulate citizen participation. They are mostly sectoral councils by areas of public policy or aimed at sectors such as youth, who articulate their proposals in sessions convened for this purpose. At present there are 10 Sectorial Councils constituted in the City Council: of Women, Consumption, Youth, Volunteering, Forum for Dialogue and Coexistence, Disability, Seniors, Associations, Development Cooperation and Trade.

4. DISCONCENTRATION IN BARCELONA

The sources that affect your entire organization are, in addition to the constitution itself, Law 7/1985 Regulating the Bases of the Local Regime, and the Municipal Charter of Barcelona, in addition to the different Regulations and their reforms that have occurred.

In the first place, it should be noted that Barcelona has 10 Districts since 1984 (11 less than Madrid), this explains why Barcelona did not annex the municipalities of the metropolitan area, which Madrid did, from the 5th of June 1948 with Chamartin de la Rosa, until July 37, 1954 with Villaverde (in 6 years it annexed 12 neighboring municipalities).

In Madrid the Districts are governed as we have seen by municipal boards with a President Councilor at the head, and in Barcelona they are called District Councils (a neighborhood participation and representation body that is configured with the president of the council, a number of councilors proportional to the number of residents in the district according to population segments, the district councilor and the assigned councilors, which is convened regularly every two months) with a Presiding Councilor (who exercises the direction of the collegiate administrative bodies), and then there is also a District Councilor (who act by delegation of the first mayor, in the areas of public policy that have been established in the constitution decree after the municipal elections for the districts being the authority of the demarcation, and directing the administration and the staff, coordinates the relationship between the central council and the decentralized bodies, executes the agreements of)
the collegiate bodies and spurs the contacts of the city council with the neighborhood movement as the main attributions), this being the fundamental difference of two types of Councilors with respect to the city of Madrid, in addition to also having only in Barcelona the District Government Commission, which is the councilor's assistance body, made up of the councilor and five councilors, although also in a less structured way in Madrid, the district councilors have two advisers each with exclusive dedication.

And in addition to the governing bodies, the participation bodies, the most important until the 2011-2015 mandate being the District Citizen Council (equivalent to the Madrid Territorial Council), which is the space for consultation and participation, made up of representatives of associations located in the district, of sectorial councils of participation and by citizens personally; In addition, the public audience of the district state, the work commissions, the equipment councils and the sector councils are also participation bodies.

In the Citizen Participation Regulation, the City Council stands out in addition to regulating the mechanism of Citizen Consultations as a form of deliberative democracy and which had its maximum exponent in the 2007-2011 term but later declined because the results were usually contrary to the objectives of the Local Government, as happened with the Consultation on the reform of the Diagonal (one of the most representative avenues of the City) in which Mayor Hereu's proposal was widely defeated (Redacción, 2010). The City Council is made up of the following members: the Mayor who holds the presidency which can be delegated to another councilor, one or one councilor from each of the Municipal Groups present in the City Council, a representative from each of the District Citizen Councils.

For the 2015-2019 term, the Citizen Participation Regulation was reformed, which was brought by the Neighborhood Council for each District with the neighborhood councils as organs of territorial participation in all matters related to the scope of their demarcation. They are established with the aim of being a channel for citizen participation in the development of public policies of proximity and coexistence, as well as to be able to advance in social cohesion and improve the quality of urban life in each of the neighborhoods of the city of Barcelona.

5. POINTS OF DIVERGENCE AND CONVERGENCE

The first common point for deconcentration in these two large cities is that for their legal articulation they have to refer to the provisions of the Sixth Additional Provision of the Law on the Bases of Local Regime.

In Barcelona, neighboring members are called Municipal District Councilors, in a clearly different model, since, in Madrid, guaranteeing the presence of all municipal groups present in the Plenary of the City Council, the municipal composition is projected according to the global results of the city to each District Board, in the same proportion and always the same total number of representatives, 29, without attending to the population
from District. In Barcelona, another model is chosen, and representation in each district is made according to the electoral results that the political parties have obtained in the corresponding district, also taking into account the population of the District to establish the number of Municipal Councilors (in L’Eixample there are 23 Municipal Councilors and in Les Corts 15, as two examples, the complete number of councilors in each District Council can be seen in the following figure number 1).

Figure 1: distribution of district councilors according to inhabitants in each district of Barcelona.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>District Councilors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ciutat Vella</td>
<td>111,290</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eixample</td>
<td>262,485</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sants-Montjuïc</td>
<td>177,636</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Corts</td>
<td>82,588</td>
<td>fifteen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sarriá-Sant Gervasi</td>
<td>140,461</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grace</td>
<td>120,087</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horta-Guinardó</td>
<td>169,920</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nou Barris</td>
<td>164,981</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sant Andreu</td>
<td>142,598</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sant Martí</td>
<td>221,029</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration and data from the National Institute of Statistics.

