UESUGI KENSHIN:
a study of the military career of a sixteenth century warlord

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Introduction.

Uesugi Kenshin (1530-78) was born in Echigo (present-day Niigata Prefecture) in north-western Japan as the son of Nagao Tamekage, a high-ranking local official of the Muromachi shogunate, and he came to rule over the province at a time when the military conflicts that had ravaged the country, locally and regionally, since the middle of the fifteenth century were quickly developing into a fight for national supremacy. He himself was a very active participant in this process from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, and the purpose of the present study is to determine what it was that motivated him to become that.

My interest in that question has its origin in the fact that modern works by Japanese scholars often portray Kenshin as a bit of a rarity among the warlords of that time — as one who let himself become involved in the conflicts of the day, not out of consideration for his own interests but out of loyalty for the central authorities. It was precisely such works that constituted the basis of a biographical study on Kenshin I wrote a number of years ago, and after having finished that, I decided to continue my Ph. D. studies along the same track, so to speak, but this time with the focus being on the questions of what there might have been behind Kenshin’s alleged loyalty and unselfishness, and on whether Kenshin perhaps had a “philosophy of life” which guided his politico-military activities, and of course with the research being based first of all on historical sources rather than modern works. Since then, my examination of the historical records has caused me to doubt the validity of the portrait of Kenshin as an unselfish Ashikaga loyalist, and thence to shift the focus to the questions of, firstly, whether he really was that or not, and secondly, of what the motivation behind his activities might have been if he was not.

The result is the present dissertation. Centred on the Nagao and Uesugi, the two warrior houses that constitutes Kenshin’s genealogical background, the first half of it (Chapters One through Four) is an account of the development some of Japan’s political institutions underwent from around the time of the Muromachi shogunate’s establishment to the time of Kenshin’s becoming militarily involved outside the borders of Echigo, and of the warfare that characterized this development. More specifically, it deals with the development of the class of provincial military governors known as shugo and of the shogunate’s branch administration in eastern Japan, with the rise of the class of domanal warlords known as Sengoku daimyō, and with the Nagao and Uesugi’s roles in all this. It thus draws up the historical background relevant to Kenshin’s involvement in the conflicts of the latter half of the sixteenth century, explaining both the basic nature of these conflict and the various factors, political and otherwise, that combined to shape the general course his military career.
The rest of the dissertation is an account of Kenshin’s political and military activities after his entry onto the stage of regional and national conflicts, and a discussion of the motives behind these activities, including an analysis of how well the picture of him as a unselfish Ashikaga supporter actually conforms to them.
Chapter 1: A short history of the Nagao and Uesugi to 1506.

The Nagao can trace their descent to Emperor Kanmu (737-806), the fiftieth emperor in the traditional line of Japanese sovereigns.1 Kanmu’s great-grandson, Prince Takamochi, was one of the members of the imperial family who in 889 had their status changed from royalty to commoner and was thenceforth allowed to use the family name Taira,2 and it was descendants of Takamochi who subsequently founded the eight renowned warrior houses of eastern Japan known as Bandō Hachi Heishi, The Eight Taira Families of the Kantō.3 These were the Chiba, Kajiwara, Doi, Miura, Oba, Chichibu, Kazusa and Nagao.4

Like so many other warrior families in the history of Japan, the Nagao took their name from the place they settled in, which was the Nagao shōen in Sagami Province (present-day city of Yokohama),5 and the first to use the name was one Kagemura, a great-grandson of Takamochi.6 Exactly when Kagemura founded the family appears to be unknown, but it is clear from the writings of several modern scholars that the family had been established by the time the Genpei War broke out in 1180.7

There has been some disagreement among modern scholars concerning the role of the Nagao during that conflict. According to Kuwata Tadachika, Inoue Toshio and Hayashi Seigo, for instance, the Nagao sided with the Taira in 1180 and apparently only saved themselves from Minamoto Yoritomo’s vengeance five years later, being on the losing side of course, by becoming vassals of the Miura.8 Hanagasaki Moriaki, on the other hand, has voiced the opinion that the Nagao participated in the Genpei conflict as vassals of the Miura,9 and the implication of this is firstly, of course, that the Nagao did not become vassals of the Miura upon the termination of the war but had been it since 1180 or earlier; and secondly, that the Nagao were fighting against and not as allies of the Taira. Because the Miura were themselves close allies of Minamoto Yoritomo right from the time of his first call for support in 1180.10

Whenever the Nagao entered the service of the Miura, their position as vassals to that house must have been quite advantageous. At least, that is how it appears when viewed in retrospect because the Miura rose to become one of the most prestigious supporters of the new Kamakura shogunate founded by Minamoto Yoritomo; in fact, by 1247 it was second only to the Hōjō, who themselves had managed to assume permanent leadership of the shogunate twenty years after Yoritomo’s death in 1199.11

But 1247 was also the year that saw the fall of the Miura. Several years of uncertainty for the Kamakura shogunate, a period marked by in-house struggles for power and the deterioration of its relationship with the imperial court in Kyoto, reached their climax in that year when the Miura let themselves be manoeuvred into taking arms against the Hōjō by another warrior house. In the ensuing battle, known as the Hōji Battle, they were defeated, with the result that the Nagao fell out of favour
with the shogunate and had their ancestral lands confiscated. It is not clear from the works consulted for this study whether or not the Nagao actually participated in the Hōji Battle; only that their chieftain at the time, a great-great-grandchild of the family founder named Kagemochi, was killed or committed suicide the same year as a consequence of the Miura’s defeat, and that the surviving kinsmen became rōnin — masterless samurai.

The Nagao were not to remain rōnin for long, however, because within a few generations they came into contact with another samurai family, a family that had been established by a nobleman from Kyoto and settled down in Kamakura in 1252, and that was thus without any long and illustrious martial record at the time; but also a family that was destined, in the span of a few generations thereafter, to become one of the most powerful warrior houses in eastern Japan and the ruler of Echigo Province: the Uesugi.

For reasons unknown Kagemochi’s grandchild Kagetane became vassal of the Uesugi and came, as the Kamakura period drew to its close, to serve the family as shitsuji, a high-ranking administrative post in the bureaucratic systems set up by clans to take care of their internal affairs.

The coming into contact with the Uesugi marked a turning point in the fate of the Nagao because due to this connection the family rose to acquire military influence in both Echigo and the Kantō region, until it finally reached a position that enabled it to overthrow the Uesugi in the former place and to participate very actively in the overthrow of the Uesugi in the latter.

The Uesugi are descended from the famous founder of the Fujiwara family, Nakatomi Kamatari (614-69). The family was established by Kajūji Shigefusa, a seventeenth generation descendant of Kamatari, and has its name from the Uesugi shōen in Tanba Province (present-day city of Kyoto), where Shigefusa settled at some point in the Kamakura period. The Kajūji were nobility but Shigefusa became samurai and entered the service of Imperial Prince Munetaka when he in 1252 was about to proceed to eastern Japan as the Kamakura shogunate’s sixth shogun.

Thus the Uesugi came to be established in Kantō, but it was not Shigefusa’s association with the shogun that sent the family on its rise to power there; it was the establishment of matrimonial ties with another warrior house, the Ashikaga, which had been settled in the region some hundred-odd years by the time of Shigefusa’s arrival.

A daughter of Shigefusa married Yoriuji, a fourth generation descendant of the Ashikaga’s founder, and Shigefusa’s granddaughter Seishi married Yoriuji’s grandson Sadauji. Especially the latter marriage is significant in connection with the rise of the Uesugi because it was one of Seishi and Sadauji’s sons who not only came to play a leading role in the destruction of the Kamakura shogunate
but also became the centre of its successor, the Muromachi government, letting the Uesugi attain political and military influence in the process.

The son in question, of course, Ashikaga Takauji (1305-58), who right from the beginning of his fight against the Hōjō in 1333 relied on the resources of the Uesugi. He had great trust in his uncle, Seishi’s brother Norifusa, and he used him as well as his cousin, Norifusa’s son Noriaki (1306-68), as military advisors at the time of his attack on the Hōjō garrison in Kyoto in that year. And as one American scholar has pointed out, it was no coincidence that that offensive was launched from Tanba, the province where the Uesugi had their ancestral landholdings.

It is well known how the Hōjō were defeated in the early summer of 1333, at the hands of Ashikaga Takauji in Kyoto and of Nitta Yoshisada in Kamakura, and also how subsequently the relationship between Emperor Go-Daigo and Takauji deteriorated as the emperor used the defeat to embark on the realization of his dream of re-establishing imperial authority and power, while Takauji took it upon himself, as one of the victorious warlords, to confiscate land, grant and confirm landholdings, and make appointments to, for instance, the post of shugo (provincial military governor). Already after the fall of the Hōjō’s Kyoto headquarters, Takauji rewarded his followers with confiscated land, shugo posts etc., and after he in 1335 had presumed, without waiting for an imperial order, to go to the Kantō in order to quell a contingent of Hōjō supporters who that had recaptured Kamakura, he for instance declared all the land of the Nitta be confiscated, and distributed it amongst his supporters. Among those who benefited from these acts were the Uesugi. In 1335 Takauji’s uncle Norifusa received the shugo post of Kōzuke Province; after him, in 1337, it went to Noriaki and was henceforth hereditary to the Uesugi.

Likewise with some of the appointments bestowed upon the Uesugi after 1335, for instance that of Echigo shugo. Takauji’s confiscation of the Nitta’s lands led Emperor Go-Daigo to declare him a rebel and hence to armed conflict between the two men and their respective supporters, a conflict that was to last until 1392 and has become known as The Disturbance of the Southern and Northern Courts (Nanbokuchō no Dōran) because of Takauji’s installing an imperial prince as emperor in Kyoto whilst Go-Daigo established a court in exile in the mountains of Yoshino. The Uesugi supported Takauji at the outset of this conflict too. Uesugi Noriaki was thus appointed Echigo shugo by Takauji, and he was sent campaigning in that province against the forces of Go-Daigo’s Southern Court, a venture that after some time met with success. Noriaki was the first Uesugi to hold the position of Echigo shugo, and he was probably appointed in, or before, 1341.

The Izu shugo post also became hereditary to the Uesugi, and in addition to this the family came to occupy the position, temporarily or for longer periods of time, in Bingo, Sagami, Shinano, Shimotsuke, Tango, Musashi, Kazusa and Awa (the Awa in the Kantō, not the one in Shikoku), with
the three last-mentioned provinces combining with Kōzuke, Echigo and Izu to form the family’s power base, that is, the places where the occupation of the shugo post made it possible for the family to build up a great military strength.\(^{35}\)

That this should be so is no surprise, considering how the shugo office evolved during the sixty years or so following the destruction of the Kamakura shogunate. From having been, during the time of that government, a not fully developed office, used by the Hōjō to make up for the declining powers of the civil authorities in the provinces, and with only three specific functions (1) to enrol retainers of the Kamakura shogunate for guard duty in Kyoto and Kamakura; 2) to suppress major crimes; 3) to punish treason), it had become, as the fourteenth century drew to its close, a post with the authority to exercise certain major judicial and fiscal powers that had earlier been exercised by the central government, and with various privileges, not all of them obtained legally or as a result of government policy, in the areas of tax levying and collection and land confiscation and distribution.\(^{36}\)

In itself, this development did not so much provide the shugo with actual power as with the means with which to accumulate power, primarily in the form of control over the provinces’ local samurai rather than over, say, land. It was this kind of power accumulation to which the office of shugo became particularly suited, because due to the development mentioned above, it allowed its holders to assume the role as lawmakers of their provinces, and it as gave them the capacity to make and give away to local samurai rewards of office and land. And it was this kind of power accumulation most shugo in the country set about to accomplish, and with notable success. The result was the emergence of what modern historians call shugo daimyō, that is, regional warlords of shugo status.\(^{37}\)

We note that obtaining control over the local samurai in their respective provinces lay at the heart of the shugo class’s rise to power; as John Whitney Hall has expressed it: “The ultimate objective of shugo policy was to reduce, when possible, all lesser warrior families in the province to a subordinate status.”\(^{38}\) What the shugo did in practice was to organize the more powerful of these warriors, the local overlords known as kokujin who were often long-established in their respective areas, into bands of vassals.\(^{39}\) It was on the kokujin that the stability of a shugo’s domain rested, and the Uesugi family’s establishment in Kōzuke is a typical example of how the shugo went about securing a measure of control over them.\(^{40}\)

The Uesugi first exercised their right as holder of the shugo post in Kōzuke to confiscate estates; they picked strategically important places and converted them into areas controlled directly by themselves. At the same time they set about to enlist samurai as their konbon hikan, the closest and (supposedly) most reliable vassals. Then came the seizure of the public lands in Kōzuke (kokugaryō, that is, the land that had not been converted into shōen), and of the administrative organization that managed these lands, to wit, the province’s civil government. In the latter bureaucracy, a deputy shugo
(shugodai) was installed, and the management of the domain could then begin to unfold with him as the centre.\textsuperscript{41} This was quite in line with the policy of the Muromachi government who paralleled the office of shugo with the civil government's provincial governor, and sought to make available to the former the bureaucracy and attached lands of the latter.\textsuperscript{42}

There was of course opposition to the Uesugi's expansion in Kōzuke, opposition in the form of a league of the province's kokujin. Such leagues, known as ikki, were to become quite common in many areas during the latter half of the Nanbokuchō conflict as a means for the kokujin to resist shugo power, and often were they successful in forcing a shugo to give up his control over a province.\textsuperscript{43} This did not happen in Kōzuke, however. The Kōzuke ikki was dealt with by heavy compromising on the part of the Uesugi, with the result that it was allowed to exist as a fairly independent organization, while at the same time being in the loose grip of the latter.\textsuperscript{44}

But the Uesugi did not leave it at that because they continuously sought to enrol as retainers the members of the ikki, especially any illegitimate sons of the kokujin for whom such a fate would often be one of the more positive prospects of life. The Uesugi were fairly successful with this, and by ca. 1350, they had thereby managed to gain influence, in some measure, on the ikki.\textsuperscript{45}

The Uesugi's appearance in Kōzuke furnishes us, as noted, with a typical example of the establishment of shugo-kokujin relationships in the decades following upon the birth of the Muromachi government. And as also noted, it was this establishment that lay at the centre of that accumulation of power which enabled the shugo to develop into shugo daimyō. But as far as the Uesugi goes, their rise to power contained an additional important element, namely the close association with military and administrative organization with which Ashikaga Takauji hoped to keep the Kantō area under his control once he had decided on Kyoto as the future seat of his new government.

This apparatus, known as Kamakura-fu (the Kamakura government), had its origin in the organization set up soon after the collapse of the Kamakura shogunate by Emperor Go-Daigo for his son Nariyoshi, whom he had appointed military commander of the Kantō area.\textsuperscript{46} When in early 1336 Takauji set out from Kamakura on his long westward drive against Go-Daigo's forces, he left behind him his six year old son Yoshiakira as his Kantō representative, and it was during his stay there that Go-Daigo's original organization developed into the Kamakura-fu.\textsuperscript{47} In 1349 Takauji sent another son, Motouji, to the Kantō to head the Kamakura government, and later, in 1367, Motouji was succeeded to the post by his own son Ujimitsu.\textsuperscript{48}

There seems to have been some confusion among modern scholars over the question of what title Motouji and his successors had as heads of the Kamakura government. Some believe it to have been Kamakura (or Kantō) kubō from the time of Motouji's tenure, onwards.\textsuperscript{49} Others have it that Motouji originally had the title of Kantō kanrei, but that it was changed at some point to kubō, a honorific title
otherwise reserved for the shogun. Among the latter we find John Whitney Hall, who has written specifically that the change took place soon after the death of Motouji, and who has also used the term kubō in connection with Ujimitsu, Motouji’s successor. So it would seem that if Hall is not mistaken, the change occurred during Ujimitsu’s term of office.

Be that as it may, as indicated, the idea with the Kamakura government was to keep eastern Japan (more precisely: the eight Kantō provinces plus Izu and Kai and, from 1392, Mutsu and Dewa as well) under shogunal control. For this purpose, its head was given extensive powers over the area, including the authority to raise armies and appoint shugo. In fact, it appears that as far as the jurisdiction over the Kantō goes, the Muromachi shogunate limited itself only to retain, as its own prerogative, the right to approve succession in the Uesugi family.

The shogunate thus clearly intended the Kamakura government to be invested with a substantial amount of authority, but why the retention of the right of succession approval for the Uesugi then? Was it an attempt to insure against the possibility that a powerful Uesugi house should seize the leadership of that government and leave the shogunate with no control over the Kantō at all?

Whatever the reasons for the shogunate’s policy, the Uesugi certainly were, as previously indicated, allowed to become closely associated with the Kamakura government. Already Ashikaga Yoshiakira received help from Uesugi Noriaki with managing the Kantō, and eventually the Uesugi became hereditary deputys to the Kamakura kubō. As such they held the office and title of Kantō kanrei, and had delegated to them all the governing duties of the kubō.

By the time of Noriaki’s death in 1368, the Nagao had of course already entered the service of the Uesugi. As noted, Nagao Kagetame became vassal of the Uesugi towards the end of the Kamakura period and served the family as shitsuji. From then on, the family prospered with the Uesugi in provinces like Echigo, Kōzuke, Shimotsuke, Kazusa and Izu, and came to manage several of the latter’s domains as shugodai.

Thus, for instance, Kagetame’s son Kagetada, who became vassal of and shitsuji to Uesugi Noriaki and was sent campaigning in both Echigo and Echū during the Nanbokuchō conflict. He served under Noriaki as Echigo shugodai for a time, but eventually settled down in Kōzuke where again he was appointed shugodai under Noriaki. The Echigo shugodai position did become hereditary to the Nagao family, however. Kagetada’s brother Kagetsune (?-1368) took over the post, and thenceforth it was held by his descendants. After Kagetsune, the Echigo-Nagao split into four branches; apart from the line that held the shugodai position, these were the Ueda, Koshi (or Suyoshi) and Sanjō lines, all named after their places of residence, and all succeeding in becoming entrenched in their respective areas as independent local overlords.
The year Kagetsune and Noriaki died was also the year Ashikaga Yoshiakira's son Yoshimitsu (1358-1408) was appointed the third shogun of the Muromachi shogunate. This appointment marked the beginning of a period of some seventy years' duration characterized by the establishment of a fairly stable balance of power between the shogunate and the shugo of the forty-odd most central provinces of the country, a balance that allowed the shogunate to function effectively as a central government over those provinces despite occasional instances of shugo rebellion (for example the Akamatsu in 1383, the Yamana in 1394 and the Ōuchi in 1399).  

However, the period was also characterized by the deterioration of the relationship between the Muromachi government in Kyoto and its branch government in Kamakura, and the history of Uesugi Noriaki's successors as Echigo shugo and Kantō kanrei and of Nagao Kagetsune's successors as Echigo shugodai is, to some degree, the story of that deterioration. For that reason, and because it was the deterioration and ultimate breakdown of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship that paved the way for a period of Uesugi predominance in the Kantō region, we ought to take a closer look at the events that caused it.

The main reason for the deterioration of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship was that successive generations of Kamakura kubō tended to disregard the authority of the central government and instead sought to expand their own. The first kubō to do that was Ashikaga Ujimitsu, who had taken over the leadership of the Kamakura government upon his father Motouji's death in 1367. Ujimitsu aspired to the office of shogun himself, and in 1379 he came very close to an armed confrontation with shogun Yoshimitsu.

The background to this incident was the downfall that year of the shogun's deputy in Kyoto, Hosokawa Yoriyuki. The office of deputy shogun or kanrei (of course not to be confused with the office of Kantō kanrei) had come into being in 1362 and was supposed to be held alternately by three of the most powerful shugo houses and closest allies of the Ashikaga in the country: the Shiba, Hosokawa and Hatakeyama. The idea was to avoid monopolization of the office by any one family, but monopolization was exactly what was feared in 1379 because Yoriyuki had by then been occupying the post for twelve years. Added to this fear were various personal resentments which had developed over the years and which burst into the open in 1379, so Yoriyuki had to step down in the summer that year, leaving the kanrei post to his chief rival, Shiba Yoshimasa.

It was during the political manoeuvring leading to Yoriyuki's forced resignation — Shiba Yoshimasa's negotiating with Yoshimitsu in the capital in the early spring of 1379 while at the same time lining up for an armed confrontation with Yoriyuki — that the Kamakura kubō Ashikaga Ujimitsu chose to give vent to his rebellious inclinations. Allegedly to comply with a shogunal need for military
reinforcements he made preparations to dispatch an army to Kyoto. His real intention, however, was to attack Yoshimitsu, and he had perhaps actually been invited to do so by Shiba Yoshimasa.\textsuperscript{63}

The Kantō kanrei at this time was one of Uesugi Noriaki’s numerous sons, Noriharu, who well knew of, and was opposed to, his master’s anti-Yoshimitsu disposition. Interestingly, Noriharu remonstrated with Ujimatsu by taking his own life, but this did not deter Ujimatsu who appointed Noriharu’s brother, Norikata, commander of the army and sent him on his way to Kyoto. Nothing came of Ujimatsu’s plans, however, because while \textit{en route} to the capital, Norikata received an order from Yoshimitsu to return to the east, and he complied.\textsuperscript{64}

After 1379, Ujimatsu spent most of his military efforts on subduing one of the Kantō’s unruly warrior houses, the Oyama, but having once let his shogunal aspirations surface, his activities were suspiciously watched by Ashikaga Yoshimitsu, who relied on, among others, the Uesugi Kantō kanrei to uphold a Kyoto-Kamakura relationship free of unpleasant incidents.\textsuperscript{65}

The next Kamakura kubō was Ujimatsu’s son Mitsukane,\textsuperscript{66} who also came close to an open confrontation with the shogunate. This was in 1399, during the so-called Ōei Rebellion.

The instigator of the Ōei Rebellion was Ōuchi Yoshihiro, shugo of six provinces in western and central Japan and for long a loyal supporter of Ashikaga Yoshimitsu. As such, he had been militarily active and successful during the Nanbokuchō conflict, and had participated in the reconciliation process between the two courts in 1391-92. But he ended up raising an army and marching against Kyoto at the end of 1399, the reason apparently being dissatisfaction with having been passed over for the post as leader of the shogunate’s regional administrative headquarters on Kyūshū (the office of Kyūshū tandoi) in 1395.\textsuperscript{67}

For the occasion, Ōuchi Yoshihiro had secured the support of, among others, the Kamakura kubō, Ashikaga Mitsukane, who raised an army and personally led it to Musashi Province under the pretext of wanting to send reinforcements to the shogunate. He might actually, as a first step towards a showdown with Yoshimitsu, have intended to attack the Ashikaga shōen in Shimotsuke which, being the place where the Ashikaga had their ancestral origin, was under the direct control of the shogunate and thus outside the jurisdiction of the kubō, or maybe he feared unruly elements in the area, families like Oyama and Utsunomiya who were antagonistic towards the Kamakura government and might be instigated by the shogunate to rise against it.\textsuperscript{68} Whatever his intentions, Mitsukane however kept himself informed about the situation in Kyoto, and when he learned that Ōuchi Yoshihiro had been defeated, he returned to Kamakura where he some months later proclaimed any idea of rebellion abandoned in a \textit{gannō} to a Shinto shrine.\textsuperscript{69}

According to Nitta Eiji, it was Kantō kanrei Uesugi Norisada who dissuaded Mitsukane from rebelling.\textsuperscript{70} Norisada was a son of one of Uesugi Noriaki’s numerous sons,\textsuperscript{71} but there is no agreement
among modern works as to whether he was the kanrei at the time. According to the writings of Hanagasaki Moriaki, for instance, the kanrei was Uesugi Tomomune, a son of one of Noriaki's brothers, but whichever Uesugi it was, it is interesting to note that the kanrei's word carried so much weight that it could prevent open rebellion by the shogun's Kantō deputy.

Perhaps, then, that is the reason why Yoshimitsu never resorted to military force against the Kamakura kubō. During the Ōei Rebellion, he had decided to subjugate the Kantō region, and afterwards his relationship with Mitsukane remained one of discord, but he never implemented his decision. But then on the other hand, if Yoshimitsu's expectations were that the Uesugi could prevent future kubō transgressions and keep the Kantō region at peace, they were soon to be proved unjustified.

Upon his death in 1409, Mitsukane was succeeded as Kamakura kubō by his son Mochiuji, during whose term of office the Kantō remained anything but quiet and peaceful. In the first seventeen years of his tenure alone, a period during which by far the greatest part of the rest of Japan was all but totally unafflicted by any serious disorder, thirteen major incidents took place in the Kantō region, all of them but one, instances of local overlords or powerful provincial samurai families' rebelling against the Kamakura-fu. In addition to these incidents, there were a number of military campaigns during the same period, undertaken by Mochiuji himself (or at his behest) as revenge against various military houses that had supported the chief protagonist in one of the rebellions, the one exception mentioned above, the instigator of which was Uesugi Ujinori.

Ujinori was a son of Uesugi Tomomune and became Kantō kanrei in 1411. Obviously, already this fact makes his rebellion stand apart from the other twelve, but its real exceptionality lies in its basic cause being quite different from that of the others.

As far as the latter goes, their basic causes are to be found in the not altogether simple interplay between the interests of the local Kantō warlords, the Kamakura-fu and the shogunate. Underlying this interplay was the Kantō warriors' traditional spirit of independence from any central authority, a spirit that led them to support the Kamakura government's efforts to protect the region's independence against shogunal infringements, but also led them to rebel against the same government when its rule of the Kantō region was felt oppressive, as, for instance, was the case in the years following upon Uesugi Ujinori's rebellion when kubō Mochiuji attempted to suppress the remnants of the kanrei's party.

In such instances, the Kantō warriors were often willing to join forces with the shogunate in order to, as Imatani Akira has put it, "attempt to cast off the yoke of the Kamakura kubō," and after Ujinori's uprising, the shogunate, for its part, tried to utilise this willingness by organizing some of the lesser warrior houses into a group of direct shogunal allies called Kyoto's Stipend Band (Kyōto Gofuchi-shū) in order to use them to check any aggressiveness on the kubō's part.
Uesugi Ujinori’s rebellion, on the other hand, was basically caused by internal rivalry in the Uesugi house, which by Ujinori’s time had split into several branches. Such rivalry was not uncommon in Japan’s samurai families at this time. Originally strong blood ties weakened as families branched off, and the individual branches often tried to build up their own military strength and gain independence from the other family lines. At Ujinori’s time, the two Uesugi lines that competed for strength and power were the Yamanouchi, which had been founded by Uesugi Noriaki, and Ujinori’s own line, the Inukake, founded by Norifuji, one of Noriaki’s brothers and grandfather to Ujinori.79

It was disagreement between Ujinori and kubō Mochiuji that sparked off the rebellion. In the early summer of 1415, during a meeting in the Kamakura government’s highest decision-making body, Mochiuji for some reason or other confiscated the domain of a Hitachi warrior who was one of Ujinori’s retainers. Ujinori found the confiscation unwarranted and tried to prevent it, and failing this, he felt obliged to resign his post as Kantō kanrei in protest.80

Mochiuji accepted Ujinori’s resignation without further ado and appointed instead Uesugi Norimoto, who was a son of Norisada and hence of the Yamanouchi-Uesugi line, and with whom Ujinori was on bad terms. With the one’s resignation from, and the other’s appointment to, the office of Kantō kanrei, the relationship between the two men became one of hostility.81

And hostilities almost did break out because the change of kanrei made the respective supporters of the two men gather in Kamakura during the summer of 1415, and the atmosphere appears to have grown very tense indeed. But kubō Mochiuji interfered and ordered the samurai back to their provinces and they complied. According to Nagahara Keiji, the reason for Motouji’s move is not clear, but he has conjectured that it was an attempt to make up for the fact that neither the kubō nor Uesugi Norimoto was ready for a confrontation with Ujinori.82

Be that as it may, even though Ujinori, when he later set about to recruit kubō Mochiuji’s uncle and father-in-law, Ashikaga Mitsutaka, as an ally for the forthcoming confrontation, claimed that the kubō was unfit as ruler of the Kantō and used this as excuse for rebelling,83 the events in Kamakura in the summer of 1415 certainly indicate that as far as Ujinori himself was concerned, the confrontation’s true background was the internal Uesugi rivalry rather than dissatisfaction with the kubō.

After about a year of preparation Ujinori was ready to rebel. On the 2nd day of the 10th month (31st October), 1416, Ujinori, Mitsutaka and more than one hundred accomplices joined in a surprise attack on Mochiuji’s mansion, and in a few days both the kubō and kanrei Norimoto had been chased out of Kamakura. By then, Ujinori’s ranks had been joined by many a Kantō warrior who saw the fighting as an opportunity to improve his own fortunes, and soon Ujinori was able to dispatch troops to Musashi and Sagami to suppress the remaining contingents of Mochiuji’s followers.84
The shogunate reacted slowly to the events in the east, and for about three months Ujinori and Mitsutaka were the rulers of Kamakura. When eventually, early the next year, the shogunal armies bore down on Kamakura they were led by the Suruga shugo, Imagawa Norimasa, and the Echigo shugo, Uesugi Fusakata.85

Uesugi Fusakata was a brother to Norisada and hence kanrei Norimoto’s uncle. He had been adopted by one of Noriaki’s sons, Uesugi Norihide, who occupied the Echigo shugo post from 1368 to 1378, and is considered the founder of the Echigo-Uesugi branch,86 and it was to him Norimoto had fled when he and Ashikaga Mochiuji had been chased out of Kamakura.87 Fusakata’s subsequent military involvement in Ujinori’s rebellion was, however, short and unimpressive. He was checked by rebel forces in a battle at Seyagahara in Musashi on the 9th day of the 1st month (3rd February), but already by the following day the combined efforts of Fusakata and Imagawa Norimasa forced Ujinori, Ashikaga Mitsutaka and more than a hundred followers to commit suicide, thus ending the rebellion.88

So Mochiuji returned to his post, and, as already indicated, in the following years he initiated a number of military campaigns against various eastern warrior houses who had supported Ujinori in his revolt,89 and caused, by his altogether oppressive administration of the Kantō, several local overlords to react with further uprisings. As these were suppressed his control over the region strengthened, and the shogunate began to suspect that there was more to his activities than just keeping the Kantō at peace.90 It was during these years that Kyoto’s Stipend Band was organized, and as members of this group were among the targets of Mochiuji’s activities, these activities were seen as challenges to shogunal authority. Indeed, the eagerness with which Mochiuji went about quelling opposition was perceived, by Kyoto, as a sign of shogunal aspirations.91

On the 5th day of the 7th month (20th August), 1423, the shogunate decided that action had to be taken against the Kamakura kubō; the Stipend Band was to be instigated to start hostilities against Mochiuji, and a punitive force was to be dispatched to the Kantō. Accordingly, about a month later the Satake, Oguri, Utsunomiya and other members of the Stipend Band rose in rebellion against Mochiuji. They were defeated, but in consequence of the unrest, the system of alliances existing among the various local overlords and kokujin ikki of the Kantō were upset, and some of Mochiuji’s kokujin supporters began aligning themselves with the pro-Kyoto shugo of Shinano. This isolated the kubō, as it were, and in order to avoid an all-out war with the shogunate and its supporters in the region, he let himself be persuaded by his advisors to submit a written pledge of loyalty to the shogunate. The pledge was sent to Kyoto in the 11th month and was accepted in the early spring the following year, rendering superfluous the dispatch of the punitive force.92

The Kantō kanrei at this time was Uesugi Norizane (1410-66), a son of Echigo shugo Fusakata. He had been sent to Kamakura in 1418 upon the death of kanrei Norimoto and had been appointed to the
post the following year. He was among those advocating that Mochiuji pledge loyalty to the shogunate in 1423, and he indeed altogether strove to keep the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship harmonious. But as his efforts on that front often meant arguing with Mochiuji, he gradually incurred the latter’s displeasure until finally the kubō decided to destroy him. These matters will shortly be touched upon, but first we should take a look at Echigo, where war broke out in 1423 — a war which, at least when examined on the surface, was a consequence of the crisis in the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship that year.

In 1423 the Echigo shugo was Uesugi Fusakata’s grandchild, Fusatomo (d. 1449), who was only a child at the time; the shugodai was Nagao Kunikage, a grandchild of Kagetsune. For some reason or other the two of them became involved in the Kyoto-Kamakura crisis, with the former declaring his support to the shogunate and the latter siding with Ashikaga Mochiuji. This resulted in a shogunal order for the shugodai’s destruction and split the warrior society of Echigo in two camps, supporting, respectively, Uesugi Fusatomo and Nagao Kunikage.

In the 11th month the Kamakura kubō sent an army to Echigo where it conquered an area controlled by allies of the shugo, but that was as far as Mochiuji became involved in Echigo, as this was the time he submitted the pledge of loyalty to the shogunate. However, the kubō’s pledge did not bridge the gap that had opened in Echigo’s warrior society, and the war that ensued between the two camps was fought, at least on the surface, because the pro-shugo camp, led by Nagao Yorikage and Uesugi Yorifuji, tried to comply with the shogunal order for shugodai Kunikage’s destruction.

