Willful Distraction: Katie Mitchell, Auteurism and the Canon

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Willfulness

The opening of Katie Mitchell’s Royal Opera House production of *Lucia di Lammermoor* in April 2016 was, unusually, considered worthy of mention on the following morning’s Today programme. Widespread booing was reported and the Guardian critic Charlotte Higgins described ‘a real feeling of division in the audience’ over Mitchell and her designer Vicki Mortimer’s decision to use a form of split-screen staging to expose the operations and consequences of patriarchal abuse in the narrative that are otherwise excluded from the audience’s direct awareness by being conducted off-stage (BBC News, 2016). These interpolated scenes, which included the staging of Lucia’s murder of her husband, had been considered by the Royal Opera House’s management to be sufficiently concerning to warrant the sending of an email to those who had booked for the production, warning of ‘scenes that feature sexual acts portrayed on stage, and other scenes that – as you might expect from the story of Lucia – feature violence’. The Opera House sought to reassure its customers that ‘If there are any members of your party who you feel may be upset by such scenes then please email us […] and we will, of course, discuss suitable arrangements’ (Royal Opera House, 2016). Mitchell’s interpolations were widely criticised in reviews of the opera. ‘A lot of thought has gone into Katie Mitchell’s staging,’ wrote Rupert Christiansen (2016), ‘most of it misguided’.

Mitchell has long had a reputation with British theatre critics for willfulness. In 2007, reviews of her production of Euripides’ *Women of Troy* at the National Theatre united voices from opposite sides of the political spectrum in approbation. In The Guardian, Michael Billington expressed his regret that whereas ‘Once [Mitchell] was content to realise an author's text, now she has become an auteur whose signature is on every moment of a production’. The ‘lament against auteurism’ has figured prominently in Billington’s writing, as Dan Rebellato (2010, 317) has observed, and has been directed particularly at Mitchell whom he described, also in 2007, as ‘the controlling figure and ultimate auteur in a continental European tradition’. Billington’s argument was echoed in more vociferous terms in Charles Spencer’s Daily Telegraph review of *Women of Troy*. He argued that Mitchell’s ‘primary aim isn't to serve the dead author’, her ‘particular speciality […] is smashing up the classics […] using what she needs, discarding what doesn't suit her, and leaving her grubby fingerprints all over whatever survives of the original masterpiece’. Spencer suggested
that this is ‘common practice among the directorial auteurs of Europe’ but pronounced himself relieved that ‘this overweening arrogance is mercifully less often seen in Britain’. Rebellato argues, on the basis of this evidence, that ‘Mitchell’s work has a sensibility and a set of priorities that fit awkwardly into the institutional structures or critical consensus that surround British theatrical practice. Put simply’, he writes, ‘Katie Mitchell is too European for some British tastes’ (319).

No doubt this argument is correct, but I think it is not merely a matter of taste. Or, more precisely, that there is more at stake in ‘British tastes’ than merely what people happen to like. I am going to argue here that Sara Ahmed’s idea of the ‘willful subject’ can help us to probe beneath the bluff, dismissive xenophobia and misogyny we find in Billington and Spencer’s accounts of Mitchell’s work. Ahmed’s concept of wilfulness, I will argue, brings into focus what is at stake politically in the ‘institutional structures’ and ‘critical consensus’ that have shaped the presumed ‘British tastes’ by whose standards Mitchell is deemed a joyless, overweening cultural vandal. Ahmed’s idea of ‘willfulness’ will also enable us to see distraction as a political strategy that exposes the operations of power within canonical texts and the perpetuation of their canonical status. I will begin by tracing the history of the term ‘auteur’, which is the principal accusation of Mitchell’s opponents, and go on to read Mitchell’s interventions into the dramatic canon not as vandalism, but as willful distractions from the conservative agenda it commonly represents. As the idea of a ‘canon’ was consolidated in the nineteenth century, I will offer, as examples, three texts that emerged from that time, and are now considered canonical: Donizetti’s Lucia di Lammermoor, Strindberg’s Miss Julie and Chekhov’s The Cherry Orchard. I will conclude with a cautionary note about the dangerous security of willfulness, and its capacity to distract those, such as Mitchell, who choose to adopt its position.

