
Robert Heinze,
University of Trier, Germany

Abstract:
Liberation radios, the propaganda stations operated by the anti-Apartheid and anticolonial movements Southern Africa, provide us with a unique lens on the relationship between broadcasters and their audiences. Most importantly, they conceptualized audiences in a specific, two-pronged way to mobilize target populations and influence global media publics. Going beyond ideas of ‘propaganda’ and circulation of media content, this article uses oral history interviews with broadcasters from the Namibian ‘Voice of Namibia’ to analyze the way broadcasters thought about and spoke to wider audiences, which included media institutions and cultural production circulating content to audiences beyond direct listeners to their station. It argues that liberation radios’ relationship with their audiences can be usefully analyzed taking theoretical models from community media research, such as the ‘rhizome’ approach that emphasizes a multiplicity of connections between media and the communities they serve.

Keywords: Liberation radios, Southern Africa, propaganda, community media

Radio is, famously, a one-way medium as Bertolt Brecht observed decades ago. Whatever the developments of Media and Cultural Studies since, on a purely technical level his observation remains true, and determines the ways broadcasters and listeners interact with each other. Historically, this has led broadcasters to engage with their audiences through multiple venues – quantitative and qualitative listener research, newspapers, listener magazines, letters to the station, call-in programs, and more. But what do you do when you don’t have such venues for access to your audience? For broadcasters in the so-called ‘liberation radios’ in Southern Africa, this was an urgent problem, and one which they tried to overcome.
Brecht, one of the earliest and most influential theorists of radio, thought that in order to use it effectively for social progress, it needed to become a dialogic medium, activating its audience and making it an engaged participant in negotiated processes of information and education. Though his reception in media theory has largely focused on his short essay ‘Der Rundfunk als Kommunikationsapparat’ (‘The Radio as an Apparatus of Communication’, 1932), in which he imagines a technological solution for the problem of the ‘one-sided’ apparatus for distribution, Brecht was active in workers’ radio clubs in Weimar Germany, where workers not only familiarized themselves with how to construct receivers and operate their own broadcasting devices, but also listened to radio together and discussed content. This social solution for the issue of the ‘distribution apparatus’ has been taken up consciously in alternative and community media, most famously the Italian opera-ist Radio Alice, which produced theory as well as broadcasts. Their solution to the Brechtian problem: invite all listeners into the station and let them produce their own programs. In other words: build a community around, through and within the radio itself.

Liberation radios didn’t produce a specific theory (though the movements operating them, and some intellectuals like Frantz Fanon, did reflect on the use of radio in decolonization); but through the European anti-Apartheid movement, these stations were connected to the Free Radio movement that had sprung up in the wake of Radio Alice. Also, in South Africa (and, to a lesser extent, in Namibia), community media had become an effective tool for a multitude of social movements during the 1980s. In the case presented here, SWAPO produced texts reflecting on the role of its different media in the struggle, from which we can glean conceptualizations of how to engage with their audiences; additionally, interviews with broadcasters from the Voice of Namibia show how they themselves constantly reflected on their own role in the struggle and their relationship to the different audiences they were addressing. Thus, the Brechtian tradition of thinking about how to make radio into a communication instead of a distribution apparatus via integrating audiences into radio production proves useful when conceptualizing them as specific media phenomena. Though the geographical separation of liberation radios from their audiences made such an approach physically impossible, some effort was made to make radio interact more with its audiences. As this article will show, liberation radios also sought to build communities around their medium.

This analysis is made more complicated by certain aspects of liberation radios as a medium. They are usually seen as a regionally specific emanation of a ubiquitous phenomenon of the second half of the Twentieth Century – international propaganda radio. Liberation radio was part of international propaganda broadcasting, but operated through piggy-backing on the frequencies of larger stations like Radio Cairo. Most famously, the FLN radio Voix d’Algérie was described by Frantz Fanon as making Algerians ‘enter [...] into communication with the Revolution.’ Radio Cairo is the most well-known, but by far not the only agent in the history of radio and decolonization. The baton was picked up by so-called ‘External Services’ established in independent African states. Airtime and infrastructure was given to nationalist movements to broadcast: the ANC’s Radio Freedom,
the ZANU/PF’s Voice of Zimbabwe, the FRELIMO’s Voz da Moçambique and MPLA’s Voz da Angola all worked from External Services set up in Dar es Salaam, Lusaka and other cities of already independent countries. The content of the broadcasts ranged from direct political and military propaganda over reporting from important events such as OAU sessions in Addis Ababa or independence talks in London to music and cultural programs.