Nagao Yorikage (?-1469), also known as Tomokage, was a son of one of Kunikage’s brothers, but Uesugi Yorifuji’s exact identity seems to be unknown. He does not figure in any of the modern Uesugi genealogies consulted for this study, and the works that mention him do so only in the context of the war that broke out in Echigo in 1423. But one scholar, Inoue Toshio, has conjectured that Yorifuji was also known as Yorikata or Yamaura-dono (The Lord of Yamaura), a conjecture which, if true, makes him Uesugi Fusakata’s son, the brother of Kantō kanrei Norizane, and the founder of the Yamaura branch of the Echigo-Uesugi.

Be that as it may, as for the fundamental cause of the war, Haga Norihiko has speculated that it should be found not so much in the shogunate’s desire to see Kunikage destroyed, as in a rivalry between Nagao Yorikage and Uesugi Yorifuji on the one side and Kunikage on the other, a rivalry over influence on the Uesugi leadership which was headed by a shugo who was still under age and resided in Kyoto more or less permanently. This contention for power among persons close to Echigo’s centre of authority exploded into a war engulfing the whole province because it was seen by many kokujin as an opportunity to settle either disputes with other kokujin or intra-family rivalries.

The war was thus a rather complicated affair, but the axis around which it revolved was the confrontation between shugo power and the kokujin class brought about by the shogunal order for
shugodai Kunikage’s destruction. In short, Uesugi Yorifuji and Nagao Yorikage allied themselves with various local samurai families of northern Echigo, the group of traditionally semi-independent families known as Agakita-shū (The Band from North of Aga, so named due to their living north of the river Aganogawa in northern Echigo), and went to war against Kunikage and his supporters. The hostilities continued intermittently for several years, with both sides having their share of battlefield successes and failures and both absorbing a great number of casualties.

Early in 1428, Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s son, Yoshinori (1394-1441), was chosen to be the sixth Muromachi shogun, and before the year was out, he had reconfirmed Kunikage to the position as Echigo shugodai. According to Haga Norihiko, the war in the province ended due to this reconfirmation, but as for the details of its termination, nothing is said in any of the works consulted for this study. The implication of Haga’s notion is, however, that the war ended because deprived of the excuse for engaging in military activities by the central authorities’ re-acceptance of Kunikage, all those claiming to fight the cause of the shugo and shogunate found it wiser to submit, as it were, to the shugodai than to continue a conflict, the nature of which would prove to be fundamentally altered in Kunikage’s favour by the reconciliation (because of the possibility of military interference by the shogunate or of being declared rebel, have one’s landholdings confiscated etc.).

Whatever its political and military background, the termination of the war had some interesting consequences. Both the Uesugi and the Nagao had witnessed an increase in the number of followers during the conflict, but especially the Echigo shugo benefited from this as it meant a number of new retainers spread out over the province, warrior families who because of all the kokujin rivalries and family conflicts that had surfaced during the war had found it opportune to hand over their landholdings to the shugo and then become enfeoffed with the land as vassals.

As we have already seen, this vassalization was exactly the kind of change the Uesugi, and other shugo in other provinces, had strived to bring about ever since the Muromachi shogunate’s formative years. The process was thus far from being new to Echigo when the war broke out in 1423, but it was accelerated by it. And, as Haga Norihiko has pointed out, it enabled the shugo branch of the Echigo-Uesugi family to obtain a stronghold in the midst of the kokujin class, and had the consequence that the shugo branch was provided with so much real power over that class that it was able to use it for military involvement outside the province. This ability was, as we shall soon see, to be of great benefit to the Uesugi in the Kantō region.

Regarding shugodai Kunikage’s position after 1428, Inoue Toshio has written, in a discussion of who can be said to have won and lost the war, that “there was only one result. Nagao Kunikage, having the house of Uesugi over him, extended his power to include the Agakita region (...), and strengthened his control over the Echigo kokujin.” What Inoue is implying here is that the war left shugodai Kunikage so dominant a figure in the Echigo leadership that it was he, rather than the shugo, who
benefited from the changes in the province’s warrior society outlined above; that he was so much the man in power that he was able to utilize these changes for extending his power to include the Agakita region and strengthening his control over the province’s kokujin. This may sound very probable but it is inconsistent with the writings of Haga Norihiko.

According to Haga, “it was the shugodai branch of the Nagao family that had grasped the right to command the Echigo forces” after the war, but “they were nothing more than military commanders — essentially the executors, as far as it goes, of the shugo’s legal authority — without the function of a ruling master.” Kunikage did, in the opinion of Haga, manage a substantial part of the shugo domains, with the shugo, as noted, more or less residing permanently in the capital, but he did so because the task had been entrusted to him by the Uesugi family, and he and his branch of the Nagao were not regarded as being of a different standing than the kokujin of the province.112

This is quite a different picture of Kunikage than that depicted by Inoue Toshio. If Haga is correct, whatever power and authority Kunikage wielded over the Echigo kokujin, he did so on behalf of, rather than at the expense of, the Uesugi shugo; and if he came out of the war strengthened, he apparently did so, at least as far as his role in the provincial leadership goes, only to the limited extent that he was able to “grasp” the right of military command.

Whatever the true position of Kunikage and his branch of the Nagao family after the war, it is certainly primarily in the role as military commanders of the Echigo armies that they have inscribed themselves in modern history books in a post-1428 context; more specifically, in the context of the hostilities caused by the continuing deterioration of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship.

Kamakura kubō Ashikaga Mochiuji’s activities after Uesugi Ujinori’s rebellion in 1416-17 had, as we have seen, given rise to suspicions in the minds of the central government of his harbouring shogunal aspirations. His pledge of loyalty in 1423 had prevented an open military confrontation, but his subsequent behaviour was certainly still full of indications that these aspirations had not subsided; thus, for instance, in 1428 when Ashikaga Yoshinori was chosen as the new shogun.

Mochiuji had spent much time in the capital in the hopes of being selected for the post, and having had his claim rejected by the senior members of the shogunate he vented his resentment on Yoshinori by raising an army in Kamakura with the intent of attacking Kyoto.113 Interestingly, Mochiuji also tried to secure the friendship and allegiance of Nagao Kunikage and the Echigo kokujin, but Kunikage remained loyal to the shogunate and promptly reported Mochiuji’s approaches to Yoshinori.114

The central authorities was thus forewarned of the kubō’s plans, but what in the end deterred Mochiuji from carrying them out was not his masters in Kyoto but his own deputy, Uesugi Norizane. Norizane dissuaded his master from rebelling but also finally abandoned all hopes of his improvement, while the shogunate for its part strengthened its vigilance vis-à-vis the kubō.115
Already by the following year there was another indication of Mochiuji’s shogunal aspirations, to wit, his refusal to accept the new era name Eikyō, and this year also saw the kubō continuing his aggressive behaviour towards various warriors of eastern Japan. Finally, in 1432, Ashikaga Yoshinori felt obliged to make a demonstration of force in the east. On the pretext of wanting to view the mountain Fujisan and enjoy an excursion into nature, the shogun made a trip to Suruga in order to intimidate Mochiuji and perhaps also, should the latter choose to join his master for the mountain viewing, to have him assassinated.

During this period Uesugi Norizane again showed himself on the side of moderation and anti-confrontation. It was he who persuaded Mochiuji after some time to accept the Eikyō era name, and he was among those advisors trying to dissuade the shogun from going on the mountain viewing trip, foreseeing as he did that the trip could lead to an armed confrontation with Mochiuji.

Mochiuji never showed up at Yoshinori’s excursion. Instead, Uesugi Norizane came as Kamakura’s representative, thus postponing an open confrontation between Kyoto and Kamakura, and the following years the kubō could continue his aggressive behaviour toward Kyoto’s Kantō allies — his rebellious spirit was boiling and seething by this time, according to Nagahara Keiji.

After the shogun’s mountain viewing expedition, Uesugi Norizane continued to advocate moderation, but as this often meant aligning himself with the central authorities, the kubō came to distrust him and indeed, avoid him altogether. The two men were finally alienated, when in 1437 a public rumour arose to the effect that the kubō had meant to attack and subjugate the kanrei during a military campaign in Shinano the year before. This caused Norizane to leave Kamakura for a time, but he stayed at his post, and it took one more clash of opinions the following year before it came to a final split between the two of them, a split that at the same time meant the breakdown of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship.

The incident that triggered the split was Mochiuji’s refusal to comply with an old custom, according to which the Ashikaga shogun gave the heir of the Kamakura kubō a part of his own name — the non-“yoshi” part — to use in the adult name he was to take at the time of his coming-of-age ceremony. In the summer of 1438 it was time for the coming-of-age ceremony of Mochiuji’s heir, Kenōmaru, and hence for him to receive a part of shogun Yoshinori’s name, naturally, as precedent would have it, “nori.” But Mochiuji decided that his son’s new name should be Yoshihisa, and because “yoshi” had become a customary part of the Ashikaga shoguns’ names, this decision was seen by the shogunate as a signal of his ambition for the boy’s future position.

Uesugi Norizane eagerly advised his master against breaking the old name tradition, but Mochiuji was so dismissive that rumours again surfaced in Kamakura to the effect that the kubō intended to have his kanrei killed. The latter, for his part, considered committing suicide because he, at this point, felt he
had failed in his duty, but he let himself be persuaded by his advisors to abandon the idea and instead leave Kamakura. This he did, but not until he had contacted the shogunate and secured its support for a future clash with Mochiuji. So when he left Kamakura for his home base in Közuke on the 14th day of the 8th month (12th September) and Mochiuji promptly raised an army and set out after him, causing him to complain to the central authorities about being on the verge of being attacked, the shogunate had already sent out mobilization orders to its supporters in eastern and northern Japan. And as indicated by one extant specimen paraphrased by Nagahara Keiji in one of his works, it clearly intended to act in concert with Norizane and grasp the initiative right from the start: “Concerning the Kantō matter, do not miss any opportunity; depart when the Awa governor Uesugi Norizane has left for his province!”

It is not surprising that Echigo was among those provinces mobilizing on behalf of the shogunate and Norizane because shugodai Kunikage had remained loyal to the central authorities since his rehabilitation in 1428, and indeed, seems to have been held in quite high esteem by shogun Yoshinori himself.

Already in 1429 Echigo troops had been sent to the aid of victims of Mochiuji’s attacks in the east, and in 1435 Kunikage had been called to the capital to participate in a conference on the Kantō problem. In a letter written by the shogun himself on the day of the conference to a political adviser, Kunikage is praised as a person of unrivalled devotion with whom the advisor should make detailed consultation and then report his impression to the shogun.

In 1438, during the final clash between Ashikaga Mochiuji and Uesugi Norizane, it was Kunikage’s son, Sanekage, who led an Echigo army to Közuke in support of Norizane. Actually, being “an unyielding jingoist,” Sanekage not only supported Norizane militarily; he positively encouraged the kanrei to take action at a time when the latter was bent on avoiding war. This demonstration of zeal impressed Yoshinori favourably, and before the year was out Sanekage’s whole campaigning had earned him praise from the shogun personally. For all Sanekage’s zeal, however, the conflict was not brought to a close before the following spring, and to the very last kanrei Norizane showed himself to be a somewhat reluctant protagonist.

Since having set out from Kamakura in pursuit of his kanrei, Mochiuji had by the end of 1438 been forced back to the city by the approaching armies of his enemies, where he had encamped in what was to become the place of his last stand, a temple called Yōanji. There, however, he was not attacked for a while because Norizane wanted to spare his life and have him replaced as kubō by his son Yoshihisa, a solution the shogun not surprisingly disfavoured. On orders from Yoshinori, Norizane laid siege to the Yōanji, and on the 10th day of the 2nd month (2nd April), 1439, he attacked. But Mochiuji set the temple on fire and committed suicide with more than thirty followers, including Yoshihisa. Two other
sons, Yasuōmaru and Haruōmaru, survived the conflict, though, having earlier managed to escape to Shimotsuke. Thus ended what has become known as The Eikyō Rebellion.\footnote{128}

After Ashikaga Mochiuji’s death Uesugi Norizane entered priesthood in order to atone for having caused his master’s death. He even thought of taking his own life, but like in 1438 he let himself be persuaded by his advisors to abandon the idea and leave Kamakura instead, this time to the Izu temple Kokuseiji.\footnote{129} For the Kantō kanrei post, a member of the Echigo-Uesugi house was again chosen, the candidate this time being Norizane’s brother Kiyokata (d. 1446?), the founder of the Jōjo-Uesugi branch.\footnote{130} Also Norizane’s son Noritada (1433-55) became a monk after Mochiuji’s death, and Norizane forbade him, on pain of being disowned as an unfilial child, ever to return to secular life.\footnote{131}

How serious this threat was meant is a disputed point. According to Nagahara Keiji, Norizane actually later pressed for his son’s candidature as kanrei behind the scenes, while according to Tashiro Osamu, for instance, Noritada was disowned when he in 1446 left the priesthood.\footnote{132} Be that as it may, Noritada did take up the kanrei position in 1448,\footnote{133} and, as we shall see later in this chapter, his death a few years later signalled the Kantō region’s entry into the period of civil wars, “one step,” as Imatani Akira has put it, “ahead of the rest of the country.”\footnote{134}

The situation in the Kantō region after the Eikyō Rebellion has been described by John Whitney Hall in the following manner: “The Uesugi house (…) exerted as much of a centralizing force as was possible under the circumstances. But this was exerted less and less on behalf of Kyoto.”\footnote{135} And Nagahara Keiji has written that it actually “looked like the Kantō headed toward a restoration of order with Uesugi Kiyokata as the centre.”\footnote{136} In other words, peace and orderly government was re-established to some extent after Ashikaga Mochiuji’s death.

This situation emerged because many local warlords of the Kantō had so great hopes in Uesugi Norizane as the future manager of the region and conciliator vis-a-vis the central authorities after Ashikaga Mochiuji’s death, and even after the kanrei’s retirement many still looked to the Uesugi for leadership. In consequence, the family’s power grew rapidly in the subsequent months; to such heights, in fact, that when shogun Yoshinori voiced a desire to send a son to the Kantō in replacement of Mochiuji (at some point within the first year after the death of the kubō), he had to abandon the idea because of opposition from the Uesugi.\footnote{137} As we shall soon see, a reaction to this development was not long in setting in, but for the moment, the breakdown of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship had clearly left the Uesugi in a powerful position.

There is an interesting point to be made in this connection; to wit, that while the deterioration and ultimate breakdown of the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship clearly paved the way for the Uesugi’s attaining the predominant position in eastern Japan, there seems to be no indication that the Uesugi
actually facilitated the deterioration. On the contrary, the re-occurring instances of a kubō being rebuked by his kanrei and persuaded not to take up arms against the shogun, as well as Norizane’s efforts in 1432 to prevent shogun Yoshinori from going on his mountain viewing expedition, and in 1439 to have Ashikaga Yoshihisa appointed kubō, seem to indicate that the successive generations of kanrei wished to prevent the Kyoto-Kamakura relationship from breaking down.

Why would they want to do that? Well, any elements of genuine loyalty toward the shogunate or the Kamakura kubō notwithstanding, it is difficult to imagine that the successive generations of kanrei did not constantly strive to improve the political and military position of their family. That is certainly the way Uesugi Norizane has been judged, and the obvious reason for their wanting to maintain a good Kyoto-Kamakura relationship would then be that they saw greater opportunities of upholding and improving their fortunes in the continued existence of such a relationship than in its weakening or demise.

Such a policy of preservation would not have been unique to the Uesugi. During the period the family would have applied it in the Kantō (to wit, the seventy years or so following upon Ashikaga Yoshimitsu’s appointment as shogun in 1368), a similar policy, on the part of the shugo of the forty-odd most central provinces of the country, lay at the very heart of the balance of power which, as has already been noted, existed between the shogunate and those shugo; during those seventy-odd years, “the shugo,” in the words of John Whitney Hall, “found it to be in their best interests to join with, rather than compete against, the bakufu [i.e. shogunate].”

However, the Uesugi’s successful opposition to shogun Yoshinori’s wish to install a son as the new kubō soon after the hostilities had ended in 1439 indicates, as indeed does the Hall quotation at the beginning of this section, that the family did not pursue this policy once Ashikaga Mochiuji was dead. On the contrary, for the Uesugi house, from 1439 onwards, the policy seems to have been more one of preventing than facilitating the re-establishment of the old power structure, and of using the new power structure, with an Uesugi kanrei being the shogun’s sole Kantō representative, for the advancement of its interests. Hence, when in 1449 a new kubō was in fact successfully installed, the Uesugi were not long in chasing him out of Kamakura.

The Uesugi’s change of policy should of course not surprise us, given the strength of the position the unrest had left the family in. But on the other hand, neither should it surprise us that despite this strength there would always be those ready to challenge the Uesugi, as implied by the Hall quotation at the beginning of this section, the Kantō region, powerful though as the Uesugi was, did not lend itself easily to central administration.

Basically, the opposition came from local overlords in the provinces where the shugo post was not in the hands of the Uesugi. Such overlords had often been vassals of Kamakura since the beginning of
the Muromachi period, and they saw the expanding power of the Uesugi as an attempt to obtain control over the kokujinikki in their areas — as it had been in other areas where an Uesugi shugo was in charge. This would clearly not be in their interest, and they tended to prefer the old kubö system.¹⁴¹

Already a year after Mochiuji’s death, there was an attempt to raise an anti-Uesugi front in Sagami. It was headed by the Isshiki, old allies of Ashikaga Mochiuji, and many local samurai joined the cause out of discontent with the concentration of power in the hands of the Uesugi, who, however, managed to nip the rebellion in the bud.¹⁴²

A month later, another and far more obstinate anti-Uesugi front came into being, this time developing around the two sons of the late kubö, Yasuómaru and Haruómaru. This confrontation has become known as the Yuki Battle, but actually it was a rather prolonged affair, lasting for more than a year and taken very seriously by the shogunate. Just how seriously is indicated by the fact that Uesugi Norizane was approached and induced to leave his seclusion to become the leader of the forces that were to suppress the rebels, and that mobilization orders were sent out not just to the Kantô and the neighbouring regions but also to as far away as Hizen and Bungo on Kyushû. The hostilities themselves were centred on the siege of the castle where the Ashikaga brothers stayed, that of their chief ally Yuki Ujimoto, but skirmishes did occur in other places, as the large Uesugi army was spread out all over the Kantô region in order to check sympathisers of Yasuómaru and Haruómaru.¹⁴³

Echigo were among those sending troops to aid the Uesugi. As before they were led by Nagao Sanekage, and as before he was praised for his campaigning by the shogun himself. Sanekage won his praise in various battles taking place at Yuki Ujimoto’s castle,¹⁴⁴ but on the whole the besieging army acted with restraint in order to avoid an escalation of hostilities in the east, and it was not until the garrison ran out of food that the castle fell.¹⁴⁵

Neither Yuki Ujimoto nor the two Ashikaga brothers survived the conflict. The former is said to have cut open his stomach whilst running up a hill towards the command post of the besieging army, while Yasuómaru and Haruómaru tried to exploit a safe-conduct grant promised to the women in the castle just before the final attack by dressing up in female attire and making their escape in a palanquin.¹⁴⁶ It was the Echigo army that caught them and the job of escorting them to Kyoto as prisoners was entrusted to Nagao Sanekage who also carried out the shogunal order for the two boys’ execution received while en route to the capital.¹⁴⁷

1442 saw another abortive challenge to Uesugi authority, an affair led by a Hitachi samurai called Shishido Mochisato, and at the same time the anti-Uesugi forces of the Kantô increasingly looked for a political solution to the problem of how to curb of the power of the kanrei house; the general wish to restore the kubö system became stronger.¹⁴⁸ Interestingly, the anti-Uesugi forces in the Kantô had a
loyal ally in Echigo in the shape of one of kanrei Kiyokata’s sons, Fusasada (d. 1494), who had been adopted by Echigo shugo Fusatomo. For years Fusasada conveyed to the authorities in Kyoto petitions from the anti-Uesugi front in the Kantō to have restored to the position of Kamakura kubō the sole surviving son of the late Ashikaga Mochiiji, Eijuō (1438-97).149

None of the works examined for this study attempts an explanation of Fusasada’s motives for what seems to have been a clear case of disloyalty towards his relatives in Kamakura, but, of course, there is nothing strange about his behaviour. As already noted, in that day and age originally strong blood ties weakened as warrior families branched off, and the individual branches often tried to build up their own military strength and gain independence from the other family lines. Scores of warrior families had experienced this — the Uesugi themselves at the time of Ujinori of the Inukake line — so we should not be surprised if that was the case in Echigo in the 1440s. In other words, what Fusasada may have attempted was to strengthen the Echigo shugo line by gaining influence in eastern Japan; perhaps, even, by manoeuvring himself into a position for the kanrei post?

However Fusasada’s behaviour was regarded by the Uesugi in Kamakura, there was one person in Echigo to whom it was disturbing. That person was shugodai Nagao Kunikage, and the reason was that Fusasada was supporting the very Kantō faction he himself had made an effort to defeat.150 So after Echigo shugo Uesugi Fusatomo’s death on the 27th day of the 2nd month (30th March), 1449, when Fusasada took over the post, the shugo and the shugodai soon found themselves at odds.151

About half a year after Fusasada’s succession to the Echigo shugo post, on the 9th day of the 9th month (4th October), he joined the anti-Uesugi forces in Kamakura to welcome the new Kamakura kubō, Ashikaga Eijuō. The shogunate had complied with the wishes of the anti-Uesugi front in the Kantō, and early the next year, true to the old custom, the new kubō received a part of the shogun’s name — the character “shige” — and changed his name to Shigeuji.152

Nagahara Keiji has conjectured that the shogunate’s acceptance of Shigeuji as the new kubō was a necessary step in order to secure the harmony of the Kantō region.153 Perhaps that was indeed the way the authorities saw things then, but with the benefit of hindsight one must conclude that it was not a sufficient step because harmony did not ensue. From the start there was discord between Shigeuji and the Uesugi,154 and the anti-Uesugi party did what it could to obstruct the Uesugi’s government of the Kantō, while Shigeuji, as an easy way to strengthening his own position, showed obligingness towards it by restoring domains confiscated by the Uesugi to their former owners. He also supported a relative of Yūki Ujítomo who had lived in hiding since the Yūki Battle,155 and added to this there was a serious discord between Shigeuji and kanrei Noritada, based on the former’s deep resentment over the Uesugi’s having caused his father’s death.156
About half a year after Shigeuji’s entry into Kamakura the first clash between the two parties occurred. In the early summer of 1450 some of Noritada’s leading retainers had come to realize that Shigeuji’s presence in Kamakura had led the Kantō too far along the road leading back to the days of the old kubō system, and in order to prevent further steps in the same direction, they attacked Shigeuji in his mansion and drove him out of the city.\textsuperscript{157}

Shigeuji fled to the island of Enoshima, was pursued, but defeated the Uesugi army after a fierce battle. The Uesugi withdrew to Sagami where a kinsman served as shugo, and, interestingly, the defeat also made kanrei Noritada leave Kamakura for Sagami for a while;\textsuperscript{158} clearly, the Uesugi viewed the situation and how it might develop from this point with great seriousness.

A reconciliation was actually obtained through the mediation of, among others, a brother to Uesugi Norizane, but the relationship between Ashikaga Shigeuji and Uesugi Noritada continued to deteriorate,\textsuperscript{159} and at the beginning of 1455 the kubō’s hatred of his kanrei hurled the Kantō region into the maelstrom of civil war.

In Echigo no reconciliation was reached between shugo Fusasada and shugodai Kunikage. On the contrary, the relationship between the two continued to deteriorate, and just as the Kyoto-Kamakura crisis in 1423 had triggered some years of unrest in Echigo, so did the confrontation between the two Kantō factions in 1450, though on an far lesser scale.

Nagao Kunikage had participated in the attack on Ashikaga Shigeuji’s residence in 1450 and had earned much discredit on this account. And even after the defeat of the Uesugi army on Enoshima, both Kunikage and Sanekage were persistent in their support to the Kantō-Uesugi. With no chance of the shugodai and his son distancing themselves from their Kantō allies, Kunikage was ordered to commit suicide by Fusasada as the year drew to its close.\textsuperscript{160}

According to Kuwata Tadachika, Nagao Sanekage also committed suicide on the shugo’s order together with his father.\textsuperscript{161} Perhaps he was ordered to commit suicide — it is not mentioned in any of the other works consulted — but according to both Inoue Toshio and Hanagasaki Moriaki, Sanekage fled to Shinano at the time of his father’s death and there began to make plans for his own restoration. About half a year later shugo Fusasada received orders from the shogunate to subjugate Sanekage, and when the latter eventually did return to Echigo, late in the summer, 1453, he was defeated thoroughly in battle by Fusasada at a place called Nechidani.\textsuperscript{162}

It is not clear from the works examined for this study whether or not Sanekage survived the battle at Nechidani, or, if he did, what his fate was. Inoue Toshio has written that his restoration was hoped for when the Kantō hostilities broke out upon the death of kanrei Noritada in 1455,\textsuperscript{163} and this, if correct, certainly seems to imply that Sanekage had survived the battle but given up all political and military activities. But that he was completely out of the picture by the summer of 1466 at least can be surmised
from a letter written on the 3rd day of the 6th month (24th July) that year by shogun Yoshimasa. The letter, which Hanagasaki has referred to in his writings and which has been paraphrased by Inoue, is addressed to Uesugi Fusasada, and it is, in effect, an order for Fusasada to suppress “the party of Sanekage rōnin.” Anyway, with Kunikage and Sanekage gone, Fusasada appointed Nagao Yorikage, Kunikage’s old enemy during the war in 1423-28, to the position of Echigo shugodai.

As we have seen in the preceding sections, the Uesugi family attained a position of predominance in the Kantō region upon the death of Kamakura kubō Ashikaga Mochiuji in 1439. In the following years this position was challenged on a number of occasions — directly by the Isshiki in 1440, by Yūki Ujítomo and Ashikaga Yasuōmaru and Haruōmaru in 1440-41, and by Shishido Mochisado in 1442; indirectly by the policy of Ashikaga Shigeuji in the six months following upon his installation as kubō in 1449. The instances of armed opposition had been successfully quelled, and the Uesugi’s own armed attempt to check Shigeuji, while clearly less successful, had nevertheless resulted in an unstable reconciliation with the kubō.

1455 saw another challenge of Uesugi power, and this time the Uesugi were unable to suppress the ensuing hostilities. Actually, the fighting continued for more than two decades before peace was concluded and it caused a dislocation of the balance of power existing between the two main branches of the Kantō-Uesugi. This dislocation, in turn, caused the two branches to start fighting each other for supremacy in the east a few years after the previous hostilities had ended, leaving the whole house more vulnerable to attacks from outside forces than it had been before. Such attacks did indeed begin very shortly after the two branches began their in-house war, and by the time that war ended in 1505, they had rendered its issue obsolete; by then it was not a question of which Uesugi branch was to rule the Kantō but of preventing an outside force from toppling the whole house. Thus, in less than fifty years the Uesugi declined from being the predominating house in the Kantō to being a house fighting for its existence.

On the 27th day of the 12th month in the 3rd year of Kyōtoku (24th January, 1455), Kantō kanrei Uesugi Noritada was summoned to the mansion of his master, Kamakura kubō Ashikaga Shigeuji, and assassinated in revenge for the death of the latter’s father sixteen years before. This started what has become known as the Kyōtoku Rebellion, an affair which was very similar in nature to the previous Eikyō Rebellion. Like that conflict, it was on one level a war between two camps headed by the Uesugi and the kubō respectively, with the central authorities supporting the former, but more basically, its was a rivalry for power fought between the upper and lower echelons of the Kantō warrior society. However, contrary to the Eikyō Rebellion, as we shall soon see, this basic issue came very
much to the fore towards the end of the conflict, as the Uesugi then found their position directly challenged by those lower echelons. Thus the Kyotoku Rebellion really became, as Nagahara Keiji has written, “the beginning of the new forces’ relief of the old forces” in the Kantō.168

For the first several months of the conflict the Uesugi fared rather badly, “piling defeat upon defeat,” in Imatani Akira’s words, and even armies mobilized in Echigo and Shinano and dispatched to the aid of the Uesugi by the shogunate in late summer were sent on the retreat by Shigeji by the end of the year.169 It was, however, not all defeat for the Uesugi camp at this stage of the war. On the 16th day of the 6th month (8th August), Imagawa Noritada of that party conquered Kamakura and burned it to the ground, and Shigeji had to set up his headquarters in Koga in Shimôsa; hence the title by which he has become known: Koga kubô.170

Interestingly, in both 1455 and 1456 Shigeji reported a complete victory over the Uesugi camp to the shogunate, but if he had expected that this would lead to forgiveness for the assassination of kanrei Noritada, it was not forthcoming. Instead, in 1457 the authorities sent the shogun’s brother Masatomo (1435-91) to the Kantō as the new kubô with an order to destroy Shigeji, and the fighting not only continued but intensified up through the 60s. Masatomo settled down in a place called Horikoshi in Izu, which was Uesugi territory, and became known as the Horikoshi kubô.171

As indicated, Echigo became involved in the Kyotoku rebellion rather early on in the conflict on the side of the Kantō-Uesugi and the shogunate, and if shugo Fusasada’s aim with helping Ashikaga Shigeji to the kubô post in 1449 had been to gain influence in the east, one must assume that the subsequent development in the region had made him realize that continued support to the kubô would not be the best way to reach that aim. Anyway, the change of alliance should certainly prove to be leading towards influence in the Kantō.

The Echigo involvement fell on two fronts. From the letter written by shogun Yoshimasato to Fusasada in the summer of 1466 and referred to above,172 we might surmise that by that time, the Echigo shugo himself had been doing quite a lot of soldiering in the east (as Yoshimasato in the letter expresses his sympathy over the hardship suffered from prolonged campaigning), and the Echigo shugodai Nagao Yorikage and his son, Shigekage (ca. 1425-1482), have been reported to have “distinguished themselves in several battles, and made their military fame resound in the Realm.”173

The other front on which Fusasada exerted himself was the political one. In 1466, Uesugi Noritada’s successor as Kantō kanrei, his brother Fusaaki (b. 1434), fell in battle, and the next year Fusasada’s son, Akisada (1454-1510), took over the position.174 From this point onward Fusasada disengaged himself from his military activities and, taking advantage of the weakening of the shogunate caused by the futile attempt to install Ashikaga Masatomo as kubô, and by the outbreak of the Ônin War in 1467 in Kyoto, managed to manoeuvre himself into a position as the most politically
important person in the Kantō region.\textsuperscript{175} It is not clear from any of the works used for this study exactly how he managed to do that, but one can well imagine that the fact that he was the father of a still young kanrei must have placed him in a favourable starting-position \textit{vis-a-vis} the leaders of the Kantō-Uesugi, their chief vassals and others of influence.

Once he had reached this central political position, Fusasada, in order to maintain his newly acquired influence, began working for a peace settlement for the Kantō region and having Shigeuji pardoned.\textsuperscript{176} Precisely when he began on this scheme is unclear, but the implication of the writings of Inoue Toshio and Yuyama Manabu is that it was around 1480.\textsuperscript{177} If that is correct it certainly makes Fusasada appear somewhat of an opportunist because by then the shogunate had been working towards the same goal for more than a decade, and a sort of truce had actually already been established.

Already in 1467, upon the outbreak of the Ōnin war in Kyoto, officials belonging to the inner circle of the shogunate made peace overtures to Shigeuji, and as the war dragged on, with the power of the Koga \textit{kubō} rising continuously, it was seen as imperative that a reconciliation was reached. In 1477 a mediator was sent to Shigeuji, who immediately revealed a desire for peace by accepting to withdraw his troops from Kōzuke. When some of the commanders of the Uesugi camp too began withdrawing their troops the following year, peace was actually restored for a while.\textsuperscript{178}

However, a former Uesugi vassal, Nagao Kageharu (1443-1514), refused to accept this state of affairs. Kageharu was a distant descendent of the first Nagao \textit{shugodai} in Echigo, Kagetada, and had been vassal of the Yamanouchi-Uesugi until sometime in 1476, when he attacked his master, kanrei Akisada, out of dissatisfaction with being passed over for an administrative post some years before. In the following year, even as peace was otherwise settling down over the Kantō region, he fought the Uesugi, until finally, being constantly defeated, he professed alliance to Ashikaga Shigeuji and besought him for help. The fighting continued, and it was not until the autumn of 1479, after a further string of defeats, that Kageharu let himself be persuaded by Shigeuji to make peace with the Uesugi.\textsuperscript{179}

After this interlude the final reconciliation between Ashikaga Shigeuji and the shogunate took place, and had Uesugi Fusasada not been involved before, he certainly became so at this point, being trusted by the \textit{kubō} as a mediator. By the end of 1482, Shigeuji had submitted a pledge of loyalty to Kyoto, agreed to the Horikoshi \textit{kubō}'s getting the whole of Izu as his personal domain, and was reconciled with the Uesugi.\textsuperscript{180}

Nagao Kageharu's revolt was of course the affair alluded to above that brought the basic issue of the Kyōtoku Rebellion to the fore and marked the beginning of the "new forces" direct challenge to Uesugi authority.\textsuperscript{181} The basic issue — the fight for power between the upper and lower echelons of the Kantō warrior society — was revealed because the thousands of Kantō warriors that
joined Kageharu’s cause did so not so much because they sympathized with his dissatisfaction with being passed over for the administrative post, but because they wished to gain independence from the Ashikaga power structure and have done away with institutions like kubō and kanrei altogether.\textsuperscript{182} Nagao Kageharu himself was one of the “new forces.”

