‘Aliens’ on the Copperbelt: Zambianisation, Nationalism and Non-Zambian Africans in the Mining Industry

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Following Zambia’s independence in 1964, several thousand non-Zambian Africans were identified and progressively removed from the Copperbelt mines as part of a state-driven policy of ‘Zambianisation’. Curiously, this process has been overlooked among the multitude of detailed studies on the mining industry and Zambianisation, which is usually regarded as being about the removal of the industrial colour bar on the mines. This article challenges that perspective by examining the position and fate of non-Zambian African mineworkers, beginning with patterns of labour recruitment established in the colonial period and through the situation following independence to the protracted economic decline in the 1980s. In it I make two arguments. First, Zambian nationalism and the creation of Zambian citizenship were accompanied on the Copperbelt by the identification and exclusion of non-Zambians, in contrast to a strand in the literature which stresses that exclusionary nationalism and xenophobia are relatively recent developments. Second, one of the central and consistent aims of Zambianisation was the removal of ‘alien’ Africans from the mining industry and their replacement with Zambian nationals. This was a key objective of the Zambian government, supported by the mineworkers’ union.
Introduction

Simeon Banda, a laboratory assistant at the mine hospital in Luanshya, had spent almost 30 years in Zambia when his name was added to a list of employees to be removed from the mine as soon as feasibly possible. Although his working life had taken him all over Zambia – before arriving in Luanshya in 1965 he had worked in Kitwe, Lusaka and Kasama – he had been born in Malawi and so was now officially regarded as an alien. Identifying and removing ‘alien Africans’ from the mines was central to the new policy of Zambianisation. Usually, this has been understood to be about the removal of the industrial colour bar which restricted skilled jobs to white workers, yet the implementation of this policy resulted in more black Africans being displaced from the Copperbelt mines than whites. Simeon Banda’s experiences, like those of many thousands of others on the mines, are crucial to how we understand Zambian nationalism and the developments in the mining industry. More broadly, they help us to understand exclusionary politics and citizenship in sub-Saharan Africa.

At independence, Zambia’s new government, and the people within its borders, faced a question common to many newly independent nations: who is a Zambian? The new nation inherited artificially drawn borders and, as in other parts of southern Africa, its demand for labour for mines, factories, farms and domestic work had drawn in migrants from across a vast area beyond these colonial boundaries. Some of these migrants, even those who had lived in Zambia for decades or had been born inside its borders, were deemed non-Zambians. Although

1 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (hereafter ZCCM), 3.2.3B, Aliens engaged from 1 January 1964.
2 The major mine outside the Copperbelt, the Broken Hill/Kabwe Mine, is not included in this article as its workforce was mostly recruited from the region around the mine, which became Zambia’s Central Province. Why labour recruitment patterns at this mine were so different to the rest of the mining industry is a subject best addressed in a separate article.
most scholarly accounts of nationalism concur that ‘it is arguably in the nature of nationalism to distinguish insiders from outsiders’, exactly who is distinguished as an outsider, and when, varies considerably. This article, using the historical case study of the removal of non-Zambian Africans from Zambia’s mining industry, argues that exclusionary politics were developed and deployed at Zambian independence on the Copperbelt. This stands in contrast to a strand of the literature which claims that the emergence of exclusionary politics is a comparatively recent development. The secondary argument, which is detailed in the section below, is a reassessment of the significance of the policy of Zambianisation.

Exclusionary politics – politics which justify the exclusion, suppression or expulsion of people identified as strangers who are perceived to be a threat – has generated a considerable literature, with much of this literature that concerns southern Africa written in response to the wave of xenophobic violence in South Africa in May 2008, during which 62 people were killed and tens of thousands displaced. Xenophobia, and exclusionary nationalism in Africa more generally, have often been presented as relatively recent developments, rooted in newly salient autochthonous claims and in the context of declining economic resources. Michael Neocosmos’ influential account of xenophobia in South Africa, for instance, situated ‘xenophobia’s conditions of existence … in the politics of post-apartheid nationalism’ and the fear that foreign nationals would overwhelm the country and render the gains of the liberation

movement irrelevant. Norbert Kersting uses this xenophobic violence to identify the emergence of a ‘second nationalism’ in the 1990s, which was directed ‘against denizens … living within an African state’ and so was distinguished from the ‘first phase of nationalism’ which was inclusive and directed against colonial powers. Dirk Kohnert makes the same claim: that this ‘new nationalism’ has ‘remarkable differences’ with nationalism in the 1960s, as the former is exclusionary while the latter was inclusive.

Some scholars see events in the 1990s as crucial for the emergence of exclusionary nationalism and other forms of xenophobia, and as representing ‘a radical break with the former period’. Democratisation in the early 1990s, for instance, seemed ‘to trigger a general obsession with autochthony and ethnic citizenship invariably defined against “strangers”’ and the ‘intensification of the politics of belonging’, according to Peter Geschiere and Francis Nyamnjoh. Geschiere reiterated this argument in a more recent work, arguing that in many African countries democratisation ‘inspired, quite unexpectedly, determined efforts towards closure in order to exclude certain groups’, and he contrasts these practices with efforts ‘to shape a national citizenry’ in the 1960s and 1970s of which ‘now little remains’. This focus on the very recent past, and on the period of democratisation, is also evident in the work done on citizenship and exclusionary politics in Zambia, which has concentrated ‘almost entirely

7 M. Neocosmos, From ‘Foreign Natives’ to ‘Native Foreigners’: Explaining Xenophobia in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Citizenship and Nationalism, Identity and Politics (Dakar, CODESRIA, 2010), pp. xi, 114.
10 Fourchard and Segatti, ‘Introduction of Xenophobia and Citizenship’, p. 4. The authors also point out that other scholars emphasise continuity from the post-independence period to the 2000s.
around the somewhat esoteric question of the place of birth of the fathers of senior political figures’ since the restoration of multiparty politics in 1991.  