This article, however, proposes to look at liberation radios as community media rather than simple transmission belts for propaganda, highlighting the way they were part of wider social movements and tried to foster the communities organizing themselves around these movements and their political goals. Expanding on the two-way communication model, Carpentier et al.’s proposal to analyze community media as rhizome, as a structure resembling the horizontal root network of fungi more than the vertical ‘tree’ structure so often employed in scientific and social science models. In this model, community radios embed themselves civil society (or in specific communities) not by producing content that can be received by listeners, but by horizontally connecting ‘any point to any other point’ (Deleuze/Guattari), i.e. producers and consumers in a given community. This becomes a useful model for analyzing these aspects of liberation radios – an aspect that can also be seen in Liz Gunner’s emphasis on the circulation of their cultural production and Sekibakiba Lekgoathi’s studies of the reception of Radio Freedom in South Africa. Similarly, a community radio aspect of these radios can be seen when we look to how contents were ‘actively constructed by its members and those members derive an identity from this construction’ though audiences could (outside of recording songs) not influence the actual contents broadcast, or only indirectly. But beyond the circulation theories informing much of media studies in Africa and elsewhere – which emphasize circulation of information, cultural products, and objects –, this article is interested in how radio practitioners themselves conceptualized audiences and reacted to (or instigated) this circulation. This is important because from the point of view of the broadcasters, there were multiple audiences which needed to be talked to in different ways. Again, a rhizomatic approach can be useful in conceptualizing the specific way that liberation radios connected to wider publics of diplomacy, global media and social movements in order to garner support for the nationalist and anti-Apartheid cause. What differentiates liberation radios from most other radios is their double function: they were at the same time engaged in an international propaganda war over the legitimacy and necessity of anticolonial and anti-Apartheid struggle and in an effort to mobilize people to join that struggle – as civilians engaged in local protest action and as fighters in the guerrilla armies set up in neighboring countries. Thus, such radio stations talked to several very different audiences at once. First, they targeted audiences ‘at home’: the populations that nationalist movements wanted to mobilize politically and, in cases of open conflict like in Southern Africa, militarily. Secondly, an international public was targeted, because it soon became clear that swaying public opinion in the metropoles and garnering support through social movements of anti-imperial solidarity was an invaluable element of support for the nationalist struggle, especially so in Southern Africa, which could rely on a large enough anti-Apartheid solidarity movement in
Europe and the US. Thirdly, these radios targeted an audience indifferent or sympathetic to, but not part of the nationalist cause: white listeners in South Africa, Zimbabwe or Namibia. Particularly Radio Freedom and the Voice of Namibia took care to emphasize that the nationalist movements envisaged multiracial democratic societies, and noted their willingness to cooperate with progressive groups. In Namibia, the VoN programs cut into the false idyll established by the country’s official state broadcaster, the South West African Broadcasting Corporation (SWABC), which kept the war in the North of the country as far away as possible from its listeners.12

This specific constellation leads to important differences in the way liberation radios were set up, what broadcasters working in these stations saw as their mission and how they engaged with their audiences. This article traces these specificities using the case of the Voice of Namibia (VoN), the propaganda radio set up by the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) in exile to broadcast to Namibians and the world. As the only liberation radio directly supported by the UN, the VoN is a special case among the Southern African nationalist radios, but this also gives us interesting sources to look into the inner workings of the station.

To undertake an analysis of the VoN’s conceptualization of different audiences and how to talk to them, James Carey’s distinction between transmission and ritual modes of communication is useful. Those map to a certain extent to the two main audiences the liberation radios addressed. While transmission communication refers to the ‘Habermasian’ view of media publics as fields on which different groups try to control media in order to ‘transmit[] information meant to influence attitudes or change minds’13, the ritual model instead refers to the communication and formation of identities, often through cultural programming. Zach Schiller has proposed to think of them not as separate modes of approaching communication but ‘to recognize each kind of group desires the power of community radio as both a means of transmission for purposes of influence and social change, and as a ritual of collective identity formation, validation, and reproduction.’14 This, as I will show, also pertains to differentiations in one and the same station between different audiences; depending on how broadcasters conceptualize specific audiences, they might emphasize the transmission or the ritual aspect of communication more, but they are also not completely separated.

The title of this article is derived from a book about two contemporaries of Brecht: Leo Strauss and Carl Schmitt.15 The book analyses specific works of these two writers, who never quoted each other but, the argument goes, carefully read and reacted to each other’s works. Interacting in this way – engaging with each other’s texts and adopting them in one’s own ways without directly quoting or having an exchange with each other – describes SWAPO’s relationship to its audiences very well. The Voice of Namibia journalists were near completely ignorant of their actual listeners and what they expected from the radio, while reflecting on and trying as much as possible to engage them; on the other hand, the station had audiences that never listened to actual Voice of Namibia programs, but nevertheless engaged with its contents: some did so because as a liberation propaganda radio, it targeted
multipliers around the globe, especially a global media public; others, in Namibia and among the exiled Namibians in the guerrilla camps in Zambia and Angola, circulated songs, slogans and information from the radio amongst wider audiences, including through use of other SWAPO media sharing content, such as posters, magazines and leaflets.\footnote{16}

Beyond the metaphor of the ‘dialogue between absentees’, this article attempts to conceptualize the relationship between radio and its audiences using the very unique example of liberation radios, but making a larger point. Audiences to these stations – not to be conflated with listeners – should be conceptualized following the example of the practitioners in the SWAPO Department of Information and the Voice of Namibia. They consciously targeted multipliers such as the Anti-Apartheid movement in the US and Europe, and radio newsletters for distribution to media and diplomats published by the BBC and the CIA; they also imagined their audiences, and talked about and to them via the radio and other SWAPO media. Taking the ‘rhizome’ model from Carpentier et al. as a cue allows us to think in this way about radio and its audiences, going beyond a simple sender-receiver schematic (which is implied in earlier Brechtian models), while also tackling more concrete relationships between broadcasters and audiences than are implied in circulation models.