We have seen how the power of the shugo daimyō depended on their control over their provinces’ kokujin since the time of the Muromachi shogunate’s establishment, and it has been noted that the shugo succeeded in accumulating power despite resistance from the kokujin from the very start.\textsuperscript{183} By the mid-fifteenth century, however, the control obtained by the shugo over the lower levels of the provinces’ warrior societies had in many cases fallen into the hands of their highest-ranking vassals, persons that for years had been closer than the shugo themselves to the sources of military strength and had perhaps even served as shugodai, taking care of local affairs on behalf of their masters. In the east, this was certainly true of the Uesugi who had lost much of their strength to the two vassal houses of Nagao and Ōta, and during the Kyōtoku Rebellion the strength of two latter increased even more because more kokujin in the region began to associate themselves with them for protection and leadership. Not surprisingly, both the Nagao and Ōta, for their part, encouraged this association.\textsuperscript{184}

Nagao Kageharu’s revolt was, as noted, only the beginning of the “new forces” attacks on the Uesugi, and basically he had been defeated because the Uesugi house had been unified in its fight against him.\textsuperscript{185} When after the Kyōtoku Rebellion other attacks began, the Kantō-Uesugi were engaged in an in-house war and they were unable to withstand the pressure from without. Ironically, Kagaharu, though subjugated, can be said to have contributed to the outbreak of that war because his actions contributed to the dislocation of the balance of power existing between the two main branches of the Kantō-Uesugi, and it was this dislocation which caused the war. And of course, Kageharu also thus contributed to the birth of a new opportunity to participate in attacks on the Uesugi, an opportunity he did not fail to seize.

As indicated earlier in this chapter, the Uesugi had split into several branches within a few generations of the house’s being established in the Kantō. Uesugi Ujinori’s rebellion in 1416-17 had been fuelled by rivalry between the Yamanouchi line (founded by Noriaki, the first Uesugi shugo in Echigo) and Ujinori’s Inukake line (founded by one of Noriaki’s brothers).\textsuperscript{186} A third branch of the Kantō-Uesugi was the Ōgigayatsu, founded by a cousin to Noriaki named Tomosada (1321-52),\textsuperscript{187} and to all appearance, that branch and the Yamanouchi presented nothing but a united front to the outside world prior to the termination of the Kyōtoku Rebellion.

For instance was Uesugi Mochitomo (1416-67), a fourth generation descendent of the branch founder, part of kanrei Norizane’s forces during the Eikyō Rebellion and he participated in the final attack on Ashikaga Mochiuji in 1439. And during the Yūki Battle he was second-in-command of the
shogunal armies. In 1449 he entered priesthood and left the branch headship to his son Akifusa (1435-55), but he continued to be active politically and militarily. Thus, he had a say in the appointment of Fusaaki of the Yamanouchi line as Kantō kanrei in 1455, and he fought Ashikaga Shigeuji during the Kyōtoku Rebellion. By the time that upheaval ended, the headship of the Ōgigayatsu was in the hands of another of Mochitomo’s son, Sadamasa (1443-94). He had taken over in 1473, and he too had fought the battles of the Uesugi, both against Ashikaga Shigeuji and Nagao Kageharu.

None of the works consulted for this study is specific with regard to the question of when the relationship between Akisada and Sadamasa began to deteriorate, but deteriorate it did and viewed in the light of the reasons for the deterioration, it seems to have been at some point during the last six years or so of the Kyōtoku Rebellion.

For one thing, Uesugi Sadamasa disapproved of kanrei Akisada’s willingness to work out a peace settlement with Ashikaga Shigeuji because he saw such a settlement as too much of a strengthening of the Yamanouchi-Uesugi. Akisada, for his part, apparently viewed with misgivings the strengthening of the Ōgigayatsu’s position which the conflict had brought about.

This latter issue of course has its roots in the matter touched upon above. The Ōta were the chief vassals of the Ōgigayatsu while the Nagao were those of the Yamanouchi. The strength of both Uesugi branches rested on that of their respective vassal house, but Ōta Dōkan (1432-86), the Ōta chieftain at this time, another representative of the “new forces,” and, interestingly, the one through whose efforts Kageharu was mainly defeated, had remained loyal to Uesugi Sasamasa throughout the Kyōtoku Rebellion. Thus, the Ōgigayatsu, which had always been the weaker of the two Uesugi branches, came to enjoy the full benefit of the strengthening of Ōta Dōkan and his house, and to rival in power the Yamanouchi, weakened as they were by Kageharu’s defection.

Actually, Sadamasa was also worried about the growing strength of Dōkan and eventually he came to believe, as he himself later explained in a letter, that his retainer was about to rebel and therefore had to die. Consequently, on the 26th day of the 7th month (3rd September), 1486, Sadamasa summoned Dōkan to his mansion in Sagami and had him assassinated while he was taking a bath. Perhaps, however, Sadamasa was not being quite truthful when he wrote the letter mentioned above. At least, the idea appears in various modern works that it might possibly have been Uesugi Akisada who orchestrated Dōkan’s death behind the scenes in order to curb the power of the Ōgigayatsu. The way he should have managed that, according to one scholar, was first to slander Dōkan and then press Sadamasa to have him killed in exchange for having Nagao Kageharu killed.

Whatever the background to Ōta Dōkan’s assassination, however, its consequences must certainly have been to the kanrei’s liking, as very quickly Dōkan’s son, Sukeyasu, as well as the multitude of
kokujin under Dōkan’s control turned their back on Sadamasa and allied themselves with Akisada, and in 1488, the latter could attack the increasingly isolated Ōgigayatsu chieftain.¹⁹⁵

Upon losing the support of Sukeyasu and the Ōta kokujin, Sadamasa allied himself with his old enemies, Nagao Kagetaka and Ashikaga Shigeuji, and in the following years the fighting became increasingly widespread and intense.¹⁹⁶ Thus the Kantō region was once again engulfed in war, but this time with the Uesugi unable to present a united front against the “new forces” that were soon to renew the attacks on the house. Ironically, Uesugi Sadamasa may himself have facilitated the first such attack in order to weaken Akisada.

In 1491 the Horikoshi kubō Ashikaga Masatomo died and within a few months time a struggle for power over Izu broke out among his retainers and his son Chachamaru, a development that was carefully watched by the master of Kōkokuji Castle, Hōjō Sōun (1432-1519), in the neighbouring province of Suruga. Sōun was a relative to the Suruga shugo, Imagawa Ujichika, and had for some years waited for an opportunity to extend his own power, and the unrest in Izu now offered this. Opinions differ as to when Sōun actually invaded the neighbour province (1491 or 1493), but whatever the exact year, the moment was very well chosen because resistance was weak due to many Izu warriors’ campaigning in Közuke on behalf of their master, Izu shugo and Kantō kanrei Uesugi Akisada, in his fight against Uesugi Sadamasa. It is this fact which has led to the speculation that Sōun was incited to act by Sadamasa.¹⁹⁷

Be that as it may, by 1494 Sōun had made himself master of Izu. He secured the loyalty of the province’s warrior society and peasants by publicly announcing on bulletin boards that all those loyal to him would have their landholdings and positions confirmed, a gesture that won over the twenty-one most powerful kokujin of the province and is said to have caused even the samurai campaigning in Közuke to hurry home. Furthermore, Sōun secured himself goodwill amongst the peasants and the ill by implementing a healthcare plan for some villages on the seaboard.¹⁹⁸ Thus fell the first of the house of Uesugi’s traditional power bases.

One Japanese scholar has indicated that it was around this time, that is, after the subjugation of Izu, that Sōun began aiming at advancing into the whole Kantō region,¹⁹⁹ but for a while he sufficed to support Uesugi Sadamasa against kanrei Akisada. Thus, on the 2nd day of the 10th month (8th November), 1494, he for instance saluted forth with Sadamasa to engage Akisada’s troops in battle.²⁰⁰ In itself, this confrontation does not appear to have had any great significance, but it did have some effect on Sōun’s further course of action.

It was during this battle that Sadamasa died after having fallen from his horse, and as the Ōgigayatsu camp had already lost two other high-ranking commanders the same year, Sōun eyed an
opportunity to continue his Kantō expansion; in the words of Wakita Haruko, he “decided to switch aim and eat away at the strength of his Ōgigayatsu ally who had already lost strength.” The first bite would be an Ōgigayatsu stronghold in Sagami, the allegedly impregnable Odawara Castle. It fell in 1495, but after this Sōun slowed down the pace of expansion, using the time to consolidate his new position in the Odawara area instead. He used the same procedure towards the local samurai and peasants as he had done in Izu.

Upon Uesugi Sadamasu’s death, his nephew and adopted son, Tomoyoshi (?-1518), took over the headship of the Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi. It is not entirely clear from the works used for this study how the relationship between the new Ōgigayatsu chieftain and Hōjō Sōun was immediately after the latter’s conquest of Odawara Castle, but it has been implied that they were allies in their fight against Uesugi Akisada more or less from the time of Sasamasa’s death. Anyway, in 1504 they eventually did unite in battle against the kanrei, but after that Sōun disengaged himself from the Ōgigayatsu with the consequence that the latter’s fortunes of war declined rapidly. Tomoyoshi, for his part, began distrusting Sōun as an ally, and in 1505 he made peace with kanrei Akisada in order for them to resist Sōun unitedly.

Traditionally, the Sengoku period — the period of the warring provinces — is defined as having begun in 1467, the year the Ōnin war broke out in Kyoto, and it is characterized by, among other things, the appearance of a new brand of daimyō known as Sengoku daimyō and by the subsequent fighting amongst these new daimyō for regional supremacy. The Sengoku daimyō, in their turn, are characterized by their ability to control and exercise power over the local warrior societies, in contrast to the shugo daimyō whose legitimation and authority derived from the shogunate. During the Sengoku period the shugo had their positions challenged by exactly those kokujin, shugodai or other high-ranking vassals to whom they had let the better part of their power slip. Some shugo managed to hold on to their resources and make the transition to Sengoku daimyō, but otherwise the Sengoku daimyō were the more successful of the challengers, to wit, those who succeeded in gaining control over a territory large enough to give them the status of daimyō.

With this in mind, it should be evident from the preceding sections why it is relevant to speak of the Kantō region’s entering the Sengoku period “one step ahead of the rest of the country” with the outbreak of the Kyōtoku Rebellion, as we have seen Imatani Akira has done. But strictly speaking, Imatani is not quite correct when he uses the term “the rest of the country” because not the whole of Japan outside the Kantō became engulfed by war in 1467.
Echigo was an exception. In fact, ever since the battle at Nechidani in 1453 and all the way to 1507, almost exactly the same period that saw the Uesugi fighting kubō Ashikaga Shigeuji followed by the Yamanouchi-Uesugi fighting the Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi in the Kantō, Echigo was remarkably stable and peaceful. Hostilities certainly did break out in the province in those fifty-odd years, but not until 1507 did the process that was at work in the rest of the country actually catch up with the province.

What happened in those decades, and especially during the Bunmei period (1469-87), was that Echigo finally transformed into a shugo-controlled domain, in other words, the process which, as we have seen, lay at the heart of the shugo class’ coming to power in the first place and had been facilitated by the 1423-28 war in Echigo, was completed.

This final transformation meant, in effect, the continued vassalization of the kokujin, and there were three factors contributing to it. Firstly, the decision of who was to receive letters of citation for distinguished service during the Kyōtoku Rebellion, including the letters written by the shogunate, was in the hands of the shugo, a fact that made many kokujin want to submit to shugo Fusasada. Secondly, the confirmation of landholdings increasingly became a matter taken care of by the shugo whereas it usually had been taken care of by the shogunate, on the landholder’s request and using the shugo as mediator. The reason for this change was that rivalry and disputes among the province’s kokujin and the deterioration of family ties in the kokujin houses made it necessary with a more direct and stronger guarantee if one wished to secure ones landholding rights. And thirdly, there was the shugo’s role as the province’s judicial authority, a role, though, which is thought to have been rather limited.

Limited or not, all in all Fusasada’s control over the Echigo kokujin strengthened in the decades following the battle at Nechidani, and as indicated by fragmentary data of four land surveys carried out in the central part of Echigo in the years 1483, 1484, 1485 and 1487, he managed in that decade to extend his authority to areas hitherto belonging to some of his vassals or other local samurai. And twice towards the end of his life, in 1489 and 1493, he was able to put down rebellions in the province.

All through this development the successive generations of Nagao shugodai appear to have been loyal to the Echigo shugo; at least, there are several examples of their co-operating militarily and politically with the Uesugi. The successful Kantō campaigning of Yorikage and his son Shigekage during the Kyōtoku Rebellion has already been mentioned, but there were other instances of the shugodai’s engaging in military activities on behalf of shugo Fusasada, just as Shigekage, after having taken over the shugodai position upon his father’s death in 1469, assisted the shugo in his efforts to establish peace between the shogunate and Ashikaga Shigeuji. Nagao Yoshikage (1459-1506), the son and successor to Shigekage, was in his turn the one who effectuated the land surveys mentioned above, having taken over the shugodai position in 1482.
When Uesugi Fusasada died in 1494, his son Fusayoshi (?-1507) took over the Echigo shugo position and continued to tighten the Uesugi’s grip on the province, and it is still possible to find examples on the shugodai’s willingness to co-operate. Thus, in 1497 Fusayoshi prepared for a tightening-up of the provincial administration by having a register drawn up of the Uesugi vassal’s tax payments; Yoshikage effectuated the drawing-up. And in 1504 Yoshikage accompanied Fusayoshi to the Kantō in order to assist the Yamanouchi-Uesugi in their battle with the Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi. The shugodai soldiered in both Musashi and Sagami, and, in the tradition of his father and grand-father before him, he “made his military fame resound in the eight Kantō provinces.” Finally, in 1506 Yoshikage led a shugo army to the neighbour province of Etchū in order to help suppressing hostilities there.

These examples of the co-operation of successive generations of Nagao shugodai with first Uesugi Fusasada and then his successor Fusayoshi, few as they are, indicate that these shugodai — Nagao Yorikage, Shigekage and Yoshikage — went along with, or at least did not actively oppose, the Uesugi’s attempts to tighten their grip on Echigo, and the question is of course then, what the motives for this co-operation were. Well, according to both Hanagasaki Moriaki and Kuwata Tadachika, it was Nagao Yoshikage rather than Fusasada or Fusayoshi who took care of the administration of Echigo during the former’s term of office as shugodai. And Inoue Toshio has written that the administrative power of the shugo during Fusayoshi’s time was in the hands of Yoshikage. In other words, the position of the Nagao shugodai, within the framework of Uesugi shugo rule, was during Yoshikage’s time quite strong, and as long as that position was not threatened by the Uesugi’s attempts to strengthen the shugo’s grip on Echigo, one can well imagine that the shugodai saw no reason not to co-operate.

However, such a threat did occur in 1498, according to some scholars, and even then Yoshikage supported his master’s policies. So if these scholars are correct, perhaps there lay more behind the co-operation of Yoshikage and his two predecessors than a consideration of its benefits and disadvantages; perhaps the Funai-Nagao branch was simply too weak, that is, too lacking in allies, to openly challenge the Uesugi.

In 1498 Fusayoshi attempted what in effect was a revocation of an old privilege — immunity against shugo authority — conferred on the domains of local overlords and vassals at the time of the Uesugi’s establishing themselves in Echigo in the middle of the fourteenth century. The privilege was known as gunji fanyū and had been granted in order to secure the alliance and co-operation of the warrior society of the province. But over the years, as local warriors made unlawful claims to the privilege, it had spread over the province and had come to be regarded as an obstacle to the continued expansion of shugo power, which of course is why Fusayoshi tried to revoke it. Not surprisingly, the shugo’s initiative bred much antagonism amongst the kokujin of Echigo.
Now, according to Inoue Toshio, Yoshikage supported Fusayoshi’s *gunji funyū* initiative. He did show some signs of being against it, but he was Fusayoshi’s foremost supporter and among those who would be exempt from having the privilege revoked. So it is not likely, Inoue has conjectured, that he would really oppose it, just as the *shugo* would not embark on a policy which curtailed the power of his deputy.223 According to Nakano Yasuhide, on the other hand, Yoshikage did see Fusayoshi’s revocation policy as a threat to his interests and opposed it repeatedly, but ended up allowing the *gunji* of Koshi *gun* doing his duty in his — Yoshikage’s — territory in that district, while at the same time trying to minimize the extent of the *gunji*’s influence.224 Also in Kuwata Tadachika’s opinion, Yoshikage was against Fusayoshi’s policy, and he tried to build up an opposition movement among the Echigo samurai. This never materialized, however, because Fusayoshi was able restrain his *shugodai* by utilizing the fact that the local warlords of the province were split by rivalry and mutual antagonism, and that the different parts of the Echigo-Nagao family “were setting their sights on the domains of the *shugodai* branch of the Nagao with vigilant hostility.”225

In other words, if Kuwata is correct, Yoshikage’s yielding to Fusayoshi’s policy was not because he considered such a course the most beneficial (or least disadvantageous), but because hostility and rivalry among both the Echigo-Nagao branches and the *kokujin* houses prevented the establishment of a united opposition to the *shugo*. Kuwata’s explanation sounds very reasonable; Echigo’s *kokujin* class was certainly marked by disputes and rivalry, a fact which, as we have already seen in connection with the problem of landholding confirmation, had worked to the benefit of the *shugo*.226

Be that as it may, Fusayoshi’s *gunji funyū* policy was supported by Yoshikage, for whatever reason, and the latter continued his co-operation with the *shugo* when he, as already mentioned, soldiered on behalf of his master in the Kantō in 1504 and in Echū in 1506. And the Echigo samurai, for all their antagonism, proved themselves willing also in these campaigns to fight the battles of the Uesugi. But their antagonism remained, and this, together with their rivalry and disputes with each other would, eventually, lead to a rebellion that would topple the Uesugi *shugo* house of Echigo.227
Chapter 2: Nagao Tamekage.

Nagao Yoshikage fell in battle on the 19th day of the 9th month (15th October), 1506. The battle was fought at a place called Hannyno in Etchū Province, and his vanquishers were Etchū shugodai Jinnō Yoshimune and an ikkō ikki of that province. Ikkō ikki, or ikkō leagues, were a new kind of league that began to emerge, mainly in central and north-western Japan, in the years following the Ōnin War. Like the kokujin ikki they consisted of persons who banded together in order to resist shugo power, but their demographic base was broader as they were composed of both kokujin (who typically were their organizers and leaders) and samurai of lower standing as well as peasants, all united by a common belief in the teachings of the Buddhist sect Jōdo Shinshū (The True Sect of the Pure Land).

In 1488 the Kaga shugo had been overthrown by an ikkō league. Since then the sect had “surged upon Echizen, Noto and Etchū like a tsunami,” to quote one scholar, and soon an ikki had obtained control over two gun in Etchū. Earlier in 1506, the Etchū shugo had requested help from several provinces to destroy this new threat, and from Echigo it was shugodai Nagao Yoshikage who had issued forth. Initially he had been rather successful with his campaign, but the battle on the 19th day of the 9th month became a crushing defeat due to the fact that shugodai Jinnō Yoshimune shifted his support from his master to the ikkō followers.

The death of Yoshikage triggered a samurai revolt in the central part of Echigo about two months later. The nature of these hostilities is unclear, but the unrest was quickly suppressed by the new shugodai, Yoshikage’s son Tamekage (1471?-1537), who thereby got the opportunity to assemble around him a strong force of followers. Less than a year after this, Tamekage would himself instigate a rebellion, this time a far more successful one.

As mentioned in the last chapter, the basic causes of that rebellion was the antagonism planted in the kokujin class by gunji funyū policy and the rivalry and disputes amongst members of that class. More specifically, for the Echigo kokujin it was a matter of doing away with the shugo governance and of strengthening and extending their respective domains, and they saw Tamekage’s rebellion as an opportunity to accomplish this.

What Nagao Tamekage’s personal motives for rebelling might have been seems more uncertain. Hanagasaki Morikazi has conjectured that Uesugi Fusayoshi planned for Tamekage’s destruction because he wanted to protect himself against a deputy who increasingly disregarded him in questions concerned with the administration of Echigo; and that Tamekage, perceiving this, forestalled it by taking the initiative and overthrowing his master. According to Kuwata Tadachika, Tamekage attacked
Fusayoshi as revenge for the shugo's having driven Nagao Yoshikage to his death, while Inoue Toshio has implied in his writings that Tamekage was driven simply by a desire for power; Tamekage's aim, Inoue has written, "was to destroy the (...) government structure of the Echigo shugo and (...) to place himself in the seat of a sovereign with the political power over the kokujin coalition." Yet another scholar, Haga Norihiko, has speculated that Tamekage's revolt was the result of a discord between him and Fusayoshi that had its roots in the conflict of interests caused by the gunji funyū policy.

Whatever the impetus of the Echigo shugodai, it is clear, however, that he acted only after serious preparation. After the hostilities in central Echigo had been suppressed in the autumn of 1506, he began plotting for the replacement of Fusayoshi by another of the Echigo-Uesugi, to wit, the shugo's adopted son Sadazane (?-1550) of the Jojō-Uesugi branch. He even approached the shogunate in order to promote Sadazane's candidature to the position. Then, on the 1st day of the 8th month (17th September), 1507, he attacked Fusayoshi in the provincial capital of Naoetsu and chased him out of the town. Fusayoshi attempted to escape to his brother, Kantō kanrei Akisada, but was caught up with by Tamekage's army and besieged at a place called Amamizugoe, some thirty kilometres south-east of Naoetsu. There he committed suicide six days later.

But the fighting did not stop with this. For about half a year, some of the Agakita samurai, professing a desire to revenge the shugo's death, waged war on Tamekage before submitting. At the same time, Tamekage sought to strengthen his position by, for instance, contributing land to religious institutions and conferring on them the gunji funyū privilege, and by entering into alliances with other powerful families in the neighbouring provinces, families like the Ashina, Date and Takanashi. The disturbance formally came to an end in late 1508 when the shogunate appointed Uesugi Sadazane Echigo shugo and confirmed Tamekage as shugodai.

Various scholars have mentioned how Kantō kanrei Uesugi Akisada became quite enraged when he learnt of the death of his brother, but there was more than a simple desire for revenge to his eventually taking the field against Tamekage, namely an intention to protect areas in Echigo which had been in the possession of the Yamanouchi-Uesugi since the time of the family's establishment in the province. Akisada was intent on going to Echigo immediately upon his brother's death, but conditions in eastern Japan, more specifically anti-Uesugi campaigns carried out by his old enemy Nagao Kageharu, did not allow him to do that. So it was not until the summer of 1509 that two armies set out from the Kantō, one led by the kanrei himself and one led by his adopted son Norifusa (1467-1525). After about a month in Echigo they had assembled and organized the anti-Tamekage elements of the province, defeated the forces of Tamekage and shugo Sadazane in several battles, and forced the two of them to escape to Etchū.
This did not pacify Echigo, however, as there were still those willing to fight the shugodai’s cause (or unwilling to accept the presence of the kanrei), especially so because the shogunate and imperial court backed Tamekage and Sadazane as the rightful leaders of the province and pressed for the establishment of a new alliance against Uesugi Akisada and his Echigo supporters; around eight months would pass before Tamekage was back in Echigo for the final confrontation with the kanrei, and during that period the latter laboured in vain to subjugate the province.  

The eight months have been described by Inoue Toshio as “an age of terrorism,” and both Inoue and Kuwata Tadachika have in their writings related various atrocities they hold Uesugi Akisada to have committed: imposing death penalties on those who had opposed Fusayoshi or forcing the owners of confiscated domains to commit suicide or take to the mountains with their families etc. According to Inoue, Akisada’s behaviour is in part explained by his wish to return as quickly as possible to the Kantō region, as he was heedful of the fact that his position there was threatened during his absence. Hanagasaki has also related various atrocities committed by Akisada, but at the same time he has voiced the opinion that there is no proof in the historical sources that these things actually happened.  

Whatever the nature of Akisada’s “reign” in Echigo, by 1510 he had only managed to suppress about two thirds of the province, and, as we shall soon see, his position in the Kantō had indeed become threatened. So Inoue may well be correct in assessing that he wanted to return home quickly.  

Akisada was not to return to eastern Japan, however. On the 20th day of the 4th month (6th June), 1510, Tamekage returned to Echigo and in less than two months, the kanrei’s forces had been defeated and were forced to withdraw toward the Kantō. Like when they had set out, Akisada and Norifusa were leading their own contingents of men separate from the other, and whereas the latter succeeded in making his way home, the former was caught up with by Tamekage at a place called Nagamorihara some sixty kilometres east of Naoetsu. A fierce battle ensued during which the kanrei was killed.  

It has been noted in the preceding chapter how the Yamanouchi-Uesugi and the Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi made peace in 1505 in order to resist Hōjō Sōun as an united front. In fact, though, Sōun’s activities the following years were directed not so much at the two houses as at other enemies. Thus in both 1506 and 1508 he campaigned in Mikawa on behalf of Imagawa Ujichika, and he spent three years, beginning in 1505, on subjugating Tōtōmi.  

The other Uesugi enemy in the Kantō area, Nagao Kageharu, on the other hand, seems to have been a bigger threat to the Uesugi during these years. Inoue Toshio has implied that he fought Uesugi Akisada more or less constantly from the time of his revolt during the Kyōtoku Rebellion to Nagao Tamekage’s rebellion in Echigo in 1507, and, as has already been indicated above, he certainly caused trouble for the kanrei in the years following the latter event, preventing him from embarking on
his Echigo campaign. He was at that time based in Shirai Castle in Közuke but was defeated there in 1509 by Uesugi Norifusa, and subdued for a while, he allowed Akisada to commence the preparation for the confrontation with Nagao Tamekage.

In 1510, when Akisada was in Echigo, Kageharu again started hostilities in Közuke. These activities were coordinated with Nagao Tamekage’s final offensive against Akisada in Echigo and with Hójó Sōun, who for his part incited the samurai of Sagami to revolt and began campaigning there against the Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi. The Uesugi were able to check Sōun, however, a few weeks after the death of Akisada. By then the kanrei’s adopted son Norifusa had returned to the Kantō, and together with Tomoyoshi of the Ōgigayatsu he inflicted a serious defeat on one of Sōun’s allies in Sagami. Norifusa was less successful against Nagao Kageharu, who received military assistance from Tamekage in Echigo, just as he failed to induce the central authorities to declare the Echigo shugodai a rebel and order his subjugation.

It was also in 1510, after the defeat of the Hójó ally in Sagami, that the Kantō wars acquired a new level of hostilities, so to speak, hostilities based on internal discord in the Yamanouchi-Uesugi family. After Uesugi Akisada’s death, the kanrei position had not gone to Norifusa but to another adopted son, Akizane (?-1515) who for some reason or other began to fight his brother. Not until 1512 was Akizane defeated and the kanrei post taken over by Norifusa.

Perhaps one would have expected this conflict to have caused Hójó Sōun to escalate his attacks on the Uesugi, but this he did not do. In fact, the defeat of his ally in 1510 made him change strategy as far as further expansion in Sagami went. Instead of confronting the Uesugi directly he set about to destroy one of their powerful alliances in the province, the house of Miura. On this he began in 1512 and he was highly successful in spite of the Miura’s receiving help from the Uesugi on several occasions. The period 1512-1516 saw the collapse of this famous warrior house, and Sōun thereby obtained control with the better part of Sagami province, including Kamakura. Two years later he was the master of the whole province.

In 1518, Sōun retired in favour of his son Ujitsuna (1486-1541) whose first military aims were the two Uesugi strongholds in Musashi, Edo Castle and Kawagoe Castle. The first fell in 1524 due to the defection of one of its military commanders; the other in 1537, and with this, the whole of northern Musashi came under the influence of the Hójó. In the intervening years the Uesugi suffered other military defeats at the hands of the Hójó and, on top of that, another internal conflict in the Yamanouchi line; this was in 1531 when Norifusa’s adopted son and successor Norihiro was attacked by Norifusa’s real son Norimasa (?-1579), and forced to hand over the family headship and Kantō kanrei position. There were some successes in those years, too, but they were few. In 1530, the Uesugi
managed to check the Hōjō’s advance in Musashi for a time, and Uesugi Norihiko, during his term of leadership, entered a peace agreement with Nagao Tamekage. This, as we shall see in a later chapter, should prove to be beneficial to Norihiko’s successor, Norimasa, when he in 1552 had to flee the Kantō region; Echigo would then be his place of refuge.

In one sense, the situation in Echigo after the battle at Nagamoriha in 1510 was much like it had been before Nagao Tamekage’s revolt in 1507. The shugodai had, by his own force, successfully destroyed the ruler of Echigo, Uesugi Fusayoshi, and subsequently pacified the province, but he had also been forced to promote and support another of the Uesugi house as Echigo shugo. So formally at least, the order of things were as they use to be.

Still, below this surface of normality the situation was very unstable because the local warlords of the province still made efforts to strengthen their independence from the shugo governance, efforts that in the words of Haga Norihiko “were invoking a violent confrontation.” We have already seen how Tamekage’s rebellion against Fusayoshi had been seen by the Echigo kokujin as an opportunity to gain local independence, and the continuation of the shugo governance under the leadership of Sadazane and Tamekage can hardly be said to have furthered this aim.

Tamekage, too, had no intention of letting matters stay the way they were, and in the years following the battle at Nagamoriha he steadily increased his own authority by utilizing the bureaucracy and prestige of the shugo office. By 1512, the management of Echigo had fallen completely into his hands, a development which not surprisingly bred discord between him and the shugo, and which actually left his position rather insecure. Because the same years had also seen the establishment of an anti-Tamekage front centered on shugo Sadazane.

In the 10th month of 1513, it came to a split between Tamekage and Sadazane, and the former placed the latter under house arrest in his own mansion in order to be able to control him and continue utilizing the authority of the shugo office. According to Sugiyama Hiroshi, this immediately triggered a rebellion by the anti-Nagao front, but if Hanagasaki is to be believed, the split and Sadazane’s confinement was a consequence of a rebellion that had already been under way for about a month.

According to Hanagasaki, the hostilities, known as the Eishô Rebellion, began in the 9th month when one of Sadazane’s supporters, Usami Fusatada, attacked one of Tamekage’s. The shugodai personally led an army against Fusatada, but during his absence from Naoetsu, shugo Sadazane seized Kasugayama Castle just outside the provincial capital. This move led Tamekage to give up his campaign and hurry back to Naoetsu where he laid siege to the castle, and it was after its fall that he placed Sadazane under house arrest and once again turned toward Usami Fusatada. From this point onwards the hostilities escalated, drawing in samurai from Shinano on the side of Sadazane and
Fusatada, and it would take Tamekage until the following summer, some nine months after the banner of rebellion had been first raised, before peace was again restored.\textsuperscript{44}

Basically, the Eishō Rebellion was a conflict between the Echigo-Nagao on the one side and the Uesugi and their vassals on the other, the issue of which was the leadership of the whole framework of Uesugi shugo rule. The Uesugi vassals had always been regarded as being of equal position as the Nagao within that framework, and the weakening of the shugo after Uesugi Fusayoshi’s death had caused antagonism and rivalry between them and the Echigo-Nagao, especially, of course, the Funai-Nagao branch. The deterioration of the relationship between Sadazane and Tamekage was what was needed for these two parties to start fighting each other, and they both of course tried to attract other parts of the Echigo warrior society to their respective causes.\textsuperscript{45}

According to Haga Norihiko, Tamekage’s victory meant that all hostile elements were removed from the Uesugi governance in one sweep,\textsuperscript{46} while Hanagasaki Moriake has voiced the opinion, that Tamekage was unable to do precisely that.\textsuperscript{47} However, the two scholars are in agreement on the point that Tamekage did take over the managerial organization of the Uesugi as the new ruler of Echigo,\textsuperscript{48} and as such he began to exercise the authority of a shugo, confirming the landholdings of samurai, granting favours and domains, exempting temples from taxes etc., all in his own name.\textsuperscript{49}

Interestingly, Tamekage’s new position was accepted by the warrior society of the province in general. Both the different Echigo-Nagao branches and the province’s kokujin at large rallied around the shugodai branch, but they did not submit to it as vassals; they all emerged from the Eishō Rebellion as independent local warlords — “small Sengoku daimyō,” in the words of Haga Norihiko.\textsuperscript{50}

Tamekage’s position was thus powerful, yet still somewhat unstable,\textsuperscript{51} and his next step was therefore to stabilize his position and to secure himself against the possibility of suffering the same fate as Uesugi Fusayoshi. To do this it was first of all necessary to vassalize those who had helped him during the Eishō Rebellion and thus increase the number of persons on whom he could rely on for future co-operation. And, like other Sengoku daimyō in other provinces, Tamekage felt the way to accomplish that would be to engage in military activities outside the borders of Echigo, the idea basically being that the Echigo samurai constituting an army campaigning in foreign regions would automatically come under the control of its leader, namely, Tamekage himself. The shugodai’s opportunity to implement this scheme came in 1518 when his assistance was requested in Etchū where Jinbō Yoshimune, one of the vanquishers of Tamekage’s father almost fifteen years before, was now causing unrest.\textsuperscript{52}

For the campaign Tamekage did thus not attempt to seek the assistance of all the local magnates of Echigo, only the different Nagao branches and his own retainers, and during the autumn of 1519, and again from late summer, 1520, to early 1521, he campaigned extensively in Etchū, at first with mixed
success and then victoriously. In the end, the anti-shugo front in Etchū was all but completely destroyed and Jinbo Yoshimune himself had been killed.\textsuperscript{53}

This success may have strengthened Tamekage’s grip on the Echigo-Nagao branches somewhat, but, there were other factors contributing to the improvement of his position. Early in 1522, for instance, he was made *shugodai* of Niikawa *gun* in Etchū by the province’s *shugo* in reward for his military efforts, thereby having his power base broadened.\textsuperscript{54} And around the same time he began negotiations with the shogunate in order to have his position as the ruler of Echigo legitimized, naturally supporting his claim with, for instance, timely presentations of gifts to the leading personages of the government and the imperial court.\textsuperscript{55} Then in 1528, the shogunate’s acknowledged his claim. That year Tamekage was allowed the use of the *mōsen* saddle cloth (*mōsen no kuraōi*) and the white umbrella case (*shirogasabukuro*), two ornamental articles signifying *daimyō* status, and at the same time, his eldest son, Sadakage (?-1553), was given a part of the shogun’s name. The shogun by this time was Ashikaga Yoshiharu (1511-50), the twelfth Muromachi shogun and a grandchild to Horikoshi *kubō* Masatomo, and the part of his name he bestowed on Sadakage was of course “haru;” the latter was thenceforth known as Harukage.\textsuperscript{56} Thus, formally too, Tamekage was strengthened, but still, rebellion did eventually break out in Echigo.