Along with the period of democratisation, economic crises are seen as crucial for fostering the growth of exclusionary politics and autochthonous claims, and some, such as Beth Whitaker, connect the upsurge of conflict around citizenship since the 1990s to both political and economic liberalisation. In a major edited collection, Sara Dorman, Daniel Hammett and Paul Nugent argue that exclusionary politics ‘became more pronounced at times of political or economic crisis’, as well as ‘against a backdrop of acute economic distress and state reconstruction’. ‘Possibilities for categorising non-nationals’, argues Donald Donham in his work on violence among African miners during South Africa’s transition to majority rule, change ‘in an economic context that does not provide much improvement for the bottom half of society’. Similarly, James Muzondidya connects the politicisation of citizenship in Zimbabwe during the 2000s and the exclusion of descendants of labour migrants from neighbouring countries with efforts by the government to deal with the country’s severe economic crisis.

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13 S. Dorman, ‘Citizenship in Africa’, p. 165. Former president Kenneth Kaunda was barred from standing in the 1996 presidential election and, briefly, stripped of his Zambian citizenship because his parents were born in Malawi, and his successor, Frederick Chiluba, had his citizenship challenged in the courts on the grounds that he had been born in the Democratic Republic of Congo.


15 Dorman, Hammett and Nugent (eds), Making Nations, pp. 4, 8.


Examining the position and fate of the thousands of non-Zambian African mineworkers before and after Zambian independence demonstrates that exclusionary politics existed from the beginning of the new nation. National citizenship, in Zambia and elsewhere, was a way of determining who belonged and who did not belong to the new nation, but it was more than membership of a new political community, with members being accorded political rights and responsibilities. Citizenship also became a means to distribute economic opportunities, and on the mines concerted efforts were made to restrict those opportunities to those who could claim citizenship. Although virtually everyone working on the Copperbelt mines in the 1960s and 1970s was a migrant, or the descendant of very recent migrants, some were quickly identified as outsiders and a threat to be removed. The question of who was, and who was not, a Zambian was not easily resolved, and those whose identities were rendered unclear in the eyes of the state by migration, mixed parentage or lack of documents were excluded.

This has implications for how we understand developments on the Copperbelt, which have often been seen as emblematic of the emergence of class consciousness among African workers.18 Although in this period African mineworkers had a clear sense of their own political and economic interests that were separate from, and in conflict with, the interests of their employers and the state, the existence of these class divisions did not preclude the formation of national divisions within the workforce. The Mineworkers’ Union of Zambia (MUZ) actively pressed for the removal of non-Zambian Africans and supported the government’s policies aimed at bringing this about, while the mining companies operating in Zambia – Roan Selection Trust and Zambian Anglo American – remained non-committal. It is to the literature on these mineworkers that I now turn.

Defining and Understanding Zambianisation

Zambianisation has usually been understood as the continuation of a colonial-era policy known as ‘African advancement’, which was the term used to describe the struggles and negotiations around the removal of the colour bar. Unlike South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, the colour bar on the Copperbelt mines was never enforced by legislation. An industrial colour bar operated nonetheless which limited all skilled jobs and some semi-skilled jobs to men of European descent. This was the result of an agreement reached between the mining companies and the white mineworkers’ union in 1941, and it remained in force, in one form or another, until 1964. Both mining companies sought first to resist this agreement, then to overturn it and impose their vision of African advancement on the mines, whereby African workers would perform work hitherto done by white workers but for considerably lower wages. Understandably, many African mineworkers themselves opposed this, and the African mineworkers’ union pushed for African advancement that involved better pay and expanded employment opportunities for its members.

Possibilities and policies changed around the time of Zambian independence. Restructuring the mining workforce was now referred to as ‘Zambianisation’, a process that scholars have understood as the removal of the colour bar and essentially a continuation of African advancement policies. This understanding has passed into the wider literature on the

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Copperbelt.\textsuperscript{21} Michael Burawoy’s landmark contemporary study of Zambianisation, \textit{The Colour of Class}, was influential in this regard. His study focused on ‘whether, how and why the colour bar was being reproduced’ in the mining industry after Zambian independence and on the role of class forces within Zambia.\textsuperscript{22} Both the initial study and Burawoy’s retrospective article on the study examined how Zambians replaced whites, as well as the concurrent reorganisation of work and authority on the mines, which he argued kept the colour bar intact. Charles Perrings stated the same argument more explicitly, including a claim that the government was not involved in the plans for Zambianisation:

The labour policies referred to as Zambianisation were, for one thing, no more than a logical extension of the policies referred to by the term ‘African Advancement’… They were not a radical departure nor were they worked out in the offices of the government.\textsuperscript{23}

Zambianisation, in this view, is understood as the removal of racialised hierarchies and working practices which prevented Africans from undertaking skilled, technical and supervisory work, a process planned and executed by the mining companies until the industry was entirely nationalised in 1974. Interestingly, one of Burawoy’s informants, a young mineworker who joined the mines after independence, suggested that he had a different understanding of Zambianisation, one grounded in the new national differences: ‘I have heard

\textsuperscript{21} James Ferguson defined Zambianisation as ‘the long-established policy of independent Zambia to seek the gradual replacement of white expatriate management with qualified black Zambians’, J. Ferguson, \textit{Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt} (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), p. 12.


of Zambianisation. It does not affect me much. Only those who are educated worry about it. I can work with anyone, be they Tanzanian or Congolese’.24