The Voice of Namibia

Namibia has a special role in the decolonization processes in Southern Africa because of its peculiar political situation. Administered (as a former German colony) by neighboring South Africa under a League of Nations/UN mandate since the Treaty of Versailles, it had been integrated into the country’s system of Apartheid after 1948, including racial segregation and the establishment of so-called ‘homelands’, allegedly autonomous territories, in fact reserves for disenfranchised black Africans, separated according to ethnic group. In 1966, the UN had revoked its mandate, and in 1971, the International Court of Justice declared the occupation of ‘South West Africa’ illegal. In 1960, the South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) had come out of its predecessor, the Ovamboland People’s Organisation, as a ‘national liberation movement’.\footnote{17} Two years later, the decision was made to take up armed struggle against the South African occupation, while campaigning for democratic elections inside the country. Though armed confrontations had been happening since 1966, the conflict evolved into full-on war on the northern border between Namibia and Angola in the second half of the 1970s. SWAPO had operated a small radio program from the External Services of Radio Dar es Salaam since 1966, but the decision to establish a full-fledged station was made at the 1976 SWAPO Enlarged Central Committee Meeting in Nampundwe, Zambia, and the name Voice of Namibia chosen for the new operation.\footnote{18}

Though the Voice of Namibia had a hierarchical structure under SWAPO’s Department of Information and Publicity, the station operated in a relatively decentralized way. Studios were established in External Services in Lusaka, Dar es Salaam, Addis Ababa, Brazzaville, Luanda and Harare, with an additional mobile contribution studio operating from Lubango, in the conflict zone north of the border between Angola and Namibia. Thus, broadcasters in these studios were relatively independent in their day to day operation.
The Voice of Namibia was embedded in a larger multimedia effort. SWAPO’s Department of Information and Publicity also oversaw the printing of posters and leaflets, magazines, and books, which all shared content amongst each other and with the radio station. Thus, interviews conducted with prominent African politicians or SWAPO leaders in Addis Ababa during a session of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the resident VoN broadcaster would be reprinted in magazines such as ‘The Combatant’ and ‘Namibia Today’; slogans were distributed among all SWAPO media, from posters to t-shirts to the station ID of the VoN; songs were produced by VoN studios and performed at solidarity events in Europe.

What distinguished the station from its sister stations – e.g. the ANC’s Radio Freedom – was its support through several trainee programs run by the UN Office of the Commissioner for Namibia. In 1978, the UN’s Resolution 435 repeated the call for South Africa to end its illegal occupation of Namibia, to cooperate with UN transition efforts and allow democratic elections. Though elections were held in Namibia in the same year, these were accepted by neither SWAPO nor the UN, as SWAPO was not allowed to stand as a party, and South African control remained firm through the post of an Administrator General with wide ranging powers. With the resolution, a UN transition group and a commissioner for Namibia was established, whose office, among other programs, financed a training course and stipends for broadcasters, which were then deployed to the Voice of Namibia. Thus, the station was more than a propaganda radio; it was also a trainee program for a future independent broadcaster.

Namibian listeners
The peculiar situation of radios broadcasting from outside into a country determined their relationship to this country’s audience, all the more so since listening to the Voice of Namibia was outlawed in the country. This also makes it difficult to establish substantiated information on the listeners to the Voice of Namibia. Any kind of communication with listeners in Namibia, or even quantitative – much less qualitative – listener research, was nearly impossible. Radios in African countries had relied on communication with their listeners via letters or call-in shows since colonial times, and liberation radios tried to follow in this tradition – Radio Freedom rather successfully produced a show to which listeners could send in letters with poems, short stories, music, wishes or generally voice their support. This was not an option for the Voice of Namibia, as the warzone in the North and the circumstances of the occupation made such communication near impossible. VoN broadcasters could not even be sure that the signal came through.

Help came from a different source: amateur radio operators who collected Station IDs. SWAPO headquarters received letters from such operators reporting detailed reception statistics. SWAPO’s ‘Namibia Today’ presented letters from Australia, the USA, Canada, England and Japan. Nevertheless, the most important information, namely on reception inside Namibia, could not be obtained. Though some of the broadcasters working for the Namibian SWABC, the South African controlled broadcaster in Namibia, claim that VoN
transmitters didn’t reach Windhoek, research in 1978 showed that Radio Tanzania, one of its carriers, was the third most popular station among Oshiwambo speakers in Katutura, a township on the outskirts of the capital.\textsuperscript{23} All in all, very probably at least in the area between Windhoek and the northern border, listeners could tune in to the Voice of Namibia if they wanted to do so. This extends geographically to half the country, but the North of Namibia is much more populated than the Southern half. Farther to the South, it is highly probable that the signal became too weak, even after it was transmitted from Harare (to the east).

Sources from South African institutions in Namibia show some more details on listener numbers. A sociological study in Namibia’s Northern region found in 1978 that although local broadcasts were the most popular – the South African ‘homeland’ stations broadcast in local languages and provided high quality cultural and entertainment programming – influential ‘modernizing’ élites such as teachers listened regularly to the banned SWAPO station.\textsuperscript{24} Similarly, according to listener research done by the local radio station, SWABC, in 1989 (when democratic elections were just around the corner), a quarter of black SWABC listeners also tuned in to ‘foreign’ radios. Since very few admitted to listening to Angolan or Zambian radio – on which the Voice of Namibia was broadcast - , these numbers are probably a low estimate because of the danger of admitting to listening to illegal broadcasts.\textsuperscript{25}

There are many references (e.g. the quoted research) indicating that a majority of listeners listened not just to anticolonial stations but also the SWABC and even the South African international propaganda station Radio RSA. Apparently, even fighters for the armed wing of SWAPO, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) in the Angolan camps tuned in to Apartheid radio and compared information. As one of them explained, he grew increasingly suspicious of his superiors upon listening to the South African external propaganda radio, Radio RSA, because he realized that they still stuck to their plans, although the enemy’s station had detailed information about the movements of his unit.\textsuperscript{26}