**Auteurism**

What does it mean to label Katie Mitchell an auteur? The term ‘auteur’ began in the cinema, where it was first espoused by French director Francois Truffaut in the 1950s. It refers to the idea that the director should be considered the primary author of the film and it continues, for example, in the convention of assigning films in their credits to directors (rather than producers, authors, cinematographers, editors, or to collective authorship). At this point, I’d like to draw your attention to the fact that this section of my talk will be unusual in its dependence upon the work of male theorists. The reason for that is simple: auteurism is, and has always been, a male
theory. Just as marriage traditionally collapsed a wife’s identity into that of her husband, auteurism requires that the creative process is absorbed into the figure of the auteur. And just as the medieval principle of primogeniture asserts the right of the first male child to inherit titles and property, the auteur, as primary author, is placed so as to receive by far the greatest credit for a creative work. Auteurism is thus problematically aligned with feudal patriarchal doctrine. This is ironically revealing in relation to Billington and Spencer’s accusation, because they have levelled it principally at women. Alongside Mitchell, Spencer’s review indicts Deborah Warner and Emma Rice, and Billington (2009) has likewise accused Rice of auteurism. In order to unpick the power relations at work in this process in which (male) critics are accusing (mainly female) artists of auteurism for reimagining the works of (male) authors, we may turn to the work of feminist scholar Sara Ahmed.

Ahmed writes in her book *Willful Subjects* that ‘willfulness is used to explain errors of will – unreasonable or perverted wills – as faults of character’ (Spencer diagnoses Mitchell’s will to reimagine *Women of Troy* as ‘overweening arrogance’, for instance). Ahmed argues that ‘willfulness can thus be understood, in the first instance, as an attribution to a subject of will’s error’ (2014, 4). Willfulness, as the plural of Ahmed’s title proposes – can also be many other things, but they tend to exist at odds with the will of power. ‘One way of thinking of the sovereign will’, Ahmed writes, ‘is the right to determine whose wills are willful wills’. She goes on to observe, however, that ‘a rebellion against tyranny might involve those named as willful renaming the sovereign will as willful will, the sovereign as tyrant’ (316). This is a version of the argument made by Peter Boenisch, who turns the traditionally British assertion of the arrogance of the imagined Continental director back on itself. He argues that ‘the director who poses as the text or playwright’s humble instrument, who considers himself as ‘simply staging’ the text, without taking an interpretive stance, in fact commits the most violent intervention’. That is because this position assumes the right ‘to speak for and act on behalf of the ‘truth of the text’ it defines in the first place’. This is auteurism taken to its logical, authoritarian extreme. In asserting their right to speak on behalf of Euripides and his translator, Don Taylor, and in levelling the charge of auteurism at Mitchell, therefore, Billington and Spencer are assuming, in Ahmed’s words, ‘the right to determine whose wills are willful wills’. An author’s will is sovereign, an auteur’s is ‘overweening arrogance’.

Peter Boenisch (2015, 9) rejects this characterisation of the willful director battling against the playwright in his account of *Regie*, the German term for directing, which he defines as ‘a formal
operation whereby the playtext remains [...] the same, yet our perception and understanding [of it] is ultimately changed. Boenisch argues that his process ‘truly messes up’ not ‘the authorial privilege of the playwright, but the very order of the sensible, [...] in its refusal to ‘orderly’ represent, illustrate and thus to play by the rules of the established hegemonic [...] order of things’ (186). The term ‘order of the sensible’ is taken from the philosopher Jacques Rancière (2004). By ‘the sensible’, Rancière means ‘that which can be sensed’ (what can be said, heard, seen, felt, and thought), or what it is permissible to experience in any given cultural context. He refers to the ordering or ‘distribution’ of this material to mean how it is organised and disseminated: who is permitted to see it and where and under what circumstances. Rancière proposes that this ‘distribution’ functions as a ‘regime’ within which artists and their audiences encounter one another. Therefore, put simply, Boenisch’s argument is that, by representing a play-text in unexpected ways, a director may expose and challenge the implicit ‘regime’ that governs what a culture considers permissible to show, and, by extension, to think.