There were several reasons for that: internal rivalry in the Echigo-Nagao house, the usual rivalry and distrust amongst the *kokujin*, and, as a remnant of the Eishō Rebellion, antagonism between the Nagao and the Uesugi; and then there was the antagonism between the *kokujin* and the Nagao that grew up as a consequence of Tamekage’s continued attempts to strengthen his position. The *shugodai*’s ultimate aim was to establish master-retainer relationships between himself and all the local warlords of Echigo, and some of his actions on the home front in the years following his return from Etchū were taken with a view for this. Thus for instance, in 1521 he banned the Jōdo Shinshū, and in 1527, when levying special taxes (*tansen*) on Echigo’s landholders for some purpose or other, he proclaimed that the domains of those defaulting their payments would be confiscated. Acts like these were seen as serious threats by the independent samurai houses because it endangered their possibilities of extending their own influence and power, and they caused some of the local overlords to come together in a new anti-Tamekage front.\textsuperscript{57}

The rallying point for this front became Uesugi Sadanori, a son of *shugo* Sadazane’s brother and hence of the Jōjō-Uesugi branch. In the 11th month of 1530 he entrenched himself in his castle, the Jōjō Castle in the town of Kashiwazaki, from whence he tried to muster the anti-Tamekage elements of the province, pledging to destroy the power of the *shugodai*. This started what has become known as the Great Tenbun Rebellion, but, interestingly, to begin with many of the province’s local overlords failed to answer Sadanori’s call for arms and allied themselves instead with Tamekage.\textsuperscript{58} The picture
changed, however, during the next two and a half years. Tamekage came very close to defeating his adversary shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, but then shugo Sadazane mediated, the shogunate admonished Sadanori, and peace was restored for a while, during which time many of Tamekage's supporters changed side. By the 6th month in 1533, when hostilities were resumed, Tamekage's base of power had shrunk to consist of little more than the southern part of Echigo — today's Joetsu area — while the central and northern parts of the province had allied themselves to Sadanori.59

For the next three years Tamekage would be engaged in combating the Sadanori camp, with each side having its share of battlefield successes and failures until, towards the end of the period, the shugodai was pushed back to Naoetsu by the advancing armies of his enemies. There, on the 10th day of the 4th month (10th May), 1536, he managed to halt his enemies' progression in a fierce battle just outside the town.60

Three and a half months later, on the 3rd day of the 8th month (29th August), he wrote a letter to his son Harukage in which he handed over to him the family headship,61 and if a conjecture made by Takizawa Sadaharu is correct, the reason for this move was that the shugodai was already feeling the effects of an illness that would claim his life in less than six months.62

Be that as it may, about two months later the new Echigo shugodai received an imperial order to suppress the rebellion in the province,63 but as we shall see in the next chapter, though peace would descend on Echigo not long after that, it appears to have done so no so much as a result of Harukage's military efforts as of his being forced by the circumstances to seek reconciliation by political means.64 And anyway, the peace would prove to be but a temporary one.
Chapter 3: The childhood years of Uesugi Kenshin.

Uesugi Kenshin was born on the 21st day of the 1st month (28th February), 1530, according to several sources, and if some of the more colourful chronicles dealing with his life are to be believed, it was clear from even before this date that he was destined to be quite an extraordinary being. Both Hoketsu Taiheiki, Hoketsu Gundan and Kasugayama Nikki relate how he was conceived not by the natural process but by divine interference, and though the three chronicles are far from being identical in their accounts of this phenomenal occurrence, they are basically telling the same story, namely that of a deity of some sort visiting the wife of Nagao Tamekage one night while she was sleeping. The following is Hoketsu Gundan's version which is the most detailed of the three.

"What the village elders recollect when chatting together nowadays is that the time of Sarumatsumaru's [i.e. Kenshin's] childhood years was difficult to fathom, but surely his conduct mounted to the exceptional as a matter of course. From the beginning he was a young lad of the kami gods and Buddhas. The reason for this is that Lord Tamekage's principal wife (...) received a divine portent years ago in an auspicious dream. More specifically, all of a sudden a mountain ascetic around twenty years of age was standing beside the principal wife's pillow and he said: 'I would like to borrow the inside of your womb for a little while.' The principal wife, not knowing whether it was a dream or reality, bowed [and said]: 'As might be expected, I have a spouse. If you do so without obtaining his permission, it is difficult to consent.' The visiting monk laughed wholeheartedly and said: 'If that is the case, Tamekage shall attain the right frame of mind tomorrow. I will, without fail, return the next night.' When he had finished speaking, he disappeared as writing being erased.

When the principal wife awoke from the dream, the inside of the room was fragrant with a strange smell and there was a divine light, brilliant and sparkling. She had an odd anxiety and when she arose in the morning, she somehow related to Lord Tamekage the state of things. As Dōshichigai [Tamekage], being innately a person with a profound honesty, reflected carefully upon this, he said: 'I wonder if it was not but a lucky omen of ours receiving a sagacious boy from Heaven. No misgivings must arise!' And so they purified their bodies with devotion and fasted and worshipped the kami gods of Heaven and Earth. Awaiting the coming of the night, they prepared excellent sake and rare confectionery.

When they had done this and the principal wife dozed off inside the bedchamber, the afore-mentioned mountain ascetic appeared as if in a dream. Because the visiting monk this time had Tamekage's voice and figure and had [already] announced his intentions, he just said, nodding his head: 'Then, I would like to dwell inside your womb.' And because the principal wife inquired: 'Honourable monk, you are a person whence?,' he said as his parting remark: 'I am a person from the Hakone Mountains east of the barrier.' Then he entered her left sleeve, remembering to look down as he did it. From this a child was conceived.
Moon upon moon became full as time dragged on and Lord Sarumatsu was born. Though nobody knew about these things, it leaked out into the country from time to time, and therefore the rumour was born that the young Lord (...) was a human incarnation of a kami god.\(^3\)

*Hokuetsu Gundan*’s author gives Kenshin’s childhood name as “Sarumatsu(maru),” though in a note he states that according to some sources, it was “Torachiyo(maru).”\(^4\) That is indeed correct. “Torachiyo” appears as Kenshin’s childhood name in *Hokuetsu Taiheiki* and *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu,\(^5\) both older than *Hokuetsu Gundan,* and it is also the name accepted by several modern scholars, according to some of whom it was given to Kenshin because 1530 was a Year of the Tiger in the sexagenary cycle of the Chinese calendar system.\(^6\)

Whatever the truth about Kenshin’s childhood name, it is, of course, difficult to take *Hokuetsu Gundan*’s account of his remarkable conception at face value. But still the account is of interest, not so much because of its literal content as because of the fact that it exists. It is implied in the account that the story is actually an oral tradition, and that such a story has come into existence, exactly as an oral tradition, seems to indicate that Kenshin must have stuck out, so to speak, from his surroundings in the eyes of later generations — ordinary Japanese of a later day who sought to explain what they perceived as extraordinariness by using a common belief in the existence of wandering spirits and kami deities as their frame of reference. The various chronicles dealing with Kenshin’s life and doings certainly contain many accounts of extraordinary traits and behaviour, and while some of these quite clearly belong to the realm of fantasy, others just seem somewhat fanciful or exaggerated though not evidently fictitious. As far as the latter type of account goes, the existence of the story about Kenshin’s remarkable conception is of course no guarantee for their credibility, but it does make it a little more difficult to dismiss them as altogether fiction or myth.

Thus, for instance, *Hokuetsu Gundan* has it that Kenshin, while in his earliest childhood (the first six years or so), surpassed other children in intelligence, and that “the talent of wisdom was abundant.” But “speaking about different kinds of toys, he liked only things associated with the military arts. He handled toy bows and shōbu swords skilfully, and he had an uncommonly strong-minded temperament. As he grew up there were [incidents where he showed] impatience and boldness and things could get rough. Therefore the senior retainers coaxed and admonished him, but in spite of this he never gave them the opportunity to trust him in any way. As his only pastimes, mornings and evenings, he experimented with plans for [the use of] sashimono flags made up in his own mind, and with troops on the move, using small stones; or he engaged only in rough things like sword bouts and tests of strength. For that reason servants and low-class persons nicknamed him Oniwaka-dono — The Young Lord Demon.”\(^8\)

*Hokuetsu Gundan* here introduces us to a small boy who was extraordinary intelligent and who had a very strong martial spirit indeed, but whose personality was also marked by such not altogether amiable traits as short-temperedness and rough behaviour. This image does have about it some of that air of
exaggeration that might make us want to dismiss it as fiction, but on the other hand, remarkable intelligence and extraordinarily strong martial spirit are human traits that do occur in real life, and they seem to be exactly the kind of traits that might have made the young Kenshin appear sufficiently different from his contemporaries, in the eyes of later generations, to have contributed to the coming into being of the story about his divine conception. Moreover, as these two traits are counterbalanced, in Hoketsu Gundan’s description, by the less flattering mention of Kenshin’s being unruly and short-tempered, the overall image imparted by the chronicle is actually fairly nuanced and quite realistic. Perhaps, then, it is also true to fact, to some extent; it certainly has made its way, albeit piecemeal, to some modern history books: Watanabe Keiichi, for instance, has conjectured that Kenshin “apparently was an unmanageable and mischievous child,” while according to Murooka Hiroshi, he was “a child prodigy.”

In 1536, according to Hoketsu Taiheiki and a number of other chronicles, Kenshin was placed in the care of the temple Rinsenji in order for him to acquire learning and enter priesthood. In less than a year, however, it became clear that he was not fitted to such a life and he was returned to Tamekage. Rinsenji was (and still is) a Buddhist Zen temple of the Sōtō sect, built in 1497 at the foot of the mountain Kasugayama just outside the capital of Echigo by Kenshin’s grandfather Yoshikage, and its head priest in 1536 was one Tenshitsu Kōiku.

One of the more detailed accounts of Kenshin’s time in the temple is that of Hoketsu Taiheiki which has the following to say: “Even though in the beginning Lord Torachiyo abided by the head priest’s teachings and made real efforts to study diligently and to devote himself to learning, his natural disposition was that of bravery, and he was by nature devoted to the martial arts. And when at meetings people were talking about military matters, he did not leave the place but listened to it, enjoying it intensely.

During breaks in his studies, he gathered scores of children from the temple’s neighbourhood, and they cut bamboo and made bows, muskets, spears, halberds, long swords and [ordinary] swords. Then they tested their strengths and weaknesses and weighed one another’s merits.

Often they [also] split up and decided on a contest of armies, and the senior retainers, seeing the influence of Lord Torachiyo, were instantly struck by his ability to command. In truth he was no ordinary person, and afterwards the rumour in the province was that he would distinguish himself and that he had great ability. Also the head priest Tenshitsu did not think that Lord Torachiyo would make a monk. He thought of him as a person who would certainly be made a warrior and revive his family, and therefore he returned him to his father Tamekage. When he did that, Tamekage was exceedingly enraged (...).”

With this account we have a convincing description of Kenshin’s personality and behaviour at the age of six and one that tallies very well indeed with the more general one of Hoketsu Gundan, quoted in the preceding section. Again Kenshin’s strong martial spirit is to the fore, and a certain amount of roughness of behaviour is implicit in the depiction of his game-playing, just as his failure to adhere to the religious path
chosen for him implicates that unruliness was still a part of his personality. Like *Hoketsu Gundan*’s description, it is rather realistic, and there is nothing in it that makes us want to doubt its basic authenticity.

Perhaps, however, there was more to Kenshin’s being forced to leave Rinzenji than just his incompatibility to the religious life and training of the temple. At least, Kuwata Tadachika has conjectured along such lines. According to Kuwata, Tenshitsu Koiku was indeed aware of Kenshin’s unsuitability to the future that had been chosen for him, but it was not so much on the head priest’s initiative as on that of the senior Nagao retainers that Kenshin was sent back to Tamekage. Because in the summer of 1536 the latter was an ill man, and his heir, Harukage, was a sickly person. Worrying about the future of the clan, the senior retainers persuaded Tenshitsu Koiku to let Kenshin return to the secular world under the supervision of a guardian. It was also done with the acceptance of Harukage, who was well aware of the use his younger brother might be to him in the future.14

What Kuwata is basically saying here is that Kenshin’s return to secular life was decided upon first of all because of his potential usefulness in connection with the upholding of the Nagao’s position, but in continuation of this idea, Kuwata has then speculated that Kenshin, after having left Rinzenji, stayed in Naoetsu and apparently embarked on martial arts training and on the study of military strategy, and probably also was taught the Chinese classics and Buddhist learning by Tenshitsu Koiku, thus laying the foundation of a comprehension of literature and the performing arts that became visible in later years.15

This certainly is very conceivable, but on the basis of the somewhat fanciful accounts of the years 1536-43 found in *Hoketsu Taiheiki, Hoketsu Gundan, Uesugi Sandai Nikki* and *Kasugayama Nikki*, it is also possible to conjecture that efforts were indeed made to use him politically already in 1537. To judge from these sources, more specifically, it would seem that attempts were made to have Kenshin adopted into another samurai family,16 adoption being a much used (though not always successful) method of tying two warrior houses together as allies; and that upon the failure of the adoption plan, it was decided to send him to some kinsmen or ally in the central part of Echigo, where his presence might serve as a signal to the real and potential enemies of the Nagao in the region to the effect that the *shugodai* was keeping an eye on them and intended to maintain control over the area.17

Both initiatives seem very likely, especially when viewed in the light of the idea that Kenshin returned to the secular world mainly for politico-military reasons, and of the fact that he to all appearance indeed was sent to central Echigo in 1537: “At the time of my earliest childhood, soon after my father’s death, I went up to Koshi gun,” he himself wrote in a letter to Tenshitsu Koiku on the 6th month’s 28th day (13th August), 1556,18 and we know from several sources that Tamekage died in early 1537 (on the 12th month’s 24th day in the 5th year of Tenbun, i.e. on 14th February).19
But how Kenshin’s life evolved in Koshi, then, is not so easy to ascertain. *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*, for instance, has nothing whatsoever to say about Kenshin during the years from the failure of the adoption plan to 1543, and, as noted above, *Hoketsu Taiheiki*, *Hoketsu Gundan*, *Uesugi Sandai Nikki* and *Kasugayama Nikki* all contain some rather fanciful accounts of the years following his return to the secular world in 1536, for which reason they do not offer any basis for further speculation, at least not as far as Kenshin himself goes.

According to some modern scholars, Kenshin stayed in Koshi _gun_ — in Tochio more specifically — for a number of years,²⁰ and that opinion not only corresponds well with the conjecture made above regarding the reason for his being send to Koshi in the first place; it is also corroborated, as it were, by a combination of sources, one of which is the letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku. There Kenshin wrote, as quoted above, that “at the time of my earliest childhood, soon after my father’s death, I went up to Koshi _gun_,” and he continued: “but when all the warlords from the neighbouring _gun_ saw that I was a youth who was out of place in Tochio, they turned toward me, accompanying one another from every direction. They took advantageous positions or made unexpected [troop] movements, and all the while, [the moment of] my defensive fight was getting closer.”²¹

Kenshin does not give the date of the neighbouring warlords’ “unexpected movements.” Neither does he say when the defensive fight at Tochio took place, but his description of the whole affair, short as it is, bears an interesting resemblance to descriptions found in *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu* and *Hoketsu Taiheiki* of an affair, the prelude to which began around the 10th month, 1543, and which ended with an attack on Tochio Castle on the 23rd day of the 1st month (25th February), 1544.

In *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*’s account of that affair, for instance, we read that the insurgents “turned toward Tochio and made unexpected movements frequently,” and that “in Tochio (...) they prepared to have a defensive fight settle the issue.”²² And *Hoketsu Taiheiki* has it that “while they turned toward Tochio, they took advantageous positions and built fortifications there and made unexpected movements frequently,” and that “in Tochio they continued with the preparations for a defensive fight.”²³

Of course, the passage from Kenshin’s letter quoted above is so lacking in detail that one can easily imagine it to be dealing with an affair altogether different from the one described in *Hoketsu Taiheiki* and *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*, some engagement that for some reason or other has failed to make it to the chronicles of later times. But on the other hand, it is basically telling the same story as the two chronicles, to wit, that Kenshin was attacked by rebels whilst residing in Tochio. And moreover, as we have seen above, several of the descriptive terms used by Kenshin in the letter recur in the two chronicles, indicating that their authors knew about the letter and made direct use of it.

As it shall be argued in the next chapter, there are no grounds for doubting the overall credibility of *Hoketsu Taiheiki* and *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*’s descriptions of the Tochio affair, from the preparations began in the 10th month, 1543, to the attack in early 1544, so because of the resemblance between these and
Kenshin’s reference to a “Battle at Tochio,” it seems fair to assume that the three sources are in fact referring to the same event. And that, in turn, means that in one single sentence in the letter, Kenshin is accounting for a period that began at some point in 1537, shortly after Tamekage’s death, and ended in the 1st month, 1544. In other words, we may conjecture that Koshi gun was his home base as shugodai Harukage’s representative in the region during that span of time. And it is of course clear that towards the end of the period, he was staying in Tochio.

As noted in the last chapter, in the autumn of 1536, around two months after Tamekage’s retirement, Nagao Harukage received an imperial order to suppress the Great Tenbun Rebellion in Echigo. It has also been noted above that Tamekage died some four months after this, to wit, in early 1537, and in Kenshin’s letter to Tenshitsu Koiku there is a clear indication that the unrest had not been suppressed by then: “Because the situation at the time of Dōshichi’s death,” Kenshin wrote (with “Dōshichi” of course referring to Tamekage), “was that the rebels operated as far as the provincial capital, I donned my armour and helmet and prepared for attending the funeral.” Chronicles like Hokuetsu Taiheiki, Hokuetsu Gundan and Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu are conspicuously silent on the matter of how the hostilities evolved during these years, but it would seem from the quotation above that the military situation in early 1537 had not changed for the better (from the point of view of the Funai-Nagao) since the battle on the 10th day of the 4th month (10th May), 1536, when Tamekage had checked his enemies just outside Naoetsu.

Still, peace was not all that long in settling down. It is clear from a collection of sources pertaining to the Irobe family that already later in the year, Nagao Harukage made peace with the Irobe themselves as well as with the Honjō, Ayukawa, Takenomata and others. Hanagasaki Moriai has written that the rebellion “burned itself out after Tamekage’s death,” and, as far as the cause for this development goes, that “Harukage had to support Sadazane as shugo for a second time in order to avoid the opposition of the powerful provincial families. Sadazane, on the other hand, utilized the disturbance of the Nagao’s political power and the powerful families’ tendency towards independence, and planned to recover the authority of the shugo. (...) In the 1st month of 1537 shugo Uesugi Sadazane took over the provincial government for the second time.”

Other Japanese scholars have expressed opinions along similar lines, to wit, that the two driving forces in the peace settlement were Harukage himself and the shugo, Uesugi Sadazane — that Harukage chose, or was forced by the circumstances to choose, a policy of conciliation and that the one thing (or at least the most important thing) he had to offer in return for peace was a restoration, as it were, of the shugo; and that Uesugi Sadazane, not surprisingly striving for the same thing, tried to utilize the situation for his own benefit.

However, according to Inoue Toshio, there were limits to the extent to which the office of shugo was actually restored by the peace settlement. In Inoue’s view, the official Echigo documents from that
time were only formal promulgations made by Sadazane; in reality they were expressing Harukage's will. Whether or not that is true, in 1538 and the following years Uesugi Sadazane did make what can only be seen as an attempt to improve his own position even further. More specifically, he tried to strengthen an already existing tie between his own family and the Date of the neighbouring Dewa province.

Sadazane had no sons, and his efforts, from 1538 onwards, were directed towards the question of securing for himself a heir by adopting a son of Date Tanemune (1488-1565), the latter himself being a grandchild of the Echigo shugo. The local warlords of northern Echigo, seeing these efforts as an opportunity to strengthen their respective positions, divided into two factions, one welcoming a new heir to the shugo, and one opposing the adoption plan. Not surprisingly, Nagao Harukage feared for his own position and sided with the latter group, and in late 1539 or early 1540 (in the 11th month of the 8th year of Tenbun, i.e. the period 21st December, 1539 - 18th January, 1540), a war broke out over the issue, making it impossible for Date Tanemune to send his son to Echigo. The unrest lasted for around one and a half year, ending in effect in late summer, 1541, when three of the involved parties made peace, and leaving Sadazane with the problem of finding a successor unsolved. The Date had been able to give but little help during this conflict due to internal discord.  

After this failure, Sadazane seems to have resigned himself to a strictly formal future role in the Echigo leadership. At least, on the 4th month's 5th day (29th May), 1542, he wrote a letter to Harukage, stating his intention to retire.  

As we have seen above, in his letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku written in 1556, Kenshin referred to a military operation that appears to be identical to a prolonged affair described in Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and Hokuetsu Taiheiki as having taken place in the period stretching from the 10th month, 1543, to early 1544. As far as the background to this affair goes, the two chronicles are far from being identical in their respective accounts, but basically they tell the same story, to wit, that of a rebellion the prime instigators of which were Kuroda Hidetada and Nagao Heiroku. Kuroda Hidetada (?-1546) was a senior retainer to the Echigo shugo family, while Nagao Heiroku, according to Hokuetsu Taiheiki and Hokuetsu Gundan, was of the Sanjō-Nagao line and also known as Toshikage.

Hokuetsu Taiheiki gives the year of the outbreak of the rebellion as 1542, while Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu has it that it happened in the first half or so of 1543. Other chronicles, too, mention that a revolt broke out around this time; according to Hokuetsu Gundan, it happened in early 1541, while Uesugi Sandai Nikki tells us it was in 1542. Also these two chronicles give their own separate versions of the events leading up to
the 10th month, 1543, but both of them tell same basic story as *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu* and *Hokuetsu Taiheiki*.39

There is no need to dwell too much on that story. It is so full of objectionable details as to be all but totally unbelievable, and the only things we may venture to conjecture from it is that a rebellion indeed did break out in the early 1540s, and that Kuroda Hidetada and Nagao Heiroku were the prime instigators. Such a conjecture seems safe to make in view of *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu* and *Hokuetsu Taiheiki’s* accounts of the Tochio affair which, as already noted, appear to be very credible, and which of course shall be dealt with in greater detail in the next chapter.
Chapter 4: Kenshin’s rise to power in Echigo.

According to Hoketsu Gundan, Uesugi Kenshin had his coming-of-age ceremony on the 15th day of the 8th month (23rd September), 1543, on which occasion he had his name changed to Heizō Kagetora. Other chronicles want us to believe that the ceremony took place in the 8th month of 1536, after Kenshin’s expulsion from Rinsenji, but as he was only six years old then, that is of course impossible to accept. In 1543 he was thirteen years old (or fourteen by the Japanese reckoning) which was a more common age for the ceremony, and it is also the year accepted by various modern scholars.

Apparently, Kenshin was thrown headlong into the fight against Nagao Harukage’s enemies immediately upon his coming of age. At least, the earliest credible mention of his taking part in a military operation is a letter written by the shugodai on the 18th day in the 8th month (26th September), only three days after the coming-of-age ceremony. The letter is addressed to a certain Honjō Jitsuno who was an Echigo kokujin and the master of Tochio Castle, and it seems to be a report on various subjects with which he was already familiar because Harukage tells him, somewhat disjointedly, about his own peace of mind due to an improved health and about the importance of severe punishment, among other things. And then he adds as a sort of postscript: “Kagetora was recently able to take the field and thus obtain an unmistakable victory.”

This is all we learn about what must surely have been one of the earliest military engagements, if not the very first one, Kenshin became involved in. Harukage’s letter does not reveal any details about the affair, and neither do other sources contain any information that may be interpreted as dealing with it. Nor do other sources have anything credible to say about what other military activities Kenshin might have been involved in at this time. So the reference in Harukage’s letter remains a lonely glimpse of Kenshin’s military activities in early autumn, 1543. The picture becomes clearer, however, once we reach the point in time when the rebel camp began bearing down on Tochio Castle. That was, as already mentioned, in the 10th month (7th November - 6th December), and it is the two chronicles Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and Hoketsu Taiheiki that furnish us with the particulars of that affair. The latter source is more detailed of the two, and the following is that chronicle’s version of the story.

“Nagao Heiroku Toshikage assembled his retainers and said: ‘Even though Kagetora is residing in Tochio Castle as our lord, he is an infant and has few allies. And [Honjō] Yoshihide’s martial prowess is not worthy of our fear. Let us hurry to destroy them.’ He led the rebels of the province forward, and while they turned toward Tochio, they took advantageous positions and built fortifications there and made unexpected movements frequently. But as Kagetora by nature was a skilful commander as far as the Way of War goes, the experienced Heiroku was deprived of victory constantly, and all his men had no freedom of movement.
The governor of Suruga, Usami Sadamitsu, was innately a man of position. Therefore he took the field with a great army and built sekki at the locations of three strongholds. Then he united his forces with Kagetora’s at Tochio and used them as reinforcements. Heiroku’s troops were afraid of the power of the Usami army, but it was said that Kagetora was subjected to enemy pressure from the front and from the rear and was in great trouble, so Lord Uesugi Sadazane ordered Nagao Harukage to assemble an army and dispatched these reinforcements (...). Harukage had more than five hundred troops and issuing forth from the provincial capital, he arrived at Tochio and hurriedly joined up with his younger brother (...). Kagetora rejoiced immensely and sent out a letter for circulation far and near, calling together troops from his allies."

Here Hoketsu Taiheiki lists all the samurai from central and southern Echigo who reacted on Kenshin’s call for arms, and then it goes on to relate that “also the governor of Suruga, Usami Sadamitsu, entrenched a big force in his residence castle. Then he led five hundred elite troops forward and, arriving at Tochio, joined Kagetora’s group. Still other troops, based in their respective mansions and castles, challenged those of both Heiroku, Kuroda and Kanazu to battles, and moreover, due to an order from Lord Uesugi Sadazane in the provincial capital, they turned toward the enemy’s positions, beginning with Kawanishi Castle. And then there were those who disregarded their reputation and sided with the enemy.”

At this point Hoketsu Taiheiki comes up with a not entirely convincing explanation of why the Agakita samurai also sided with Kenshin, followed by a few genealogical details concerning the Echigo-Uesugi. Then it reiterates the statement that Harukage sallied forth from Naoetsu on Uesugi Sadazane’s orders and continues: “In the first ten days of 1st month in the 13th year of Tenbun [1544], (...) it was rumoured that Nagao Heiroku Toshikage and Izumi governor Kuroda Hidetada were closing in on Tochio Castle with more than ten thousand men. In recent years Heiroku had gained control over Nakagōri, and because of his great power, the region’s warriors supported him all the more. With this force he intended to attack Tochio again and again. In Tochio they continued with the preparations for a defensive fight.

Echizen governor Ueda-Nagao Fusakage and Shingoro Masakage of the same branch were from a house so closely related [to Kagetora’s], that the two houses were difficult to distinguish from one another. They sent their vassals (...) to Tochio as reinforcements. Having thus obtained great power, Harukage and Kagetora’s army was divided into four groups. The four commanders, Mimasaka governor Honjō Yoshihide, Suruga governor Usami Sadamitsu, Bizen governor Ōkuma Tomohide, and shinzaemon no jō Shō Sanetane, were busily engaged in giving orders and did not spare themselves. The army in the castle did not exceed much more than two thousand.
Nagao Heiroku Toshikage split his forces into two groups. Seven thousand rode off at great speed towards the main gate, with Heiroku himself the commander and with Hachijō, Kazama and Igarashi constituting the vanguard. And more than six thousand, including Toya, Sanuki and Matsuo and with Izumi governor Kuroda Hidetada as the commander, were sent around to the rear gate. It seems they had decided upon safety in battle.

At the front gate Bizen governor Ôkuma Tomohide and shinzaemon no jō Shō Sanetame constituted the vanguard with Harukage as the commander. Soon they would defend it against Heiroku, and the rear gate would be defended against the Kuroda force by Kagetora and a vanguard consisting of Mimasaka governor Honjō Yoshihide and Suruga governor Usami Sadamitsu.

This was on the 1st month's 23rd day [25th February], 1544. The lingering winter cold encroached upon one's skin, and there were moreover cold winds constantly. Kagetora covered his armour thoroughly with clothing and seated himself on a camp stool. But the more than six thousand men of Izumi governor Kuroda followed the standard bearer while bells and drums were beaten in front of Zaōdō, encouraging the crowd [of troops]; they were advancing with the intention of crossing the river. Honjō and Usami saw this and hurriedly dispatched soldiers [to meet them]. They ordered their troops to play safe during the battle.

Kagetora heard this and he said: ‘Even though all of them are experienced and brave warriors, they do not seem to be excelling in the military arts yet, so it is not the right time for sending them off. In a moment the enemy will have to slacken his swelling spirit and then we will advance.’

Honnjō and Usami were in the mood to laugh scornfully, and it showed on their faces that they thought that Kagetora was perhaps frightened at seeing the fierce and strong enemy force, because even though his wisdom surpassed what was ordinary in the world, he was still fifteen years old.

Seeing this, Kagetora became very angry and full of resentment, so Yoshihide and Sadamitsu yielded to him. And as expected, the outlook for the enemy's army changed for the worse. Kagetora grasped the [commander's war] fan and directed the troops. It was time to do battle, and they were ordered to advance immediately. Honjō and Usami quickly saw this and cheered up the soldiers. They went forward to the front position and began attacking with violent force.

Half of the enemy force was by the river. They were crossing it and climbing [the river bank]; the other half had not yet crossed. Kagetora's army at the castle roused itself and, advancing, attacked them. They crossed the river in intense cold and their hands and feet were freezing. And without reaching the point of engaging the [enemy] army in actual battle, they routed it completely. Yoshihide and Sadamitsu thus gained an advantage, and while pursuing [the enemy], their powerful soldiers killed several hundred men.

The enemy vanguard of Inaba governor Toya could not retreat at all. The troops looked on with glaring eyes and had begun to be routed, and even though he had control over them, his encouragements did not reach the ears of the majority. And because they were fleeing, scrambling along, certain death was inevitable.
for Inaba governor Toya, Matsuo Hachirō and their guard force of eighteen men. They crossed to Kagetora’s camp and entered it. Swords were crossed furiously, and their desperate fight was watched [by the others].

Not one man, from Toya and Matsuo downwards, was left. All were destroyed. Toya’s head was taken by Kanai Yotarō, a resident of Tochio, and Matsuo had his head taken by Hoshino Shichīhei from the Ueda reinforcements. And because the vanguard that had crossed the river had been slain with only a few left, the force on the other side was completely defeated and retreated to Sanjō.

Everyone, from Mimasaka governor Honjō and Suruga governor Usami to all the troops, were impressed with the propersness of Kagetora’s order. He was only fifteen years old at the time. Because the order of the experienced Honjō and Usami had been illogical, he had been his own war council, and they had easily defeated the large enemy in front of them. Victory was attained, and the enemy heading for the rear gate was defeated completely.

At the front gate there were more than seven thousand men, including Kazama, Igarashi and Hachijō and with Nagao Heiroku Toshikage as the commander. They challenged Harukage’s vanguard, Bizen governor Ōkuma Tomohide and shinzaemon no jō Shō Sanetame, but when they were discovered by Kagetora, he led his troops to the left and right. And because he turned around with great force, the large attacking force of the enemy made signs to retreat. When it did that, its commander Nagao Heiroku, being a brave warrior whose excellent military prowess was unrivalled in the world, pledged his life to one battle.

He discriminated against no enemy, and standing in front of the men he led, he himself confronted the foe. There is no knowing the number of those who were killed and fell. The allied troops were hit head-on by Heiroku’s long sword, and scores of men lost their lives. Seeing this, Kagetora’s commander Chō Yozō Moritsura engaged Heiroku in battle and crossed swords with him, but eventually he was killed by him. Suruga governor Usami and Mimasaka governor Honjō [coming] from the east and Bizen governor Ōkuma and shinzaemon no jō Shō Sanetame [coming] from the west drove Heiroku’s large army away with fury, and the melee and fighting stretched over many hours. Finally, they pursued and crushed the large attacking force of the enemy. The army at Tochio castle attained a big victory and raised a shout of triumph.