**Radio enters into an international discourse**

Broadcasters for the Voice of Namibia were recruited from the Namibians who left the country – most often via neighboring Botswana – to arrive in SWAPO army (PLAN) camps in Zambia and, later, Angola. Here, recruits received basic military training, during which their commanders would regularly be asked to report and refer people who were deemed suitable for radio – people who spoke many of the Namibian languages\textsuperscript{27}, those who’d shown ‘proficiency’ when recording programs in the camps and who’d shown ‘commitment’ to SWAPO.\textsuperscript{28} It was difficult for the Voice of Namibia to find new staff. The station’s first director, Vinnia Ndadi, complained that the applicants sent to him were ‘not trained, or with very low education; such comrades found it very difficult to perform their duties at the broadcasting [sic] satisfactorily. You will find them not even able to translate a script from [the] English version into Vernacular languages.\textsuperscript{29} The operation of the different studios was severely hampered as a consequence. In theory, each studio was supposed to be staffed by
three-four people, dividing work amongst themselves in producing, translating and presenting the different programs; in reality, even the important studio in Addis Ababa (where OAU sessions were held and thus the best opportunity to record OAU sessions and interview prominent African politicians) often had only one person staffing it for periods up to a year.\textsuperscript{30} Though the UNIN set up a training center in Lusaka, broadcasters were often sent into the field and received training on the spot, only later to be further educated in the UNIN center; some received higher education at journalism schools and universities in Dar es Salaam, Harare, Sofia, Potsdam, and Moscow.

Thus, broadcasters in the Voice of Namibia were sent relatively unprepared into cities far from home and far from the centers of SWAPO’s activity, tasked with producing engaging programs for distant audiences. In interviews, they emphasize feelings of loneliness and stress, mitigated by the conviction to be an important part of the nationalist struggle and some of the amenities of life (often supported by small UN grants) in nationalist exile communities. But most of the time, the Voice of Namibia staff broadcast into a void, hoping to have some kind of effect upon its unknown listenership.

The SWAPO Information Department nevertheless tried to find out as much as possible about its listeners. It encouraged Namibians to write to the station (not very successfully), conducted (limited) listener research and singing competitions in the PLAN camps in Angola, and asked soldiers returning from incursions about, among other relevant information, whether people were listening. It also knew that the station needed not only to address a Namibian listenership, but also an international audience. Voice of Namibia broadcasters were keenly aware that there were separate audiences who needed to be addressed differently. Sackey Namugongo, Vinnia Ndadi’s successor in the post of director, explains the difference between the multi-language broadcasts to a Namibian audience and the ones in English that addressed the international audience:

For example, if I’m talking in Oshiwambo, I add certain things which are not meant for the international community. […] I’m saying that ‘your sons and daughters are passing there tomorrow. Give them water’ and so on. I can not tell somebody in Britain about that, you know? So, there are certain things which I overemphasized in local languages and understated in English. In English, we are putting our case straight. We’re appealing for action on this particular issue. But when it comes to our people we’ll say ‘yes, we got the said news. We know what happened there. Now this is what we have to do’\textsuperscript{31}

Addressing the international audience, the Voice of Namibia – and SWAPO in general – had an important advantage: though other nationalist movements were generally supported by the OAU and other international organizations, as mentioned, the UN had explicitly declared the South African rule in Namibia as an illegal occupation, and forcefully demanded democratic elections to be held, judging the first elections in 1978 illegitimate because they excluded SWAPO. This gave SWAPO and its struggle a basis in international law, a point
which the Voice of Namibia did not fail to repeatedly make. Although SWAPO itself took some turns in its political ideology, including some more openly socialist phases, its anti-imperialism remained a consistent element, which it emphasized addressing Christian, socialist, social democratic and liberal supporters alike. Human rights discourses were particularly useful to combine with this anti-imperialism, since they were broadly appealing, and Apartheid as a human rights issue had come to the fore of global public discourse after the 1976 Soweto uprising. This included strong resistance to the Apartheid government’s efforts at an ‘internal solution’, scandalizing human rights abuses – especially when civilians were victimized by the South African army and/or police – and emphasizing broad support for SWAPO as a democratic alternative in Namibia. More than just a general international audience, SWAPO broadcasters imagined the Voice of Namibia as a diplomatic tool, targeting a diplomatic community with transmission and influence in mind:

The other thing was also important: that SWAPO’s programs in exile to be known to the world. It was not only on the military front, but on the military front, the diplomatic front, and also locally to understand why SWAPO was there. It was also very good for the citizens of the countries in which we were operating to understand the role of the Voice of Namibia, and to understand what role we are playing. Otherwise they wouldn’t have allowed us. But it was also to sensitize the leadership within those countries, the diplomatic community, and all those that were there to support the national liberation struggle.32

Thus, broadcasters knew very well that to be effective, programs geared at an international audience needed to have specific targets which multiplied the Voice of Namibia’s reach. Internationally, the station had little chance to compete with the large South African propaganda apparatus, specifically its international radio station, Radio RSA, which commanded over powerful shortwave transmitters. For the SWAPO station, it was more important to be listened to by multiplicators who could effectively either further transmit the message or implement it.

