On reading my title, one could legitimately ask, which nineteenth century? An argument could be made for a nineteenth-century BCE origin of ‘Wisdom Literature’, since texts that have been associated with ‘Wisdom’ have been found in the cultures of the ancient Near East dating back to the second millennium BCE. However, the ‘Wisdom Literature’ I will be discussing is the classification of a group of texts in the Hebrew Bible centred on Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job and occasionally including Ben Sira, Wisdom of Solomon, certain psalms, and the Song of Songs. This categorization is what I will argue originated in the nineteenth century CE. Thus, I will not be examining the origins of the so-called Wisdom books or of the movement in which they originated, though the discussion to follow may affect how both are understood.

1. Wisdom Literature Today

The current understanding of Wisdom Literature is well represented by Stuart Weeks’s An Introduction to the Study of Wisdom Literature

1. Egyptian advice literature, such as the Instruction of Ptahhotep, dates to at least the Middle Kingdom, and thus the turn of the second millennium (see Lichtheim 1996: 244). The Mesopotamian Instructions of Shuruppak is even older, taking ‘Wisdom’s’ purported reach back into the third millennium (Beaulieu 2007: 4).

2. R.B.Y. Scott (1971: 19) lists three common classifications of wisdom: three books (Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes), five books (adding Ben Sira and Wisdom of Solomon), and seven books (adding Psalms and Song of Songs as well). For wisdom psalms, see, e.g., Kuntz 2003. For whether the Song of Songs should be considered ‘Wisdom’, see Dell 2005.

3. For ease of reading, I will henceforth dispense with the quotation marks encompassing the title of this category that reflect the fact that it is a scholarly convention. When ‘Wisdom’ is capitalized, it refers to the literary category and is used here interchangeably with the fuller title, ‘Wisdom Literature’.
Weeks’s work, however, suggests that ‘understanding’ may not be the best term to describe the current state of scholarly insight into the subject. This is no fault of Weeks. He provides a clear, concise, and critical evaluation of Wisdom Literature, highlighting the lack of assured results that plague the field with an incisive force that suggests a better title for his book might have been, ‘A Conclusion to the Study of Wisdom Literature’. A basic problem in defining precisely what we are talking about when we use the term ‘Wisdom Literature’ confronts us from the outset. An opening discussion of the difficulty of defining the genre has become *de rigueur* in introductions to Wisdom Literature (see, e.g., Crenshaw 1998; Dell 2000a; Hunter 2006), but Weeks is more willing than most to admit the significant challenges of this undertaking. He declares that ‘biblical scholarship does not operate with a consensus about the definition of wisdom literature as a genre—if, indeed, it is a genre in any meaningful sense’ (Weeks 2010: 85).

One challenge Weeks discusses is the development of a definition that can account for the diversity in form and theology of the so-called Wisdom texts. This leads to attempts made at a high point of abstraction in the methodology or worldview supposedly shared by the texts (e.g. secularism, universalism, and empiricism) (108-26). However, these common Wisdom assumptions are difficult to uncover, with the result that ‘what we find is going to depend very much on the ways in which we approach the texts’ (108). This facilitates the importation of later and even modern presuppositions, such as a distinction between natural theology and revelation or between universal and national conceptions of God (115-16, 119). The search for distinct elements of Wisdom thought is often, therefore, ‘driven by assumptions which lie outside the texts themselves’, as the debate revolves on a circle in which theories about the content of the category and theories about its origin are alternatively used to justify one another (107).

Second, according to Weeks, parallel ancient Near Eastern Wisdom texts ‘belong firmly within the broader religious, cultural, and literary traditions of the regions within which they each emerged’, so that, if these parallels prove anything, it is only that the biblical works and their authors were likely similarly integrated in Israelite society (21). I would

4. Alastair Hunter (2006: 23) provides an example of this process. He acknowledges that Job cannot be identified as Wisdom on the basis of ‘formal linguistic features’, so, to justify the ‘effective unanimity’ of ‘the intuitive urge to include Job’, he claims an examination of ‘the underlying perspectives which emerge from a consideration in broader terms of what these [Wisdom] books are concerned with’ is necessary. For more on the problems of Wisdom’s definition given the diversity of the accepted corpus, see Dell 2000b: 348-49.
add that it has long been noted by Egyptologists (e.g. Williams 1981: 1; Lichtheim 1996: 261) and Assyriologists (e.g. Lambert 1960: 1; Beaulieu 2007: 3), and yet is often forgotten, that the term ‘Wisdom Literature’ was adopted into their fields from biblical scholars (Whybray 2005: 7). This means that appeals to ancient Near Eastern parallels to justify the category run into significant problems of circularity. There are undoubtedly individual texts with parallels to the proverbial wisdom of Proverbs, such as Amenemope, and others which resonate with the scepticism of Ecclesiastes and Job, such as The Babylonian Theodicy, Ludlul Bēl Nēmeqi, and The Dispute between a Man and His Ba, but grouping these disparate texts together as a distinctive ancient Near Eastern Wisdom Literature is dependent on the classification of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job together as biblical Wisdom Literature. Therefore, these parallels cannot be used to justify the classification itself.

Third, Weeks claims, ‘Attempts to connect wisdom literature with royal administrators and with education are based on a lot of speculation and a certain amount of misunderstanding: we can hardly regard the case as proven’ (133). In fact, the evidence from other ancient Near Eastern societies suggests that a scribal class would have been just as responsible for texts of other genres as for Wisdom (130, 134).

Fourth, arguments for Wisdom influence, though inspired by the conception of Wisdom as something ‘historically and ideologically distinct’, have in turn called into question that very distinctiveness by becoming so widespread, including texts from Genesis to Esther. This suggests that we should instead see these links as evidence of the shared cultural context of the biblical authors and ‘the broad interconnectedness of biblical literature’ (136, 140-41). Weeks concludes, ‘With so much Israelite discourse rendered “wise” almost by definition, we must begin to suspect that “wisdom” has become more of a liability than an asset in our discussions, and that debates about origin and influence would do well to retire the term’ (141).