Burawoy, however, did not pursue the point. This reflects a broader trend in the literature whereby the position and fate of non-Zambian Africans in the mining industry has been referenced only occasionally. Philip Daniel mentions in passing that Zambia’s post-independence government insisted that Zambianisation should not simply mean ‘Africanisation’, and therefore the process involved a steady reduction of the number of non-Zambian Africans working on the mines.25 More recently, Miles Larmer briefly mentions that Zambian independence involved ‘an ahistorical assertion of fixed national identities’ and consequent demands from the government that Zambianisation involve the replacement of white mineworkers with Zambians, not with black Africans.26

Part of this neglect may be due to the fact that divisions in the mining workforce along (new) national lines sat uneasily with the prevailing view that a combative sense of class consciousness developed in the late colonial period – what Jane Parpart termed ‘the gradual emergence among the African mineworkers of a common identity and unity of purpose on class lines’ in the 1940s and 1950s.27 Researchers during the colonial period, influenced by

24 Burawoy, Colour of Class, p. 72.
teleological modernist ideas that developments on the Copperbelt would follow patterns already established in Europe and North America, first identified and emphasised this trend. Max Gluckman, for instance, argued that strikes by African mineworkers during 1956 against the recognition of the Mines African Staff Association, a breakaway union for African clerical and supervisory workers, ‘brought into the open the emergence within the African urban population of affiliations based on what we can call “class principles”’.  

A reassessment of this view of the Copperbelt’s history is overdue. Many mineworkers in the post-independence period adopted national reference points to make their claims, and class formation was shaped by the new national context. Moreover, more recent work has pointed to the emergence of localised dynamics of inclusion and exclusion around employment on copper mines in what is known as the ‘new Copperbelt’ in North-Western Province, where Kaonde chiefs have sought to limit mining employment to local Kaonde people. There are also obvious parallels elsewhere in the region. Just across the border in Katanga in the early 1960s, Katangese secessionists agitated against the presence and perceived predominance of Kasaian migrants who had come to work in the mining industry in large numbers. Although Kasaians worked in Katanga for decades, they were regarded as outsiders and not ‘authentic’ Katangans. Notably, Kasaians tended ‘to occupy not only the most skilled positions in the mining and railroad industries such as welders and train conductors and mechanics, but also


the most senior white-collar positions available to blacks’.  


from the area. By 1930, 38.5 per cent of the total workforce on the mine was from Nyasaland.\footnote{36 J. McCracken, \textit{A History of Malawi, 1855–1966} (Woodbridge, James Currey, 2012), p. 182.}

Similarly, in early 1930, Mufulira Mine, where development work had also just begun, transported 200 African workers from Umtali (now Mutare) to the mine on a goods train.\footnote{37 ZCCM 16.2.7F, District Superintendent, Livingstone to Station Master, Luanshya, 22 January 1930.}

These workers were originally from Nyasaland and Mozambique and had experience working on mines in Southern Rhodesia. Shared recruitment strategies were formalised in 1931 when all the mines merged their recruitment organisations into one body: the Native Labour Association. As the name suggests, this was modelled on the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association, which recruited labour for South Africa’s gold mines.

Rapidly though, the Copperbelt mines began to diverge from the historical experience of labour migration in South Africa. Active recruitment ceased in 1931 during the Great Depression, when the mines laid off the bulk of their workforces, and did not resume when the industry revived. By then, the mines could satisfy their labour demands from voluntary labour, as other sources of employment within the colony remained scarce and large numbers of Africans arrived at the mines seeking work. Even in the final year of active recruitment, Roan Antelope actively recruited only 1,827 African workers, whereas they hired 4,591 from among those who travelled to the mine themselves.\footnote{38 ZCCM 16.2.7F, C.F. Spearpoint to General Manager, Roan Antelope, 16 September 1936.}


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Increasingly, the mines sought to reduce their labour turnover and retain a stabilised African workforce, rather than relying on migrant labour. In early 1931, Harold Munroe, chair of the Native Labour Association, proposed this solution to the mine’s labour problems: instead of recruiting short-term migrant labour, Munroe envisaged ‘the permanent migration of a number of natives with their families [from Nyasaland] and their settlement in the immediate vicinity of the mines’. The Colonial Office refused his request, thus delaying provision for a settled urban workforce on the Copperbelt until after the Second World War.

It is telling that Munroe specifically sought labour from Nyasaland. Both mining companies believed that African workers from Nyasaland ‘had shown a high degree of skill and they could easily be trained’, therefore prioritising their recruitment. On this basis, skilled African workers, some of whom had previous experience working on the Rand, were recruited from Nyasaland from the early 1930s. There was some truth to this stereotype of Nyasaland workers. The spread of Christian missionary education in Nyasaland from the 1870s gave Africans from the colony ‘an early advantage in the regional labour market’. Across the region, workers from Malawi sought and obtained semi-skilled work and secured a relatively privileged position in the colonial labour force.

However, the Northern Rhodesia government encouraged the recruitment of African workers from within the territory to increase tax revenues, which were reduced by Africans leaving Northern Rhodesia to seek work elsewhere. Consequently, from the early 1930s the government pressured the mining companies to reduce their reliance on African labour from

40 The National Archives, London (hereafter TNA), CO 795/43/5, H.S. Munroe to Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 January 1931.
41 TNA CO 852/257/6, Notes of a Meeting Held in Mr Boyd’s Room, 14 September 1939.
42 Daniel, Africanisation, p. 64.
outside Northern Rhodesia and signed agreements with neighbouring colonial governments to attempt to regulate the flow of labour. This had some success and by 1934, Africans from outside the territory had fallen to 18.5 per cent of the workforce at Roan Antelope and 12 per cent at Nkana. The term ‘alien African’ first emerged in these debates and it is worth noting that that the term, which was used extensively in discussions about mining labour after Zambian independence, was a colonial one. The colonial administration considered any African not indigenous to Northern Rhodesia or who did not come under the authority of a recognised Northern Rhodesian chief to be an alien.