The commander, Nagao Heiroku Toshikage, had exhausted his strength and died in battle. Suruga governor Usami’s retainer, a warrior called Tsukada Kauemon, took Heiroku’s head. Just like all the commanders had fallen in battle, so all the troops were also completely defeated or put to flight. They withdrew to Sanjō Castle in Kanbara gun. Harukage and Kagetora had obtained a great victory in this battle, and they made detailed records of its course and of the men who had exhibited loyalty in battle.
And because they related the information to the provincial capital, (...) Lord Uesugi Sadazane rejoiced greatly and granted letters of citation to all the loyal and meritorious."

Thus goes Hokaetsu Taiheiki's account of the Tochio affair, and though it certainly has its objectionable points, it is, all in all, a very convincing account. Its attempt at an explanation of why the Agakita samurai chose to side with Kenshin is, as already mentioned, unconvincing, and we might also object to the information that Nagao Heiroku and Kuroda Hidetada's army consisted of more than thirteen thousand troops. And the account is inconsistent in so far as it has a long list (not included in the quotation above) of names of warriors from Nakagóri willing to support Kenshin and Harukage, while at the same time it wants us to believe that Heiroku had managed to gain control over the same area in the year leading up to the battle.

But apart from this it is a remarkably sober and realistic account. It does not contain any evidently fantastic episodes or feats, and Kenshin himself is left unendowed with any extraordinary abilities. In fact, even though the account leaves us in no doubt as to the importance of his role in the whole affair, he is far from being presented as the all-dominating hero. His allies and military commanders are depicted as persons who think and act independently and not just as a group of persons whose raison d'être is to constitute the backcloth of a stage on which he may excel.

Neither can that role be said to have been allotted to Nagao Heiroku and his allies, the extensive portrayal of whose actions has been done in an all but negative or condemning manner. Indeed, as far as the heroic goes, that element is far more conspicuous in the description of those actions (the desperate fights to the death of Heiroku himself and of the leaders of the vanguard attacking the castle's rear gate together with their small group of guardsmen) than of those of Kenshin and his side.

In other words, Hokaetsu Taiheiki's account is strikingly restrained and balanced in its depiction of the conflict and its two sides, and there is nothing in it that indicates that it is not dealing with an actual occurrence, nor indeed that that occurrence did not take place more or less as related. It is very plausible and very convincing.

Three days after the battle at Tochio, according to Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, Uesugi Sadazane wrote a letter to Nagao Harukage in acknowledgement of the latter's report on the affair. From this letter, it is clear that the Echigo shugo considered Koshi gun pacified with the defeat of Nagao Heiroku, but it seems that the affair also brought a more widespread respite to the hostilities; at least, the various historical sources contain no convincing references to any direct military action during the next twenty-one months. This, however, should not lead us to believe that the situation was not still regarded with great seriousness — not only by the Echigo leadership but also by the central authorities. Because the sources do reveal that on two occasions attempts were made to enlist the higher powers of Nature to lend a helping hand with the pacification process.
Thus we find an entry in both *Uesugi-ke Go-renpu* and *Uesugi Nenpu*, according to which Kenshin less than a month after the battle at Tochio summoned one Fujizaki Bunroku and ordered him to effectuate a donation of land to a Shinto shrine called Sumon Jinja. This happened on the 9th day of the 2nd month (12th March), a day that was considered auspicious for such a deed, and the donation was made in solicitation of prayers for the safety of the province. The order itself has been included in *Sumon Jinja Monjo*, a collection of sources pertaining to the shrine.

Moreover, according to *Uesugi Nenpu*, *Hokaetsu Taiheiki* and *Uesugi-ke Go-renpu*, there arrived in Echigo an imperial official from Kyoto around three months after the battle at Tochio. This was Kajüji Hisaaki, one of the Great Councillors of State (dainagon), who bestowed on Harukage a scroll made by Emperor Go-Nara and containing the Buddhist sutra Hannyâ Hara Mitta Shingyô. It was the imperial will that the scroll be offered to a Shinto shrine in order to bring peace to the province.

There can be no doubt about the authenticity of this occurrence because Kajüji Hisaaki also brought with him to Echigo a decree expressing the imperial will. It is quoted in full in *Uesugi-ke Go-renpu*, and, having survived into modern times, it has been included as a primary source in the vast collection of historical material called *Dai Nihon Komonjo*. It is addressed to Harukage and dated the 20th day of the 4th month (21st May): “The lay priest and dainagon Kajüji has been made envoy and will descent from the capital [to Echigo]. Because tranquillity in the province is deeply desired, and years shall be plentiful, the scroll of *Hannyâ Hara Mitta Shingyô* in the imperial hand must be offered in front of the kami (...)”

But then from the two following years we have two letters which reveal that the days of direct military confrontation were not over. The two letters were both written by Kenshin (on the 12th day of the 10th month (26th November), 1545, and the 28th day of the 2nd month (9th April), 1546, respectively), and from them it is clear that Kuroda Hidetada caused trouble both years, and that it took two campaigns to destroy him. The first resulted in his being allowed to enter priesthood and leave Echigo; the second in the death by suicide of both himself and his whole family.

The subsequent development of the rebellion is unclear. According to *Uesugi-ke Go-renpu*, *Hokaetsu Taiheiki* and *Uesugi Sandai Nikki*, it continued until 1551. But not only do these sources have Kuroda Hidetada figuring in the unrest right up to that year; their chronology of some of the events of these years are also erroneous, so they can hardly be regarded as altogether reliable as far as this particular issue goes. But whether the hostilities in fact did continue for some time after the 2nd month, 1546, or perhaps simply died out with Kuroda’s disappearance from the scene, it seems quite likely, as some Japanese scholars have it, that the latter’s defeat made Kenshin’s military reputation rise. And Kenshin’s growing reputation, in its turn, seems to have been a central element in the process that led to his succession to Harukage’s position. Other central elements were a growing dissatisfaction with Harukage in the minds of the senior Nagao
retainers, a growing friction between Harukage and the Echigo warrior society at large, and some sort of discord between Kenshin and Harukage. The process appears to have begun in 1547.

All this is clear from the two chronicles Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and Uesugi Kaki. First, there is the following entry for 1547 in Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu: "Even though Harukage had succeeded to the main Nagao lineage, it was his nature to be ill frequently. Therefore, from around early summer it became natural for him to neglect the business of government. Often he disagreed with the wishes of many of his vassals, and unavoidably the consequence was that only a few people, even among all the senior warriors, obeyed him. Those who paid their respects only to Lord Kagetora increased in numbers day by day.

The time then was one of warfare, and it was necessary to have the Realm governed peacefully. Lord Kagetora surpassed people in talent and wisdom and his intentions were pure. He was endowed with a heavenly disposition and superior abilities. In the spring of his fourteenth year at Tochio, he had fought a battle with Izumi governor Kuroda to the end, and by his own strategy he had vanquished hundreds and thousands of the large enemy force. (...) He had defeated Nagao Heiroku in the end and Harukage had obtained a great victory. Had not his war effort been completely successful? Everyone regarded him with great respect as their lord. Surely he had risen to distinction in the world. When all the Nagao retainers heard about this they held discussions and talked about it.

Harukage suffered gradually more and more from his illness, and all governance was in the hands of his retainers. Auspicious events were in truth few. But Harukage's younger brother, Lord Kagetora, presented an appearance of having been born with a divine nature and extraordinary talents and wisdom, and he also possessed an excess of the virtue of benevolence. This was something the ordinary people took widely to, and it was hoped that there would be nothing to challenge his taking over the family headship and the Nagao's prospering again. It was moreover said that when the world is peaceful, the heir of a family should take precedence, but when the world is in disorder, great deeds should take precedence. That is the permanent statement of eternity (...)."23

Thus goes Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu's account of the latter half or so of the year 1547, and though it does contain passages that make it difficult to accept it at face value — the excessively glorifying descriptions of Kenshin's personality for example — its basic message, to wit, that in 1547 the Nagao vassals began growing dissatisfied with an ill Harukage and looking to Kenshin who had proven himself on the battlefield and gained general popularity, is quite convincing. It is also corroborated by Kenshin's own writings to a limited extent; from his letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku it is clear that Harukage indeed was a sickly person, and that as a consequence, his relationship with at least some of the Echigo warrior society — "people from the far reaches of the province" is the expression used by Kenshin — was not all the best.24

It is not clear, however, from neither Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu nor the letter to Tenshitsu exactly how this situation led to Kenshin's taking over the shugodai position. But the following entry in Uesugi Kaki for the ensuing year and early 1549 takes over, so to speak, from where Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu left off: "Lord
Yarokurō [Nagao Harukage] resided in Kasugayama Castle. His illness was gradually aggravated and he neglected the business of government. Also, his son, Saruchiyo, was still a child, and consequently thought of with contempt by all the warlords. They became selfish and would claim to be ill and fail to offer their services [at Kasugayama Castle]. And using old grudges as excuses, they stayed in their castles and did not obey any orders. They had the idea to bide their time and planned for creating discord between the two brothers, circulating unfounded rumours to the effect that Lord Kagetora had the intention to usurp the leadership of the house.

Because Lord Kagetora by this time had defeated armies on many occasions, and especially because he valued truthfulness, there were many amongst the vassals who respected him and wanted him as their master. Lord Yarokurō was regarded as disagreeable.

The relationship between the brothers was for some reason not peaceful, and Lord Sadazane was greatly distressed. And even though they had not yet decided on war; he thought that unrest may break out again, so he ordered the lay priest Naoe Shuchin, Tadami Jirōzaemon and shinzaemon [no jō] Shō to admonish Lord Yarokurō and inform him of his intention: the two brothers should improve their relationship, and in addition to this, Lord Yarokurō should make Lord Kagetora his assistant, and together they should plan for the province's prosperity and happiness.

Because Sadazane ordered thus, Lord Yarokurō promised not to dissent and, sending a messenger to Tochio, summoned Lord Kagetora to Funai. Sadazane himself went to Tochio with this messenger and beseeched: 'Because Harukage’s illnesses are plenty, he is shrinking from the business of governing the province. You must quickly go to the headquarters and assist him with planning for the peace and quiet of the province.'

But as Lord Kagetora did not give any promises, Sadazane was greatly distressed and therefore he entreated again and again, (...) exhausting his arguments. And because all his vassals also offered encouragement earnestly, Lord Kagetora accepted reluctantly. He was handed over the [family] standard until Harukage would recover from his illness, and he was ordered, without being given any details, to suppress any rebels in the province and to take care of the business of government. He answered that he would do that, and on the last day of the 12th month in the 17th year of Tenbun [7th February, 1549], he returned to Funai.\(^{25}\)

That also this account is true to fact to some extent is evident from a letter written by Honjō Jitsuno to a certain Ueno Iemari on the 4th day of the 1st month (11th February), 1549. In the letter Jitsuno relates how Kenshin had settled his differences with Harukage and moved to Kasugayama four days before,\(^{26}\) but nothing is said about the background to these differences. So we cannot be sure that they really were caused by the intrigues of local warlords who were dissatisfied with Harukage.
Be that as it may, by early 1549 Kenshin had returned to Naoetsu as the new Echigo shugodai, and it would not take many years before he was challenged in that position. The challenge would come from the Ueda-Nagao, and already in 1549 there were those among his supporters who expressed concern over the possible rebellious attitude of the leader of that branch.

The Ueda-Nagao’s relationship to the Funai-Nagao had been somewhat inconstant over the years. During Nagao Tametake’s revolt against shugo Uesugi Fusayoshi in 1507 they had supported the latter, and when Kantō kanrei Uesugi Akisada had arrived in Echigo in 1509 to chastise Tametake, it was the Ueda-Nagao who had welcomed him in their stronghold, the Sakato Castle in south-eastern Echigo. But when the following year the kanrei had been forced to flee the provincial capital after Tametake had launched an offensive, the Ueda-Nagao had switched their support to Tametake, and during the Eishō Rebellion in 1513-14, which, as mentioned in Chapter Two, had basically been a conflict between the various Echigo-Nagao branches and the Uesugi and their vassals, they had remained allies of Tametake.

They had also been among the troops that formed the backbone of Tametake’s army during his Etchū campaigns in 1519-21, but when the Great Tenbun Rebellion broke out in 1530, they had sided with Tametake’s enemies. Finally, during the rebellion of Kuroda Hidetada and Nagao Heiroku, the Ueda-Nagao had supported Harukage; as it will be remembered, Nagao Masakage, the master of Sakato Castle at that time, was among those sending troops to Tochio in anticipation of the coming attack. But then by mid-1549, he had become the focus of the attention of some of Kenshin’s allies as a potential instigator of rebellion.

This is evident from two letters included in the source collection Bushū Monjo. The first letter was written by Usami Sadamitsu on the 5th day of the 6th month (9th July), 1549, to a certain Tairago Magotarō. In it Sadamitsu, evidently sharing the views of the letter’s recipient, expresses concern over the possibility of Masakage’s harbouring rebellious thoughts and of hostilities breaking out in consequence. He does strike a note of optimism when he voices the opinion that Masakage seems to be willing to send hostages to Naoetsu and to cede some territory. But he also informs Magotarō that Masakage is making plans to lay hands on his — Sadamitsu’s — landholdings, and that he has been threatened to have his residence burnt down if he does not accept Masakage as his ally.

About two weeks later, Tairago Magotarō received another letter, this time from Honjo Jitsuno. It deals with, among other things, Nagao Masakage’s alleged threat to Usami Sadamitsu’s property, and Jitsuno expresses the opinion that such a matter, despite Masakage’s being closely related to Kenshin by marriage, should be duly dealt with by the proper authorities. There can thus be little doubt that Sadamitsu’s accusations were taken seriously, and while of course neither letters can be taken as proof that Nagao Masakage had actually threatened Sadamitsu, let alone was planning a revolt, it seems clear that he had begun to be seen as a potential threat — which, if the conjecture of one modern scholar is correct, should
not surprise us; according to Inoue Toshio, one can well imagine that Nagao Masakage had had hopes of succeeding Harukage as Echigo shugodai, and that he therefore found it difficult to curb his indignation towards Kenshin.\(^{33}\)

As indicated above, Nagao Masakage did eventually rise in rebellion against Kenshin. That happened in early 1551, by which time the latter had been officially accepted as the sole ruler of Echigo. The shugo, Uesugi Sadazane, died on the 26th day of the 2nd month (24th March), 1550 (the 19th year of Tenbun), according to several sources,\(^{34}\) and two days later, as is clear from various letters included in the Uesugi Monjo collection, the authorities in Kyoto granted Kenshin the right to use the white umbrella case and the mösen saddle cloth, thus acknowledging his status as daimyō.\(^{35}\)

Masakage rebelled around eleven months later. The exact date is not clear, but on the 28th day of the 12th month in the 19th year of Tenbun (13th February, 1551) Kenshin reported the fact in a letter,\(^{36}\) so it seems safe to assume that it happened shortly before that date. As for the general course of the disturbance, other letters written by Kenshin as well as by other protagonists of the conflict impart various glimpses of the two side’s military activities over the next four and a half months or so — until the middle of the 5th month (late June) — and clearly the revolt was not very successful. It is, for instance, obvious that Masakage was subjected to strong military pressure from early on, and that he at some point during that period, just as some of Kenshin’s military commanders were about to launch an attack, sent a brother of his to Naoetsu to negotiate a peace settlement, thus putting off the attack.\(^{37}\)

Just how peace eventually prevailed in Echigo during the next two and a half months is evident from several chronicles.\(^{38}\) One of these, Uesugi Nenpu, tells the story as follows: “In the autumn of the Tenbun period’s 20th year, during the last ten days of the 7th month [late August/early September, 1551], a war council decided that the castle of the Ueda had to be castigated. The masters of the Ueda castle, Echizen governor Nagao Fusana and Nagao Rokurō Masakage, had had treacherous intentions since the year before, and because there were rumours about this, orders for a campaign against them had been proclaimed. But due to Fusana and his son’s repeated entreaties in the spring in the face of this campaign, the dispatch of troops had been halted.

However, autumn had arrived, and no news at all had been heard about the rebels. This caused a variety of doubts, and it was then agreed that the Ueda evidently still had [rebellious] plans. So on the 7th month’s 23rd day [3rd September] an order to take the field was issued and all the troops were assembled. It was decided to depart on the 1st day of the 8th month [11th September].

Hearing this, Fusana and his son were struck with a great fear and again they made arrangements for submitting a pledge of submission and apologized. As might be expected, even though Lord Kagetora regarded them as part of the clan, he found it difficult not to punish them. So he summoned them, and his
senior commanders were forceful and outspoken with their remonstrances. For that reason they were reconciled [with Lord Kagetora] in the end."

There can be little doubt that this account is basically true to fact. The passage about the Nagao’s repeated entreaties in the spring in the face of a major offensive against them and the subsequent postponement of that offensive corresponds nicely to what we know from the letters referred to above — that Masakage’s brother was sent to Naoetsu to seek peace with the result that an attack was put off. And, moreover, another part of the account is substantiated by a letter included in the compilation Tairago Monjo. The letter was written by Kenshin on 7th month’s 23rd day (3rd September), and quite in accordance with Uesugi Nenpu, it is an order to make ready for an offensive against Ueda scheduled for the following month’s 1st day. And finally, the chronicle is also correct in asserting that the Ueda-Nagao were eventually pardoned because, as we shall see again and again in the following pages, there are plenty of documents to prove that Nagao Masakage was a close associate of Kenshin for years thereafter, and the latter even adopted one of his sons.

The Japanese scholar Kurokawa Mitsuko has described the situation in Echigo after the Ueda-Nagao’s submission as one of instability born from antagonism between the Nagao and the province’s kokujin. That seems to be an accurate description. Because, as we shall see later in this study, in both 1555, 1556 and 1568 members of the province’s warrior society found it worthwhile to attempt revolting against Kenshin. And moreover, as Kurokawa herself has pointed out, Kenshin frequently made special regulations for the management of Echigo when he was about to launch a military campaign outside the borders of Echigo with the express purpose of forestalling rebellion while he was away.

The way out of this instability proved to be precisely extra-provincial campaigns because, again as Kurokawa has pointed out, such campaigns gave Kenshin an opportunity to assemble the Echigo kokujin in a military organization and thus to obtain a measure of control over them. In other words, over the years, through a number of military activities in foreign regions, Kenshin came to acquire a grip, as it were, on the Echigo kokujin that he did not have in 1551.

Of course, this is not to say that these activities were a strategy deliberately adopted by Kenshin for the purpose of strengthening his position in Echigo, and indeed, the traditional view seems be that he had other motives for his extra-provincial campaigns. That question, however, will be discussed in Chapter Eight and needs not concern us at this point. Suffice to note that it would not take long after the submission of the Ueda-Nagao before opportunities for going to war outside Echigo presented themselves to Kenshin.
Chapter 5: The Kantō campaigns.

We have seen in earlier chapters how Kamakura kubō Ashikaga Shigeuji’s assassination of Kantō kanrei Uesugi Noritada in 1455 signalled the entry of eastern Japan into the Sengoku period, and how the Uesugi house in that region thenceforth tried, rather unsuccessfully, to stem the rise of the Hōjō, one of the “new forces” that increasingly would make themselves felt over most of Japan in the latter half of the fifteenth century.¹

The expansion of the Hōjō lasted until 1538 when Ujitsuna, the chieftain at that time, decided to halt his conquests and instead concentrate on the management of his territories. Ujitsuna’s son, Ujiyasu (1515-71), continued this policy after he, in 1541, succeeded to the leadership of the house, but in 1545 a major anti-Hōjō front came into being with the object of destroying the family’s widespread rule. The main members of this coalition were: Imagawa Yoshimoto (1519-60) of Suruga, Norimasa of the Yamanouchi-Uesugi and Uesugi Tomosada (1525-46), who was the Ōgigayatsu’s chieftain at the time and the second generation successor to Uesugi Tomoyoshi. Also the Takeda of Kai and Koga kubō Ashikaga Haruji (1508-60), a great-grandchild to Shigeuji, threw in their support.²

The Uesugi, especially, were interested in conquering their former Musashi stronghold, the Kawagoe Castle, and in late 1546, they assembled a huge army with the help of the Koga kubō and laid siege to it. After half a year, with the castle still holding out, Hōjō Ujiyasu came to the rescue, and though his troops were outnumbered ten to one, he succeeded in routing the enemy thoroughly. The kubō escaped to Koga and Uesugi Norimasa to Hirai Castle in Közuke, but Uesugi Tomosada died in battle, and as several of the Ōgigayatsu’s closest vassals afterwards defected to Hōjō Ujiyasu, the whole affair in effect meant the ruin of that Uesugi branch and left the Hōjō in control of the larger part of Musashi.³

Uesugi Norimasa, too, had problems with his retainers after the battle at Kawagoe Castle. Though his position in Közuke, the traditional power base of the Yamanouchi, was strong, and though he still had military allies in Musashi, he was considered weak and feeble-minded, and his retainers gradually distanced themselves from him.⁴

In this situation Norimasa looked to Echigo for support. From a letter written by Honjō Jitsuno to Tairago Magotarō on the 20th day of the 6th month (24th July), 1549, some five months after Kenshin’s return to Naetsu as the new shugodai, we may gather that the Kantō kanrei had contacted Magotarō with an appeal for help, and Jitsuno tells the latter that Kenshin was inclined to help Norimasa if he would send a request directly to him (Kenshin). Furthermore, Jitsuno announces that in case of a Kantō campaign, the Echigo army’s departure date had been set to the 7th month’s 10th day (13th August).⁵ Then, on the 4th day
of the 7th month (7th August), Magotarō received another letter from Jitsuno, who this time ordered him to prepare for the coming campaign. The historical sources contain no mention that a Kantō campaign actually took place in that year, however, and it does not appear too far-fetched to conjecture that despite what Honjō Jitsuno wrote to Tairago Magotarō, it was simply never launched. Because, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, by this time Nagao Masakage had already become the focus of the attention of some of Kenshin's allies as a potential rebel, justly or unjustly, and it seems quite likely that Kenshin, newcomer as he was to the post of Echigo shugodai, should have considered an extra-provincial campaign ill-advised in such circumstances — even more so, in fact, because Sakato Castle, the stronghold of the Ueda-Nagao, controlled the highway from Naoetsu to the Kantō.

Whatever the extent of Kenshin's Kantō involvement in 1549, however, if the chronicle Kanbashō Kosenroku is to be believed, Uesugi Norimasa himself did manage to check the advance of the Hōjō for a while. “Because Hōjō Ujiyasu wanted to attack Hirai Castle in Kōzuke in the spring of the year 1551 (...),” we read in that chronicle, “he appointed as commanders saemon no daibu Hōjō Tsunashige, his heir Zenkuro Yasushige (later to be appointed vice-governor of Hitachi), his second son Fukushima Magochiro Yorisue, Iga governor Katsuhiko of the same house, Shirokurō of the same house, Echizen governor Yokoi and others. Leading more than twenty thousand mounted warriors forth, he set out from Odawara, and soon headed for Kanagawa on the border between the two provinces Musashi and Kōzuke.

When they heard about this at Hirai, all the military commanders (...) arranged their forces in a vanguard and a rearguard and, accepting the challenge, checked the enemy halfway [to the border].

Already by the 3rd month's 10th day [25th April], it came to battle, and the kanrei's camp won a great victory. And because the Odawara force looked like it was trying to retreat, Ujiyasu took command and moved forward to the head of his troops. He disciplined them again and again, and when orders were given, all the young warriors from Izu and Sagami exchanged glances, and closing ranks, they made a fierce attack. The Kōzuke forces came together in a mass formation, and retreated to Hirai in disorder.

They entrenched themselves in the castle and guarded it, occupying it securely. Ujiyasu planned to pursue them and then to besiege the castle before making an onslaught, and he wanted to inform the Izu and Sagami forces about this. But because they had many wounded and dead, and because there were exhausted foot soldiers to the left and right, they did not enter far into the enemy's territory. Instead, they had to be content with looking forward to a victory in the future when there would be no grounds for any mishaps.”

Kanbashō Kosenroku goes on to relate how Hōjō Ujiyasu later the same year — in the 7th month — resumed his offensive against the Kantō kanrei, this time with the result that the latter gave up Hirai Castle altogether and sought refuge with Kenshin in Echigo. The chronicle is not clear on the point of when
Norimasa actually went to Echigo, but according to another source, *Musashi no Kuni Ryūenji Nendaiki*, he “left Hirai for the mountains of Echigo in the northern regions on the 1st month’s 10th day in the 21st year of Tenbun [14th February, 1552],”¹¹ and yet another source, *Kyōto Shōgun Kafu*, has it that in the 21st year of Tenbun, “Hōjō Ujiyasu attacked Hirai Castle in Kōzuke and took it by storm. Uesugi Norimasa fled to Echigo.”¹² Several other works relating more or less the same story give other dates for Norimasa’s flight,¹³ but the 1st month’s 10th day or at least early 1552 is the date widely accepted by modern scholars.¹⁴

Whatever the exact date, with Norimasa’s abandoning the Kantō, the whole region came under the dominance of the Hōjō and it stayed that way, more or less, for almost forty years — until 1590, when the family was defeated by Toyotomi Hideyoshi in one of the very last steps in the unification process.¹⁵ Of course, it can hardly have been foreseen in the early 50s that the Hōjō would remain undefeatable for so long, and as it will be revealed in the following pages, there was indeed many a local warlord who was ready to challenge their dominance. And even though Uesugi Norimasa’s actions, at the time of his arrival in Echigo, show us that he himself had given up leading the fight against the Hōjō, they also show that he had not lost the hope of having the house of Uesugi restored to power in eastern Japan.

The actions referred to are Norimasa’s offering the Yamanouchi-Uesugi leadership and the Kantō *kanrei* position to Kenshin, which, if *Uesugi Nenpu* is to be believed, happened in the following manner: Upon arriving in Naotsu, “Norimasa felt Lord Kagetora’s friendliness and finally ceded the family headship. He handed over the Uesugi genealogies and the written injunctions from many generations of Kyoto shoguns as well as a long sword and a short sword, made by Tenkoku and Yukihi, respectively, and handed down through the successive generations of [Uesugi chieftains]. Furthermore, he transferred the Kantō *kanrei* position. Norimasa made Kōzuke Lord Kagetora’s fief, and as far as the remaining [Kantō] provinces go, they should be subject to his military command.

Lord Kagetora said in answer: ‘In recent years, the enemy troops of the Hōjō and Takeda have overrun and taken the gun and villages of the neighbouring provinces. Their factions have already swelled to great numbers, and they have furthermore taken the Kantō kubō Haruuiji (...) prisoner. He has been forced into confinement in Hatano in Sagami. The *kanrei* has tried to punish them, but even though he has succeeded in engaging them in battles on numerous occasions, it is him instead of them who has been totally defeated. It is not that this was [due to] an unskilful strategy; only that his fortunes of war declined.’

That [I] Kagetora, who is devoid of any talents, receive the name of Uesugi arbitrarily and is appointed to the military position of *kanrei*, is an honour to my family. Still, as far as the important position of *kanrei* goes, I shall not agree without having somehow obtained the imperial will in Kyoto. After that I shall moreover devise a secret plan and suppress the two families’ atrocities at once, and when that is done, I shall obey your strictest orders (...).”¹⁶

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This account is basically corroborated by several other chronicles, and though we can hardly accept it at face value, it does indeed seem very likely that some kind of ceremony was held upon Norimasa’s arrival in Naotsu during which the Uesugi family treasures may have been handed over to Kenshin; and also, especially, that the latter thought it prudent to await shogunal sanction before agreeing to take over the kamrei position, because that would ensure he was not going to be labelled a rebel or aggressor in connection with future advances into the Kantō region.

As we shall soon see, however, it would take several years before the central authorities came up with something that may be interpreted as such a sanction, and it will also soon be evident that Kenshin’s acceptance of the Uesugi leadership cannot have been more that a matter of principle; the real transfer was still several years away.

Official recognition to some extent, though, was not long in forthcoming. In the 4th or 5th month, 1552, Kenshin was invested with the court rank Lower Junior Fifth Rank, and he was appointed danjō no shōhitsu, originally an administrative post in the police department of the imperial government which by the mid-sixteenth century had been reduced to a purely honorary position. Furthermore, it also seems that Kenshin began preparations for a Kantō campaign around this time; at least, Isa Sō Monjo contains a letter, dated the 5th month’s 24th day (26th June) and written by Uesugi Norimasa to Nagao Masakage, from which it is clear that Kenshin had sent a Buddhist monk to Kōzuke in order to check the conditions in the Kantō, and also that he intended to sent an army there. Norimasa also tells Masakage to prepare for the campaign and asks him to repair the mountain road by which the Echigo army would advance. According to another letter, written to Tairago Magotarō by a certain Yoshie Shigetaka on the 20th day of the 6th month (21st July), “our lord’s campaign will be on the following 20th [20th August].”

The details of the campaign are few. If the chronicle Uesugi Nenpu is to be believed, Kenshin did not set out himself but dispatched some of his commanders to Kōzuke with the object of conquering a newly built Hōjō stronghold in Numata close to the Echigo border. Modern scholars believe this to be correct, and it has been conjectured that the campaign was inconclusive due to Kenshin’s troops having to retreat to Echigo with the approach of winter. Whether or not that was so, however, the whole affair seems indeed to have been over by late autumn because on the 13th day of the 10th month (9th November), Kenshin wrote a letter to an Echigo warrior named Shōda Sōzaemon, expressing his sympathy with his having suffered hardships whilst soldiering in eastern Japan, and we may infer from that document that the campaign had been brought to an end by then.

Around the same time as he began the preparations for the Kantō campaign, Kenshin also began planning a trip to Kyoto. According to the chronicle Honseiji Ki, he contacted a priest named Chōken from the Shinano temple Honseiji in the 4th month in order to get him to use his influence with the
ikkō ikki of Echizen, Kaga and Noto so that they would not try to prevent him (Kenshin) from reaching the capital. And it is clear from a document in the collection Honseiji Monjo that Choken was successful in obtaining a promise to that effect.

Several chronicles mention that Kenshin went to Kyoto in the following year's 2nd intercalary month, but it is a widely accepted notion among modern scholars that it did not happen until the autumn. This in fact also seems far more likely because we know from an entry in a priest's diary that Kenshin was in the Kyoto-Osaka area as the year drew to its close. So no doubt the chronicles in question are mistaken as far as the date of Kenshin's departure for Kyoto is concerned, but that should not automatically lead us to conclude that their accounts of the trip itself are completely erroneous. For instance, there can be little doubt that Kenshin had an audience with the emperor, as we are told by for example Uesugi Nenpu, on which occasion he received a sake cup from the sovereign. Because in the Uesugi Monjo collection there is an undated letter written to a high-ranking imperial official in which Kenshin's receiving the cup (together with a dagger) is mentioned, and Kenshin himself touched upon this in his letter to Tenshitsu Koikou.

Neither is there any reason for doubt when we are told by the various chronicles how Kenshin received an imperial edict while in Kyoto. Because the edict, quoted by, for instance, Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, has survived into modern times and has been included in Dai Nihon Komonjo. In part it reads as follows: "Kagetora must subdue and punish the parties that harbour antagonistic inclinations in his own domain as well as in the neighbouring provinces."

Other details from Kenshin's stay in Kyoto, related by Uesugi Nenpu, Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu etc. and equally credible as those mentioned here, will be touched upon in Chapter Eight. The point to be made here is that these chronicles are far from being completely erroneous in their accounts of the affair, but in spite of this, there is one question they fail to answer satisfactorily, or even, in some cases, fail to address altogether, namely the question of why Kenshin went to the capital in the first place. Hokketsu Taiheiki, for instance, does not touch upon that issue at all, while both Uesugi Nenpu and Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu have it that Kenshin went in order to have an audience with the shogun so that he could express his thanks for the preceding years' favours.

The two chronicles do not specify what the favours were, but it is reasonable to assume that they in fact were Kenshin's court rank investment and danjō no shōhitsu appointment. Some modern scholars have voiced the opinion that he went to Kyoto precisely in order to give thanks for that, but actually that is a very unconvincing explanation. As already mentioned, Kenshin's position in Echigo was not all that secure to begin with, and as we shall furthermore see in the next chapter, in 1553 a new threat appeared on the borders of Echigo. In 1527 the Takeda of Kai had begun to advance into Shinano and had since then subjugated an increasingly larger part of the province. By mid-1553 they had reached the northern part of the province — an area around 70 kilometres from Naoetsu in Echigo — and in the 8th month Kenshin felt obliged to confront them on the battlefield.
It is hard to imagine that Kenshin, in such circumstances, would travel more than three hundred kilometres to Kyoto, through a countryside controlled by more or less hostile fellow daimyō, in order to take care of what can hardly be viewed as much more than a formality. On the other hand, it is not difficult to imagine why Kenshin went to Kyoto if one considers how his stay in the capital actually proceeded and what the results of it were; if there is any indication of the motive for the trip to be found therein, it certainly is that he went for political and religious reasons.