Weeks does not, of course, retire Wisdom completely; it is in the title of his book, after all. He acknowledges that Wisdom Literature defies simple classification by either intrinsic or extrinsic criteria, which causes attempts to apply the classification either to ‘make the criteria hopelessly vague, or adjust the contents of the corpus’ (142). However, he presses on to provide his own definition, apparently choosing the former option of vagueness. He declares that wisdom is not specifically a genre, a movement, or a school of thought. Since it is far from clear, moreover, that the wisdom texts were identified as a distinct corpus by contemporary readers, we should probably not strive too hard to identify some classification that the writers might
Perspectives on Israelite Wisdom

themselves have used. Perhaps we can do no better than to speak of their works loosely as products of a wisdom tradition, which drew on long-established genres linked to exhortation or disputation, was marked by a characteristic style of discourse, and focused on particular problems surrounding individual human life. (Weeks 2010: 144)

Weeks is admittedly more pessimistic than some other scholars about what can be said about Wisdom, but his lack of confidence in the scholarly conclusions on its definition, ancient Near Eastern comparative support, setting, and influence suggests scholarship on Wisdom Literature is not currently in a particularly strong position. It seems that what Gerhard von Rad (1993: 7-8) observed four decades ago may apply now with yet greater force. He claimed that wisdom ‘is by no means directly rooted in the sources’, having instead ‘first emerged in the scholarly world’. Therefore, the possibility exists that it suggests ‘something which never existed’, which could be ‘dangerously prejudicing the interpretation of varied material’. He complained that the rise of scholarly interest in Wisdom had only succeeded in making the concept increasingly unclear (a fact to which Weeks’s work testifies), and thus, he declared, ‘The question is therefore justified whether the attractive codename “wisdom” is nowadays not more of a hindrance than a help, in so far as it disguises what stands behind it rather than depicts it properly’.

2. The Beginnings of Wisdom Literature

What are the prospects for the future of the Wisdom Literature category? At this point, any steps forward will require a leap backwards to its origin. Katharine Dell (2013: 605-606 n. 2) has noted in her survey of nineteenth-century interpretation of Wisdom that this is an undertaking that has not yet been successfully accomplished, leaving this a ‘grey area’ in biblical scholarship. Like most current scholars, Rudolf Smend

5. For criticism of the lengths to which Weeks goes in this regard, see Dell 2012.
6. The session at the SBL annual meeting in 2012 that discussed whether a Wisdom tradition ever existed, inspired by Mark Sneed’s article, ‘Is the “Wisdom Tradition” a Tradition?’ (2011), is further evidence of the field’s current instability. For papers presented at that session as well as further reflections on the question from a number of scholars, see Sneed (ed.) forthcoming.
7. This ‘meta-critical’ undertaking follows the lead of several earlier works that trace how the scholarly presuppositions driving the rise of modern criticism have had lasting effects on the interpretation of the Bible; e.g., Frei 1974; Legaspi 2010; Moore and Sherwood 2011. For a comparison between how the context in which the minor prophets have been read has affected their interpretation and the ‘invention’ of the ‘scholarly construct’ of Wisdom, see Seitz 2007: 58, 61.
(1995) seems simply to assume the category’s existence in his study of nineteenth-century Wisdom scholarship, as he focuses on the interpretation of Proverbs as representative of the category as a whole.8

Once again Weeks provides a starting point. He claims that the separation of the Wisdom texts into a separate grouping developed after World War II, when a widespread emphasis on history in Old Testament scholarship fused with a conception of the foreign nature of Wisdom Literature, which began in earnest after the similarities between Proverbs and the Egyptian text Amenemope were observed in 1924 (Weeks 2010: 21-22; cf. Scott 1970: 23-24; Crenshaw 1976: 5-6). The surveys of scholarly trends composed by members of the Society for Old Testament Study appear to support Weeks’s contention: Wisdom receives a single mention in the 1925 volume, a few pages in 1938, and only in 1951 a chapter of its own.9 Though interest in the category did grow slowly in the twentieth century, the category itself had developed earlier.

James Crenshaw (1976: 3) suggests that Johannes Meinhold was the first to recognize the separate existence of Wisdom as a category in his Die Weisheit Israels in Spruch, Sage und Dichtung (1908).10 However, two years earlier John Genung published The Hebrew Literature of Wisdom in the Light of To-day: A Synthesis (1906), and before that, in 1894, W.T. Davison published The Wisdom-Literature of the Old Testament. Both works testify to an earlier acceptance of the category around the turn of the century. R.N. Whybray (1995: 1) points even further back to S.R. Driver’s An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament (1891).11 Driver (1891: 369, 385) claimed that Israel’s ‘wise men’ took the nation’s creed for granted, focusing instead on humanistic, practical, universal, reflective, and often natural investigation, and he even referred to Job as ‘a product of the Wisdom-Literature’. Another decade before Driver, Eduard Reuss (1881: 487) was already speaking of the ‘Wisdom Books’ as he claimed that a summary chapter on this

8. In his work on nineteenth-century biblical scholarship, J.W. Rogerson (1984) generally ignores the Wisdom Literature, claiming it, along with the rest of the poetic books, was ‘treated, in the spirit of Herder, as essentially poetic compositions’ (257). However, this overlooks the fact, demonstrated below, that the Wisdom books were also treated as philosophical treatises.


10. Crenshaw is apparently following Walter Baumgartner (1933: 261). Though he is less specific, Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger (2013: 119) has also recently dated the separation of Wisdom from Law and Prophecy to the beginning of the twentieth century.

11. Like Crenshaw, Whybray also claims Meinhold is the first to devote an entire book to the Wisdom Literature (1995: 2).
literature and its spirit could be found in most introductions of recent times, including in commentaries on the Proverbs. He explained that the Hebrew term Chokmah does not need to be used for this literature, just as it is unnecessary to refer to prophetic texts as Nabi-literature.

Reuss’s discussion suggests that the idea of Wisdom Literature was already widespread, but the fact that he had to explain its title indicates it was not yet firmly established. A review of introductions to the Old Testament in the second half of the nineteenth century demonstrates this to be the case. One need look no further than the tables of contents to see that changes were afoot. Poetry, consisting of Psalms, Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, and Lamentations continued as the dominant category into the second half of the nineteenth century. For some, this category was divided into lyrical poetry (Psalms, Song of Songs, and Lamentations) and didactic poetry (Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes), and eventually the latter collection achieved a category of its own as Wisdom Literature.