Although Boenisch does not use the term ‘auteur’, and with good reason, its appropriation by makers of theatre has often functioned much more like his conception of Regie than cinematic auteurism, which is to say that, in the theatre, self-proclaimed ‘auteurs’ have not generally claimed sole authorship of their work. Prominent among early adopters of the term into the theatre was Roger Planchon, who, as Yvonne Daoust (1981, 17) observed, ‘has always integrated cinematic techniques into his mise en scène because he regards theatre and film as closely related’ (as does Mitchell, of course, whose cinematic influences are well documented, and who almost invariably frames the action of her productions in a cinemascope). Planchon considered that what he called the ‘langage scénique’ (the stage language) ‘has a responsibility equal to that of the written text’, and he therefore believed it was impossible to stage a text without interpretation (Daoust 1981, 15). Planchon’s understanding of the responsibility of ‘stage language’ derived from Brecht, and particularly Brecht’s idea of a play’s Fabel: the sequence of events and interactions that constitute its action. Like Planchon’s ‘langage scénique’ a Fabel is not, however intended to be a neutral description of the action. Like much of Brecht’s thinking, it is dialectical, and therefore seeks to expose contradictions and competing positions within a narrative.

*Lucia di Lammermoor*

An understanding of dialectical thinking can enable us to see Mitchell’s alleged auteurism as something quite different: the creation of a Fabel that, in David Barnett’s (2015, 86) definition,
‘teases out contradictions in order to emphasise them in performance’. Take, for example, her decision to adopt a ‘split screen approach’ to staging *Lucia di Lammermoor*.

Here are the responses of three critics. George Hall (2016) in The Stage:

…Mitchell’s split screen approach, whereby the audience sees not only the characters meant to be singing at any given moment, but what is happening simultaneously offstage. The effect is hugely *distracting*. (emphasis added)

Michael Tanner (2016) in The Spectator:

…while the main action is on one side, plenty of *distracting* business is being executed on the other, much of it the invention of Mitchell. (emphasis added)

and Fiona Maddocks (2016) in The Observer:

…attention was drawn constantly to another part of the stage, tearing us from the singer, usually poor Castronovo, who has a powerful, alluring voice but had to battle with compulsive *distractions*…. (emphasis added)

The repeated accusation of ‘distraction’ is revealing. The verb ‘to distract’ derives from the Latin *dis-*(away) and *trahere* (to draw). Attention is drawn away, in one or more different directions, from a desired, or intended focus. It brings to mind Ahmed’s reading of will as ‘the possibility of deviation’ (11) and therefore of willfulness as ‘the perverse potential of will’ and its traces as ‘a wayward line’ (12). As she writes:

…the willful subject is often depicted as a wanderer. When you stray from official paths, you create desire lines, faint marks on the earth, as traces of where you or others have been. (21)

Mitchell’s critics were right: distraction was clearly her intention. Her staging was achieved, technically, by a series of ‘box sets’, that were wheeled into position during scene breaks. These boxes recall the German name for a proscenium auditorium: a *Guckkastenbühne*, literally a ‘looking-box-stage’. The proscenium arch creates realistic illusion by presenting a tightly-edited collection of objects, images and actions, screened off in order to be looked at. Its space is, therefore, a ‘closed, coherent structure’, which, as the geographer Doreen Massey (2005, 45, 61)
observes, ‘cannot exist’ in reality, because space is ‘the dimension of dynamic, simultaneous multiplicity’. If we refuse to accept the illusion of spaces as closed systems, then, we must embrace their constitutively distracting nature. To embrace distraction is to engage with the politics of space, which, as Massey writes, ‘presents us with the social in the widest sense: the challenge of our constitutive inter-relatedness, and thus our collective implication in the outcomes of that inter-relatedness’ (195). Spaces, in other words, are always composed of relations from which we cannot escape and which exceed any attempt to make them cohere from a single perspective. Mitchell and her designer Vicki Mortimer’s split-screen staging of Lucia exposed this, by distracting audiences from the opera that, in the critic George Hall’s words (2016), they were ‘meant to be’ seeing.

Donizetti wrote his opera in three acts. The first concludes with a love duet in which Lucia and her lover Edgardo exchange rings. The second reaches its climax with a famous sextet that marks the sudden return of Edgardo (whom Lucia had believed to be unfaithful) during Lucia’s arranged marriage. The final act includes Lucia’s famous ‘mad scene’, which follows her off-stage murder of her husband. It concludes, however, not with the death of Lucia (which takes place off stage), but with the suicide of Edgardo. At first sight, this appears to be the plot of a tragic love story. The lovers are briefly united only to be separated and to become the victims of terrible misfortune, with the consequence that Lucia goes mad and dies, and her lover kills himself in grief. But there are contradictions to be teased out. The opera begins with the sighting of an intruder (later revealed to be Edgardo) on Lucia’s brother Enrico’s property. It ends with Edgardo’s suicide, which takes place as he had been waiting for a duel with Enrico, arranged at the start of the third act in what the Metropolitan Opera’s synopsis describes as Edgardo’s ‘delapidated home’. We might therefore read the whole opera as a duel between Enrico and Edgardo in which not love, but property, is at stake: a story, in other words, about the operations of patriarchy.