Recruitment patterns and the structure of the workforce established by the 1940s endured until Zambian independence. Most of the African workforce came from within the territory with a substantial minority from neighbouring colonies and a white workforce drawn from mining centres around the world. In October 1948, shortly before the onset of the lengthy copper boom, Africans from outside Northern Rhodesia constituted 21.4 per cent of the African workforce on the Copperbelt mines, a figure that would remain relatively constant until 1964.

Post-war constitutional developments bolstered recruitment from Nyasaland as Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were grouped together to form the Central African Federation in 1953, in which Nyasaland was intended to function primarily as a labour reserve for the Federation’s other territories.

There is some indication that mineworkers from Nyasaland were in a relatively privileged position on the mines, either because of better education or colonial stereotypes about their proficiency. In 1959, Roan Antelope Mine conducted a detailed statistical survey

44 ZCCM 16.2.7F, Annual Report on Native Affairs, 1936.
45 ZCCM 16.2.7F, C.F. Spearpoint to Acting General Manager, Roan Antelope 22 December 1934.
46 National Archives of Zambia (hereafter ZNA), SEC1/1318, Origin of Labour Employed in the Mines and Works of Northern Rhodesia, October 1948.
on their 7,925-strong African workforce, though this survey was not a typical picture of the mine’s workforce during the late colonial period. Following a slump in copper prices, all Copperbelt mines laid off large numbers of African workers in 1958. It is likely that Africans from outside the Central African Federation were sacked first, as their share of the workforce declined from 13 per cent in 1957 to 7.8 per cent in 1959. According to the survey, 10.1 per cent of the African workforce was from Nyasaland, and a total of 18.6 per cent of the mine’s African workforce came from outside Northern Rhodesia. The African workforce was grouped into 13 grades and, significantly, workers from Nyasaland were over-represented in the higher grades. In grades 9 to 13, 13.8 per cent of workers came from Nyasaland.47 The real, or perceived, predominance of workers from Nyasaland in more skilled and better-paid positions would emerge as a major issue following Zambian independence.

The mining companies did not, for the most part, treat Africans from outside Northern Rhodesia as a separate component of the workforce. The primary division within the mining workforce was a racial one between white and African workers. Although the colonial administration distinguished ‘alien’ Africans in discussions about labour, the mining companies did not. African workers from outside Northern Rhodesia performed the same jobs, received the same pay and were housed in the same accommodation as African workers from within Northern Rhodesia. They were also members of the same union, and it was not uncommon for mineworkers from Nyasaland and Tanganyika to serve as union officials in the 1950s. The sense of Zambian identity that was articulated at independence was one seemingly at odds with the identities fostered on the mines during the colonial period.

‘Alien’ Africans after Zambian Independence

Political independence placed some population groups in new African states in an ambiguous position, especially those that had received relatively favourable treatment from colonial rulers. Even in states where the governing nationalist ideology is regarded as relatively benign or inclusive, exclusionary measures were put in place. However, much of the critical work on this nationalism has focused on the emergence and operation of racial nationalism.\textsuperscript{48} In Zambia, black Africans were the targets of exclusionary politics, so this was not a racial or ethnic nationalism. Efforts to remove non-Zambian Africans from the mines also cut across ethnic ties. Mineworkers from Malawi had a common language and ethnic ties with mineworkers from Zambia’s Eastern Province – a substantial source of mining labour in the 1950s and 1960s. Although those living near the border reported that they could not distinguish between Malawians and Zambians, a sharp distinction was made on the mines.\textsuperscript{49}

African mineworkers from outside Zambia could reasonably feel that their future was looking brighter at independence. Independence year 1964 saw the beginning of an economic boom as copper prices rose and output in Zambia surged from 568,000 tonnes in 1963 to 720,000 tonnes in 1969.\textsuperscript{50} Employment on the mines increased as well. The African workforce on the Copperbelt mines was roughly the same size in 1963 (36,946) as it had been in 1952 (36,668) but rose steadily following independence, reaching 43,500 in 1969.\textsuperscript{51} It might seem an unlikely moment for exclusionary politics to emerge, and, as discussed previously, the

\textsuperscript{51} Daniel, \textit{Africanisation}, p. 107.
scholarly literature describes an association between economic decline or crisis and the emergence of exclusionary politics.

Yet the composition of the mining workforce changed markedly following independence. In January 1964, an estimated 62 per cent of the mine’s workforce consisted of Africans from Northern Rhodesia, 20.8 per cent were ‘alien Africans’ and 17.2 per cent were white.\textsuperscript{52} By December 1971, 79.3 per cent of workforce were Zambian Africans, 11.7 per cent were ‘alien Africans’ and 9.6 per cent were white.\textsuperscript{53} Although care is needed with these apparently objective statistics, as there were no clear-cut definitions available on who was and who was not a Zambian, the trend is distinct. The number of non-Zambian Africans fell from 9,276 to 5,824, a sharper decline than that experienced by the white workforce, which was supposedly the main target of Zambianisation. How did this come about?

Part of the answer lies in the growth of employment opportunities on the mines and the relative dearth of opportunities in other parts of the economy. Mining was the largest source of formal sector jobs in Zambia. Although employment in other sectors increased following independence – notably manufacturing employment rose from 16,356 in 1963 to 32,440 in 1969 – average wages for African mineworkers were almost double the national average.\textsuperscript{54} Relatively high wages and the removal of colonial laws restricting mobility helps explain the rapid influx of people to urban centres on the Copperbelt after independence. The region’s population rose dramatically from 543,465 in 1963 to 816,309 in 1969, an annual rate of

\textsuperscript{52} This is an estimate as the figures on the number of African workers taken from Daniel, \textit{Africanisation} p. 105 come from January 1964 while the figures for white workers represent an average from across 1963, taken from the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry 1966 (Lusaka, Government Printer, 1966), p. 160.
\textsuperscript{53} Daniel, \textit{Africanisation}, pp. 105, 133.
\textsuperscript{54} ZNA, Shelf 10, Box 45, Monthly Digest of Statistics, February 1972.
increase of 7 per cent, compared to a national annual population increase of 2.5 per cent.\textsuperscript{55} Most of this increase came from people migrating from Northern and Luapula Provinces.