In addition to indicating the category’s growing scholarly acceptance, Driver’s and Reuss’s introductions provide insight into its development since both refer back to earlier scholars’ influence on their views. Driver (1891: 369) cites Franz Delitzsch and T.K. Cheyne for the view that Israel’s wise men were the ‘Humanists’ of Israel. However, Delitzsch cites an even earlier influence: Johann Bruch in his Weisheits-Lehre der Hebräer (1851). Delitzsch (1874: I, 46) claims Bruch ‘was the first to call special attention to the Chokma or humanism as a peculiar intellectual tendency in Israel’. In Cheyne’s list of further literature (1887: 178), to which Driver refers, this same work by Bruch is the earliest mentioned, with the exception of an 1837 commentary on Proverbs by Lowenstein, written in Hebrew. Bruch is also the primary resource for Reuss. Gustav Oehler (1874: II, 434), as well, refers primarily to Bruch in his description of Wisdom in his Old Testament theology, and Otto Zöckler (1898: 5, 7, 22) interacts with Bruch’s work at some length in his Proverbs commentary. These various streams of interpretation all seem to flow from the same source: Bruch’s Weisheits-Lehre der Hebräer.

12. See, e.g., Davidson 1862; Vatke 1886; C.H.H. Wright 1891.
13. See, e.g., Keil 1869, who admits that the two categories cannot be distinguished sharply because there are didactic psalms and Job is written in a lyrical style (437).
14. An early example is Nöldeke 1868. He groups Proverbs, Ben Sira, Ecclesiastes, Wisdom, and Job separately, though he refers to them as Lehrdichtung, not Weisheitsliteratur, and refers to them at one point as the ‘didaktischen Poesie des Alten Testaments’ (156).
Bruch himself refers to earlier sources, which offer valuable insight into his work. (For a graphic representation of the sources of Bruch’s work and its influence, see Figure 1, overleaf) But before discussing these, it is also important to observe a stream of interpretation he does not mention: early Jewish and Christian classification of ‘didactic’ biblical texts. One of the four divisions of the Old Testament in the Vulgate is the *libri didactici* or ‘pedagogical literature’, and Josephus mentions four books in the Hebrew canon that ‘contain hymns to God and precepts for the conduct of human life’ (*Ag. Ap.* 1.8). Bruch’s omission, if not due to ignorance, is likely due to the fact that these classifications are inconsistent, both with one another and with the modern category. The Vulgate category included the Psalms in their entirety and the Song of Songs in addition to Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, Job, Wisdom, and Ben Sira. Josephus, on the other hand, is most likely referring to Psalms, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs, and excluding Job, which he probably includes with the prophets. Thus, these groupings, both by including other books and—in Josephus’ case—by excluding Job, do not appear to be built around the philosophical nature of Wisdom Literature that Bruch argues is its essence.

Bruch does mention an enthusiasm for discussing the philosophy of the Hebrews in the seventeenth century, which is evident most prominently in Johann Franz Buddeus’s *Introductio ad historiam philosophiae ebraeorum* (1702). This work is unlike the modern categorization of Wisdom, however, since Buddeus includes the wisdom of Joseph, Moses, and others from Hebrew antiquity. Among the discussions of Hebrew philosophy or Wisdom closer to him both conceptually and chronologically, Bruch (1851: 4) mentions four in particular: Blessig’s description of Proverbs as the philosophical literature of the Hebrews in his Foreword to Johann Georg Dahler’s 1810 commentary; W.M.L. de Wette’s distinction between practical philosophy in Proverbs and speculative philosophy in Genesis 1, Psalms 37 and 73, Job, and Ecclesiastes in the second edition of his *Lehrbuch der hebräisch-jüdischen Archäologie* in 1830 (first edition 1814); Friedrich Umbreit’s high praise of the wisdom of the Hebrews in his Proverbs commentary of 1826; and Heinrich Ewald’s argument for the development of wisdom and of schools in Israel in the century after David’s rule in his history of the people of Israel (Ewald 1843–55) and his article on Israelite intellectual movements (Ewald 1848). Also, though he does not mention it here

15. Delitzsch 1891: 14. Delitzsch refers to Josephus’ list primarily to justify his inclusion of Song of Songs as Wisdom.
as influential on his views, later in the book Bruch demonstrates an awareness of Wilhelm Vatke’s *Biblische Theologie* of 1835 (Bruch 1851: 178-79 note). Bruch concludes that this diversity of opinions justifies an investigation of whether and to what extent a Hebrew philosophy existed, which is the task he goes on to undertake (5-6).

Figure 1. *Influences on Bruch’s Work and Its Influences on Later Scholarship*

These acknowledged influences on Bruch’s work shed light on the evolution of Wisdom Literature as a category in the first half of the nineteenth century. The most striking feature of this development is the strong influence of the philosophical currents of the time. De Wette, Umbreit, Ewald, and Vatke offer a variety of approaches, which, perhaps
like the Wisdom Literature itself, are unified in very little beyond this abstract interaction with philosophical ideas. I will consider each in turn.

De Wette’s affinity for the philosophy of Jakob Friedrich Fries is well-known (e.g. Smend 1962: 171). Friesian philosophy bears a close resemblance to Kantian idealism but emphasizes the ability of intuition to discover truth. This view enabled de Wette to employ the critical method to discover something his aesthetic interests deemed worthwhile: deeply felt religious experience in the Old Testament books. Prior to the work cited by Bruch, de Wette (1807) combined the Psalms, Job, and Ecclesiastes to describe Hebrew religion as characterized by Unglück or ‘misfortune’, a theme adopted from Fries. Though he presents these works as common witnesses to the existential affliction tormenting Hebrew experience, he does not suggest that they together comprise some kind of Misfortune category of biblical literature. In fact, Job and Ecclesiastes are each presented as eccentric and isolated within the canon (de Wette 1807: 286-88, 306). The author of Job had shed the fetters of the usual faith in providence and the widely oppressive particularism of the theocracy, breaking free from the sphere of Hebrew religion and producing a work that stood by itself, supported by nothing and supporting nothing. Ecclesiastes is similarly isolated, strange and mysterious, and set off from the rest of the Hebrew Bible. The concept of wisdom is not absent from the work, but it is not presented as a particular category of texts or of worldview (e.g. 298). Instead Ecclesiastes is described as a great work of sceptical philosophy, and Job is at times associated with it in this regard. Both books are seen as rejecting the doctrine of retribution, but this concept is considered a general trait of Hebrew religion, and not simply the worldview of Proverbs, a text scarcely mentioned in de Wette’s discussion.