Cultural theorist Heidi Hartmann (1979, 11) defined patriarchy as ‘a set of social relations between men, which have a material base, and which, though hierarchical, establish and create interdependence and solidarity among men that enable them to dominate women’. To read the opera as an exploration of relations within patriarchy in this way is to follow, for example, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s (1985) reading of nineteenth century literature as structured by male homosocial relations. Mitchell’s use of the split stage served initially to expose these relations (in that we saw Enrico’s men searching for Edgardo while the main action was elsewhere) and then
quickly to expose the ways in which Lucia becomes trapped in relations between men, as Enrico’s men searched not only for the intruder but for incriminating evidence in Lucia’s private rooms. The split stage served a slightly different function in Act Two, separating Lucia’s bedroom stage right, to which men had free access, from her bathroom stage left (to which they did not). Here, Mitchell and Mortimer teased out a further contradiction, this time within the patriarchal structure. We might expect the marriage bed (as the traditional site of both conception and birth) to be placed centrally. But, by offsetting it against the privacy of Lucia’s bathroom, Mitchell and Mortimer presented it as a public site, and showed that patriarchy depends, crucially, upon both public and private acceptance. Thus, the bathroom came to stand for the question of women’s private willingness to accept their position within patriarchy, which, as Coppélia Kahn (1981, 13) has argued, is ‘the invisible heart of the whole structure’. The split-stage thus offered a dialectical representation of patriarchal power: its public domination of women’s bodies leaves it vulnerable to their private refusal to accept its terms.

These two uses of the split stage were united in Mitchell’s simultaneous staging of the meeting of Enrico and Edgardo at which they agree to duel and Lucia’s murder of her husband Arturo, assisted by her maid Alisa. Just as Lucia attempted to escape her enforced marriage by killing her husband, a homosocial contract was established in Enrico and Edgardo’s agreement to duel that would make any idea of Lucia’s escape from a life governed by male relationships impossible. This reading was consolidated in the staging of Edgardo’s dying aria at the opera’s close in Lucia’s bathroom. Fiona Maddocks (2016) deplored this decision: ‘For Castronovo to have to sing his last farewell against the sound of running water was an assault more abominable than any operatic sex or violence’, she wrote. But if we read this not as an ‘assault’, but as a ‘distraction’ that refuses to allow the male voice to encompass the opera’s narrative in its last words, then Mitchell’s willfulness, and the distractions that it generates, can be seen as an effective political strategy for exposing the power relations working beneath the surface of the textual narrative.

Fräulein Julie

Mitchell’s 2012 production of Miss Julie for the Schaubühne am Lehniner Platz was, if anything, even more wilfully distracting than her Lucia. Mitchell approached Strindberg’s play, in which an aborted affair between the valet Jean and his master’s daughter, Julie, leads to her presumed suicide, as a narrative of the operations of class and gender power. But rather than concentrating
on Jean’s position as a victim of his class or Julie’s confinement by her gender, Mitchell focused on the frequently overlooked housemaid Kristin, whose life is constrained by both of these structural inequalities. Mitchell took the decision to remove anything not experienced by this character. Therefore, as Kristin slept or looked out of the window, or day-dreamed as she washed the dishes, the audience was likewise unaware of allegedly significant plot developments between Jean and Julie, and watched and listened instead to Kristin’s dreams, in the form of text excerpted from the Danish poet Inger Christensen’s 1981 poem *Alphabet*.