The religious aspects of Kenshin’s trip to the capital will be dealt with in Chapter Eight. What indicates that there were political motives for it is, firstly, his giving of gifts to the Buddhist priest Shōyō. Shōyō (1516-54) was the head priest of Jōdo Shinshū’s main temple, Honganji in Osaka, and from an entry in his diary, Honganji Shōyō Shōnin Nikki, it is clear that Kenshin sent various presents to him on the 13th day of the 11th month (28th December). Seen in the light of the fact that Jōdo Shinshū had been banned from Echigo for more than thirty years, and that the sect began various public activities in the province thereafter, there can be little doubt that this was a political move — an attempt, as Inoue Toshio has conjectured, to come to terms with the sect and let it return to Echigo because its friendship was deemed necessary if Kenshin was to involve himself militarily in Shinano and the Kantō region.

The second indication that Kenshin’s Kyoto trip was politically motivated is the already mentioned imperial edict, according to which he was ordered to suppress “the parties that harbour antagonistic inclinations in his own domain as well as in the neighbouring provinces.” Considering that Kenshin the year before, in all likelihood, had expressed a desire to receive official backing before letting himself become involved in the Kantō region, the simple fact that he received such an edict in 1553 makes it seem probable that the trip was made partly for the obtainment of it, or something along the same lines (such as official approval of his taking over the Kantō kanrei position), in mind.

So, to sum up, it is likely that Kenshin’s Kyoto trip was in parts politically motivated — that his aims were, among other things, to rally direct and indirect support for future military involvement outside the borders of Echigo; more specifically, to befriend the Jōdo Shinshū and to get official backing for such enterprises.

Kenshin appears to have returned from Kyoto in early 1554. The exact date is not evident from any of the sources examined for this study, but on the 12th month’s 18th day in the 22nd year of Tenbun (31st January, 1554), Honjō Jitsuno wrote a letter to Ueno Lenari in which he informed him that Kenshin was due arrive home later in the month (the 12th month, of course).

As we have seen, in 1549 Kenshin accepted, in principle, to assist Uesugi Norimasa in his fight against the Hōjō. Then, in 1552, he welcomed Norimasa to Naoetsu after the latter had been chased out of the Kantō; he accepted, again in principle, to take over the Yamanouchi-Uesugi
leadership; and he launched an offensive against the Hōjō’s Numata Castle in Kosuke. Finally, in late 1553 he went to Kyoto in order to, among other things, solicit support for future extra-provincial campaigns.

All this indicates that Kenshin’s mind was firmly set on taking military action against the Hōjō. Yet in spite of this, more than six years would elapse between his return from Kyoto and the launching of his second Kantō offensive. Maybe he was not too keen on campaigning in eastern Japan after all? Or did something happen which made him change his mind after his return from Kyoto?

In fact, it is very likely that personal considerations made him somewhat reluctant to let himself become involved in the Kantō at all, at least for some of the time during the six years. This will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Eight, but any such considerations notwithstanding, it also seems likely that the Takeda’s presence in northern Shinano alone would have either dampened his willingness to campaign in the Kantō or prevented him, as it were, from doing so. In other words, it seems likely that that presence, resulting as it did in an insurrection in 1555 by the Echigo kokujin Kitajō Takahiro, a confrontation with Takeda Shingen in Shinano the same year, a revolt by another Echigo warrior, Ōkuma Tomohide, in 1556, two confrontations with Shingen in Shinano in 1557 and 1558, one or more Takeda raids on Echigo in 1559, and an Echū offensive in the early summer of 1560, either made Kenshin deem a Kantō campaign ill-advised under the circumstances or simply left him with too little time or resources to engage in one. These matters will also be treated in greater detail later, in Chapter Six.

So the years went by and Kenshin refrained from letting himself become directly involved in the Kantō region, but at least he did not fail to attempt to adapt to the great changes that the military situation there was undergoing with the coming into being of the so-called “Alliance of the Three Provinces.” That was in the 3rd month of 1554, when the Hōjō allied themselves with the Takeda of Kai and the Imagawa of Suruga, and Kenshin’s response was to join up with several lesser warrior houses in eastern Japan in order to create a united front against the three powerful daimyō. His second Kyoto trip in 1559 also seems to have been, at least partly, an attempt to accommodate himself with the new situation in eastern Japan, though the immediate reason for it was the activities, in the central provinces, of representatives of the country’s “new forces.”

We have seen in Chapter One, how from the middle of the fifteenth century onwards the shugo had their positions challenged by these “new forces,” that is, kokujin, shugodai and high-ranking vassals in general. The process began in the Kantō region during the Kyōtoku Rebellion that broke out in 1455, and spread to the central and western provinces with the commencement of the Ōnin war in 1467, and to Echigo in 1507 with Nagao Tamekage’s revolt against Uesugi Fusayoshi.
Throughout these years the Ashikaga shogunate, while evidently in decline, continued to function, and the fact that the house of Hosokawa had monopolized the post as deputy shogun (kanrei) after the Ōnin war brought a measure of stability to the capital and surrounding areas for a long time. Yet in the end neither the Hosokawa nor the Ashikaga could avoid the pressure from the “new forces” of that region.

In late 1525 or early 1526, an internal conflict broke out in the Hosokawa family. This did not in itself result in the downfall of the family, but it certainly weakened it, as various vassals and kokujin entered the conflict in order to strengthen their own positions. In the five to six years after the outbreak of the conflict, for instance, the kanrei branch of the Hosokawa lost control of its domains because the areas’ kokujin had grown increasingly independent, and one of the Hosokawa’s vassal houses in particular, the Miyoshi (retainers of the Hosokawa’s Awa shugo branch), utilized the conflict cleverly and came to the fore on the politico-military stage of the central provinces, becoming one of the dominant forces in the area for a period.

The year 1532 saw an outburst of violent ikkō uprisings in the many of the central provinces. The devastation that followed in the wake of the Hosokawa conflict had caused widespread dissatisfaction amongst peasants and earth-cultivating samurai, and these uprisings were directed at that family and its allies, weakening it further. In 1533 ikkō followers began gaining control over another Hosokawa domain, to wit, the province of Settsu.

One person who understood how to utilize all this unrest to his own benefit was a Hatakeyama retainer named Kizawa Nagamasa. Nagamasa was an ally of the Hosokawa in their fight against the ikkō believers, and it was as such that he helped with mobilizing adherents of a rival Buddhist sect, the Nichirenshū, for that fight. As a result of the mobilization and of the eventual defeat of the ikkō contingent in Kyoto, that sect became very powerful in the capital where it had a large following, but in 1536 the Hosokawa and the shogun attacked and destroyed it, leaving Nagamasa the dominant force in the capital. He remained so until 1542 when he himself was attacked and destroyed by the Miyoshi.

As noted, the Miyoshi had come to the fore of the politico-military stage of the central provinces as a consequence of the in-house war of the Hosokawa. But in 1532, internal rivalry in the family and amongst the Awa-Hosokawa’s military commanders led to the Miyoshi chieftain’s being attacked and killed by Kizawa Nagamasa, among others. This seems to have been a bit of a setback for the family, and its rise did not continue until 1542, when the chieftain’s son, Nagayoshi (1523-64), attacked and killed Kizawa Nagamasa in Kyoto and took over the position as the man in power in the capital.

Nagayoshi’s main enemies from then on were the Ashikaga shoguns — Yoshiharu at first, then his son and immediate successor Yoshiteru — and their supporter, Hosokawa Harumoto (1514-63). He waged war on them on several occasions until his death, often forcing them to flee from Kyoto, but every now and then he would make peace with them and confront other enemies in the Kyoto region. By alternately waging war
on and making peace with the Ashikaga-Hosokawa coalition, he succeeded in subjugating these other enemies one by one, and by 1563 he controlled, somewhat insecurely, Awaji, Sanuki, Settsu, Yamashiro, Kawachi, Yamato, and Izumi.\textsuperscript{52}

One of the instances of the shogun’s being chased out of Kyoto was in 1558 (1st year of Eiroku), an affair touched upon by the chronicle \textit{Uesugi Terutora-kō Ki}. According to that source, Ashikaga Yoshiteru “was caused distress by Miyoshi Nagayoshi and Matsunaga Hisahide,” and was forced to flee to Kuchiki in Ōmi. Once there, he sent out letters to Kenshin and Shingen, instructing them to make peace, and in particular he asked Kenshin to come to Ōmi and secure his return to the capital. This, however, Kenshin failed to do, we are told, because he was engaged in a confrontation with Shingen — in particular in an attack on a stronghold known as Unno Castle in Shinano. So when Yoshiteru eventually managed to make peace with his enemies, he returned to Kyoto without Kenshin’s help, and again he contacted the Echigo \textit{daimyō} and Shingen, urging them to make peace.\textsuperscript{53}

\textit{Uesugi Terutora-kō Ki}’s account of this affair is all but completely corroborated by a combination of three different sources. The first is a letter written by Kenshin to Ashikaga Yoshiteru.\textsuperscript{54} It is undated but believed to have been written in the 5th or 6th month of 1559 (2nd year of Eiroku),\textsuperscript{55} a date that seems very likely when judged by the content of the letter. It is, in effect, a declaration of loyalty to the shogun with various comments on Kenshin’s trip to Kyoto and, and this is what is of interest in connection with \textit{Uesugi Terutora-kō Ki}’s account, on his failure to assist the shogun with his return to the capital during the latter’s exile in Kuchiki in Ōmi; the reason is, just as the chronicle tells us, that he was militarily engaged in Shinano.

The two other sources are two letters written by Ashikaga Yoshiteru and Takeda Shingen, respectively. In the compilation \textit{Hennen Monjo} we find a letter written by the Kai \textit{daimyō} on the 28th day of the 11th month in the 2nd year of Eiroku (5th January, 1560). In it Shingen mentions both that “last year [1st year of Eiroku] arrangements were made for a reconciliation between Kai and Echigo,” and that Kenshin failed to comply and later “incinerated the ground of Unno in Shinano.”\textsuperscript{56} Ashikaga Yoshiteru’s letter, included in the \textit{Uesugi Monjo} compilation, is dated the 20th day of the 2nd month in the 2nd year of Eiroku (7th April, 1559) and addressed to Kenshin. It is another attempt to have Kenshin and Shingen settle their differences, and the shogun refers to a letter he sent the year before (1st year of Eiroku) concerning the “the peace talks with Harunobu.”\textsuperscript{57}

Even though Kenshin declined to respond to Ashikaga Yoshiteru’s call for help in 1558, it is clear from another document, quoted in \textit{Rekidai Koan}, that he began preparations for a Kyoto trip the same year; the letter, written by two of Kenshin’s vassals and dated the 30th day of the 10th month (19th December), deals with the collection of taxes levied on certain areas of Echigo especially for use in connection with the “Kyoto expenses.”\textsuperscript{58} And if \textit{Uesugi Nenpu} is to be believed, he also dispatched a
messenger to Kyoto in the 11th month in order to inform the central authorities about his forthcoming visit, planned for the next year, and sent letters the following month to the Asakura in Echizen and the Sasaki in Ōmi, informing them of his intention of going to Kyoto and soliciting a safe passage through their territories.59

On the 3rd day of the 4th month (19th May), 1559, still according to Uesugi Nenpu, Kenshin set out from Naoetsu at the head of around five thousand warriors, and he arrived in Sakamoto in Ōmi on 4th month’s 20th day (5th June), where he decided not to proceed to the capital. As far as the reason for this decision goes, we are told, not quite convincingly, that “concerning the arrangement of the eminent banquet at the inn [where he stayed], danjōchū Matsunaga of the Miyoshi clan had been ordered by the shogun to deal with it as he saw fit, and Kenshin’s followers, paying deference to the luxury of Miyoshi and Matsunaga, failed to proceed to the capital.”60

Uesugi Nenpu goes on to relate that shogun Yoshiteru the following day sent a messenger to Sakamoto with a letter urging Kenshin to enter Kyoto quickly because someone was causing unrest.61 This is undoubtedly correct; the Uesugi Monjo collection contains a letter from Yoshiteru to Kenshin dated the 4th month’s 21st day (6th June), and from this document it is evident, firstly, that Kenshin was in Sakamoto at the time, and secondly that the shogun indeed wanted him to come to the capital for the reason given by Uesugi Nenpu.62

However, Kenshin did not immediately comply with the shogun. He stayed in Sakamoto until the 27th day (12th June), during which time he was visited by representatives from various Buddhist temples and a number of high-ranking imperial officials, and also by Miyoshi and Matsunaga together with their followers.63 The reasons for Kenshin’s failure to accommodate the shogun and for the visits of the Buddhist monks and imperial officials are not revealed by neither Uesugi Nenpu nor by other sources consulted, but Uesugi Nenpu gives as motive for Miyoshi and Matsunaga’s visit that they wanted to sound out Kenshin’s intentions.64 This is a very reasonable explanation when one considers that Kenshin the year before had been urged by the shogun to come and help with precisely the “distress” caused by Miyoshi and his camp, but if Kenshin himself is to be believed, the shogunal enemies had nothing to fear; in the undated letter to Ashikaga Yoshiteru referred to above, he states the reason for his Kyoto visit, and it was not to subjugate Miyoshi but to celebrate Yoshiteru’s successful return from Ōmi.65

Be that as it may, as noted, Kenshin eventually did set out for the capital where, as it is clear from the Japanese scholar Satō Hironobu’s analysis of his letter to the shogun as well as of various other documents written during his stay, he entered into discreet and seemingly delicate political negotiations with the shogunate, the results of which are revealed by four letters written to him by Ashikaga Yoshiteru on the 26th day of the 6th month (9th August).66
All four letters are included in *Uesugi Monjo*. The first is a grant of the privilege known as *uragaki gomen*,\(^67\) that is, the privilege of being allowed to write one's personal name and official title on the front side of envelopes and one's family name on the reverse side when sending letters;\(^68\) only members of the three warrior houses that traditionally occupied the position as deputy shogun (*kanrei*) — the Hatakeyama, Hosokawa and Shiba — had that privilege.\(^69\) The second letter is also a grant of a privilege, to wit, that of being allowed to use a *nurikago*,\(^70\) a special kind of palanquin which only the shogun, the nobility and Buddhist priests of imperial descent were allowed to use.\(^71\) These two privileges made Kenshin's social position improve greatly, thus lending authority to his position as a *daimyō*.\(^72\)

The two other letters have to do with the situation in Shinano and the Kantō, respectively. In one of them the shogun expresses his support to Kenshin's continued fight against Takeda Shingen in order to protect the warrior society of Shinano; in the other, Yoshiteru wrote: "Concerning the question of whether or not Kantō-Uesugi Gorō [Norimasa] is to stay in office, he has to make use of Kagetora's wisdom when he makes decisions in the future. Kagetora's assistance is important."\(^73\) This short passage has been interpreted differently over the years. The authors of *Uesugi Nenpu* and *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu* have seen it as an appointment of Kenshin to the position as Kantō *kanrei*,\(^74\) an interpretation shared by some modern scholars.\(^75\) Other modern scholars have seen its as the shogun's entrusting Kenshin with the protection of Uesugi Norimasa, and yet others as an order for Kenshin to attempt to reinstate Norimasa in his proper function in the Kantō.\(^76\) Satō Hironobu has seen it simply as an appointment of Kenshin as Norimasa's advisor and assistant,\(^77\) a far more sober interpretation when one takes into consideration the actual phrasing of Yoshiteru's letter.

Still, the fact that Kenshin was granted the two privileges mentioned above does appear to indicate that the shogun had accepted the idea of him as the new Kantō *kanrei*, if only tacitly, and anyway, as far as Kenshin himself goes, he does not seem to have needed further official sanction before finally assuming the office; as we shall soon see, he did so in early 1561, and there is nothing in the historical sources to indicate that he solicited the central authorities again between his Kyoto stay in 1559 and that point.

The fact that Kenshin received the four letters only after prolonged negotiations with the shogunate of course strongly indicates that he had come to Kyoto for political reasons and not, as he himself wrote, in celebration of Ashikaga Yoshiteru's return from Ōmi. He must have had one or more political aims for the journey and taken the initiative to open negotiations upon his arrival in Sakamoto or Kyoto because why else did negotiations take place; if the central authorities had wanted to confer special privileges on him, sanction his fight against Takeda Shingen, and appoint him to a position as assistant to the Kantō *kanrei*, surely it would just have done so with little prior consultation with him.
But what, then, were Kenshin’s political aims for the Kyoto trip? Well, as the four shogunal letters are the result of political negotiations, it seems safe to assume that they reflect the issues of the negotiations, and hence also Kenshin’s political aims for the trip, to some degree. Therefore it is not too far-fetched to conjecture that his aims were to obtain official backing of both future military involvement in the Kantō region and future confrontations with Takeda Shingen in northern Shinano. Kenshin had of course already obtained such backing during his previous stay in the capital — in the shape of an imperial edict, ordering him, it will be remembered, to suppress “the parties that harbour antagonistic inclinations in his own domain as well as in the neighbouring provinces” — but as the shogun had since then changed policy and more than once attempted to make him come to terms with Takeda Shingen, and as in the Kantō region the formidable “Alliance of Three Provinces” had come into being, it is not surprising that Kenshin sought firmer legitimation of future actions in the two regions.

According to Hoketsu Taiheki, Kenshin returned to Echigo on the 26th day of the 10th month (5th December). That date, or at least the 10th month, is accepted by some modern scholars as the right one, while others have voiced the opinion that Kenshin arrived home already by the 8th month. Whatever the correct date, however, it is clear from a document found in Uesugi Komonjo that once Kenshin was back in Echigo, four significant events were arranged in celebration of his home-coming. The document is dated the 14th day of the 3rd month (15th April), 1593, and it lists the names of more than one hundred samurai from Echigo, Shinano and the Kantō provinces, who on the 28th day of the 10th month, the 1st and 13th days of the 11th month (7th, 9th and 21st December), 1559, and the 15th day of the 3rd month (20th April), 1560, came to Naotsu and paid their respects to Kenshin, each of them presenting him with a sword. The significance of these events of course lies in the fact that they reveal the approximate extent of the support Kenshin could count on for future military campaigns.

It has already been indicated that Kenshin in the early 50s apparently became firmly intent on involving himself in the Kantō region, and that the explanation for his failure to do so is partly to be found in Takeda Shingen’s pressure on the Shinano-Echigo border in the period 1554-60, a pressure that among other things led to two revolts in Echigo and to Kenshin’s first military campaign in Etchū in the early summer of 1560. Still, it appears that by the time of the latter event, Kenshin had already come to regard a Kantō offensive as something that might be realized in the not too distant future. At least, on the 21st day of the 4th month (26th May) that year, Uesugi Norimasa explained in a letter to Nagao Masakage how he expected Kenshin to set out as soon as he returned from Etchū, and another document, written by Kenshin on the 4th month’s 28th day (2nd June) to a Kantō ally, a Hitachi warrior named Satake Yoshiaki, is evidently a response to a letter written by the latter, reporting on the situation in the east and requesting Kenshin to begin campaigning there. Then, on the 8th month’s 4th

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day (4th September), Kenshin revealed his intentions to launch a campaign in a letter to Nagao Masakage who, it was planned, was to stay in charge in Echigo during his absence. Later the same month, he informed a number of warriors in Közuke, Shimotsuke and Musashi.

The historical sources disagree on the point of when Kenshin actual left Echigo for the Kantō. Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, among other chronicles, has it that it happened in the beginning of the 9th month (30th September–28th October), while Musashi no Kuni Ryūenji Nendaiki give the 29th day of the 8th month (29th September) as the date of departure. Whatever the correct date, however, there can be little doubt the following excerpt from Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu concerning the campaign’s general course during its early days is by and large true to fact, substantiated as it is by various other sources.

"First," Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu has it, "[Lord Kagetora] took the castle of Numata in Közuke by storm where Hōjō Magoshirō had entrenched himself. After that, he captured castles here and there. (...) His authority spanned the whole Kantō region, and all those who were subject to his command prostrated themselves like grass before the wind. (...) Norimasa rejoiced immensely, and before long they arrived at Umayabashi. Avoiding the main castle itself, Lord Kagetora moved into its outer citadel. From then on, samurai from far-away places, including the two provinces of Mutsu and Dewa lying outside the Kantō region, congratulated him by way of messengers, and [those of] the nearby places came and had audiences with him. Throngs of high and low came and went in a ceaseless traffic. Lord Kagetora tided over the year-end in Umayabashi together with Norimasa." As noted, this scenario is, on the whole, corroborated by other sources — some letters and a temple diary — and likewise is Hōjō Ujiyasu and Takeda Shingen’s reaction to Kenshin’s offensive documented to some extent by various documents. Thus, for instance, we have a letter written by Shingen and offered to the Shinto shrine Matsubara Jinja in Shinano. Dated the 1st day of the 9th month (30th September), that is, the approximate time when Kenshin commenced his campaign, it is a prayer for the defeat of Kenshin (as well as of Shingen’s enemies in Shinano). Moreover, on 28th day of the 9th month (27th October), Hōjō Ujiyasu wrote a letter to one of his Shimotsuke allies, Makabe Ujishige, warning him to be on his guard against Kenshin and informing him that he himself would take the field and set up camp in Kawagoe in Musashi.

Two other letters, dated the 17th day of the 10th month (14th November) the same year and the 2nd day of the 10th month (23rd November), 1566, reveal that during Kenshin’s presence in the Kantō region, Takeda Shingen sought to relieve the pressure on Hōjō Ujiyasu by sending, firstly, a messenger to Honganji in Osaka with an entreaty that the Jōdo Shinshū incites its followers in Kaga and Echū to raid Echigo, and secondly, a request to a Echū samurai named Ueda to invade Echigo together with an ally. Clearly both Shingen and Ujiyasu viewed Kenshin’s Kantō campaign with great seriousness, and perhaps that should not surprise us. But when viewed in retrospect, the campaign can hardly be said to
have constituted a real threat to the Hōjō’s dominance. As we shall soon see, Kenshin was far from being successful.

According to several chronicles, Kenshin began his advance towards Odawara at some point in the 3rd month, 1561.\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Uesugi Nenpu}, though, has it that it happened in the 2nd month, more precisely on the 11th day (6th March).\textsuperscript{95} That is an altogether more likely date inasmuch as the source collection \textit{Sōshū Monjo} contains a letter written by Hōjō Ujiteru to an ally on the 25th day of the 2nd month (20th March), from which it is evident that Kenshin was indeed on the move by then; Ujiteru (1540?-90), Hōjō Ujiyasu’s second son,\textsuperscript{96} explains in the letter that Kenshin, “is now en route. He has already arrived at Akaishi,”\textsuperscript{97} which is in Kōzuke.

Be that as it may, if \textit{Uesugi Nenpu} is to believed, Kenshin’s approach was viewed with quite some misgivings in both Odawara and Takeda Shingen’s headquarters in Kai, though military countermeasures eventually appear to have been taken with some confidence. When Kenshin set out, according to the chronicle,\textsuperscript{98} “the uneasiness of Ujiyasu and his clan and senior retainers defied description, even though they had anticipated it.

Because Takeda Shingen had been Ujiyasu’s ally for some years, the latter had dispatched messengers [to him] since last winter, counting upon him for help. But in spite of this, Shingen, fearing Kagetora’s violent attack, had delayed the departure of his troops and in the end cancelled it. He used the Hōjō messengers to renounce the close and years-old relationship again and again, and he had no doubt that the Hōjō clan would be destroyed because of the postponement of the departure.

Shingen assembled his kinsmen and senior retainers and held a conference full of disagreement on the problem of what should be done about this matter. \textit{Hyōbu shōyū} Obu said:\textsuperscript{99} ‘Kagetora’s military readiness this time will no doubt lead to Ujiyasu’s death by seppuku and, after that, to the destruction of Imagawa Ujizane and Shingen.\textsuperscript{100} As long as Ujiyasu is unwavering, an army can be dispatched, and apart from that it is not necessary with further consultations. If we do so, the army should pass through Fuefuki. From Kai it must cross Mimase Pass immediately and cross the river Hanakawa. Ignoring the Kantō contingents, it must attack Kagetora’s personal guard fervently and engage it in battle. Even if there is no victory, Shingen’s military fame will without fail be handed down eternally. The house of Takeda has no special concern for this occasion. It has been appealed to by the house of Hōjō and has an obligation to fight a battle. Isn’t taking up our bows and arrows in accordance with the Takeda’s honour?’ Thus he remonstrated, but some feared the huge superior and threatening army [of the enemy], and vacillation consequently split the conference in two.

Obu’s war council was not heeded. So without anything to stop him, he let both the leader of the foot soldiers, Hajika Gengorō, and chief treasurer Aonuma Sukebei join the mounted warriors and foot
soldiers, and accompanying the more than two-hundred men, he went off to Shinano. Separated from the Kōzuke border by Fuefuki Pass, he set up camp.

In the same month [i.e. the 2nd] Hōjō Ujiyasu and his son sakyō no daibu Ujimasa assembled the clan and senior vassals and held a war conference. Since the enemy's approach, a great number of people had been sent to Ōiso where they had contained the enemy midway, and both sides appeared to be attacking. However, Ujiyasu said: 'First of all, concerning Kagetora's present advance, the orders given to all our men stand completely to reason. But even so, Kagetora is by nature tough and strong, and if he is angered once, it is like setting fire to a plain; it is said that he will crush even all sorts of demons. However, in time he will become our problem, and therefore we must have a sudden revival of courage and consider all contingencies.

It is said that a man of virtue is without doubt courageous, and that a courageous man is certainly without virtue. But the warlords of the Kantō will generally conform to Kagetora's intentions, when before anything else he replaces Norimasa and calls himself kanrei, and when they do that, the resentment they harbour [towards me] due to past experiences will make them display their martial skills even more. In addition to this, because he has a great following and our allies are only few in number, we will entrench ourselves in the castle for the time being without first dispatching an army. If his hot-blooded temperament is broken and he exhausts his military strength, we immediately avoid the violence of the attacking army; that is the way for us to overcome our inactivity.

It is my plan to wear Kagetora's courage down, to stand fast for several days of confrontation and to force those serving under him to starvation. One day I shall be able to put down my pillow in a place of complete safety, if only for a moment.

I shall be diligent to the utmost. I shall do away with self-interest. And relieving my soldiers of their hardships, I shall make myself suffer and for once quell the turbulent waves of the eastern sea. The weakened governance shall be restored and benevolent statecraft shall be eternal.

Our course of action is limited, but if the commanders and soldiers bear in mind to respond to any suitable opportunity for change, there will no refraining from a fight this time. Recognizing the moment to advance, we must take care not to miss the opportunity; and seeing that we'll have to retreat, we may do that in order to secure our rear.'

Consequently, because Ujiyasu conjectured thus, there were no other strategies [up for discussion] (...). When the vassals, from Ujimasa to all the seasoned commanders, had seen the reason [in Ujiyasu's argument], they made up their minds and decided upon entrenching themselves in the castle.

From the Imagawa (...), Bitchū governor Asahina, Harima governor Kuzuyama, Kai governor Okabe and Suruga [governor] Sena Saburō were sent to Odawara as reinforcements, accompanied by
three hundred men. Also the advancing army from Kai had already reached Fuefuki with Hashika and Aonuma as the commanding generals.

It had been decided for certain that the castle in Kawagoe in Musashi was to be subjugated by the soldiers of Satake Yoshishige from the Echigo capital at the same time [as the attack on Odawara Castle]. In addition to this, the castles in Ujiyasu’s possession were forced to confront soldiers who were connected to the areas surrounding them. On the 12th day of the same month [7th March], Lord Kagetora gave strict orders for the whole army to form ranks here and there and, before anything else, for the coastal road to Odawara to be set on fire. The enemy forts in the areas of Inage, Kosugi, Ogi, Kongenyama, Shinanosaka and Ōkura were pillaged on the way. As all the soldiers had been specifically prohibited to make disorder, private houses had their boundaries respected beyond expectation. However, the soldiers set fire to the houses in the neighbourhood of Odawara, leaving no one standing. (...). 102

Already by the end of the same month’s 13th day [8th March] the one hundred and fifteen thousand troops had advanced their position to the vicinity of Odawara. The vanguard, the second contingent and the personal guard arranged themselves for battle to the front, rear, left and right, and the reserve troops to be used for the surprise attack and the frontal attack set up their camp in accordance with the principle of Yin and Yang. The vanguard and the second contingent arrived at the camps at Ōiso and Koiso. For his headquarters Lord Kagetora decided upon a place called Yamashita at the foot of the mountain Kōrajisan, 103 separated from the other camps by around one hundred and ten metres.

In Odawara they had heard that the Uesugi force was already closing in, so Ujiyasu had been waiting, making preparations for a defensive battle, and therefore everyone in the castle had to acquaint themselves with these preparations.

Lord Kagetora’s large army was stretched out, the troops resembling nails in the sole of a shoe, and the contingents from the eastern provinces were riding around in front of it and behind it. Its commanders made their rounds amidst all the troops and gave orders concerning the military preparations.

Firstly, the soldiers that were to attack the front of the castle let out a war cry that closed in on the enemy from the Kōda Gate in front of a shrine and encircled all the other castle entrances and all the soldiers. Echoing back from Ashigara, Hakoneyama, Futakodake and Eboshiyama to the west, and from the rocks in the angry and enraged waves of the limitless, dark blue ocean to the south, the sound of the war cry smashed to pieces the Heaven-supporting Ropes and the Axle of the Earth. 104 The war cry was also heard inside the castle, and at the same time the garrison joined in, their burning arrows flying from the walls of the gates and the high towers like the falling rain. The soldiers of the attacking enemy had their shields smashed to pieces, and there were even those who attained death. They
rearranged their muskets in the shadow of the fences they had built from shields and demolished the gates and towers, [but] the number of those who were thrown into confusion from above is unknown.

Inside the castle they were alarmed at the fierce attack. More than ten military commanders charged forward on horseback with their force of around three thousand men. Lord Kagetora’s vanguard, Ōta Sanrakusai and his son and their more than three thousand five hundred mounted warriors, engaged them furiously in battle. Because the [Ōta] attackers had numerical superiority, they dashed forward aggressively and tried to surround their enemies. But when they did that, the garrison troops shut themselves up [in the castle] and were not surrounded. When the attackers made the Crane’s Wings, the garrison troops began to make the Fish Scales but were defeated.105 This was watched from inside the castle and was no doubt perceived as a crisis. A force of around three hundred mounted soldiers in the castle came to the rescue of its allies, the fierce strength of whom had been prominent. While preparing themselves, the horse-riding samurai had arranged their arrows and muskets, and afterwards they had let go of the scabbards of their spears and halberds. Then, making the feet of their horses float through the air, they had advanced.

Lord Kagetora’s troops engaged the first contingent of the garrison in battle for several hours, never knowing what the outcome might be, but because the latter pulled back towards the castle, having exhausted its strength in vain as there were no allies who relieved it, the more than three thousand five hundred men of the lay priest Sanraku[sai], took advantage of the victory and gave chase. Wanting to utilize the unguardedness of the enemy, they attacked.

When they did this, a military commander of the enemy said in a loud voice as he walked to and fro in front of the vanguard of the reserve troops: ‘Now we’re just looking on while being exposed to this danger. Shouldn’t we do something about it? Our allies have been thoroughly defeated, but even though the enemy has already forced his way to the area around the pond Hasuike, there is no indication of a battle taking place there. If we stay here, we won’t escape reproach in the days to come.’

When he had raised his powerful voice thus, the reserve troops united, without any protests, to make his exalted opinion come true. And as there was no action [around them] for a moment, they got their horses ready and mercilessly engaged the Ōta force, elated by its victory, in battle, opening the attack by shooting arrows in rapid succession from its flank towards its centre. Horses ridden so hard as to make them sweat blood passed each other going eastward and westward; they were chased away and they were returned. The Ōta’s kaburaya banners and the mitsu urokogata banners of the enemy commander spread out to the south and north and separated,106 and then came together in mutual combat eight or nine times with no sparing of lives.

This was seen from the castle, and again fresh troops were dispatched. They engaged in a tough battle, causing the lay priest [Sanrakusai] to pull at the bit [of his horse]. ‘Our destinies lie in the
Heavens. Let no one be left standing. Let them die in battle!' he said, and grabbing a spear, he himself beat off the enemy and thrusted down three enemy soldiers on horseback. Narita, Shimōsa governor Narita, Hirota, Fujita and Uesugi from the second contingent approached together from the north-east with twelve thousand mounted warriors, and going around the vanguard, they broke it up. Because of that, the force of the lay priest was invigorated and, taking advantage of its growing spirit, attacked it [too]. They got their performance under control again and strengthened their resolve. Their courageous spirit came spontaneously to life, and the sounds of war resounded far and wide in the sky. The sound of the cries almost made the earth tremble. A number of enemy troops were subsequently attacked, but they were relieved from a cruel fate as they pulled back into the castle. When they did that, the soldiers of their allies retreated to Ōiso and gathered together in a large group.

Lord Kagetora passed many days campaigning at Odawara. During this period he either engaged in battle with those sallying forth from the castle, or had his allies bear down on it and raid it. Or the castle’s garrison attacked at night and set fire to a few camps, but his troops did not care at all about that. Or when at night a spring breeze suddenly blew and hit the sandy soil on the ground, Lord Kagetora would give orders for a scout to be dispatched stealthily to ignite fires outside the castle. Once the homes of the local residents caught fire, causing the houses, the ridges of which were side by side and the eaves of which met, to fill the sky with clouds of smoke, and the flames to scorch the ground. The garrison was greatly agitated, but because it was fighting a defensive battle, it did not have any strength [to help].