The theological sentiment behind de Wette’s presentation of Job’s rejection of the oppressive particularism of the theocracy is developed in his Biblische Dogmatik of 1813. There he divides Hebrew religion between universalism and particularism. Universalism is the general

16. Blessig’s comments are too brief to merit discussion. For a discussion of de Wette, Vatke, and Ewald, and their lasting impact on Old Testament scholarship through taking it from Romanticism to Idealism, see Kraus 1982: 174-208, esp. 208. Kraus does not mention their interpretation of Wisdom, though he does treat the influence of contemporary philosophy on their work. Bruch is not mentioned by Kraus.

17. See the fuller discussion of Fries, his philosophy, and his influence on de Wette’s interpretation in Rogerson 1984: 36-44.

18. References here are to the third edition (1831).
doctrines of faith, the doctrines of God, the world, and humanity. Particularism is the State and Church of the Israelites and everything associated with the theocracy, including the priests and prophets, judges and kings, law, offerings and festivals (Smend 1962: 171). De Wette presents Hebrew philosophy as the Israelites’ abstract ideas about God, including the deity’s omnipotence, omniscience, ubiquity, and eternity (de Wette 1831: 73). These doctrines are not found exclusively in the Wisdom Literature (a term he does not use). When he does mention wisdom, it is as one of these traits of God, and de Wette again finds this described in a range of texts not limited to Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes (80). De Wette reproaches the Hebrews for confusing the symbol with what it represented by exchanging the universal for the particular in their devotion to the theocracy and cult. This view found a significant following, which is not surprising because it performed an important apologetic function. The cosmopolitan humanists of the eighteenth century were inclined to reject the Old Testament as a document of a particularistic spirit characterized by nationalism and statutory instead of moral laws. Rather than dispute those claims, de Wette could acknowledge them from the outset but declare that they were only the degeneration of the main, universal idea of Hebrew religion. At the same time, he could avoid being accused of neglecting these features of the religion, since they contributed intrinsically to his depiction of its development (Smend 1962: 172).

Umbreit, on the other hand, was influenced by Johann Gottfried Herder and Friedrich Schleiermacher (see Rogerson 1984: 136-37), and this comes out clearly in his discussion of the nature of wisdom as a concept and its relationship to poetry and Hebrew religion generally in his Proverbs commentary (Umbreit 1826). In his opening description of wisdom, he differentiates between the longing spirit of poetry and the inner peace of wisdom, and claims that Job and Ecclesiastes are sometimes classified as poetic and other times as philosophical because they represent this conflict (iv). In this way his interpretation of these books stands between de Wette’s emotional existential interpretation and Bruch’s more abstract philosophical reading. Umbreit refers to Kant and Herder in his discussion of the differences between Eastern and Western metaphysics. With echoes of Schleiermacher, he declares that a conception of religion as direct feeling of the existence of the divinity

19. De Wette refers to Pss. 33.11; 40.6; 104.24; Job 12.13; 28.23ff.; 38; Prov. 8.22ff.; and Isa. 55.8f.
belongs intrinsically to the Orient, as opposed to the cold systematic approach of the West. Then, drawing on the declaration in Prov. 1.7 that the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom, he claims that religion and wisdom are as indivisible as the root of a tree and its trunk (vii-ix). Wisdom, he argues, does not contradict the law, and its proper essence is revealed in the covenant (xxxvi-xxxviii). He then gives an overview of Israelite history, which includes a description of the prophets as sages in Israel (xliv). Thus, his approach mixes Romanticism with a traditional, unified biblical theology.

Ewald styled himself an objective neutral interpreter (see Rogerson 1984: 93), so the influence of contemporary philosophy on his work is most evident in his response to it. Indeed, during his depiction of the rise of the wisdom schools in the centuries following David’s reign, he makes the connection explicit. Like Umbreit, Ewald firmly links wisdom with religion, declaring that for wisdom to be true and beneficial it must have a ground in God himself, and even claiming that the fear of God is not merely the beginning of wisdom, but that it is wisdom (Ewald 1848: 99). However, in addition to the rise of a circle of the wise, he envisions a contrasting group of ‘mockers’ (סיצל) and ‘fools’ (סילבנ), which are mentioned in Proverbs and several prophetic texts (100). He claims that in the seventh century these ‘happy libertines’ found philosophical defenders for their views. History shows, he declares, that if a time is favourable for practical atheism, theoretical atheism is soon to follow, ‘as we have adequately experienced also in Germany again in the last fifteen years’ (102). He claims the words of Agur in Prov. 30.1-14 reflect the views of one of these atheists in Israel, which Ewald compares to ‘our Feuerbaches’, who have demonstrated the atheism of Friedrich Theodor Vischer and David Friedrich Strauss (two Hegelian-influenced scholars at Tübingen) only more logically and audaciously. Just as Agur did, Ewald claims, ‘So the philosophers of our day also ask which reasonable man could consider as real such a being as the God depicted in the Bible’ (102).

Though his view of wisdom schools was influential on Bruch as well as later interpreters (e.g. Delitzsch 1874: I, 40-41, 46), Ewald does not appear to have a developed view of Wisdom Literature as a category. In the Introduction to his commentary on Job, he does describe the book as ‘the most sublime didactic poem of the Bible’, but Ewald (1882: 71)

21. A similar survey of the covenant and Israel’s religious history appears in Umbreit’s introduction to his Job commentary (1836: 2-4).

22. See, e.g., Prov. 13.1; 15.12; Hos. 7.5; Isa. 28.14. This idea is picked up by a number of later commentators, e.g., Bruch 1851: 65; Delitzsch 1874: I, 39.
primarily compares it with the experience of the sufferer in the Psalms and Lamentations; Proverbs and Ecclesiastes and the word ‘wisdom’ are never mentioned. His commentaries on Job, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Psalms were published between 1835 and 1839 under the title *Die poetischen Bücher des Alten Bundes*. A final evident influence on Bruch’s work is Vatke. Though Vatke escapes Ewald’s mention, he was closely associated with Strauss in his ardent Hegelianism (see Kraus 1982: 194-99; Rogerson 1984: 70-71). He dedicated a large portion of his biblical theology to explaining how his Hegelian views guided his depiction of the development of Israelite religion, and this is evident in his discussion of Wisdom Literature. The Hegelian influence on biblical scholarship in the mid-nineteenth century was an issue of considerable contention, with conservative scholars like Ernst Hengstenberg vehemently denouncing it, which may explain why Bruch does not acknowledge Vatke more explicitly.