Two of these important multiplicators were the broadcast newsletters published by the BBC and the CIA. The BBC published (and still does) the Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), a daily newsletter (with a weekly edition) that was produced in the BBC’s monitoring studios in Reading, where strong receivers enabled staff to listen in to even very small radios, as long as they broadcast on shortwave frequencies. Their content was edited to globally newsworthy items – i.e., most importantly, the developments in specific conflict theaters. After short summaries, the SWB quoted directly from different radio stations involved in a conflict, often contradictory statements. This newsletter was a subscription service mostly used by Western media; thus, the SWB was SWAPO’s arbiter to reach a global audience with its version of events, and legitimization of its actions. Many international media subscribed to the SWB as a reliable source for statements by different
factions involved in conflicts around the world, and for information on world regions covered by few correspondents. The CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), a similar publication, was less important for media and more often used by diplomats, secret services and other governmental agencies. The importance of both for SWAPO is reflected in the archives of the Secretary for Information and Publicity, Peter Katjavivi, who collected especially the SWB and noted Voice of Namibia quotes.33

There are two important aspects of how the Voice of Namibia talked to an international audience. Most importantly, its audience was different from its actual listenership. VoN’s international audience consisted as much – or more – of readers of the SWB, and consumers of the newspapers and other media that reported on the basis of it. Thus, rather than speaking to an unresponsive listenership, these media’s reactions to Voice of Namibia broadcasts and the broader discourse about SWAPO’s fight and legitimacy was openly accessible to the producers. International VoN programs were part of a public conversation, which enabled broadcasters to react and watch for reactions to their own programs – with the caveat that they could not always connect to that public conversation, which depended on the host stations providing access to cable and telex services. Broadcasters would look for items on Namibia distributed by wire services and news agencies, compile a news bulletin of around ten minutes and then prepare an English language commentary on these news. They also obsessively listened to South African stations, especially Radio RSA, to counter their reports, and scoured international radio stations such as the BBC and the Voice of America for items on Namibia.34 Broadcasters knew that the SWB and FBIS would present their version of events and their commentary, contrasting them with the Johannesburg-based Radio RSA. Thus, they embraced the dialogic form in their own broadcasts to produce content geared not at specific listeners, but designed as an intervention in ongoing public discourse. In the absence of any direct listener feedback, and because the target audience was an international media and diplomatic discourse rather than an actual mass of individual listeners, this enabled the Voice of Namibia to engage and interact with it in ways not open to the radio otherwise.

This involved a relatively strict adherence to a transmission model of communication – focusing on providing news that SWAPO saw as wrongly or underreported –, but also a certain rhetoric. Calling the South African government fascist and racist, emphasizing its human rights abuses, war crimes, and, increasingly during the 1980s as international public discourse became more and more critical of Apartheid, denouncing the whole system as one which went against international standards of human rights was paramount. Voice of Namibia broadcasts in English were adapted to play to broadly anti-imperialist and human rights discourses, which allowed SWAPO to make its point without opting for either side in the Cold War. As other liberation movements, SWAPO managed to receive support from both Western European and US and Eastern European and USSR sources – in the example of the VoN, broadcasters were enabled to study at higher education institutions ranging from the GDR’s Werner Lambertz solidarity school in Potsdam (which specialized in journalism courses) and the University of Sofia to the Thompson Foundation and Deutsche Welle.35
Added to this was the support from the OAU and the UN, which translated in access to educational institutions, housing and other infrastructure in countries neighboring Namibia. The legal and ideological support from the UN also allowed SWAPO to easily refute the South African propaganda of ‘total onslaught’ (meaning that Apartheid South Africa was the last bastion of Western democracy in a communist bloc-controlled region), which claimed SWAPO was a ‘puppet’ of communism.\textsuperscript{36} Thus, speaking the language of human rights and an international community was an important part of VoN international broadcasts.

The VoN, in concert with other SWAPO media, denounced the South African-led ‘internal solution’, i.e. the Apartheid occupation regime’s efforts at implementing UN demands to democratize the country without significantly giving up power. The ‘internal solution’ led to the first elections in 1978, which were won by a coalition of several parties called the ‘Democratic Turnhalle Alliance’ (DTA), named after the place where leaders had met to form the coalition. These parties’ demand for democracy was genuine, but, confronted with the limitations placed upon them by the political structure – in which a South African-appointed Administrator General retained much of the legislative and executive power – successive governments fell apart during the 1980s. In 1985, after the failure of yet another ‘interim government’ called the ‘Multi-Party Conference’, the Voice of Namibia commented:

\begin{quote}
What the Botha regime is up to in 1985 is nothing new. It is its old game of delaying tactics. The idea of yet another interim government aimed still more at preventing Namibia from achieving its independence, is one more ample testimony that racist South Africa is determined to turn Namibia into its client state and sphere of economic plunder.\textsuperscript{37}
\end{quote}

Thus, an international audience was not unknown to the Voice of Namibia broadcasters. Far from it, the radio actually constantly interacted with other media, reacting and prompting them to disseminate and react to its own contents. Broadcasters became obsessive consumers of international radio, new agency wires, and newspapers, constantly checking and answering to what others reported on Namibia. They also learned to adapt to an anti-imperialist and human rights discourse to speak to as many different ideological positions as possible, balancing the global Cold War by speaking to both sides – and effectively countering South African denunciations of SWAPO as ‘communist’. Through news aggregators like the SWB and FBIS, the station could assume that its message carried further than the weak shortwave signal. Its international audience was actually one that the Voice of Namibia very much dialogue\textsuperscript{ed} with.

**Talking to the distant home**

Namibian listeners, on the other hand, were nearly unknowable for the Voice of Namibia. Broadcasters in the second generation working in the station referenced their own experiences when listening to the Voice of Namibia to guide their programming was. Other
than that, SWAPO told PLAN soldiers to try and gather as many information as possible on SWAPO media consumption during incursions into the country, a task that was easier for print media and posters, since soldiers carried them into Namibia to deliver to trusted locals, who would hide them and distribute further.