Christensen’s poem is structured around the Latin alphabet (its sections begin with successive letters from A to N) and the Fibonacci series (its first section has one line, the next two, then three, five, eight, thirteen and so on). This structure enables the poem to perform a dizzying series of expansive leaps from the plainest of observations (it begins: ‘apricot trees exist’ (2001, 11)) to an ecological perspective on the planet, and back again. These movements are constantly haunted by man’s capacity to inflict catastrophe, which lurks at the poem’s centre like the poison in an apricot’s stone:

killers exist, and doves, and doves;  
haze, dioxin, and days; days  
exist, days and death; and poems  
exist; poems, days, death (14)

Christensen’s poem functioned, in other words, as a willful distraction from the linear dramaturgy of Strindberg’s play. It spiralled away from and around the plot, and enabled Mitchell to go much further than merely highlighting the structural violence inflicted on those, such as Kristin, whose voices are silenced in the canon. Its associative leaps from the ‘bracken and blackberries’ of Kristin’s daily perspective to ‘bromine [...] and hydrogen, hydrogen’ (12) (foreshadowing the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki) asked what kind of world might be made by a culture that listened to these unheard voices and paid deep attention to the perspectives they might articulate.

*The Cherry Orchard*

Mitchell’s approach to directing canonical works has been consistently both willful and distracting insofar as it has drawn focus away from what audiences expect to see. But she has not always taken such an overtly interventionist approach. Her 2014 production of Chekhov’s *The
Cherry Orchard at the Young Vic didn’t interpolate either action or text into the play, but nonetheless set out wilfully to reject the conventional reading of it, which Mitchell labelled ‘gentle introspection around the samovar’. Instead, she promised an ‘edgy, fast-moving and frightening’ exploration of ‘the cruelty and lack of imagination that privilege brings and class ambitions encourage’ (Bailey 2014, 97).

This reading was exemplified, for me, in one gesture, which was distracting in that it introduced a set of associations and resonances from Britain in the early twenty-first century rather than Russia just over a century before. The servant Yasha, seducing the maid Dunyasha, suddenly held her at arm’s length and assessed her, coldly, before reaching forward, in anticipation of Donald Trump’s sickening boast, to grab her. I was distracted not only by shock, but by an anachronistic pun. Yasha is a groom, and, in the language of contemporary Britain, this was grooming. Mitchell’s production opened eleven months after the police reported on what seem to have been 450 counts of sexual abuse and rape of girls and women perpetrated by Jimmy Savile (Gray and Watt 2013, 11). It was five and six months respectively after the convictions of Stuart Hall and Rolf Harris for sexual abuse (BBC News 2014a, 2014b). It was two years after the start of Dame Janet Smith’s review into incidents of sexual abuse at the BBC and fifteen months before the publication of her final report (Smith 2016). David Mamet (1994, 196) analysed the dramaturgical structure of The Cherry Orchard as the same scene played again and again, in which one half of a couple attempts ‘to consummate, clarify, or rectify an unhappy sexual situation’. This reading can be extended to involve those characters (Pishchik, Firs and Gaev) who Mamet excludes from interest as ‘local colour’ because they are ‘celibate and seen as somewhat doddery in different degrees’, if we alter his reading of the subject of these scenes from sex to love. In this version, the play is a series of scenes in which people ask each other ‘why don’t you love me more?’ Mitchell’s reading of the play showed us this reiterative pattern but sharpened its repeated, implicit question: ‘why are you hurting me?’ her characters asked.

Abuse echoed everywhere in this production. For example, Mitchell moved Act Two indoors. This decision fitted her preference for sets that represent bounded spaces, but it also meant that the empty bed of Ranevskaya’s drowned son remained upstage almost throughout, haunting the action with its silent reproach. Angus Wright’s Gaev also strongly rejected the conventional characterisation of studied, nonchalant denial and aristocratic absent-mindedness. Wright created instead a portrait of extreme anxiety, punctuated by sharp tics that spoke of buried
trauma. Dominic Rowan’s Lopakhin likewise resisted the traditional bourgeois reading of the role of peasant-turned-businessman as a kindly but rational man whose only choice is to buy Ranevskaya’s estate and make it profitable. He began by making rational arguments, but by the end his decisions were transparently vindictive and vengeful: punishing Ranevskaya’s cruel treatment of him in childhood, the scars of which clearly had not healed.

Reviewing representations of child sexual abuse in recent British theatre in 2013, Anna Harpin (2013, 181) demonstrated conclusively that treatments of the subject have been characterised, almost unanimously, by ‘a seemingly unremarkable heterosexism’ that works to underwrite ‘misperceptions about child sexual abuse’ and to ‘shore up established fictions of gender and sexual practices’. By contrast, Mitchell’s *Cherry Orchard* used productively distracting contemporary references to challenge the assumption that abuse is a grotesque anomaly rather than a common feature of lived experience. By following the traces of these willful distractions from the play’s apparent subject, it was possible to read in the production what the reports of the inquiries led by Dame Janet Smith and Sir William Macpherson (1999) have shown: that abuse is, by its very nature, systemic and is produced by structural inequality. Thus, as Mitchell’s production closed with the text’s violent uprooting of the cherry orchard and the collapse of the forgotten servant Firs in the abandoned house, it was impossible not to experience these actions as instances of abuse, and to reflect that abusive behaviour does not go against the grain of social history. Mitchell proposed that abuse is that grain and that it can be read as clearly as the rings of a tree.