Following Hegel in seeing religion as developing from the lower to the higher, Vatke reverses the relationship between the universal and the particular depicted by de Wette. Instead of being a pure original idea that degenerated into particularism, in Vatke’s view Hebrew religion sheds earlier particularistic nature worship for postexilic universalistic monotheism. In the Persian period, with the political interests of the nation pushed into the background, the ‘wisdom teachers’ (*Weisheitslehrer*) emerge in Proverbs, Job, and Ecclesiastes, and the freer prophetic spirit lives on in the ‘teachings of the wise’ (*Lehren der Weisen*), in which the particularistic elements, so far as was possible, were stripped or subordinated to general spiritual and humanistic (*menschlichen*) interests (Vatke 1835: 561, 563). Proverbs and Job, which Vatke dates to the fifth century, and Ecclesiastes, which he dates even later, are the synthesis of the earlier conflict between the thesis and antithesis of the priests and prophets, and thus, in the Wisdom texts, the particularism of the Jewish nationality disappeared (Vatke 1835: 563-64; cf. 570-72). Vatke may have been the first to posit a late date for Proverbs (Dell 2013: 608), and considering how the Wisdom books fit into his Hegelian view of the development of Israelite religion, one can see how he arrived at this conclusion.

---

23. These were published in later editions under the title *Die Dichter des Alten Bundes*.

24. In a footnote, he also refers to Pss. 34, 37, and 78 and Mal. 3.16.

25. Rogerson (1984: 78) claims that it is ‘obvious that Vatke’s views about the development of religion led him to interpret the Old Testament material according to his preconceived notions’.
Therefore, Bruch’s presentation of his work as an investigation of the ‘philosophy’ of the Hebrews fits naturally into the scholarly climate which preceded it, in which contemporary philosophy contributed to the evolution of a view of the Wisdom Literature as Israel’s own philosophy. In fact, like the interpreters before him, Bruch appears to have one eye on the biblical text and the other on the latest philosophy written in Germany. He even claims to be writing not only for theologians but also for philosophers (Bruch 1851: xiv). The Introduction of his work, similar to Schleiermacher’s *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, reads like an apologia to a philosophical audience for the study of the Hebrew Bible. He begins his Foreword by acknowledging that the title of the work may awake an unfavourable prejudice in the reading public, especially the philosophers, who believe the Hebrews did not take up philosophical speculation until Alexandrian Jewish philosophy,\(^\text{26}\) as their omission of the Hebrews from histories of philosophy demonstrates (ix). However, Bruch disputes the allegation that the Hebrew people lacked any philosophical efforts. A non-theocratic spirit blows in the Old Testament, he claims, which found no satisfaction in the religious institutes of the nation and hence found another way, the way of free thought and the exploration of difficult questions to seek to provide peace of mind (an echo of Umbreit). However, this speculative wisdom is not separated from the divine, since all are guided by God (xv-xvi).

At the beginning of the Introduction, Bruch again attempts to justify his title, this time explaining the choice of ‘wisdom teaching’ (*Weisheitslehre*) instead of ‘philosophy’ (*Philosophie*), since, echoing Umbreit again, the speculative efforts of the Hebrews are different from those in the West, and because the term ‘wisdom’ is concentrated in their opinions and teachings (1). Though Bruch uses similar terminology to Vatke to describe the Wisdom books, the role he sees them playing in the development of Hebrew religion is unlike Vatke’s Hegelian view and much more along the lines of de Wette and Schleiermacher. Bruch claims Hebrew myth contains the conception of a unique, eternal, all-powerful divinity, who was essentially differentiated from nature. Though this divinity is presented anthropomorphically, he could also be conceived of in a purer form. Therefore, even though the Hebrew thinkers recognized the emptiness of the whole ceremony of their national cult and its numerous laws, rarely spoke of its theocratic institutions, and had an aversion for the narrow-minded spirit of the priesthood, they had no

\(^{26}\) See Bruch 1851: 2-3. There, for example, he quotes Krug’s declaration in the *Philosophisch-encyclopädisches Lexicon* that there is no such thing as Hebrew philosophy.
reason to separate themselves from the essence of their religion and instead held fast to the old Hebrew conception of God. This principle became the basis of their whole thought, on which their entire philosophy rested (59-60). This, Bruch claims in his conclusion, is the most important characteristic of Hebrew Wisdom, one that distinguishes it from other peoples, and the Greeks in particular: it never rejected the religion of the collected consciousness of the nation. All the Hebrew wise men proceeded from the doctrines which formed the substance of their popular religion; their philosophy remained always a religious philosophy (379-80). Thus, neither the priests nor the prophets, nor even later the scribes, contested the Hebrew sages, but the ‘mockers’, whom Ewald mentioned, took their indifference to the law and national cult and developed it into a true unbelief (65).

Bruch’s work is divided into three parts. The first is a discussion of the ‘cosmogonic fragments’ in Genesis, in which the essence of the Hebrew conception of God as found in their myths is discussed first in Gen. 1.1–2.4 and then in Gen. 2.4–3.24. The second part deals with Proverbs and Job, which he considers the pre-exilic products of Hebrew Wisdom, laying out in particular their views on God, the world, humanity, and human relationships. The Proverbs chapter has an extended discussion of the nature of wisdom as a concept, dividing it into divine and human wisdom, and then dividing the latter into theoretical and practical wisdom, echoing de Wette. The third part discusses post-exilic Hebrew Wisdom, dealing with many of the same topics in Ecclesiastes, Ben Sira, and the Wisdom of Solomon, with a short discussion of Baruch as well.