Competition for mining jobs grew as these jobs became more attractive. African mineworkers’ industrial militancy led to rising wages and directly challenged the new government’s policy of wage restraint. The most serious and successful challenge to wage restraint came in April 1966, when African mineworkers embarked on wildcat strike action against a pay deal signed by their union’s leadership. This initiated months of industrial unrest.\textsuperscript{56} Although African mineworkers received higher wages than other African workers, they compared their wages to those received by white mineworkers, which were considerably higher. The outcome of the strikes was a commission of inquiry (the Brown Commission) into the disparity between the pay and conditions of African mineworkers and white mineworkers. The Commission’s report recommended an immediate 22 per cent pay increase for African mineworkers, which was quickly awarded.\textsuperscript{57}

Industrial unrest was an important context for the subsequent push to remove non-Zambian Africans from the mining industry. The Brown Commission also recommended that government be actively involved in planning Zambianisation, and in November 1966, a Zambianisation Committee for the Mining Industry was formed comprised of representatives from various government ministries, the mining industry and the mining unions.\textsuperscript{58} The first meeting in January 1967 mostly involved discussions about the scope of the committee’s power


\textsuperscript{57} Commission of Inquiry into the Mining Industry 1966, pp. 45, 73.

\textsuperscript{58} ZNA MLSS1/18/3, Ministry of Labour Press Release, 19 November 1966.
and forecasts for Zambianisation. It was only at subsequent meetings that the issue of non-Zambian Africans was raised and emphasised.59

Pressure to remove non-Zambian Africans came from both government and MUZ. For the government, it was an easy way to satisfy mineworkers’ demands and win support without further derailing its policy of wage restraint. Pressure from MUZ seems more counter-intuitive as mineworkers born in Malawi had played an active role in the union since it was founded. Nevertheless, there were exclusionary nationalist politics within the union. After being ejected from the union in 1960, Lawrence Katilungu, leader of the union in the 1950s, attempted to delegitimise Kenneth Kaunda by highlighting his Malawian ancestry. The ruling United National Independence Party also contributed to this style of politics by distributing propaganda during the union’s branch elections in February 1966 that claimed that the union was run by Malawians.60

Moreover, the union came under pressure from its members. In February 1967, the Chibuluma branch of the Mines Local Staff Association, which merged with other mining unions to form MUZ that same month, sent a litany of complaints to the Ministry of Labour about ‘aliens’ on the mine. Key among their demands was that the promotion of ‘alien Africans’ had to cease ‘in order to stop causing bitterness among Zambians’ and because their promotion was contrary to the ‘essence’ of Zambianisation. The branch named eight men, including seven from Malawi, who had been promoted ‘illegitimately’ in this way. They also implausibly claimed the men had secured promotion by bribing highly paid white mine officials with low-

value items such as 200 pounds of rice and a pair of trousers. One of the men named was a Zambian national, but union officials insisted that his citizenship had been forged.61

Similar sentiments were expressed at the first meeting held between a MUZ delegation and Minister of Labour Munukayumbwa Sipalo. Sipalo explained to MUZ that official policy meant ‘first and foremost to look after the interests of Zambians’. Henceforth, the promotion of non-Zambian Africans would be allowed only with the permission of the Minister, and any non-Zambian Africans in training for skilled jobs would be removed from the training courses. The position of ‘aliens’ in the mining industry would be carefully monitored and the mining companies would be required to produce lists of all non-Zambian African employees in skilled and supervisory positions. MUZ leaders welcomed this policy and argued that ‘Zambia was a rich country and whereas Zambians would not go out in large numbers for jobs the aliens came to Zambia in thousands. Government should watch the fact that some applications for citizenship were not genuine’. Sipalo concluded by noting ‘[n]o publicity required – the matter would be handled quietly’ and, unconvincingly, that ‘we are Pan-Africanists’.62

The mining companies expressed disquiet over these proposals rather than serious opposition. The proposals cut across the new employment structure that both companies had implemented in 1964 and, significantly, ran contrary to the identities seemingly fostered by that employment structure. The new structure graded all employees either as ‘local’ or ‘expatriate’. The distinction was a racial one. All Africans – even those from Malawi, Tanzania and elsewhere – were graded as ‘locals’ and all whites – even those born on the Copperbelt – were graded as ‘expatriates’.63 Despite grading all African workers as locals, the mining

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61 ZNA MLSS1/18/3, Memorandum, Mines Local Staff Association – Chibuluma, February 1967.
62 Ibid., record of meeting, 14 March 1967.
companies duly produced lists of skilled non-Zambian African employees. These lists included individuals who had been in Zambia since the late 1940s, some of whom had attended school on the Copperbelt and even some employees who had been born in Zambia. The position for unskilled employees, who do not appear on the lists, was considerably worse. The chief immigration officer decided that the employment of all non-Zambians in unskilled positions be terminated and that they be ordered to leave the country.

The government’s request for these lists, and the general policy of removing non-Zambian Africans, presupposed that government and the mining companies could reliably distinguish between a Zambian and a non-Zambian. This was not an easy task. Article 3 (1) of Zambia’s new constitution declared, ‘Every person who having been born in the former Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia, is on the 23rd October 1964, a British protected person SHALL become a citizen of Zambia on the 24th October 1964’. Furthermore, any person born outside Zambia’s borders, but whose father was born within Zambia’s borders, became a Zambian citizen. Jeffrey Herbst notes that granting citizenship based on descent, regardless of the location of birth, is usually associated with efforts ‘to promote a heightened sense of nationality’. He also notes that this was a deliberate decision by the Zambian government as it differed from Britain’s citizenship rules, whereas most other African states adopted the citizenship laws of their former colonial power.