**Distraction and Affinity**

In all three of these productions, therefore, we can see Mitchell’s allegedly ‘misguided’ thoughts and ‘distracting’ effects as political strategies to resist the hegemonic values that are routinely asserted by canonical texts and which underwrite their canonical status. She uses distraction wilfully to expose operations and abuses of power, and to redirect the audience’s attention to characters and experiences that are commonly overlooked. But Sara Ahmed (2014, 167) warns that willfulness can also distract us from recognising the privilege of our own position: ‘the very assumption of willfulness’, she writes, ‘can protect some from realizing how their goals are already accomplished by the general will’. The experience of battling willfully against authority in one area can blind us to the ways in which we may, from other perspectives, be more closely aligned with it than we may be willing or able to see. Mitchell (2009, 3-4) makes a similar
argument in her book *The Director's Craft*, where she counsels directors to be aware of ‘affinities’: ‘things that you are drawn to in the play because they relate to your own life or how you look at the world’. These, Mitchell warns, ‘can be both useful and somewhat limiting’ because they give you ‘special insight’ but ‘could stop you seeing other aspects of the play’. The productions that I have analysed show Mitchell using affinity creatively, by distracting audiences from what they may be instinctively drawn to, and thereby exposing the relations of power that influence how we look at the world.

It is important to note, in concluding, however, that Mitchell’s project is not without its unspoken affinities. You may, for example, have noticed in the images illustrating these talks that her casting has not been ethnically diverse, a fact that is rarely remarked upon in public discussions of her work, but is unmistakable once noticed. It’s important to say, by way of mitigation, that Mitchell often works with permanent ensembles in European theatres, whose performers are usually entirely or overwhelmingly white, and she does not, therefore, have the freedom to cast anyone she chooses. But she has also worked with what Rebellato (2010, 328) has described as ‘a kind of informal repertory company’ in her UK productions who are also exclusively white. In her advice for directors on casting, Mitchell (2008, 102) notes the importance of ‘how [actors] will fit into a group of people who need to work together’, and clearly the relationships that have developed among members of her informal ensemble are likely to generate a positive group dynamic.

But Mitchell’s project to expose political realities that are commonly overlooked should alert us to the problematic exclusion of actors of colour from British stages today just as it enables us to see the exclusion of women (and working-class women in particular) from canonical texts. Racial prejudice may not be the subject of her work, but ethnicity is legible in it nonetheless, and may prompt us to question whether the act of staging plays from white cultures with white casts in diverse European cities today may unintentionally participate in the continuing white-washing of history that actively excludes people of colour from cultural narratives in which they (like Lucia, and the maids Kristin and Dunyasha) also have a stake. Mitchell’s political agenda seems to have distracted her from these challenging questions surrounding the representation of ethnic identities in particular. But her strategy of willful distraction from the agenda of canonical authority in relation to gender and class does offer a model of intervention that might be usefully applied to other forms of systemic exclusion, that she has, until now, overlooked.
References


1 A notable exception is the actor and campaigner Danny Lee Wynter, who tweeted, for example, about Mitchell’s production of Sarah Kane’s *Cleansed*: ‘Zero critics reviewing Katie Mitchell's *Cleansed* call out her prolific on stage racism. Probably cos they’re all white too & don’t notice!’ (@dannyleewynter, 10.10am, 24 February 2016).

2 I chose in the recorded lecture to use the term ‘race’ rather than ‘ethnicity’ in this section in the spirit of W.J.T. Mitchell (2012), who argues that race is paradoxically both non-existent and a means by which our vision of the world is mediated. I have decided, however, to revise my terminology for this published version and use the term ‘ethnicity’ instead. This is because ‘ethnicity’ can refer, intersectionally, to multiple identities and incorporates cultural aspects of identity (such as nationality), whereas the term ‘race’ is assumed (inaccurately) to be biological and unitary.