In fact, the commentaries and rhetoric of the station that were relatively successful as an intervention in an international public also betray SWAPO’s disconnectedness from the political goings-on in Namibia itself. For example, it wrongly denied that the DTA had any popular support in Namibia in the run-up to the elections of 1978, claimed the people would not accept the election and called for a general strike, alleging that ‘all’ workers in the country were supporters of SWAPO. The spokesman for the movement’s Namibian wing, Dan Tjongarero, denied reports of a general strike two weeks later. Even further, Robin Makayi, a Zambian journalist supervising the UN Commissioner’s training programs and the Voice of Namibia stations in general, only found out that the broadcasts from Lusaka, until the move of SWAPO HQ to Luanda in 1978 the most important station in the network, had been effectively blocked by a South African military jamming facility in the Caprivi Strip, a bottleneck forming the short border between the two countries and perfectly placed to jam Lusaka broadcasts. Through SWAPO’s connections with community media inside the country, though, actual journalistic scoops could make it through to the VoN. For example, in 1980, the church newspaper Omukwetu received a ‘hit list’ of prominent opposition figures including the Lutheran Bishop Dumeni. While the paper itself broke the news, its editor fled to Angola and handed over the list to SWAPO, which disseminated and published it via the VoN. This was the first evidence of the notorious special unit Koevoet, which would go on to terrorize the war zone in the North in the following decade.

In contrast to the content geared at an international audience, the broadcasts for Namibians had one main goal: mobilizing as many people as possible to join and support the movement, give support to soldiers. To address a Namibian audience, SWAPO emphasized national unity. This was an important part of its propaganda, in order to address the accusation that – since it had originated from a regional organization and most of its leadership belonged to the Ovambo ethnic group – it was an ethnic movement, not a nationalist one,

that was the cornerstone of our radio service in propaganda, in psychological warfare. [...] This message [...] must have all the ingredients: unifying the people. Inform the people about the importance of unity. [...] Tell them how bad is apartheid [sic]. [...] What happened is that South Africa was saying: SWAPO is only for Ovambos; it doesn’t care for the rest of the country. Then we’d say ‘No, that’s not our aim. We are fighting for the whole country. We are fighting for the betterment of everybody.’ We were uniting people to fight for a common cause.
SWAPO presented itself as the first truly national liberation movement in Namibia, the one organization which united the different strands of anti-colonial resistance that shaped Namibian history and, for SWAPO, national identity. It also included white Namibians in this, albeit in an ambivalent tone. In 1979, upon news that white Namibians had started to leave the country, the VoN commented:

We are very much aware of the fact that the whites who have been living in Namibia for years [...] simply came to Namibia to exploit the country’s natural resources [...] If they have now decided to run away from Namibia well and good, because they feel that if the regime they have been supporting has no more control over Namibia, that would mean that their property would have no more protection. But since their leaving of Namibia has no impact on our struggle for the total liberation of Namibia, we can say goodbye to them. Nevertheless, we would like to reiterate the policy that is quite clear. The policy of SWAPO has nothing to do with the colour of skin of somebody. A person [sic] can be black, white, yellow or brown. Those whites who want to live in a democratic society of an independent state of Namibia are welcome.\(^{44}\)

Over the course of the 1980s, SWAPO would meet with liberal white groups from Namibia for talks, such as the ‘Interessengemeinschaft Deutschsprachiger Südwester’.\(^{45}\) Thus, broadcasters took care to address their audience in all languages spoke in Namibia, with the exception of German and San (for largely practical reasons, though San people were long discriminated against in the media as elsewhere).\(^{46}\)

However, this internal propaganda geared at mobilizing a Namibian listenership would not go very far. Concerning the details of information and news programs, surveys done by South African radio and sociologists – even when taking the probably skewed data into account – show that radio listeners in Namibia relied on a mix of sources ranging from the South West African Broadcasting Corporation to Radio RSA and the BBC World Service, other African radios, and the Voice of Namibia.

The actual effect of the Voice of Namibia in the country itself lies in the ‘ritual’ aspects of its communication, the parts aimed at identity- and community-building. Listening to the SWAPO radio was illegal, thus for many, it became a first act of resistance, and in the words of Frantz Fanon, it let listeners ‘enter into contact with the revolution.’ The singer Jackson Kaujeua, who would later work for the SWAPO station, remembers listening to it as a student in Namibia:

[...] every evening we would all surround a small wireless. It faintly relayed what we wanted to hear all the way from Tanzania: ‘This is the Voice of Namibia coming to you through the external services of Radio Tanzania.’ [...] It recharged our batteries and we became rebellious in many ways [...].\(^{47}\)
This is corroborated by other accounts, which claim that listening to the Voice of Namibia strengthened their resolve to leave the country and join the nationalist struggle. Sekibakiba Lekgoathi mentions a similar effect for South African listeners to the ANC’s Radio Freedom. Thus, the practice of listening to the Voice of Namibia alone was enough to become part of a community of resistance.

This particularly pertained to cultural programming. Although there were no specific cultural programs in the Voice of Namibia (in contrast to especially Radio Freedom and the Zimbabwean Voice of Zimbabwe), the commentaries were interspersed with music sourced from ‘liberation songs’. These songs were produced in the PLAN camps, where the Voice of Namibia held music and songwriting competitions. Songs written by PLAN soldiers were also produced by the SWAPO’s own band, the Ndilimani Cultural Troupe, which performed them also at live solidarity concerts in Europe and the US. Liz Gunner describes the power of such songs for the South African case:

[the songs] travelled with cadres between the camps beyond South Africa’s borders and into the country. [They] had their genesis in the particular cultural forms that the military camps produced. [...] The songs produced in the camps were often part of wider debates within the liberation movement and tied into the desires of combatants.