[One day] Keimi Yojūrō came galloping [into a camp] and stated his object: ‘Our lord has ordered that we lead all our men away from here and attack and capture the castle almost immediately.’ However, Hitachi vice-governor Satake Yoshishige, nakatsukasa shōyū Oda,¹⁰⁷ and Usunomiya Yasaburō, as well as the vassals Naoe the Yamato governor and Usami the Suruga governor, secretly sent word to their lord: ‘Presently, the Kantō warlords have in general submitted to your Lordship’s command for the first time and, obeying your orders, has taken action. In bygone days when your predecessor, kanrei Norimasa, lived in the Kantō, they were subjected to all his orders. But in spite of this, he had the extreme mischance of running out of luck, and after a short time they all came under the rule of Odawara.

Because the fortunes of war have now returned again, we have attacked Odawara twice with the help of your Lordship’s military might. Norimasa has been satisfied due to the strategy initiated by you, so to wield even more authority and destroy and defeat the castle — cannot that be said rather to be the decline of martial virtue? In addition to this, what kind of persons with treasonous minds might there be found amongst your military commanders? A secret plot may be made, but it hasn’t yet. Only
if one provides for a compassionate governance, shall one’s enemies submit wholeheartedly as a matter of course.’

Exhausting their logic, they remonstrated thus, and consequently their lord also saw that their point was reasonable. Immediately the order to attack the castle was halted.

Now, in former times Odawara Castle was made the residential castle of Izu governor Ōmori Yoriharu, his legitimate child, Shinano governor Ujiyori, and Saneyori from the same family, all of whom were vassals of shuri no daibu Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi Sadamasa and Ōgigayatsu-Uesugi Gorō Tomoyoshi. On the 12th month’s 27th day in the 3rd year of Meiō [1st February, 1495], Hōjō Shinkurō Ujinaga suddenly attacked and took it, imposing his commanding presence on the Kantō, and his territory has prospered with the passing of time. Therefore the samurai who obey him without fail are multitudinous. With the coming of this year, the time that has passed [since then] already amounts to sixty-eight years. The shelves in the shops of the town that has been lying by the castle compound through three generations have been decorated, and the ceaseless traffic of men and horses in the streets never ends. It certainly must be called a bustling town.

One morning some soldiers burned it down. High and low folded their arms and lamented this, and old and young just stood and grieved. This was how the castle compound appeared, but the castle did not appear to be on the verge of succumbing as well. Having fervently avoided the violently attacking forces, there was nothing to do but to fight inactivity.

Reinforcements were sent [to Lord Kagetora] from both Odawara and Sogayama on the island of Tashima, and there were plans of carrying out a night assault. But because the large crowds of his allies assembled sporadically, a military conference was not easily realized. Furthermore, a long campaign in a foreign province was of no benefit to the allies, and the army provisions had accidentally reached the point where they were seriously wanting. If the enemy forces took advantage of the impoverishment of Lord Kagetora’s troops, they would be in trouble. But not only that; the warlords would also have bitter regrets. Thus, it was mutually decided that they had to retreat with their victories intact, and this was informed the warlords. On the 3rd day of the 4th month [26th May], the troops were sent home.”

Thus goes Ūesugi Nenpu’s account of the confrontation between Ūesugi Kenshin and Hōjō Ujiyasu at Odawara Castle, and it is, of course, hard to accept as being completely true to fact in every single detail. The size of Kenshin’s army, for instance, seems grossly exaggerated. One Japanese scholar, Ikegami Hiroko, has conjectured that it was less than fifty-five thousand, and when one considers that the two armies engaged in the famous battle at Sekigahara in 1600, the very pinnacle of military mass deployment in Japanese pre-modern history, is believed to have consisted of seventy thousand and eighty thousand, respectively, that conjecture does not seem too far-fetched.
It is also unlikely that the army should have been able to reach Ōiso which is situated only a couple of kilometres from Odawara before the end of the 2nd month when it on the 25th day of that month, as we have learned from Hōjō Ujiteru’s letter written on that date, was to be found in Kōzuke. Around the middle of the 3rd month would be a prudent guess for the time of the army’s arrival in the Odawara area, especially when one takes into account that Kenshin wrote a letter to an ally on the 15th day of that month (9th April), telling him that he was now there and urging him to come and visit his camp.\(^{113}\)

Conversely, the reasons given by *Uesugi Nenpu* for the decision to discontinue the siege — to wit, that the army had become vulnerable due to difficulties with obtaining supplies, and that the campaign had begun to strain its unity — sounds probable enough, though we may expect that there was more to it than that. We have already seen how Shingen the year before had exerted himself on the diplomatic front in order to help Hōjō Ujiyasu (the dispatch of a messenger to Honganji in Osaka and of the request to the Etchu samurai Ueda),\(^{114}\) and he would himself be militarily active in Shinano during the campaign.\(^{115}\) And as both Kuwata Tadachika and Hanagasaki Morikaki has pointed out, these activities surely made a prolonged siege of Odawara Castle inadvisable.\(^{116}\)

It is also likely that both Imagawa Ujizane and Takeda Shingen sent reinforcements to Odawara in the 2nd month. The former certainly did it at a slightly later date, as is evident from a letter he wrote on the 4th day of the 3rd intercalary month (28th April),\(^{117}\) and as far Shingen is concerned, such an initiative would of course only be a natural continuation of the other ones mentioned above (even though *Uesugi Nenpu*’s account of how the decision was made is not quite convincing).

Another part of the account that appears to be true to fact is the one concerning Kawagoe Castle’s being singled out for an attack by Kenshin’s ally, Satake Yoshishige. Because it is clear from two letters, written by Hōjō Ujiyasu and Hōjō Ujimasa on the 8th day of the 4th month (31st May) and by Imagawa Ujizane on the 25th day of the 4th month (17th June), respectively, that the castle was indeed besieged by troops from the Echigo army and that a number of battles or skirmishes took place.\(^{118}\)

Other details, too, are corroborated by various letters. For instance, we know there was an Ōta Sanrakusai present at Odawara. A great-grandchild to the famous Ōta Dōkan, he is also known as Sukemasa (1522-91),\(^{119}\) and Kenshin refers to him in a letter written to an ally on 27th day of the 3rd month (21st April).\(^{120}\)

In another letter, written to Kenshin by one Konoe Sakitsugu, we find an interesting reference to the siege at Odawara that also substantiates, as it were, certain details of *Uesugi Nenpu*’s account. Sakitsugu (1536-1612) was a high ranking imperial official, and he is believed to have been a go-between of prime importance in connection with the political negotiations Kenshin was involved in during his second Kyoto visit in 1559.\(^{121}\) His letter to Kenshin is undated (or at least, the date written on the letter has not survived intact to the present day), but as he is beginning it with congratulating
with the withdrawal from Odawara, he obviously must have written it after that. The interesting thing about it, however, is a passage where he refers to “the incendiarism of the neighbourhood of Odawara” during the campaign.122

Kenshin himself also referred to that aspect of the conflict in a letter he wrote in 1564. “In Odawara and its neighbourhood,” he wrote, “where a hundred years have passed without incendiary fires being raised, buildings everywhere were burned down, leaving not one standing.”123 It would seem that Uesugi Nenpu is not completely off the mark when it has it that arson was resorted to during the conflict.

There is more corroboration to be found in Kenshin’s letter, namely of Uesugi Nenpu’s account of how Satake, Oda and Utsunomiya and others were instrumental in the decision to end the siege,124 and another document, a letter written by Hōjō Ujikuni on the 11th day of the 4th month (3rd June), substantiates the chronicle’s date of the withdrawal of the army: Ujikuni wrote that the enemy appeared to be retreating.125 Interestingly, though, by the beginning of the 4th month both Uesugi Norimasa and Kenshin had already left Odawara, as we shall soon see.

All in all Uesugi Nenpu’s account of the Odawara confrontation must be judged fairly credible. It has its unconvincing parts, but there are no real inherent indications that it is not basically a truthful rendering of actual events; on the contrary, the apparent credibility of the various details analysed above make it seem reasonable to conjecture that it is just that.

Kenshin left, as noted, Odawara before the rest of his army appears to have begun retreating. In his letter from 1564 referred to at the end of the previous section he wrote that after having received the advise from Satake, Oda and Utsunomiya, he withdrew to Kamakura where Uesugi Norimasa transferred to him the Uesugi headship and Kantō kanrei position at a ceremony at the Shinto shrine Tsurugaoka Hachimangū.126 Kenshin does not give the date for this event in the letter, but as another communication in which he briefly refers to the transfer is dated the 16th day of the 3rd intercalary month (10th May), 1561, we can of course conclude that it took place before that date; and also, incidentally, that he had by then changed his name to Masatora which is the signature of the latter missive.127 Evidently, he had received a part of Uesugi Norimasa’s name upon taking over the leadership of the Uesugi.

Kenshin’s whereabouts and activities during the month or so following upon the ceremony at Tsurugaoka Hachimangū are not quite clear. Of the various chronicles consulted for this study, only Uesugi Sandai Nikki and Hokuetsu Taiheiki provide reasonable accounts of that period (with Uesugi Sandai Nikki’s in effect being an abridged version of Hokuetsu Taiheiki’s), and according to these, it was then that Kenshin returned home: After the ceremony, the two chronicles have it, Kenshin left
Kamakura and, with his various Kantō allies beginning to pull out from the area, started on the homeward journey. *En route* he engaged Hōjō forces in battle in the provincial capital of Musashi and at Hirai Castle in Kōzuke before returning to Echigo in the 4th month.\textsuperscript{128}

All this sounds, as noted, quite reasonable, especially the notion that Kenshin left Kamakura more or less at the same time as the rest of the army retreated from Odawara. But no letters or other documents dating from the time of these events substantiate two chronicles — on the contrary, at least as far as the time of Kenshin’s return to Echigo is concerned. Because a letter written by Konoe Sakitsugu on the 10th day of the 6th month (1st August) indicates that Kenshin had not yet arrived home by then.\textsuperscript{129} Several modern scholars have voiced the opinion that he returned later the same month.\textsuperscript{130}

Be that as it may, in his letter, Konoe Sakitsugu congratulated Kenshin with his military triumphs at Odawara,\textsuperscript{131} and likewise did shogun Ashikaga Yoshiteru in a letter dated the 2nd day of the 6th month (24th July).\textsuperscript{132} Apparently the Kantō campaign was considered successful to some extent, but what was there really to congratulate? Kenshin apparently managed to conquer a good many Hōjō strongholds on his way to Odawara, but apart from that it is difficult to see what might have caused a sense of success. Perhaps the Hōjō were judged to have been seriously weakened by Kenshin’s siege, but we can of course see, with the benefit of hindsight, that they had not because, as already mentioned and as Kenshin himself would come to experience, they would prove to be able to hold their own in the Kantō region for many years to come. So overall the Kantō campaign must be said to have been only a very modest success indeed.

After the campaign of 1560-61 there followed a long series of Kantō offensives directed at the Hōjō and Takeda and their allies, offensives which can hardly be said to have constituted any real threat to either of these adversaries, at least not when seen in retrospect. A short survey of the campaigns, thirteen in all only one of which Kenshin did not lead himself, amply illustrates this, and at the same time reveals their basic nature.

1) In late 1561 or early 1562 Hōjō Ujiyasu attacked Matsuyama Castle in Musashi which was held by one of Kenshin’s allies. Konoe Sakitsugu who was residing in Shimōsa at the time contacted Kenshin and asked him to commence an offensive against Ujiyasu. Kenshin advanced into the Kantō and engaged some Hōjō forces in battle at Hanyū in Musashi in early 1562. After this Ujiyasu and Takeda Shingen united to lay siege to Kuragano Castle in Kōzuke which was also held by an ally to Kenshin. They were defeated by the garrison and forced to retreat. On the 9th day of the 2nd month (23rd March), 1562, Kenshin attacked a Hōjō ally at Tatebayashi Castle in Kōzuke. The castle fell
after about a week, and Kenshin installed an associate of his own as its new master. On the 14th day of the 3rd month (27th April) he attacked and conquered Karasawayama Castle in Shimotsuke. He returned home later in the same month. 133

2) Later the same year Hōjō Ujiyasu began a major offensive against all the castles in Közuke and Musashi belonging to warriors who had associated themselves with Kenshin. One of these was Matsuyama Castle, and as the enemy closed in on it, Ōta Sanrakusai, the master of Iwatsuki Castle in Musashi and one of the prominent commanders of the Odawara siege the year before, urged Kenshin to come to its aid. Kenshin did so and arrived at Numata Castle at the beginning of the following year, but he proved unable to save the castle. It fell the 4th day of the 2nd month (8th March), 1563, so Kenshin instead turned against two other Musashi strongholds, Kisai Castle and Oshi Castle which he eventually captured. Later he attacked and seized Oyama Castle and Karasawayama Castle, both in Shimotsuke, before returning home in the 6th month. 134

3) Hōjō Ujiyasu continued his activities in Musashi, and Takeda Shingen again attacked Kuragano Castle in Közuke. When a request for help from the latter place reached Kenshin in Echigo, he set out for the Kantō. This was in late 1563 or early 1564 (the 12th month of the 6th year of Eiroku). While en route he learned that Shingen and Ujiyasu had joined forces and were heading for another fortification in Közuke, Kanayama Castle. He ordered some of his Kantō allies to take the field to counter this move, while he himself began attacking Wada Castle in Közuke. While he was thus engaged, one of his allies in Hitachi, Oda Ujiharu, declared his support for the Hōjō. This made Kenshin abandon his attempt to conquer Wada Castle and turn against Ujiharu. He took several small Hitachi fortresses before confronting Ujiharu at Oda Castle. It fell on the 29th day of the 1st month (22nd March), 1564, and Kenshin went on to confront Karasawayama Castle in Shimotsuke for the third time. Its master, Sano Masatsuna, surrendered on the 17th day of the 2nd month (8th April). Kenshin returned home in the 4th month. 135

4) In the 10th month, 1564, Sano Masatsuna sent out an appeal to a number of Kantō warlords to join forces with Hōjō Ujiyasu against Kenshin. When reports of this reached Echigo, Kenshin went to Numata Castle in Közuke from where he went on a tour of conquest around the province. He attacked and subjugated more than twenty fortresses before taking on Karasawayama Castle for the fourth time. The castle fell on the 27th day (10th December), and Kenshin returned home. 136

5) In early 1565 Kenshin received reports that Takeda Shingen and Hōjō Ujiyasu had begun offensives in Közuke and Musashi, and with them also pleas for assistance. He made preparations for a new Kantō campaign and left Naoetsu on the 24th day of the 2nd month (5th April), but for reasons that are not quite clear, he did not in fact leave Echigo until the 11th month, after Shingen and Ujiyasu had stepped up their efforts to subjugate his Kantō allies and he had received more requests for help. In
the beginning of 1566, he attacked and conquered Oda Castle for the second time, a feat which won many new allies. He tried in vain to take another castle, Usui Castle in Shimōsa, before returning home.137

6) On the 5th day of the 9th month (27th October), 1566, Kenshin’s ally, the master of Kanayama Castle in Közuke, declared his support for Hōjō Ujiyasu. Later the same month Takeda Shingen attacked and captured the fortress of another Kenshin supporter, Minowa Castle, also in Közuke. Kenshin began a new Kantō offensive early the following year. While residing in Numata Castle he learned that the master of Karasawayama Castle, Sano Masatsuna, had again allied himself with his enemies. He duly attacked and eventually captured the castle, installing the Echigo kokujin Irobe Katsunaga as its commander. Before he returned to Echigo in the 5th month, he learned that another castle commander and Echigo kokujin, Kitajō Takahiro at Umayabashi Castle in Közuke, had also allied himself with Hōjō Ujiyasu. He ordered several of his commanders to attack and punish Takahiro.138

7) In late 1569 Kenshin again advanced into the Kantō region. By then the “Alliance of the Three Provinces” had broken down, and Imagawa Ujizane had sought Kenshin’s assistance against Takeda Shingen who had begun his conquest of Suruga. The Hōjō had also approached Kenshin. Early in the year Ujiyasu had requested that peace be concluded, and while Kenshin was residing in Numata Castle he received year-end presents from Hōjō Ujimasa, Ujiyasu’s eldest son. Early the following year (1570) Kenshin attacked and captured Sano Masatsuna’s Karasawayama Castle. He reported this to Hōjō Ujiyasu who did not interfere. On the 18th day of the 2nd month (3rd April), Ujiyasu and Ujimasa sent him a written pledge of friendship. About half a month later peace was consolidated with Kenshin’s adoption of Ujiyasu’s seventh son, Ujihide (1552-79). He returned to Echigo on the 20th day of the 4th month (3rd June).139

8) Later in the year — in mid-autumn — Kenshin received a report from Közuke according to which Takeda Shingen was planning to attack Umayabashi Castle. He went to Közuke, but Shingen avoided him and withdrew to Kai, and he returned after some months.140

9) Shingen, for his part, turned his attention toward some of the Hōjō’s castles in Suruga, and in the 1st month the following year (1571), Hōjō Ujimasa requested Kenshin’s assistance. Kenshin sent his adopted son Uesugi Kagekatsu (1555-1623), a son of Nagao Masakage of the Ueda branch, to Közuke where his presence apparently was enough of a threat to make Shingen’s troops in that province retreat. Kagekatsu, in his turn, returned home to Echigo without having involved himself in Suruga.141

10) In the 11th month the same year, Kenshin’s old ally Satake Yoshishige declared his loyalty to Takeda Shingen and attacked the Hōjō at Odawara and Oda Ujiharu in Oda Castle in Hitachi. Ujiharu
appealed to Kenshin for help, and the latter advanced into Közuke where he captured Ishikura Castle which belonged to a Takeda associate. After this he retreated to Umabayashi Castle where he spent the new year, but already on the 3rd day of the 1st intercalary month (26th February) the following year he had to return to Ishikura and attack it again. He re-took it and demolished its walls. He returned to Echigo in the 4th month. It was during this campaign that the Hōjō broke the alliance with Kenshin and aligned themselves with Takeda Shingen again.¹⁴²

11) In the 4th month of 1573, Takeda Shingen died from illness. Later the same year his son and successor, Katsuyori (1546-82), began a Közuke offensive against Kenshin’s allies together with Hōjō Ujimasa. Kenshin was appealed to for help and in early autumn he began preparations for a new campaign in eastern Japan. He did eventually set out, but nothing is known of his activities in the region. It seems he went directly from the Kantō to Echū around the 9th month.¹⁴³

12) Early the following year (1574), while in Echū, his help was again needed in the east. This time it was Sekiyado Castle in Shimōsa that was being attacked by the Hōjō and seemed to be on the verge of succumbing. Kenshin went to Numata Castle from where he communicated with both Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) and Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) with the intention of coordinate their respective initiatives directed at the Hōjō and Takeda. In the 3rd month he attacked and seized several areas in Közuke controlled by the Hōjō and prepared to enter Musashi. In the middle of the 4th month Hōjō Ujimasa advanced to block his progress, and the two forces came close to engaging in battle. However, Ujimasa retreated without a fight, and so did Kenshin shortly after. For some reason or other he did not attempt to advance into Musashi let alone Shimōsa but returned to Echigo in the 5th month.¹⁴⁴

13) Later the same year Hōjō Ujimasa was reported to have attacked Umayabashi Castle. Kenshin sent some of his commanders to Numata, and on the 5th day of the 9th month (29th September) they engaged Hōjō troops in battle. Even later in the year Kenshin himself went to the Kantō. He captured two castles in Közuke, attacked Kanayama Castle and proceeded to Musashi where he incinerated the lands belonging to the castles of Hachigata, Oshi and Kisai. He also confronted Hanyu Castle which he demolished. He was intent on coming to the rescue of Sekiyado Castle in Shimōsa, but as an opportunity to attack Hōjō Ujimasa in Közuke presented itself, he returned there. Nothing came of it, however, because Ujimasa, wanting to avoid a decisive battle, retreated. Kenshin instead attacked Kanayama Castle again and thereafter went to Shimotsuke where he incinerated several enemy domains. Leaving the problem of Sekiyado Castle to an ally, he proceeded to attack four or five enemy strongholds in Musashi and to incinerate enemy domains in the province before returning home in early 1575.¹⁴⁵
Such were Kenshin’s Kantō campaigns following the great Odawara siege in 1561, and even though they are presented here only in rough outline, their basic nature is clearly revealed. Apart from a couple of occasions where it seems that Kenshin saw an opportunity to engage his enemies in that potentially decisive battlefield confrontation that may have gained him a strategic advantage over them, the campaigns were isolated attempts to prevent the Hōjō and Takeda from gaining control over castles and fortresses belonging to those local warlords who were not prepared to submit to them, and to conquer strongholds held by Hōjō and Takeda allies himself.

It would appear, then, that Kenshin changed his strategy for the Kantō region after the Odawara siege. Instead of going directly and aggressively against the Hōjō or the Takeda in the manner he had done in 1560-61, he sufficed to attack them indirectly by confronting subsidiary strongholds, and by attempting to come to the aid of those local warlords who had not yet accepted them as masters.

Apparently it was a bit of an uphill battle because of allies who shifted their support, vanquished enemies who rose again in opposition, and conquered castles which fell into enemy hands during his absences from the region, and perhaps it was not the most efficient way for Kenshin to combat his enemies.

Efficient or not, however, Kenshin was in fact far from being unsuccessful in encroaching upon the Hōjō’s domains. By the early 1570s he had obtained an uneven measure of influence in a continuous area covering more than half of Kōzuke and Shimotsuke as well as the north-western corners of Hitachi and Shimōsa and the northern part of Musashi. In the border regions of that area the influence was limited. These were the regions that for years had been under pressure from not just the Hōjō but other Sengoku daimyō in neighbouring provinces as well, and where only a small number of local warlords were prepared to submit to him as their ruler. They did in general, however, accept him as their military leader in their fight against the other sources of pressure. In central Kōzuke he managed to establish himself as a true domainal ruler. In other words, he obtained the political power as well as the role as military leader, whereas he in the rest of the area obtained control to some degree, but not the full control of a domainal lord; in these areas he was, one could say, still in the process of establishing himself as the ruler when he returned home from what was to be his last Kantō campaign in 1575.¹⁴⁶

That was as far as Kenshin got in the Kantō region in terms of influence, and perhaps he had also reached the limit for how far it would be possible to go, given the nature of his campaigning. At least, in the opinion of the Japanese scholar Ikegami Hiroko, his military activities in the region after the great Odawara confrontation amounted to “a war of attrition” that would not allow him to keep his footing in the region.¹⁴⁷ That may indeed be so, but we shall of course never know because he died in 1578 while still a central figure in Kantō region’s anti-Hōjō front.
Chapter 6: Takeda Shingen and the threats to Echigo’s borders.

Just like Uesugi Norimasa’s defeat at the hands of the Hōjō was the immediate reason for Kenshin’s militarily involvement in the Kantō region, the defeat of one Murakami Yoshikiyo and a number of other local Shinano warlords at the hands of Takeda Shingen was the immediate reason for his involvement in that province.

The house of Takeda was established in Kai Province by a warrior named Minamoto Nobuyoshi (1128-1186) who adopted the name from the shōen he settled on in late Heian times. Already in the Kamakura period it came to acquire the post of Kai shugo, though it did not hold it continuously throughout the period. It was, however, rewarded the office by Ashikaga Takauji at the time of his ascendancy, but then it lost it after having allied itself with Uesugi Ujinori during his revolt against Kantō kubō Ashikaga Mochiuji in 1416.¹

For a good many decades after this Kai was ravaged by internal strife as the Takeda fought for supremacy against other local warlords, and even though the shugo post quickly returned and became hereditary to the family, the province was in effect divided until Shingen’s father Nobutora (1494-1574) unified it in the early sixteenth century. It was of course also during this period that Kai entered the Sengoku period and hence began to be seen as an object for conquest by forces outside its borders — by the Imagawa of Suruga, for instance, who towards the end of the fifteenth century tried to invade, thus instigating a feud with the Takeda which ended only with Takeda Shingen’s conquest of Suruga in 1570; and by Hōjō Sōun who twice, in 1495 and 1501, tried in vain to conquer the province.²

After Takeda Nobutora had secured his position as the ruler of Kai, he, too, began looking beyond the borders of his own domain. In 1524 he allied himself with the Uesugi in their fight against the Hōjō, thus giving himself the opportunity to campaign in Közuke, Musashi and Sagami, just as he every now and then would raid Suruga. His real object of conquest, however, was Shinano which was split into a number domains without any one warlord being able to dominate the whole province. From 1527 to 1540 Nobutora subjugated the southern and eastern districts, and his son Shingen continued advancing northward after he had taken over the Takeda leadership in 1541.³ By 1553 he had subjugated almost the whole province but not without having experienced some stiff opposition from Murakami Yoshikiyo (1503-73), the master of Kutsurao Castle forty to fifty kilometres from the Shinano-Echigo border, who at one point defeated Shingen so thoroughly that the latter had to retreat to Kai.⁴

Various chronicles mention, in differing degrees of detail, how Yoshikiyo and a number of other Shinano warlords looked to Kenshin for assistance upon being finally defeated by Shingen in 1553,
and also how Kenshin, having agreed to help, confronted Shingen at a place called Amenomiya at Kawanakajima in northern Shinano late in the 11th month the same year where he won a huge victory after a single battle.⁵ A few other sources also touch upon these matters. In his letter from 1556 to Tenshitsu Koiku, for instance, Kenshin himself relates how he had felt compelled, by the detriment Shingen’s conquest of Shinano had caused Murakami Yoshikiyo and other warriors, to confront him at Kawanakajima, not just once in fact but twice, the second time being in 1555.⁶ Kenshin does not say when the group of Shinano samurai came to him for help, nor when the first battle with Shingen took place, but the names of the Shinano allies he mentions are the same as those appearing in both Hokaetsu Taiheiki and Kawanakajima Gokado Kassen no Shidai’s accounts of the affair.

In another document, a ganmon written in 1564 and offered to the Shinto shrine Yahiko Jinja, Kenshin alludes in general to his involvement in Shinano and also here we come across the same names of some of the Shinano warriors who had suffered from Shingen’s conquests.⁷ Moreover, from yet another document, a letter written by Takeda Shingen on the 28th day of the 3rd month (7th May), 1557, we learn that a battle indeed took place at Kawanakajima in 1553, but it was in the 8th month rather than in the 11th, and at a place called Fuse instead of Amenomiya.⁸

Evidently the chronicles referred to above are not completely true to fact, and just as evidently they are not altogether unreliable. There can be no doubt that Kenshin met Shingen in battle at Kawanakajima, and neither that his reason for doing so, the official one at least, was that Murakami and others had asked him to assist them in their fight against the Kai daimyō. There was, however, more to the whole affair than just a single confrontation at Fuse. According to the diary of one of Shingen’s vassals, the Kō Hakusai Nikki, the two armies met again just south of Fuse at a place called Yawata in the beginning of the 9th month, and after that it seems that both sides embarked on a series of tactical manoeuvres around the countryside, attacking castles and incinerating enemy domains or castles here and there. Being victorious at Yawata, Kenshin thus captured or forced the surrender of a number of strongholds in the possession of Takeda associates over the next few days, and he incinerated an area called Aoyagi. Eventually, however, Shingen’s army rallied and counterattacked, burning down a couple of castles and defeating two of Kenshin’s allies on the battlefield. Kenshin responded by setting fire to an area called Minamijō before returning home towards the end of the month.⁹

Belying the chronicles referred to above, Kenshin’s first confrontation with Takeda Shingen at Kawanakajima was thus something of a prolonged and not altogether straightforward affair, and it cannot be said to have been such a grand victory as they want us to believe it was. Perhaps it can be considered a modest success, though. Of course, we cannot say how Shingen’s conquest of northern Shinano would have proceeded had he not been confronted by Kenshin — whether or not he fairly quickly would have obtained control with the whole region. But given the strength of his position after
he had defeated Murakami and the other Shinano warlords, it does not seem too far-fetched to conjecture that he would, and hence that Kenshin at least prevented that.

So maybe Shingen considered the Kawanakajima confrontation a setback, but it evidently did not diminish his interest in northern Shinano to any significant degree. He would continue with his military activities in the region, but not only that; with Kenshin having now become an enemy, he would also engage in diplomatic activities in order to undermine his position in Echigo and to strengthen his own military position in Shinano. As indicated in the preceding chapter, these military and political activities would lead to further confrontations with Kenshin at Kawanakajima, to two Echigo revolts, and to Kenshin’s embarking on his first Echū offensive, and this, as we have seen, at a time when the Echigo daimyō had turned his attention toward the Kantō region and to all appearance was firmly intent on becoming involved there. It is not difficult to imagine that he, in such circumstances, found it hard to realize this intention.

Shingen’s first attempt at unsettling the internal situation of Echigo was in early 1555, just over a year after the first Kawanakajima confrontation, when he persuaded Kitajō Takahiro of Kariwa gun in the southern part of the province to rebel against Kenshin. The ensuing unrest is only documented to a very limited extent. A letter written by Kenshin to one Mori Kagemoto on the 14th day of the 1st month (15th February), 1555, is an order for the latter to join up with other warlords and attack Takahiro. Another letter written by some of Kenshin’s vassals to Kagemoto on the 2nd month’s 3rd day (6th March) makes it clear that Kenshin himself had taken the field and personally directed the operations. In yet another letter dated the 13th day of the 2nd month (16th March) Kenshin is extolling Kagemoto’s military exploits, thus indicating that by that date a measure of success had already been obtained.

At some point during the revolt, Kitajō Takahiro asked Takeda Shingen for military assistance, but as that failed to materialize, he eventually — the exact date is unknown — submitted to Kenshin. The latter treated him leniently; his life was spared and he was allowed to keep his landholdings, and in time he seems to have gained Kenshin’s trust. At least, when Kenshin became involved in the Kantō region, Takahiro would be installed as commander of Umayabashi Castle in Kōzuke (where he again would turn his back on Kenshin).

During these events Shingen campaigned with success in the north-western part of Shinano and ultimately advanced to Zenkōjidaira, the central basin of northern Shinano where Kawanakajima is located, thus giving Kenshin a new opportunity to confront him on the battlefield as soon as Takahiro had been defeated. This was of course to become the second Kawanakajima battle Kenshin referred to.
in the letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku, and like with the first one, the historical sources reveal only a few
glimpses of its actual course.

Kenshin himself, in the letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku, relates that he had set up camp at a stronghold
called Asahiyama Castle and captured some enemy fortresses. He also reveals that he had planned for a
decisive battle with Shingen, but that due to the mediation of Imagawa Yoshimoto of Suruga, peace
was concluded before it took place.\textsuperscript{17}

From another letter written by Kenshin on the 10th day of the 5th month (9th June), 1555, we learn
that he had advanced into Shinano about a month before and that he, at the outset of the campaign, had
incinerated numerous enemy positions and rebuilt Asahiyama Castle, making it his base of operations.
Kenshin also writes that Shingen had expressed a desire for peace, and that the hostilities in
consequence had been postponed.\textsuperscript{18}

Yet another letter, written by Takeda Shingen on the 19th day of the 7th month (16th August),
reveals that a battle actually had taken place at Kawanakajima on that day,\textsuperscript{19} and if the temple diary
{	extit{Myōhōji Ki}} is to be believed, another confrontation, an inconclusive one, took place at Ashiyama Castle
later still. The chronicle also relates how peace eventually was restored between Kenshin and Shingen
due to the mediation of Imagawa Yoshimoto, and how the two protagonists retired on the 15th day
of the 10th intercalary month (8th December).\textsuperscript{20}

Several chronicles also mention a Kawanakajima confrontation in 1555,\textsuperscript{21} but no useful information
is contributed by them because they are all either very superficial in their treatment of the affair or all
but completely inconsistent with the few details imparted by the sources referred to above. To judge
from only these details, then, as well as from the subsequent activities of Kenshin and Shingen, neither
of the two daimyō emerged from the clash in 1555 seriously weakened. So as in the case of the first
confrontation, the only real result seems to have been that Shingen had thwarted his ambition to
conquer the part of Shinano that was still outside his control. But, again as in the case of the first
confrontation, he did not stop trying, just as he continued trying to undermine Kenshin's position in
Echigo.

In 1556 Shingen again persuaded an Echigo samurai to rebel against Kenshin. This time it was
Ōkuma Tomohide,\textsuperscript{22} who, it might be remembered, had been one of Kenshin and Nagao Harukage's
leading commanders during the battle at Tochio Castle in early 1544, and who had become a close
political advisor to Kenshin upon his taking over the Echigo leadership.\textsuperscript{23} Tomohide (and another
Echigo samurai) "had rendered distinguished war services at the time of Kenshin's childhood, but
afterwards both men left Echigo, even though Kenshin had befriended them," we are told by {	extit{Hokuetsu Taiheiiki}},\textsuperscript{24} and it is clear from a letter written to Tomohide by one Yamanouchi Takamichi on the 13th
day of the 8th month (26th September) that Shingen had asked him (Takamichi) to assist Tomohide in
his rebellion; Takamichi writes that he has dispatched a certain Odagiri to Etchū, apparently because an army was being assembled there for an invasion of Echigo. In another letter, dated the next day, Kenshin orders one Shōda Sadayoshi to take the field and proceed to a place called Nishihama, and finally a letter written by Kenshin on the 25th day of the 8th month (8th October), reveals that Ōkuma and his followers had crossed the border from Etchū two days before and had successfully been engaged in battle at Komagaeri, which is to the far south-west of Echigo. After this, Ōkuma fled to Kai where he became Shingen’s retainer.