Bruch’s extended description of Hebrew Wisdom incorporates elements from the works that preceded it. The independence of the Wisdom Literature from the particularism of Israel’s theocracy found in several of these works is prominent in Bruch’s interpretation. That he connects these universalistic ideas, not with a later development in Hebrew thought, but with the essence of Hebrew theology, which was obscured by the particularism of the theocracy, links his views with de Wette, and not Vatke’s Hegelian understanding of history. However, de Wette does not give the Wisdom Literature a prominent position in his discussion of Hebrew religion, so here Bruch is closer to Vatke. In Bruch’s repeated affirmation that Wisdom is never in conflict with Hebrew religion, he repeats an idea Umbreit and Ewald had emphasized. Bruch’s work is therefore not without its precedents, but he appears to be the first to draw these earlier views into a systematic and comprehensive examination of the issue. We could call Bruch the Wellhausen of Wisdom.
The implications of the origin of Wisdom Literature must be interpreted with care, since any conclusions drawn from it run the risk of falling into the genetic fallacy that an idea’s origins can be used either to confirm or contradict its truth. Even so, the timing and location of this origin are certainly suspicious. In nineteenth-century Germany, Christians were struggling to reconcile the universalistic, humanistic, and philosophical aspects of their religion with its particularistic connection with a history that was becoming increasingly problematic under the intense examination of eighteenth-century rationalism and nineteenth-century historical criticism. This was fertile soil in which Wisdom Literature might sprout as the ‘universalistic, humanistic, philosophical’ collection within the Old Testament (Delitzsch 1866: I, 5), independent of Israel’s particularistic theocracy, cult, and law. Though he adopted the Wisdom category from Bruch, Delitzsch (1874: I, 46) had concerns in this regard. He claimed that Bruch was ‘mistaken in placing [Wisdom] in an indifferent and even hostile relation to the national law and the national cultus, which he compares to the relation of Christian philosophy to orthodox theology’. This might suggest the development of Wisdom Literature was the equivalent in Old Testament theology to Schleiermacher’s *On Religion*, which similarly shows an aversion to theocracy as it attempts to defend Christianity to its ‘cultured despisers’.27

It is difficult not to see this as another example of nineteenth-century scholars looking into the well and seeing their own reflection, though this is an interpretive tendency from which scholars of other centuries, even our own, are not immune.

Thus, Crenshaw (1976: 3) observes, since its identification as a separate category, Wisdom Literature ‘has stood largely as a mirror image of the scholar painting her portrait’, though his belief that study of a distinctive Wisdom Literature only began in 1908 means he misses the marked evidence of this phenomenon in the nineteenth century. When Ewald, teaching in a university in Germany and opposing the atheists of his time, envisions the Wisdom teachers in their schools in Israel opposing the atheistic ‘mockers’ who criticized Israel’s religion, it certainly appears that he is reading his own modern circumstances into the text. The same could be said for Bruch’s attempts to argue to both theologians and philosophers that there was indeed a Hebrew philosophy that deserves a place in the history of the subject. He does so by abstracting a philosophy from the rest of the Hebrew Bible that is itself built on his

27. E.g. Schleiermacher 1893: 24-25. This translation is based on the second German edition (1806).
abstraction of the essence of Hebrew religion from its particularistic qualities. This, in itself, does not mean that their interpretations are wrong. Perhaps their personal circumstances and the intellectual trends of their time enabled them to see actual features of the text that earlier interpreters had missed. The same should be said of the prominent influence of contemporary philosophy on all these interpreters; it may have offered new, valid insight into the biblical texts.

However, if our interpretive goal is to uncover what the texts meant within their original context, the contemporary cultural convenience of the conclusions that these interpreters reach, which serve apologetical purposes in the arguments of their time, does legitimate a healthy scepticism toward their results. They may be driven by modern concerns that have distorted the texts’ original meaning. Indeed, in the circular relationship between Wisdom Literature’s definition and its contents, the early nineteenth-century development of the category suggests that the universalistic, humanistic, and philosophical definition influenced by the likes of Fries, Schleiermacher, Herder, and Hegel came first, and the contents were found and molded to fit it. The origins of the Wisdom category draw into question Julius Wellhausen’s claim that ‘philosophy does not precede, but follows [biblical criticism]’.28

3. The Future of Wisdom Literature

Whether valid or not, the development of the Wisdom category with its own distinctive features within Israelite religion, presented most fully, prominently, and influentially by Bruch, has created a persistent interpretive trajectory for the so-called Wisdom texts. Ever since then, Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job have been read together as both philosophical and independent from the rest of the canon and Israelite religion. In fact, over time the distinctive nature of Wisdom has increased. Some of this may be due to the twentieth-century discovery of ancient Near Eastern parallels and preference for Israel’s history, as mentioned above. But, beyond the ebbs and flows of scholarly interest, the increasing isolation of Wisdom is also likely due to the nature of categorization. In order to justify its own existence, the classification has created an echo chamber in which the similarities among the books

within the category are magnified and their connections with texts outside of it are muffled. When the category was developing, Job, for example, was seen as responding to the doctrine of retribution as it is represented throughout the canon (e.g. de Wette 1807: 288; Umbreit 1836: 3-4; Oehler 1874: 435). Now, however, it is primarily a dispute between Proverbs and Job that drives the interpretation of the two books. Weeks provides a second example when he wonders if the crediting of Wisdom with a creation theology may be due to scholars’ attempts ‘to identify a theoretical basis for apparent differences between these texts and others’. This creation-theology emphasis can lead to the neglect and marginalization of the influences of revelation or Torah within Wisdom, since they challenge that paradigm (Weeks 2010: 116-17).

While reading the Wisdom Literature as increasingly distinct from the rest of Israelite religion, interpreters have continued to consider its contents similar to their own academic pursuits. Even Weeks, despite his awareness of the tendency to read Wisdom according to modern concerns quite foreign to it, is not immune to this temptation. Though he denies that the Wisdom Literature ‘arose as the products of an academic discipline per se’, he claims that ‘we need not look far afield to find the same sort of phenomenon, in which a recognizable kinship between texts defies precise delimitation, and for which criteria of style or theme cannot be applied in isolation’ (Weeks 2010: 143; cf. 126).