This made the cultural programming of the Voice of Namibia part of a wider resistance culture shared by Namibians and other liberation movements. SWAPO had early on realized the importance of this culture in the nationalist struggle. It acknowledged that ‘the politico-military confrontation between the Namibian people and the racist South African occupationist regime is exerting tremendous influence upon the material and spiritual phenomenon known as culture.’

The national culture of Namibia, it argued, had been formed through decades of oppression and resistance, an experience and influence that most Namibians shared. Most Namibian music, for example, had undergone major changes through the influence of Christian missionaries, who introduced Christian choral music. For the SWAPO musicians, modernizing and adapting the musical traditions to the needs of nationalist resistance was also a way to create a new national culture for an independent Namibia:

Their songs mirror reality. They reflect clearly and realistically the soul of the people in bondage: speak about its history full of glory and heroism. The revolutionary content of their lyrics has given their songs effectiveness, influence and great motivation. The NCG gears itself at creating consciousness, helping our people to understand their difficulties and those responsible for them. [...] Enlarging the group will make it possible for the NCG not only to add to its music traditional dancing and singing, but also to use their modern instruments to compose good music with Namibian roots and tastes. [...] That
Music played an important part in connecting Namibian listeners to the Voice of Namibia, a fact that broadcasters were acutely aware of: ‘Especially the colleagues in Luanda used to do that, and then they would send us those songs. In fact, each program was interspersed with those songs. And from what we heard from the people who were inside, it really encouraged them.’ Liz Gunner and Marissa Moorman have shown that music had significant mobilizing power, catching emotions and providing important communication between guerrilla camps and listeners at home. Thus, although it took up only a small part of broadcast time, music was an essential part of the Voice of Namibia, and it played an important role in the actual reception of its programs in Namibia.

The two strands of communicating to its different audiences – the ‘transmission’ and the ‘ritual’ – come together in the way that the Voice of Namibia reported from specific events and turned them into commemorations of struggle history. It did so not on its own, but as a part of the wider SWAPO media network, in coordination with the poster and print publications. ‘Heroes’ Day’, ‘Namibia Day’ and ‘Cassinga Day’ were occasions to reflect on the history of anticolonial resistance, placing SWAPO squarely in its center and presenting it as a legitimate successor to earlier resistance movements, such as the fight of Herero and Nama chiefs against the German colonial state. It also commemorated the victims and scandalized the South African army’s human rights violations, thus using these commemorations as political intervention and unifying site of memory at the same time.

The most famous – and until today most contested – event in the war happened on 4 May, 1978. An attack by South African forces on a SWAPO camp in Cassinga/Kassinga, in Southern Angola, the ‘Battle of Cassinga’ became a focal point in both sides’ propaganda, with Radio RSA claiming a ‘limited military operation’ to eliminate a military target, and SWAPO saying that Cassinga was a refugee camp and the South Africans had attacked ‘a few thousand women, old men and children.’ These narratives were established early on, from the day of the event. The conflicting versions are duly noted in the Summary of World Broadcasts, but SWAPO went further, making the ‘Cassinga Massacre’ a yearly commemorated event. It used its whole media apparatus: posters, magazines, books and radio to reiterate the event as a war crime, showing the Apartheid government’s disregard for human rights and international law. Songs referenced Cassinga, and leaders were interviewed on anniversaries about its relevance for the Namibian people.

Thus, though SWAPO media were separated from their audiences in Namibia, they managed to put in place a circulation of media content that worked in several directions. Though direct information and propaganda often missed the mark both in terms of actual information and effectiveness, the Voice of Namibia, as part of a wider media network, established a culture of resistance that connected SWAPO in exile to audiences at home, a culture consisting of circulating songs and images that played a much more important role.
in mobilizing Namibians than direct propaganda.\textsuperscript{57} While intervention in international public discourse took the form of a dialogue with several other international media, putting out SWAPO’s position on the diplomatic stage, Namibian audiences were mobilized more effectively by creating a common idiom through which the experiences of oppression and resistance could be formulated in a nationalist framework.\textsuperscript{58}

**Conclusion**

The Southern African liberation radios provide us with a unique lens through which we can analyze the relationship of broadcasters to their audiences. Despite having few to no possibilities to actually undertake audience research and get any direct feedback to orientate its programming, the Voice of Namibia managed to be part of feedback and circulation loops that allowed it to have meaningful impact on its audiences. Taking a cue from practitioners in the Voice of Namibia, an analysis of audiences going beyond listeners and including ‘institutional audiences’ such as the media and newsletters targeted internationally, as well as an emphasis on the ‘community media’ or ‘ritual’ character of parts of the way in which the VoN engaged its audiences is useful in bridging a problem that a ‘propaganda’ approach is tasked with: the question of whether propaganda was effective. While that question has long been eschewed as the wrong one, recent approaches have tended to emphasize listener agency, describing how listeners to liberation radios made sense of the content themselves. This article has tried to show that while this emphasis on listener agency is useful to an extent, broadcasters themselves were aware of it and actively engaged with their audiences to the extent it was possible; not direct propaganda, but enabling circulation of a perspective, of certain identities and a culturally enriched sense of community was their goal. This has so far been viewed as an effect of how listeners engaged with liberation radios, but it is worth it to explore the broadcasters’ awareness of and active role in it.