In addition, the Barcelona model that has been developed to date encourages the Presiding Councilor of each District not to have to be from a party in the government if not also taking into account the results in the District, (remember that the executive powers will be of the District councilor who will be councilor of the Government team). Therefore, with these two figures, District Councilor and Councilor President of the District Council, a more participatory model is achieved.

This occurs, for example, in the Eixample District, where CiU won the 2007 municipal elections with 32.3 percent of the votes, and thus the Presiding Councilor of this party for the 2007-2011 term was the Ilmo. Mr. Gerard Ardanuy Mata. And in District 4, Les Corts, the Presiding Councilor is representative of the third political force in the District, the PP with 19.9 percent of the votes, and the Council has a conservative majority with 10 representatives of PP and CiU and then 1 from ERC and 5 from the bipartisan government formed by PSC and ICV-Eu i A. We see how they adhere to clear criteria of proportionality, according to the results and the population of the District, unlike in Madrid, where, as I said before, projects the image of the Plenary of the City Council to each District.

With this, 4 of the 10 Municipal Councils of the District were chaired during that term by councilors from the opposition, two by councilors from CiU, one from the PP and the other from ERC. And the other six from the bipartisan government. In Madrid, the District Councilor is the Presiding Councilor.
because it exercises the executive powers of the government in the District and presides over the Municipal Board, and the 21 councilors are from the ruling Popular Party, with an identical composition in each District Board, when the population differences are if we take the two extremes of more than 200,000 inhabitants as we can see in the following figure number 2.

In the case of Barcelona, the basic composition has remained the same in the last three mandates 2011-2015, 2015-2019 and 2019-2021 despite the change of municipal government in 2015, while in Madrid we have observed how the change of Political color in the government has brought with it its own model of participation, with the change in total members as can be seen in Figure 2 and with the introduction of Local Forums.

Figure 2: number of neighboring members and inhabitants for each district of the city of Madrid.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>149,718</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arganzuela</td>
<td>146,833</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>125,978</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>147,707</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamartin</td>
<td>142,626</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetouan</td>
<td>155,649</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamberí</td>
<td>145,593</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuencarral-El Pardo</td>
<td>220,085</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moncloa-Aravaca</td>
<td>116,531</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>256,644</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabanchel</td>
<td>253,678</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usera</td>
<td>142,415</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallecas Bridge</td>
<td>244,151</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moratalaz</td>
<td>104,923</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear City</td>
<td>228,171</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hortaleza</td>
<td>161,661</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villaverde</td>
<td>126,802</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa de Vallecas</td>
<td>73,281</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicálvaro</td>
<td>66,439</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>157,367</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing cards</td>
<td>43,423</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration and data from the National Institute of Statistics and the City of Madrid.
With the change of political color in the 2015-2019 term, all the districts of Madrid were also for the Municipal Group that held the Mayor's Office of Now Madrid. And for the 2019-2023 mandate, they have been distributed proportionally between the two Municipal Groups of the Government team of the Popular Party and Citizens. The competencies of the Districts in both cities are very similar. And the number of plenary sessions per year of the political-neighborhood representative body is higher in Madrid, where the average is 13, and in Barcelona the average is 7.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The Madrid model has a great possibility for a reform of its deconcentration that makes it more efficient, applying a rational model of public policy, firstly because it would have to be adapted on two levels, some neighborhoods should change district, and other districts divide, such as is the clear example of Moncloa-Aravaca, so that Moncloa and Aravaca were two differentiated districts, and even more pressing is the case of Fuencarral-El Pardo, where clearly what is now the largest district of the city of Madrid should be divided to give rise to Fuencarral on the one hand and El Pardo on the other, it makes no sense that the residents of El Pardo have as a reference a Municipal Board that is located 10.8 kilometers from its population center. This is a problem derived from the annexations of municipalities to Madrid in 1953.

These effects cause the social fabric, with its citizen entities at the head, to move away from its administrations and even feel harmed, since, if it has these difficulties in the administrative and social services offered by its closest administration, the model of governance and its public management does not advance but regresses, making it necessary a strategic plan of governance in the city of Madrid.

Another possibility, -with the possibility of implementing it through an agreement-, would be to incorporate representation of the Community of Madrid, at least in the new proximity councils, and even in the Municipal Board, taking into account that the metropolitan area
of Madrid is managed by the Community, and above all considering that numerous neighborhood petitions submitted as initiatives in the Councils are the responsibility of the Community, and therefore at the end of the year there are numerous initiatives that end up being the literal tenor of “urge the competent body to...”, therefore, in order to make the governance and management of the city more effective, institutional representation should be improved at least in the Council, since it is currently limited to the City Council. In the section on the normative reform of the Territorial Council of 2008, the representativeness of citizen entities was increased (maximum number of members from 40 to 51), but in terms of including representatives of other institutions, it was completely ignored, and this is possible, because in the Local Security Board, there are representatives of the City Council (the Head of the local Police Unit in the District), the National Commissioner of the District Police Station, and a representative of the Government Delegation in Madrid; In this Local Security Board in the Districts we have a model to follow, which could be implemented in the Territorial Council and even in the Municipal Board, in order to make the Governance in the city of Madrid more effective as previously stated.