The main problem is that the definition of Wisdom Literature is so vague that it invites interpreters to import their own modern presuppositions into the texts to fill it out. In fact, when scholars start with what some admit is a ‘presumption’ (Hunter 2006: 7) or ‘assumption’ of a ‘subjective nature’ (Crenshaw 1976: 5) that the Wisdom category exists, and that it is primarily composed of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job, they are forced to move to a level of abstraction to justify the grouping that leaves ample room for their own views, as is evident in the category’s nineteenth-century origins. Might the ‘mysterious ingredient’ that Crenshaw (1998: 9) claims holds the category together, in fact, be scholarly presuppositions informed by these nineteenth-century origins? Because little concrete evidence exists, either literarily or historically, to confirm or deny these scholarly suppositions, it is little surprise that these vague, abstract features of Wisdom, such as ‘didactic emphasis’ or ‘humanistic interest’ or ‘focus on creation’, may be found in so many other texts, both in the Hebrew Bible and in the ancient Near Eastern texts (and even in New Testament texts like James). This process enables these unfounded presuppositions to spread virus-like through the canon, transforming texts into Wisdom texts that then contribute to the
definition and spread the contagion. We do not know what Wisdom is, but we see it everywhere, or, perhaps, more accurately, it is because we do not know what Wisdom is that we can see it everywhere.

But, if the modern conception of Wisdom Literature is more a hindrance than a help in understanding the original meaning of the texts, how should Wisdom and the traits which have been associated with it, including didacticism, humanism, and interest in creation, contribute to the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible? I hope to provide a fuller answer to this question in a future monograph, but I will make a preliminary suggestion here. Currently, scholars operate with a narrow (yet unclear) definition of Wisdom based on the shared traits of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job, to which has been added a broad understanding of Wisdom’s influence, in which this narrow understanding is found in texts across the Hebrew Bible. However, because the Wisdom category, even if not jettisoned, must be admitted to stand on quite shaky foundations, the interpretations of texts across the Hebrew Bible built upon it are sure to totter. I would suggest, instead, reversing the approach to Wisdom’s definition and influence. Our understanding of the definition of Wisdom would then be broad, based on the role that the diverse Wisdom traits, which need not be considered distinctive of any one worldview, play in the variety of texts in which they appear. Though broad and diffuse, this definition would be tied closely to the text instead of sitting high in abstraction on a wobbly scaffolding of scholarly presupposition. In this reversal, our understanding of Wisdom’s influence would become narrow. It would not even encompass the whole of texts in which it appears prominently, but only contribute, along with other factors in the Israelite conception of reality, to the interpretation of those texts. This, in effect, would treat wisdom (in the lower-case) as a concept, similar to ‘holiness’ or ‘righteousness’, instead of a genre.

Instead of starting with the ill-defined, circularly justified, modernly developed, and extrinsically imposed corpus of Wisdom Literature for the definition of the idea and then extending the search across the canon, this would involve beginning with the concepts now associated with Wisdom as they appear across the canon, and even throughout the ancient Near Eastern, and then investigating how they contribute to both the so-called Wisdom Literature and other texts as well. This would be more like the interpretation of wisdom and the so-called Wisdom books before the Wisdom category developed. This approach would also solve many of the problems that Weeks notes with the current understanding of Wisdom Literature. It would reflect the fact that arguments for Wisdom influence generally find that influence in texts written before the
Beginning the study of wisdom with its appearance in earlier texts, and then seeing how these ideas have influenced the so-called Wisdom books would better represent the chronology of the composition of the Hebrew Bible. Treating wisdom as a concept instead of a genre would also avoid vexing questions regarding the point at which content associated with wisdom in a text tips the balance and makes something a ‘Wisdom text’. This approach would also reflect the fact that, as Weeks (2010: 142) says, it is ‘difficult to find anything in the wisdom literature as a whole which is not found elsewhere as well’. Additionally, it would fit well the integrated scribal setting he posits for Wisdom on the basis of comparison with ancient Near Eastern cultures. Finally, taking this approach avoids the scholarly speculation that over a century of biblical scholarship has not been able to support with evidence definitive enough to provide scholarly consensus. This approach would admittedly limit our ability to draw conclusions about the historical setting of Wisdom, since the placement of texts into discrete genres is a primary contributing factor to current arguments on that issue, but it is far better to be able to say a few things that can be justified by the evidence we have than a great deal that cannot.

This approach would facilitate the needed reintegration of Wisdom with the rest of the Hebrew Bible after its widespread ‘marginalization’ (see Dell 2006: 188). Even in Proverbs, which is undoubtedly broadly characterized by Wisdom ideas, other features of Israelite religion are still evident and worthy of attention. This would become apparent even if the book were grouped merely with the two apocryphal books, Ben Sira and Wisdom of Solomon, which are most like Proverbs in their positive attitude toward wisdom, and in which Israel’s history and law play prominent roles. This integrative approach would particularly liberate Job’s interpretation from the limitations of its Wisdom classification. As Claus Westermann (1981) argues, the categorization of Job as Wisdom has led to the view that it deals with a philosophical problem, when, in fact, it focuses on an existential struggle to respond to God in the midst of suffering. Here he reflects de Wette’s existential reading of Job in combination with Psalms and Ecclesiastes, and anticipates my own work on allusions to the Psalms in Job (Kynes 2012), which I believe had been at least partially obscured by the Wisdom category. This vital feature of

---

29. As Dell (2006: 14) observes, ‘It is odd that wisdom might have had influence outside, but never itself been influenced from outside.’
30. Weeks (2010: 85) asks this question in regard to the instructions in Tob. 4, but it could be asked for many other texts, including the so-called Wisdom Psalms.
31. E.g. Sir. 44–49 and Wis. 11–19. See Murphy 1967: 108.
the book should be considered alongside its connections to Proverbs. On the other hand, while opening new avenues of interpretation, this approach would limit over-interpretation through Wisdom connections. A text such as Psalm 73, which shares some traits with one or more of the so-called Wisdom books, such as a struggle with retribution, would not need to be assumed to share the setting or any more of the traits now associated with Wisdom Literature.

Behind this approach is the insight succinctly and provocatively expressed by Harold Bloom: ‘There are no texts, but only relationships between texts’ (Bloom 1975: 3, emphasis original). John Barton uses the concept of genre to explain this idea that texts cannot be understood in isolation: ‘unless we can read a text as something—unless we can assign it to some genre, however ill-defined and in need of subsequent refinement—we cannot really read it at all’ (Barton 1996: 24, emphasis original). Genre, at least in its traditional taxonomic formulation, however, is an unwieldy tool for accomplishing this purpose.32 This approach attempts clearly to delineate which texts ‘belong’ to a genre and which do not, but the inevitable ‘betweenness’ of interpretation means that both the textual relationships which are pursued within a genre and those which are overlooked outside of it will have great effect on its results. Genre classification is interpretation because it determines the primary texts between which the meaning of a text is found. Alastair Fowler (1982: 272) gives the example of Hamlet, which ‘has not recovered yet from its grouping with novelistic psychologically motivated literature’, and ‘has become a difficult, even obfuscated, play’.