There were two problems with this definition. The first is that birth records were patchy at best. Some mineworkers claimed they had been born in Zambia but possessed no documents

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64 ZCCM 3.2.3B, RST – Luanshya Division, Foreign Local Section & Shift Bosses.
65 Ibid., Letter from Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs to Copper Industry Service Bureau, 30 May 1967.
to prove it so were instead listed as being from Congo, Malawi, Tanzania and Portuguese West Africa.\textsuperscript{68} When Rhokana Mine interviewed all non-Zambian Africans employed as shift bosses on the mine they found that 23 men claimed to be Zambian citizens but could not produce any evidence other than a Zambian citizen registration card, which was insufficient. Even more confusingly, ‘a further four men produced Zambian Citizen Registration Cards and yet accepted that they were Aliens’.\textsuperscript{69} The second problem was that the emphasis on patrilineal descent excluded some people who did have documentary evidence of their birth but whose fathers were not regarded as Zambian. Two nursing assistants at the mine hospital in Luanshya, Gladys Mwalima and Thabani Mwalima, had been born in Broken Hill (Kabwe) to Zambian mothers and Zimbabwean fathers. Although both had been born in Zambia and had lived there for many years, neither had a passport or work permit so were categorised as aliens.\textsuperscript{70}

Policy towards non-Zambian Africans was tightened during 1967 and recruitment of non-Zambian Africans for any job on the mines was banned.\textsuperscript{71} MUZ monitored the situation closely. In December 1967, MUZ branches across the Copperbelt approached mine managers to demand figures on the numbers of Zambians and the ‘total number of aliens occupying senior posts’.\textsuperscript{72} It appears that MUZ members were pushing their branches to take action, and some mine managers thought local branch leaderships ‘are being pressed hard by their older men to force us to block aliens for promotion’.\textsuperscript{73} Both mining companies had already assured the government ‘that in no case would an Alien be promoted if a suitable Zambian was available’, assurances that were accepted with the caveat that ‘the Mine Unions would keep a vigilant eye

\textsuperscript{68} ZCCM 3.2.3B, RST – Luanshya Division, Foreign Local Section & Shift Bosses.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid., D.A. Etheredge, Anglo American to C. Halliday, RST, 13 May 1967.
\textsuperscript{70} Ibid., List of Nurses of Rhodesian Origin, 13 September 1966.
\textsuperscript{71} ZCCM 14.1.3A, Ministry of Labour, Circular Minute, 18 August 1967.
\textsuperscript{72} ZCCM 3.2.3B, CISBEE, Kitwe to Graywacke, Mufilira, 21 December 1967.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., Roan Antelope, Luanshya to CISBEE, Kitwe, 21 December 1967.
on the promotions of Aliens. MUZ was clearly making good on this pledge. However, in an indication of government priorities, expatriates continued to be recruited for and promoted into these positions. In August 1967, for instance, the companies reported that they had recruited six new expatriates as shift bosses, and this was accepted by government.

The Zambianisation Committee met regularly through 1968 and 1969 and continued to press for the removal of non-Zambian Africans. The measures implemented were successful. By June 1969, the proportion of non-Zambian Africans had fallen to 15.3 per cent of the Copperbelt’s mining workforce. Some of this decline may be attributable to people from Malawi, Tanzania and elsewhere taking up Zambian citizenship. Individuals on the lists of skilled non-Zambian African mineworkers occasionally have notes attached that they intend to apply for Zambian citizenship and there are a few copies of renunciations of Malawian citizenship on file. However, this accounts for only a small number. The 1969 census found there were 12,853 male Tanzanian citizens in Zambia and 13,906 males who had been born in Tanzania and 31,797 male Malawian citizens but only 30,106 men who had been born in Malawi. This meant that some men born in Zambia held Malawian, not Zambian, citizenship. It is more likely that non-Zambian Africans were pushed out of the mining industry, either resigning as promotion was permanently blocked or by being removed from Zambia. Many non-Zambian Africans who left the country on leave found themselves unable to re-enter Zambia. The mining companies consequently discharged them.

74 ZNA CO10/01/4, Minutes of the Committee on Zambianisation in the Mining Industry, 20 September 1967.
75 Ibid., Minutes of the Committee on Zambianisation in the Mining Industry, 29 August 1967.
76 ZCCM 3.2.3B, Quarterly Summary of Alien Local Labour Employed.
77 Ibid., Declaration of Renunciation of Citizenship of Malawi, Frank Mkwanazi, 21 November 1966.
78 Figures at a provincial level are not available. Figures are only given for males here as almost all mineworkers were male at this time. Central Statistical Office, Census of Population and Housing Volume I – Total Zambia (Lusaka, Central Statistical Office, 1973), pp. 18, 23.
79 ZCCM 3.2.3B, Assistant Personnel Manager to Sectional Personnel Heads, Roan Antelope, 16 October 1968.
Nationalisation and Economic Decline

In January 1970, the mining industry was partially nationalised when the government acquired a 51 per cent stake in both mining companies, though little changed at first as these same companies were awarded generous contracts to manage the mines and sell the copper produced. Under the management contract, the companies retained control of labour policy and recruitment. The situation lasted only three years. Management and sales contracts were terminated in late 1973, and the government took full control of the industry. Mines operated by Anglo American became the Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) division while those operated by the Rhodesian Selection Trust became Roan Copper Mines (RCM) division. The timing proved disastrous. Copper prices collapsed in 1975 and did not recover for decades, crippling the Zambian economy.