This ‘rhizome’ worked in different ways depending on the audience, but in both cases the radio did so by attaching itself to larger media circulation processes. In the first instance, the Voice of Namibia did not talk to actual individual listeners sitting in front of a receiver. Rather, it imagined its main recipients as other international media, which could act as multipliers for SWAPO’s position in a global diplomatic intervention. Radio thus acted as an ideological support mechanism for SWAPO’s international diplomacy, intervening and interacting with public – and, importantly for the broadcasters, published – discourse. In the second, though direct propaganda was part of the programs, the actual effectiveness of the Voice of Namibia consisted in the lifeline it produced between soldiers’ voices and Namibian listeners. It constituted a part of a network in which cultural artefacts like songs and images circulated between the exiled fighters’ camps and the inhabitants of Ovambo villages, of Windhoek’s Katutura township and the ‘homelands’. The opening stanza of the Voice of Namibia alone carried significance as a cultural artefact and a sign that SWAPO was still there, just beyond the border, fighting against the oppression that Namibians experienced daily in an Apartheid society. Broadcasters and the Information Department of SWAPO,
limited as they were both in terms of training and equipment, realized these necessities and actively worked to integrate with these different circulation networks.

This means that when regarding this specific form of radio, we need to take into account that practitioners in liberation radios had a different relationship with their audiences, targeting specific networks of circulation and engaging more with other media – both in terms of information and culture. To reach and interact with their audiences, they tapped into these wider networks, which gave them indirect possibilities at interacting with audiences instead of broadcasting into the void. Analyzing liberation radios as community radios allows us to emphasize these aspects, going beyond the paradigm of propaganda and international radio to look for the wider ranging effects these radios had on their different audiences.

Biographical note:
Robert Heinze is a researcher and lecturer at the University of Trier. He received his PhD at the University of Konstanz with a dissertation on the history of radio in the decolonization of Zambia and Namibia. He is currently working on a postdoctoral research project on urban transport in African cities. Among his published articles are “‘Men Between’: The Role of Zambian Broadcasters in Decolonisation’ (JSAS, 2014) and ‘Fighting over Urban Space: Matatu Infrastructure and Bus Stations in Nairobi, 1960–2000’ (Africa Today, 2019). His research interests include the history of radio in Southern Africa, the history of infrastructure and transport in Africa, and postcolonial urban economies. Contact: heinze@uni-trier.de.

Bibliography:


**Notes:**


Carpentier et al. 2001, 5.


Schiller 2007, 127.


Heuva 2003.

Miescher et al. 2009.


32 per cent of teachers in Ovamboland indicated they listened in regularly. Tötemeyer differentiates between ‘modernizing’ and ‘traditional’ elites, the latter being mostly Ovambo chiefs, which were conservative and integrated into the structure of the Namibian ‘homeland’ system. Ibid.


34 The problem of multilingual broadcasting exists throughout Africa. Broadcasting in different languages was not just an issue of reaching listeners and having them understand. Many listeners in Namibia, for example, would have been able to understand Afrikaans, the language of primary
education and lingua franca. Instead, the issue was one of identity and symbolism: Afrikaans was the language of the oppressor and South African language policy was an integral part of Apartheid. This meant that speaking to Namibians in their respective native languages was an equally integral part of the anti-Apartheid movement. Infrastructure, this put a strain on the Voice of Namibia, since it meant more staff and less airtime for individual segments.

28 Interview Sackey Namugongo, Windhoek, 11.08.2006
29 Helao la Ndadi, “The Department of Information and Publicity (Radio Section) Supplementary Report or Recommendation”, undated, UNAM Archives Special Collections, SWAPO Documents of Dr. Peter Katjavivi, 14/1.
30 Interview Kaomo Tjombe, Windhoek, 27.11.2007.
31 Interview Sackey Namugongo, Windhoek, 11.08.2006.
33 see UNAM Archives Special Collections, SWAPO Documents of Dr. Peter Katjavivi.
38 see Dobell 1998: 21f.
41 Evenson/Herbstein 1989: 61; BBC SWB ME/6399/B/2, 17.04.80.
42 As many postcolonial nations, Namibia has had to grapple with the question of conflict between ethnic and national identities; however, it is overshadowed by the process of reconciliation between white and black communities in the aftermath of Apartheid. Though discussions such as about the overpresence of Ovambo people in SWAPO and in the administration exist, they never escalated to any bigger conflict. cf. Du Pisani, André/Reinhart Kößler and William A. Lindeke (eds.) 2010. The Long Aftermath of War: Reconciliation and Transition in Namibia (Freiburger Beiträge zu Entwicklung und Politik 37), Freiburg: ABI.
43 Interview Sackey Namugongo, Windhoek, 11.08.2006.
44 BBC SWB ME/6026/B/6, VoN Luanda, 23.01.1979.
46 The San (hunter-gatherer) communities live mostly in the Kalahari desert between Namibia, Botswana and South Africa. They were more harshly discriminated against than other groups during Apartheid, and continue to experience discrimination in all three countries. The Namibian state

48 Interview Theofilus Ekandjo, Oshakati, 10.11.2007.
49 Lekgoathi 2010.
51 ‘Namibia: Culture and the Liberation Struggle’, BAB Registratur AA.3: SWAPO Collection, 86fSLuPb1, 3.
52 Ibid., 6.
53 Interview Kaomo Tjombe, Windhoek, 27.11.2007.
55 BBC SWB ME/5806/ii, 05.05.1978.
57 Lekgoathi 2013; Akawa 2009.
58 Heuva 2003.