We have also talked about the significant absences of the sector of representatives of the neighbors chosen randomly in the census of the respective district. Some spokespersons for the territorial councils stated at the time, that in addition to the neighbors or instead of those randomly chosen, there could be a sector of neighbors designated or who could stand for elections, just as the citizen entities are already presenting themselves for send their representatives, a proposal that he made so that those members could work, more than in the plenary, in the commissions. It is a proposal that, in the future, with these participation problems, should be taken into account, so as not to despise those who want to participate in the public policies of their city.

However, considering that the Barcelona model is more effective than the Madrid model, the improvements considered above would be of a secondary nature, since the main reform would be that of political representation; It does not make sense that the least populated district, Barajas, and the most populated, Latina, have for now the same number of representatives on their Municipal Board, so a reform would fit here to establish that the number of members has some proportion with the population, so that the Boards can be more effective. One way of doing this would be for district boards with a population of up to 100,000 inhabitants have 15 vowels, that the largest ones increase one vowel at the rate of one vowel for every 10,000 more inhabitants, the figure rounded up, and adding one more if the result is even, and that from 250,000 inhabitants no exceed the number of 30, remaining with this proposal and with the population data for the year 2005 as shown in the following table, which includes the ratio of vowels per inhabitants in the corresponding district as can be seen in Figure 3:
Figure 3: new distribution of Neighbor Members in each District according to the number of population.

| District          | Population | Vowels     | Relation 
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Center</td>
<td>149,718</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arganzuela</td>
<td>146,833</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retirement</td>
<td>125,978</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salamanca</td>
<td>147,707</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamartin</td>
<td>142,626</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tetouan</td>
<td>155,649</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chamberí</td>
<td>145,593</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fuencarral-El Pardo</td>
<td>220,085</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>7860</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moncloa-Aravaca</td>
<td>116,531</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin</td>
<td>256,644</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carabanchel</td>
<td>253,678</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Usera</td>
<td>142,415</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vallecas Bridge</td>
<td>244,151</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>8138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moratalaz</td>
<td>104,923</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear City</td>
<td>228,171</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>8149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hortaleza</td>
<td>161,661</td>
<td>2. 3</td>
<td>7348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villaverde</td>
<td>126,802</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Villa de Vallecas</td>
<td>73,281</td>
<td>fifteen</td>
<td>4885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicálvaro</td>
<td>66,439</td>
<td>fifteen</td>
<td>4429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Blas</td>
<td>157,367</td>
<td>twenty-one</td>
<td>7494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Playing cards</td>
<td>43,423</td>
<td>fifteen</td>
<td>2895</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own elaboration and data from the National Institute of Statistics.

In addition, it would be pending to achieve the objective set forth in the OR of the Districts of the City of Madrid of decentralized spending, and that is that for the 2003-2007 term, the objective was set for the districts to manage at least 13 percent of the municipal budget, so that each district can respond in its own way to the demands of its neighbors that they raise in their participation bodies. It was not fulfilled for that mandate, and it has not been fulfilled for the 2007-2011 mandate either, in which there was also a decline in the percentage of deconcentrated spending, moving further away from the objective established in the OR, then it stagnated and for the The current mandate 2019-2023 is also not expected to reach that old goal. On the contrary, in Barcelona the objective is higher, being 15 percent for decentralized spending, being actually quite high in comparison with the other large Spanish municipalities, and having been effectively achieved in several financial years, although in any case, as a general recommendation for global decentralized spending in the districts, one higher than 15 percent could be recommended that it remains...
to be determined (the one that is more efficient); the candidate of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party for Mayor of Madrid in the last elections of May 22, 2011, proposed a global decentralized spending target of 20 percent. One more than 15 percent could be recommended, which remains to be determined (whichever is the most efficient); the candidate of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party for Mayor of Madrid in the last elections of May 22, 2011, proposed a global decentralized spending target of 20 percent. One more than 15 percent could be recommended, which remains to be determined (whichever is the most efficient); the candidate of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party for Mayor of Madrid in the last elections of May 22, 2011, proposed a global decentralized spending target of 20 percent.

For the city of Barcelona there was a reform proposal, supported by the different political forces, even more ambitious is the direct election of the district councilors. “This is an old aspiration of the political forces with implantation or representation in the
Barcelona City Council, who consider it a key factor to increase the involvement of citizens in public affairs and to consolidate the remarkable tradition and participatory will of this city "(Jiménez and Mallo, 2007: 302). It is a proposal that already has a journey and that, although it has tried to rescue itself several times until now, it has never been possible.

It is worth examining new reforms such as the one expected with the Madrid coalition government this year, with a new model of Proximity Councils to start working in 2021 if the municipal plenary session approves the new Regulation. And especially it is necessary to accommodate critical work with the results and participation mechanisms as Ruano de la Fuente did in 2010, to improve in this matter.

7. BIBLIOGRAPHY


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Brief curriculum

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