The policy of reducing non-Zambian African employment continued steadily through boom and bust, and economic decline does not seem to have accelerated progress. Significantly, the policy was pursued even when it hindered the more often stated aim of Zambianisation: reducing the number of white expatriates in the mining industry. The number of expatriate workers remained stubbornly high. In 1968, the Zambianisation Committee forecast that the number of expatriate employees would decline to 3,774 in December 1970 and 3,168 in December 1972. In fact, there were still 4,375 expatriates on the mines in 1970 and their numbers had actually increased to 4,600 by 1972, nine per cent of the total workforce in both years. Change among senior technical and managerial staff seemed glacially slow. In April 1973, there were only 33 Africans among the 282 senior staff at Rhokana Mine, and all

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of them were Zambian nationals.\textsuperscript{82} Reports from government and the mining industry during this period repeatedly lamented a shortage of skilled and qualified Africans, yet the Zambian government continued to block the promotion of non-Zambian Africans and was willing to let their skills remain under-utilised.

Examining employment trends at Rhokana Mine – whose workforce contained one of the highest proportions of non-Zambian Africans on the Copperbelt in 1967 – shows that the removal of non-Zambian Africans was consistent before and after nationalisation. Although the data are incomplete, Figure 1 illustrates a definite trend: a steady reduction in both the total number of non-Zambian Africans working on the mine and their share of the total workforce.

\begin{center}
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\end{center}

\textbf{Figure 1.} Non-Zambian Africans employed at Rhokana Mine, 1967–1978. \textit{Sources:} see note.\textsuperscript{83}

By the end of the decade, non-Zambian Africans tended to be clustered lower down the occupational hierarchy of the African workforce than previously. In 1978, the three divisions

\textsuperscript{82} ZCCM T8.2A, Rokana Senior Staff Employment Returns for April 1973.

of technical and managerial staff contained the lowest proportions of non-Zambian African employees: RCM and NCCM Central Service Divisions, where they constituted 1.2 per cent and 3.1 per cent of the workforce, and the Copperbelt Industry Service Bureau, where they constituted 2.7 per cent. Collectively, the Copperbelt mines employed 4,481 non-Zambian Africans in 1978, 8.2 per cent of the overall workforce.84

Prohibiting promotion for non-Zambian Africans and efforts to push them out of the industry were not the only ways that their numbers were reduced. Substantial changes in recruitment patterns also had a major impact. The closure of Kalengwa Mine in 1977 revealed the resulting changes to the structure of the workforce. Kalengwa Mine had opened in 1970 in North-Western Province, 320 kilometres to the west of the Copperbelt on what is now known as the ‘new Copperbelt’. It was an open pit mine, small by Copperbelt standards, but its 1.23 million tonnes of ore reserves were 6.67 per cent copper, the highest grade of any mine in Zambia.85 Despite these riches, in November 1977, RCM Division announced that the mine would close due to persistently low copper prices and halted operations.86 Redundancies began the following month. It is striking that among the 254 mineworkers laid off in the first tranche, all were Zambian except one, a 42-year old mechanic named Takahamba Cotton who was listed as ‘Rhodesian’. Moreover, most mineworkers were from the nearby rural districts of Kasempa, Kabompo and Solwezi and had joined the mine in the mid 1970s, whereas Cotton had worked in the Zambian mining industry since before independence.87 Sixteen employees at the open pit were expatriates and, as expatriate labour had become scarce by this time, all were

84 ZCCM 1.3.4J, Number and Percentage of Alien African Employees as at 28 February 1978.
87 ZCCM 1.3.4J, Chibuluma Division, Kalengwa Mine, December 1977.
redeployed to other mines.\textsuperscript{88} Fifteen years earlier, it would have been unthinkable that such a small proportion of the workforce on a mine was from outside Zambia.

At the same time, exploration activity was curtailed and the geological services department based at Kalulushi closed. An analysis of the 61 employees made redundant by this decision reveals a slightly different picture to that at Kalengwa but still significantly different to the Copperbelt workforce of the early 1960s. Those made redundant included five expatriates, one employee from Tanzania and two from Malawi, a higher proportion than at Kalengwa but still much lower than in previous decades. The three non-Zambian Africans had begun working in the Copperbelt mining industry in the 1950s and had significantly more experience than almost all the Zambian employees.\textsuperscript{89}

In 1982, the government merged RCM and NCCM to form Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), creating what was then the world’s second-largest copper producer. Economies of scale, more co-ordinated capital expenditure and better deployment of scarce technical skills were all identified by government as benefits from the merger, as was the continued removal of non-Zambian Africans.\textsuperscript{90} All ZCCM divisions formed Zambianisation committees, and government ministers emphasised that these should work to remove non-Zambian Africans. Following ZCCM’s creation, Cosmas Masongo, Minister of Labour and chair of the Zambianisation Committee, called for all 2,990 ‘alien Africans’ to be removed from the mines as his ministry had established that their jobs ‘could be done by local people’. Expatriate workers, he argued, should continue to be recruited, however.\textsuperscript{91} The number of white expatriates had fallen to almost negligible levels by this time as ZCCM struggled to recruit new

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., Telex from Copper Industry Service Bureau, Kitwe to RCM, Lusaka, 31 March 1978.
\textsuperscript{89} ZCCM 1.3.4J, Chibuluma Division, Redundant Labour – Geological Services Departments, December 1977.
\textsuperscript{90} ZCCM 11.7.9C, Merger Benefits Plans, Annex 5.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Alien Miners Must Go’, \textit{Times of Zambia}, 2 October 1982.
expatriate workers and because the category of ‘expatriate’ had been de-racialised. Most of the 2,102 expatriates on the mines in 1983 had been recruited from Britain but the three next most common countries of origin were India, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. There were also a handful of employees from other African nations, including a Malawian and a Tanzanian national graded as expatriates.92