For this reason, given the fraught nature of Wisdom as a genre, the classifications used before it developed are worth reconsidering. ‘Poetry’ is problematic because distinguishing poetic from non-poetic texts in the Hebrew Bible has its own difficulties. However, even this would be preferable to ‘Wisdom’ because its formal nature does not facilitate the importation of theological assumptions in the same way. In fact, because the ‘Poetry’ category in the canon would then end up basically encompassing anything that is not law, history, or prophecy, as it did for much of the nineteenth century, ‘Writings’ would work even better. The wisdom of this traditional Jewish classification, whether merely an accident of history or not, is evident in its acknowledgment of the idiosyncrasy of the texts it contains. Forcing them into other categories,

32. For discussion of how more recent and more flexible definitions of genre, such as prototype theory, may change the way Wisdom is understood, see B.G. Wright 2010 and Sneed 2011.
whether reading Daniel with the Prophets or Chronicles with the History, or grouping the so-called Wisdom Literature together, risks obscuring that individuality.\textsuperscript{33}

Circumscribing the influence of genre categorization on the interpretation of these texts by emphasizing their individuality does not mean undertaking the impossible task of reading them alone. Instead this broad approach to wisdom would enable new connections to be explored and lost ones to be resurrected and re-evaluated. Given the origins of the Wisdom Literature category and its lack of assured results, it would be wise to consider anew the meaning that may be found between its contents and a broader range of texts.\textsuperscript{34} Perhaps it is time to break the mirror, scattering its shards throughout the Hebrew Bible and the ancient Near East, so that in gathering them again, interpreters might see the true nature of Israelite wisdom instead of merely their own reflections. The result will not be a mirror but a mosaic, which, though it may not be as clear, will likely be more accurate, and, perhaps, more attractive as well.

\textit{Bibliography}

Barton, J.  

Baumgartner, W.  

\textsuperscript{33} The difficulty of categorizing the books within the Writings is evident in the general title given to the collection and in the earliest references, which refer to it vaguely as ‘the other books of our ancestors’ (Sirach prologue) or ‘the Psalms and other books’ (Philo, \textit{Contempl.} 25). See the recent summary of the extensive debate over the category’s origins in Schmid 2012. Though Bernhard Lang (1998) suggests the Writings were an anthology of exemplary texts in four literary genres—Poetry, Wisdom, Historiography, and Novella—he simply assumes the early existence of a Wisdom category consisting of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Job, even as he implicitly acknowledges a ‘sapiential’ Solomonic corpus of Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs would have been more likely at the time (Lang 1998: 51, 54).

\textsuperscript{34} See, e.g., \textit{Reading Job Intertextually} (Dell and Kynes [eds.] 2013), \textit{Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually} (Dell and Kynes [eds.] 2014), and \textit{Reading Proverbs Intertextually} (Dell and Kynes [eds.] forthcoming) in which scholars pursue connections, both thematic and literary, between each book and texts across the canon and beyond.
Perspectives on Israelite Wisdom

Beaulieu, P.-A.  

Bloom, H.  

Bruch, J.F.  
1851  Weisheits-Lehre der Hebräer: Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie (Strasburg: Von Treuttel & Würtz).

Buddeus, J.F.  
1702  Introductio ad historiam philosophiae ebraeorum (Halae an der Saale: Orphanotrophii Glaucha-Halensis).

Cheyne, T.K.  

Crenshaw, J.L.  


Dahler, J.G.  
1810  Denk- und Sittensprüche Salomo’s: Nebst den Abweichungen der Alexandrinischen Uebersetzung ins Teutsche übersetzt (Strasbourg: Amand König).

Davidson, S.  

Davison, W.T.  

Delitzsch, F.  


Dell, K.J.  


Dell, K.J., and W. Kynes (eds.)

2013 Reading Job Intertextually (LHBOTS, 574; New York: T&T Clark International).

2014 Reading Ecclesiastes Intertextually (LHBOTS, 587; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark).

forthcoming Reading Proverbs Intertextually (LHBOTS; New York: Bloomsbury T&T Clark).

Driver, S.R.

1891 An Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament (New York: Scribner’s Sons).

Eissfeldt, O.


Ewald, H.A.


Fowler, A.


Frei, H.W.


Genung, J.F.

1906 The Hebrew Literature of Wisdom in the Light of To-day: A Synthesis (Boston: Houghton Mifflin).

Hunter, A.


Keil, C.F.


Kraus, H.-J.

Kuntz, J.K.  

Kynes, W.  
2012 *My Psalm Has Turned into Weeping: Job’s Dialogue with the Psalms* (BZAW, 437; Berlin: de Gruyter).

Lambert, W.G.  

Lang, B.  

Legaspi, M.C.  

Lichtheim, M.  

Meinhold, J.  

Moore, S.D., and Y. Sherwood  

Murphy, R.E.  

Nöldeke, T.  

Oehler, G.F.  

Peake, A.S. (ed.)  

Rad, G. von  

Reuss, E.  
1881 *Die Geschichte der heiligen Schriften alten Testaments* (Braunschweig: Schwetschke & Sohn).

Rogerson, J.W.  

Schleiermacher, F.

Schmid, K.

Schwienhorst-Schönberger, L.

Scott, R.B.Y.

Seitz, C.R.
2007 Prophecy and Hermeneutics: Toward a New Introduction to the Prophets (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic).

Smend, R.

Sneed, M.

Sneed, M. (ed.)

Umbreit, F.
1826 Commentar über die Sprüche Salomo’s (Heidelberg: J.C.B. Mohr).

Vatke, W.
1835 Die biblische Theologie wissenschaftlich dargestellt (Berlin: Bethge).
1886 Historisch-kritische Einleitung in das Alte Testament (Bonn: Emil Strauss).

Weeks, S.

Westermann, C.

Wette, W.M.L. de
Whybray, R.N.

Williams, R.J.

Wright, B.G., III

Wright, C.H.H.

Zöckler, O.