Consolidation in the mining industry failed to halt the decline. Copper prices remained stubbornly low and did not recover to the levels of the early 1970s until the early 2000s. The mines accumulated enormous debts and were crippled by under-investment as mining became more technically challenging. No new mines were opened in the ZCCM-era, exploration virtually ceased and proven ore reserves were steadily depleted. Zambia was heavily dependent on mining, and the slump in mining activity dragged down the rest of the economy. According to the World Bank, GNP per capita shrunk by an average of 3.1 per cent every year from 1980 to 1993, and Zambia became one of the world’s poorest countries.93

Resources were diverted from ZCCM to fund other economic projects or were misappropriated by politicians. One consequence of this was the declining institutional capacity of ZCCM. Record keeping became more haphazard, and the level of statistical detail available for the mining workforce in the 1960s and 1970s is not available for the 1980s. Figures on the number of non-Zambian African employees were calculated only intermittently, though this is not to suggest that efforts to remove them were halted. The World Bank provided significant loans to ZCCM during the 1980s that were conditional on ZCCM reducing its workforce.94 Redundancies were targeted at non-Zambian Africans, while the mines continued

92 ZCCM 1.4.1F, Nationalities of Expatriates in ZCCM Divisions, 1983.
93 Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity, p. 6.
to recruit Zambians. Recruitment of non-Zambian Africans ceased almost entirely across all ZCCM divisions after 1987. Over the next five years, only one non-Zambian joined the general payroll: a Malawian nurse recruited at Mufulira in 1990 who was married to a Zambian national.95 Over the same period 906 non-Zambian Africans were made redundant, most of them Malawians and Tanzanians.96 This, however, prefigured massive lay-offs. Mining employment at ZCCM peaked in 1990 at 58,369, almost all of whom were Zambian nationals. Employment thereafter fell rapidly, and over the following five years almost 14,000 jobs were lost on the mines.97

**Conclusion**

When, where and under what circumstances, exclusionary nationalism and xenophobia emerges is not only a matter of historical interest but remains a live issue in Zambia. In March 2017, MUZ General Secretary Joseph Chewa called for foreigners occupying mining jobs that could be done by Zambians to be ‘flushed out’ of the mining sector, following a promise by President Edgar Lungu to audit the mining industry to ascertain how many jobs were held by foreigners.98 Similar dynamics are evident elsewhere in southern Africa. It may be one of the drivers of the remarkable decline in the proportion of South Africa’s mining workforce who were born outside South Africa: from over one-third in 1986 to only eight per cent by 2012.99 Moreover, the issue is by no means confined to the region, or Africa more generally, as the

95 ZCCM 5.2.2H, General Manager, Mufulira Division to ZCCM Human Resources, Lusaka, 23 July 1992.
97 Total employment was higher than this as several thousand people were also employed by ZCCM in non-mining subsidiary companies. ZCCM 5.5.1D, Labour Strengths by Division, 1981–1995.
access of workers regarded as foreign to national labour markets is a contentious issue across Europe and North America.

It might reasonably be expected that in Zambia exclusionary politics would emerge most strongly in the context of the protracted and severe economic decline from the mid 1970s and would target the country’s comparatively wealthy white minority. Yet, neither of these was the case. The distinction made by some scholars, between ostensibly inclusive nationalism in the 1960s and contemporary exclusionary politics – emphasising the relatively recent origins of the latter – does not hold here. Exclusionary nationalist politics are evident in Zambia from the early 1960s as demands to remove ‘alien Africans’ from the Copperbelt mines began very soon after Zambian independence and the key policies to achieve this aim were all in place by the late 1960s. Zambian citizenship was used to identify and remove workers from the mines deemed to be harmful to the economic interests of legitimate Zambians, even though some had been living and working in what became Zambia for decades.

I have also examined Zambianisation in this article to make a second, narrower argument significant for Copperbelt history. I argue that one of the primary aims of Zambianisation was to remove non-Zambian Africans from the mining industry. To do so, this policy had to create new distinctions between Zambians and non-Zambians and to categorise mineworkers, who then had to affirm their citizenship to retain their jobs. Non-Zambian Africans were successfully removed and this was achieved through determined and consistent efforts by the Zambian state and MUZ, with the somewhat reluctant co-operation of the mining companies. The many detailed studies of Zambia’s mining industry have overlooked this process. This is perhaps because it did not generate the kind of serious and widespread violence which often accompanies xenophobic politics. But it is also because the existing literature concentrates on the removal of the industrial colour bar and the white workforce. The experiences of the thousands of non-Zambian Africans on the Copperbelt have not been
discussed previously, despite Zambianisation having displaced more Africans than whites from the mines and despite the removal of non-Zambian Africans being pursued even where it hindered the replacement of white expatriates.

In some ways Zambian nationalism can be regarded as a fairly benign form of nationalism. It has seldom involved external aggression or national chauvinism, and the lack of explicit ethnic appeals is characterised by the popular slogan ‘one Zambia, one nation’. Yet, as this article has shown, it contained a strong element of xenophobia. Nationalist politics were used to restrict employment opportunities to those regarded as legitimate Zambians and to remove those not regarded as legitimate Zambians from the mining industry. I hope that this article will encourage a more critical assessment of nationalism in Zambia, and elsewhere, and encourage more research on the kind of nationalism that emerged in Zambia, and why it was so readily taken up on the Copperbelt. Examining the patterns of labour recruitment and the structure of the mining workforce also points towards a moment of transition in southern Africa’s labour history when the much-discussed systems of regional labour migration largely ended, and a settled workforce developed which, in origin and perhaps in attitudes, could be characterised as ‘national’.

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