As indicated above, Takeda Shingen also continued to be active in northern Shinano after the second Kawanakajima confrontation in 1555. His immediate objective was to secure his position in the Kawanakajima area, an objective he strove to reach by diplomatic as well as military means. He thus succeeded in enlisting the support of two members of the Ochiai family that were otherwise allies of Kenshin. With Katsurayama Castle just to the north-west of the present-day city of Nagano as its home base, the Ochiai controlled a road leading from the northern part of the Kawanakajima area to Echigo, and it was precisely Katsurayama Castle that was Shingen’s main military objective.

It is clear from two letters of citation written by Shingen to warriors who had evidently participated in the attack that the castle fell on the 15th day of the 2nd month (25th March), 1557, and Kenshin seems to have been intent on countering with a Shinano campaign quickly after this. At least, in a letter written on the 16th day, he refers to the fall of the castle and asks the letter’s recipient to make his way to Naoetsu in preparation for an offensive. If, however, various chronicles are to be believed, he did not sally forth until in the 4th month, which in fact is a quite probable date. Because a letter from him to Nagao Masakage written late in the 3rd month reveals that the campaign had not yet started, and in another letter written about a month later to Irobe Katsunaga he reports on the military situation in northern Shinano, relating, among other things, that he has set up his camp at the temple Zenkōji, which is just to the north of Kawanakajima.

As far as the actual campaign goes, it does not appear to have differed much in nature from the two previous Kawanakajima confrontations. The glimpses a number of letters impart of Kenshin’s activities reveal that these consisted of tactical manoeuvres in the area, incinerations of enemy territory and the conquest of fortifications, and it is evident that he clashed with Shingen at Uenohara in the 8th month. Also with regard to the outcome, the campaign must be judged to have differed little from its predecessors; part of northern Shinano was still outside Shingen’s control, but neither he nor Kenshin can be said to have been weakened by the affair.

So Shingen continued being militarily active there, and, as indicated in Chapter Five, already in 1558, there was again some sort of confrontation between him and Kenshin in Shinano — apparently in the autumn because on the 19th day of the 6th intercalary month (13th August), Shingen wrote to a
Buddhist priest at the Shinano temple Buneiji, informing him that Kenshin was expected to issue forth from Echigo the coming autumn, and asking him to pray for victory over his adversary.\textsuperscript{36} At any rate, we have seen in the last chapter that both Shingen and Kenshin alluded to a Shinano confrontation in letters, Shingen, it will be remembered, blaming Kenshin for being the one who had not wanted to make peace despite the shogun’s request to do so, and complaining that he had resorted to arson at Unno; and Kenshin giving the necessity of campaigning in Shinano as the reason for not having come to the help of shogun Yoshiteru when he had been forced out of Kyoto by Miyoshi Nagayoshi.\textsuperscript{37}

The same two letters also reveal that Shingen was again active in the region the following year at the time of Kenshin’s second trip to Kyoto. Kenshin mentions in his letter that Shingen had taken advantage of his absence from Echigo and raided the province from Shinano,\textsuperscript{38} and Shingen himself admits to this, and defends it, in his letter; we may infer from this latter document that it is a response to a letter of reproach sent by the central authorities because of Shingen’s actions in northern Shinano and Echigo.\textsuperscript{39}

In 1560, then, Shingen allied himself with an Echū samurai named Jinbo Yoshiharu, making him agree to raise an army in order to check any movement on Kenshin’s part while Shingen himself would be active in northern Shinano.\textsuperscript{40} Kenshin’s reaction to this alliance is evident from the already mentioned letter he wrote to his Hitachi associate Satake Yoshiaki on 4th month’s 28th day (2nd June).\textsuperscript{41}

As noted, the letter to Yoshiaki was a response to a request for a Kantō campaign, and in it Kenshin explains that he had advanced into Echū about a month before — on the 3rd month’s 26th day (1st May) — in order to confront Yoshiharu because of the risk the Echū warrior constituted to future Shinano campaigns. Kenshin goes on to relate how he a few days later had attacked and conquered Yoshiharu’s Toyama Castle in the middle of the night, forcing Yoshiharu to flee to another stronghold in the province, and how Yoshiharu had fled once again as he bore down on that other location. And he informs Yoshiaki that he had gone on to pacify the whole province in less than ten days, after which accomplishment he could begin strengthening the its defences.\textsuperscript{42}

As we have seen in Chapter Five, Kenshin would finally commence the extensive Kantō campaign later the same year,\textsuperscript{43} and it has been mentioned too that Shingen again took advantage of his absence from Echigo, himself campaigning in Shinano whilst calling upon ikkō followers in Kaga and Echū to raid Kenshin’s province.\textsuperscript{44} Thus, the Kai daimyō kept up the pressure on Kenshin after the latter’s return from Echū, just as he had done throughout the period dealt with in the preceding section, and it would seem that the time of the Odawara campaign was as ill-suited to such a venture as that period; at least, that is how it appears when viewed in retrospect. Surely it is not
too far-fetched to assume, however, that Kenshin did not view it that way at the time. After all, he did embark on the Odawara campaign, so one should think that he must have judged the circumstances to have improved sufficiently to make the undertaking possible and not too risky.

Perhaps such a judgement would not have been completely unfounded. Because in 1555 Shingen had begun raiding Hida and eastern Mino,45 and in 1558 he had begun being active in the Kantō region,46 an effort that eventually would lead to his obtaining control over the western part of Kōzuke. All things being equal this must have meant a reduction, if only a slight one, in the efforts and resources he poured into northern Shinano, a reduction that might have caused Kenshin to regard the situation in that region as altogether less of a hindrance to his own campaigning in eastern Japan. And yet, Kenshin was obviously still intent on settling the situation in northern Shinano, and not long after his return from the Kantō in 1561 he set out from Echigo,47 heading for what has become the most famous of all the Kawanakajima confrontations — “the real Shingen-Kenshin clash,” as one scholar has put it.48

The source of this fame is no doubt to be found in various chronicles’ accounts of the affair: In the general impression they impart of a particularly vehement confrontation — a single battle, bloody and intense, fought on the 10th day of the 9th month (28th October), preluded by a few skirmishes but otherwise without any major secondary activities (such as attacks on enemy strongholds, tactical manoeuvring in the countryside surrounding Kawanakajima etc.), as if both daimyō were especially intent on defeating the other once and for all;49 and in various anecdotes that seem to be of the kind that legends are made of:

One such anecdote is Hokuetsu Gundan’s relation of how in the evening of the 9th day Kenshin stood and watched the camp of Shingen’s troops from a distance together with some of his commanders, noticing that “the smoke from the cooking of the troop’s meals is in harmony with the clouds, and there is furthermore an abundance of coloured banners identifying each and every battle group.” This made Kenshin and his advisers realize firstly, that Shingen intended to attack early the following morning, and secondly, which tactics he would use; of course they quickly planned what countermeasures to take.50

Another chronicle, Kenshin Ki, tells us that the brain behind Shingen tactics, the famous strategist Yamamoto Kansuke, assumed responsibility for his master’s battlefield intentions having been seen through by the enemy by plunging himself desperately into the fight the next day; and that one of Kenshin’s commanders spotted and attacked him with brandished sword, cutting into him nine times before another approaching Echigo samurai finished him off by relieving him of his head.51

Yet another chronicle, Kōyō Gunkan, furnishes us with the following anecdote of what is no doubt the most famous incident alleged to have occurred during the battle: At a point when Kenshin’s forces
were pressing in on Shingen’s command post, “a warrior dressed in a light green, sleeveless haori coat wrapped a white cloth around his head and mounted a cream-tinted dapple grey horse. He unsheathed his approximately one metre long sword and attacked, galloping straight toward the place where Lord Shingen was sitting on a camp stool. He missed a thrust with the point of his sword and therefore struck with it three times. Lord Shingen stood up and parried with his commander’s war fan. Afterwards when he looked at the fan, there were marks after eight blows.

The head of Lord Shingen’s attendants and the leader of a twenty-man squad together with a total of twenty horsemen drew close to this warrior of towering strength, so one could not tell enemies from friends. Thus they concealed Lord Shingen, and men approaching were killed or chased away. Amongst them, the head of the attending samurai, Ōsumi governor Hara, stood holding a spear with a mother-of-pearl handle. He stabbed at the warrior who rode the cream-tinted dapple grey horse and wore the sleeveless haori coat made of light green damask, but because he missed, he [only] broke off one of the shoulder guards of the warrior’s armour, and being carried along [by his spear], it hit the hind quarters of the horse. The horse reared and ran away. Afterwards rumour had it that this warrior was Kenshin.”

The notion that two of the most prominent daimyō of the age might actually have met in single combat on the battlefield, if only for a few seconds, is of course rather intriguing, but neither that anecdote nor the others are substantiated by letters or the like; indeed, very little of what the various chronicles tell us about the battle is. It is evident from four letters of commendation written by Kenshin on the 13th day of the 9th month (31st October) that a clash had taken place at Kawanakajima on the 10th day,53 and another letter, written by Konoe Sakitsugu to Kenshin about half a month later, makes it clear that “recently in Shinano,” the latter himself had been active with his sword during a battle with Shingen.54 But that is about all we learn about the affair from sources that are not chronicles.

Still, as noted, it is no doubt the chronicles — the general impression of the battle they impart and the heroic or colourful incidents some of them relate — that have earned the fifth Kawanakajima confrontation its legendary status. At least, it is difficult to see what else could have done it. Certainly the battle did not have had any important political or military consequences for the two daimyō. Despite its apparent ferocity, neither of them can be said to have emerged from it weakened to any serious degree, proof of which, as the Japanese scholar Sugiyama Hiroshi has pointed out, is found in the fact that both of them went campaigning in the Kantō region only a few months later.55 The fifth Kawanakajima confrontation must be judged as inconclusive as the four preceding ones.

So the situation in northern Shinano was left unresolved, and Shingen kept up the pressure on the Echigo border. We find an indication of this, for instance, in a letter written by one Sekiya Masatomo to Nagao Masakage on the 12th day of the 3rd month (25th April), 1562. At this time Kenshin was
engaged in his first Kantō offensive after the great Odawara campaign, and in the letter Masatomo is expressing anxiety, on behalf of the Echigo daimyō, over the possibility of Shingen raiding the province during his absence.\textsuperscript{56}

A second indication is found in another letter, one written by Kenshin on the 4th day of the 3rd month (24th April), 1564. By this time he was soldiering in the east again — his third post-Odawara campaign — and the letter is an order to some of his commanders in Echigo to strengthen the defences of Kasugayama Castle during his absence.\textsuperscript{57} He does not specifically write that he feared an attack from Takeda Shingen, but it seems likely that he did because the Kai daimyō's was active in northern Shinano and Echigo around the same time; in a letter Shingen wrote to a retainer of the Mustu daimyō Ashina Moriuji on the 20th day of the 4th month (9th June), he tells about his success of conquering Nojiri Castle in northern Shinano, and also that he had crossed the border to Echigo, attacking several villages. And then he urges Ashina Moriuji to invade Echigo from the north.\textsuperscript{58}

It is clear from other documents that Takeda Shingen had in fact tried to enter into an alliance with the Mutsu daimyō for some months, and also that the latter, in apparent compliance, had already had one of his military commanders try to mobilize various Echigo warriors against Kenshin before having him advance into Echigo on the 15th day of the 4th month (4th June).\textsuperscript{59}

Perhaps Shingen was not aware of this latter offensive when he, a few days later, wrote to Moriuji's vassal. At least, he evidently failed to take advantage of Kenshin's being pressured from two directions, and in two weeks time it was too late because by then Moriuji had been defeated by Kenshin: On the 2nd day of the following month (20th June), Kenshin wrote to a Dewa warrior that he had defeated the Mutsu daimyō's troops at the Sugaya shōen in central Echigo, and five day later, in a letter to Irobe Katsunaga, he revealed that Moriuji had sued for peace.\textsuperscript{60} Kenshin then turned his attention toward Shingen.

On the 13th day of the 5th month (1st July), he offered a ganmon to the Shinto shrine lizuka Hachiman Jinja in Echigo. In the document he prays for success against Shingen — that he would effectuate the subjugation of the Kai daimyō and "raise my own banners in Kai's capital in the autumn;" and that "Harunobu’s domains shall fall into the hands of Terutora completely."\textsuperscript{61}

On the 24th day of the 6th month (11th August) Kenshin offered another ganmon, this time to the Echigo shrine Yahiko Jinja; this is the already mentioned document in which he alludes to his involvement in Shinano and to some of the province's warriors who had suffered from Shingen's conquests.\textsuperscript{62} In addition to this he again prays for Takeda Shingen's downfall (as well as for that of the Hōjō and the pacification of the Kantō), and he expresses his intention to continue campaigning against Shingen.\textsuperscript{63}
Kenshin composed two other documents the same day, both with the heading: "The wrongdoings of Takeda Harunobu." One was offered to Yahiko Jinja, the other to a kankinjo, and both of them list what Kenshin held to be unacceptable acts on the part of Shingen — for instance, breaking the peace agreement that had come into being with the help of Imagawa Yoshimoto during the second Kawanakajima confrontation in 1555; destroying Buddhism by confiscating land belonging to temples and shrines in Shinano and giving it to warriors; and invading provinces and gun with which the Takeda had no connection, burning down their temples and shrines — and end with a declaration of his intention to subjugate his enemy the forthcoming autumn, and to restore all the sacred places to their former state.64

After these attempts to enlist the support of, and explain himself to, the higher powers of Nature, Kenshin went to Shinano to confront Shingen. A letter he wrote on the 29th day of the 7th month (14th September) reveals that he left for Kawanakajima on that day,65 and two days later he again tried to invoke Nature's divine powers with the offering of a new ganmon to the shrine Hachimangū in Sarashina gun a little south of the battlefield; it goes without saying that it was a prayer for victory and the destruction of Shingen.66

A further three days after that, Kenshin wrote another letter to one of his associates, and from this document it is clear that he had set up his camp at Kawanakajima and that he was intent to fight a decisive battle with Takeda Shingen.67 Apparently, however, nothing of the sort happened; in fact, it would seem that no really serious hostilities broke out at all. Certainly, there are no documents to suggest that there did — no letters mentioning any fighting and no post-battle letters of citation, for example — and neither are there accounts of battles to be found in the various chronicles that have Kenshin and Shingen confronting one another at Kawanakajima in the autumn of 1564.68

With one exception, none of these latter sources account for the confrontation very convincingly. The exception is Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu which is evidently in accordance with fact to some extent. Thus it relates how Kenshin went to the Hachimangū where, just as we have seen above, he offered a ganmon on the 1st day of the 8th month. The document is quoted in full and so is a letter Kenshin is known to have written to the central authorities on the 4th day of the 8th month (19th September).69

As far as hostilities go, according to this chronicle, there was an exchange of kaburaya at the outset of the confrontation, which of course was a common prelude to a battle in those days. But we are specifically told that no fighting broke out, and Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu does not say anything about any clashes or other military activities in the next half a month or so. Indeed, Kenshin managed to return to Echigo for a few days during that period, and not until the 17th day of the 8th month (2nd October) did a night-time skirmish occur.70

A few days later a Takeda samurai fought a duel with an adversary from Kenshin's camp, but that is the only other instance of martial activity we are told about by Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu. The chronicle fails
to furnish us with the reason why a major battle never broke out, and it ends its account of the confrontation by relating that Kenshin, before he returned home on the 1st day of the 10th month (14th November), saw to it that liyama Castle and another Shinano stronghold had their defences strengthened. The return date and the information about liyama Castle is substantiated by a letter Kenshin wrote the following day; the letter is quoted in Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and it is included in the collection Iwafune Monjo.

So again the situation in northern Shinano was left unresolved, and it remained that way; Shingen never got the region completely under control, and Kenshin never succeeded in loosening the grip the Kai ruler had obtained. There can be little doubt that Shingen for his part gave the region a lower priority than hitherto after the sixth Kawanakajima confrontation, a policy his son and successor adopted (or was forced by the circumstances to adopt) upon his death in 1573.

True enough, as late as the 9th day of the 11th month (26th December), 1569, three and a half years before his death, Shingen did offer a gammon to a Shinano Shinto shrine in which he prayed for the successful subjugation of that province, among other things. But the years from 1564 to 1567 he spent completing his conquest of western Kozuke, and after that, from 1568 to 1570, he subjugated Suruga to the south of Kai before turning his attention toward the road to Kyoto and the enemies who lay in wait there, and the nature of both his military activities in northern Shinano and those of his political initiatives concerned with that general area during the same period strongly indicate that his immediate goal was not the completion of the conquest of Shinano but to neutralize Kenshin by, for instance, keeping up the military pressure in the region.

Thus, a document dated the 27th day of the 3rd month (7th May), 1565, for example, makes it clear that Shingen had allied himself with the Jodo Shinshu's main temple in Osaka, the Honganji, and that the sect thenceforth regarded Kenshin its enemy and would coordinate its activities in Etchū with the Kai ruler, thus posing a threat to the right flank of any future Shinano advances from Echigo. And in 1568 he entered into an alliance with the Shiina of Etchū, Honjo Shigenaga and the Odagiri of Echigo and the Mutō of Dewa.

On the 21st day of the 1st month (28th February), he thus wrote a letter to Odagiri Masatada in which he revealed a scheme to raid Echigo the coming 4th month and called upon the warrior families of northern Echigo to unite against Kenshin. And a few months later, while Kenshin was campaigning in Etchū against the Shiina (more of which in the next chapter), he induced Honjo Shigenaga to raise the banner of rebellion in Echigo.

There is no need to dwell too much on Shigenaga's revolt here. It is fairly well documented by a number of letters, and it is touched upon in differing degrees of detail by various chronicles, some of
which, though, are left unsubstantiated to a large extent by the letters.\textsuperscript{80} Still, it is clear that the revolt was a long and not altogether easily overcome affair, lasting as it did about a year, from the 3rd month, 1568, to the 3rd month, 1569. In the end Kenshin did prevail, but what is of special interest here is that Shingen, true to tradition, took advantage of the situation. He contacted the Jōdo Shinshū in order to get the sect to mobilize ikkō leagues against the forces which Kenshin had left behind in Etchū as garrisons of various fortresses and which caused the Shiina military problems. He also called upon the leagues to raid Echigo, just as he himself repeated his intention to do so. He never did, in fact, but he did dispatch army provisions to Honjō Shigenaga, and he attacked the Iiyama Castle in northern Shinano which was allied to Kenshin.\textsuperscript{81}

Yet in the middle of all this Shingen also tried to make peace with Kenshin; we may infer from a letter written by Oda Nobunaga to one of Kenshin’s associates on the 25th day of the 6th month (29th July), 1568, that the Kai ruler had approached him (Nobunaga) to have him “sound out” Kenshin’s views on a peace agreement.\textsuperscript{82} This seems to suggest that Shingen was not all that intent on involving himself too directly with Kenshin at this time. Inoue Toshio has speculated that if Kenshin, whilst in Etchū in early 1568, had not received information about the Honjō uprising as soon as the case was, the Kai daimyō may well have invaded Echigo with a huge army and occupied Naotsu.\textsuperscript{83} This does indeed appear to be a very plausible scenario; there is no reason to believe that Shingen would not utilize any particularly favourable opportunity that might present itself, but the existence Oda Nobunaga’s letter suggests that the main aim of his political and military activities in the region of north-western Japan in early 1568 was to keep Kenshin at bay so that he himself could concentrate his efforts on the other fronts.

As is well known, the Kai daimyō died from illness during the highly successful military drive towards the capital early in 1573, and one of his sons, Katsuyori (1546-82), took over the Takeda leadership.\textsuperscript{84} None of the works consulted for this study contains any indication that Katsuyori ever campaigned in northern Shinano, let alone raided Echigo, nor that he continued his father’s policy of keeping up the pressure on Kenshin by diplomatic or political means; if he in fact harboured any intentions to embark on one or more of these activities, they certainly seem have been low-priority intentions. What he spent his energies on instead was the continuation of the westward offensive towards Kyoto, and with this he was successful to begin with. But after a resounding defeat in 1575 at the hands of Oda Nobunaga — the famous Nagashino battle — he was constantly on the defensive until his death in 1582.\textsuperscript{85}

Kenshin, too, seems to have given northern Shinano a lower priority after the Kawanakajima confrontation in 1564. There certainly are indications that he might have embarked on a few campaigns there over the years, but they are not substantiated by any documents. He did, for instance, express an
intention to advance into the province in order to divert Shingen’s attention from the Kantō in three letters written late in the 6th month, 1565 (on day 25, 26 and 27 respectively, i.e. 1st, 2nd and 3rd August), as mentioned in the preceding chapter, Shingen had earlier in the year commenced an offensive in eastern Japan, and Kenshin hoped to relieve the pressure on his allies there, announcing in the letters the 8th day of the 7th month (13th August) as the date for his departure for Shinano. Then, in a communication dated the 23rd day of the 7th month (28th August), he announced a new date of departure, to wit, the following day, but there are no further documents to prove that he ever set out.

Also in 1570 Kenshin seems to have made plans for a Shinano campaign. At least, in a letter written to some of his associates on the 3rd day of the 9th month (12th October), Kenshin’s ally at the time, Imagawa Ujizane, expressed “great happiness” over his (Kenshin’s) having declared his intention to lead an army thither, but also in this case we have no evidence that the intention was realized.

There are two other indications that Kenshin might have been militarily active in Shinano after 1564, namely a short entry in the chronicle Uesugi-ke Go-renpu, according to which he led an army to Kawanakajima for a short period in the 4th month, 1572, without, apparently, engaging in fighting of any sort, and one in Kasugayama Nikki, which mentions a similar affair taking place in the 11th month the same year. Neither sources are corroborated by letters or other documents.

So all in all it would seem that like the Takeda, Kenshin was only slightly active in Shinano after 1564, probably not at all, and this despite his having previously revealed in the various documents a firm intention to subjugate Shingen and avenge all his wrongdoings. Perhaps he was not all that intent after all? Actually, it would seem that he was not. As shall be argued in greater detail in Chapter Eight, Kenshin’s Shinano involvement seems to have been motivated by considerations of Echigo’s security, at least partly. Hence, as Shingen increasingly concentrated his military efforts on other provinces than Shinano, the threat to Echigo’s border diminished, and Kenshin was left free to concentrate on his other military involvements: the Kantō region, of course, and, perhaps more importantly, the provinces that lay between Echigo and the capital.
Chapter 7: The road to Kyoto.

As we have seen in Chapter Six, Takeda Shingen and Jinbō Yoshiharu of Echū became allies in 1560, causing Kenshin to embark on a successful campaign against the latter in the 3rd month that year because, as the Echigo daimyō himself wrote in a letter, he constituted a potential threat to future advances into Shinano.¹

Perhaps, though, there was more to the campaign than is immediately evident from Kenshin’s letter. The Japanese scholar Hanagasaki Moriake has suggested that apart from being a question of suppressing Jinbō, the campaign was also one of subjugating the whole of Echū as a first step toward securing the road to Kyoto,² and that is a very plausible idea. Both Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and Hokuetsu Taiheiki mention that Kenshin during the trip to Kyoto in 1559 promised shogun Yoshiteru to return one day with an army in order to suppress Miyoshi Nagayoshi and his followers,³ and such a promise is also vaguely inferable from a letter written at the time by Yoshiteru to the imperial official Konoe Sakitsu.⁴ So apparently Kenshin was intent on leading an army to the capital, and seen in that light it is not unreasonable to assume that his Echū campaign in 1560 was also an attempt to open the road to there.

But if it was, it was to all appearances an isolated one because there are no indications in the historical sources that he tried to follow up the success with taking the logical second step on the road to Kyoto, advancement into Kaga Province. On the contrary, as we have seen, he appears to have had his mind set on attacking the Hōjō as soon as possible, even as he was engaged in the confrontation with Jinbō Yoshiharu in Echū.⁵ And after having embarked on that venture (the Odawara campaign, stretching from the 8th or 9th month, 1560, to the 4th or 6th month, 1561) he confronted Takeda Shingen in Shinano (from the 7th or 8th month to the 9th month, 1561), and shortly after that, he went back to the Kantō where he campaigned until the 3rd month of 1562.⁶

So the years went by without Kenshin trying to conquer Kaga, but that should actually not come as a surprise to us. Because even though Yoshiteru in 1559, during Kenshin’s visit to Kyoto, might have found it a good idea to have him return in force one day, his position in the capital became fairly stable in time; so stable, in fact, that he could begin rebuilding his authority by acting as mediator between the country’s warring daimyō.⁷ He even subjected Kenshin to this policy, despite all the authority and status he had conferred on him during the Kyoto visit. For instance, in a letter dated the 10th day of the 3rd month (30th April), 1564, the shogun tried to admonish Kenshin into making peace with both the Hōjō and the Takeda,⁸ and just over a year later he again remonstrated in another document, though in this instance he concerned himself only with the discord between Kenshin and Hōjō Ujiyasu.⁹ With the
situation in Kyoto developing in this manner, there would have been no need — or no excuse, depending on his true motives for wanting to lead an army to the capital — for Kenshin to embark on a Kaga offensive for several years after 1560.

Like with the 1560 campaign, all but one of Kenshin’s subsequent Etchū campaigns prior to the moment he finally invaded Kaga in 1573 appear to have had more than one motive. They all seem to have been motivated by a wish to eliminate potential threats to the security of Echigo, and all of them, save one, also take on the appearance of being part of the more long-term strategy to reopen the road to the capital. As far as the first motive goes, a short survey of the campaigns, seven in all, should suffice to prove the point.

1) In 1568 the Shiina, allies of the Funai-Nagao since Nagao Tamekage’s Etchū campaign in 1520, allied themselves with Jōdo Shinshū and, as mentioned in the last chapter, Takeda Shingen, causing Kenshin to embark on a campaign against them early that year. He attacked a couple of their castles, but when after less than half a month reports reached him from Echigo that Honjō Shigenaga had rebelled, he discontinued operations and returned home to suppress the revolt.10

2) Kenshin returned to Etchū in the 8th month the following year and campaigned there with success for about four months. The Shiina were not completely suppressed, but he conquered some of their castles and destroyed their grip on Niikawa gun which constituted more or less the whole eastern half of the province. He made one of his military associates, Kawada Nagachika, commander of Uozu Castle which was located in the northern part of the gun, and put him in charge of a number of garrisons he left behind in the region.11

3) In the beginning of the 3rd month, 1571, he went back to confront the Shiina. Advancing into the western half of Etchū, he attacked and conquered ten enemy strongholds and returned to Echigo after about a month.12

4) In the 5th month the next year, ikkō followers from both Etchū and Kaga united with the Shiina and attacked a warlord in western Etchū, Oshima Motoshige, who was friendly to Kenshin. Kenshin responded to this by sending reinforcements to Motoshige and his local allies, but these did not make it in time to prevent the latter from being thoroughly defeated by the ikkō forces. With Motoshige’s defeat, the Echigo reinforcements became the only force to stand up to ikkō coalition, and they failed to prevent it from obtaining complete control over the western half of Etchū and advancing into the eastern half. This caused Kenshin to set out himself in the 8th month, but it took one and a half months or so of campaigning before he began to get the upper hand in the province and a further half a month before the Shiina offered to submit to him. Apparently not trusting their sincerity, however, Kenshin refused the offer and returned home.13
5) Later the same year or early the next, Kenshin went back to Etchū to continue his fight against the ikkō forces. But worrying about the situation in the Kantō region, he eventually, toward the end of the 1st month, 1573, made peace with them and finally accepted the Shiina’s submission. He placed a garrison at one of the latter’s strongholds, Toyama Castle in northern Etchū, and returned to Echigo.\textsuperscript{14}

6) Already a few months later, the Shiina and the ikkō ikkī switched sides again and declared their alliance to Takada Shingen. They took control of Toyama Castle, causing Kenshin to return to Etchū. He attacked and re-took the castle and hurriedly built a number of fortification in its vicinity. He then distributed troops as garrisons to the various strongholds under his control and went back to Echigo in the end of the 4th month.\textsuperscript{15}

7) Finally, in the 8th month he returned to Etchū where he attacked and defeated the ikkō forces, thereby completing the subjugation of the whole province.\textsuperscript{16}

Thus, in rough outline, were Kenshin’s post-1560 campaigns in Etchū up to the time of his invasion of Kaga which took place, as we shall soon see, in immediate continuation of the last offensive mentioned above. And viewed in light of the fact that they were all directed at allies of Takeda Shingen (the Shiina and the Jōdo Shinshū), and that from the time of Kenshin’s first Kantō offensive in 1560-61 the Kai ruler would regularly call upon allies in provinces adjacent to Echigo to raid that province,\textsuperscript{17} it is reasonable to assume that they were motivated by security considerations, namely a wish to eliminate potential threats to Echigo’s borders. But as indicated above, as far as all of them but one go (the exception being the second campaign beginning in the 8th month, 1569), they also seem to have been attempts to reopen the road to Kyoto.

One day in the middle of the summer of 1565, the need (or excuse) for Kenshin to advance toward the capital in force suddenly presented itself again. On the 19th day of the 5th month (27th June) of that year, shogun Yoshiteru was attacked in his Kyoto mansion by the Miyoshi and Matsunaga and their followers, and upon the place’s being overrun, he killed himself.\textsuperscript{18} The traditional explanation of this turn of events is that the Kyoto rebels wanted to substitute the uncooperative shogun with his cousin Yoshihide (1540-68),\textsuperscript{19} but in the opinion of the Japanese scholar Atsuta Kō, the attack was simply an attempt to neutralize Yoshiteru, not to replace or kill him.\textsuperscript{20} Whatever the reason, it was of course Yoshihide who took over the position as shogun. He did that with the support of a part of the rebel camp, but his appointment was challenged by one of Yoshiteru’s brothers, Yoshiaki (1537-97), who was the head priest of the Nara temple Ichijoin and who fled that city and sent out calls for support to the country’s daimyō, proclaiming that he would restore the power of the shogunate.\textsuperscript{21}

Kenshin received several such calls during the remainder of the year. One was sent to him in a circuitous way, about a month after the attack on Yoshiteru, on the 24th day of the 6th month (31st July). It was a report of the events in Kyoto sent by an Ōmi samurai to some of Kenshin’s associates,
and it included a message from the Buddhist priest Gishun, to wit, an appeal for Kenshin to come to the capital and deal with the rebels.\textsuperscript{22} Gishun was of course not just any priest despaired by the decline of the old order and the violence surrounding him; he was the head priest of the Kyoto temple Daikakuji and an uncle to Konoe Sakitsuugu,\textsuperscript{23} the high-ranking imperial official, and he himself also wrote a letter directly to Kenshin on the 5th day of the 8th month (9th September), in which he entrusted the Echigo daimyō with taking charge of the capital and restoring the Ashikaga to power. This was done on behalf of Yoshiaki, a short note by whom accompanied the letter.\textsuperscript{24} Yet another letter, written by one of Yoshiaki’s associates to one of Kenshin’s on the 4th day of the 10th month (6th November), expresses the would-be shogun’s hopes that the Echigo daimyō would make peace with the Hōjō and come and take charge of things in the capital.\textsuperscript{25}

There was thus no lack of legitimation of Kenshin’s leading an army to Kyoto in 1565, and there can be little doubt that he again became intent on doing so. Because a letter written to him by Yoshiaki on the 10th day of the 3rd month (10th April), 1566, acknowledges that he had decided to comply with the requests for help,\textsuperscript{26} and another document, a ganmon written by Kenshin the 9th day of the 5th month (6th June), also reveals that he meant to push forward to the capital; in it he declares himself willing to make peace with Hōjō Ujiyasu, advance to Kyoto and punish Miyoshi and Matsunaga, and serve as Yoshiaki’s supporter in both the capital and Kamakura, and he prays for the success of this enterprise.\textsuperscript{27}

Seen in the light of Kenshin’s reborn intention to go to the capital in force, it is reasonable to assume that the first of the seven Echū campaigns listed above was not only an attempt to eliminate a potential threat (the Shiina) to the security of Echigo, but also an attempt to secure the road to Kyoto. Not so with the second campaign, however. The reason for this is that by that time (the 8th month, 1569), the military and political situation in Kyoto had again undergone drastic changes which had rendered Kenshin’s promise to come to the aid of Yoshiaki obsolete; the need (or excuse) for advancing on the capital had disappeared. The changes referred to are of course Yoshiaki and Oda Nobunaga’s arrival at the capital in force and the subsequent appointment of the former as shogun.\textsuperscript{28}

It has already been mentioned how Oda Nobunaga was launched to prominence by the defeat of Imagawa Yoshimoto at Okehazama in 1560.\textsuperscript{28} This victory made him the most powerful warlord of his home province, Owari, a position he utilized over the following seven years to gain control over the major part of the province and of neighbouring Mino.\textsuperscript{29} His military successes made him one of those to whom Ashikaga Yoshiaki turned for support after his brother’s death in 1565, and, like Kenshin, he agreed to assist.\textsuperscript{30} After he had completed the conquest of Mino in 1567 he moved his headquarters to the capital of that province, to where he invited Yoshiaki in order for them to advance to Kyoto together. This they did, accompanied by around fifty thousand of Nobunaga’s troops, in the 9th month
the following year. Ashikaga Yoshihide and the rebels who had supported him fled the city, and Nobunaga took militarily control of it. In less than half a month, the rebels had been defeated in battle or had submitted to Nobunaga, and shortly thereafter Yoshiaki was appointed the new and fifteenth shogun by the emperor.31

As is well known, however, the situation in the capital soon developed into one of confrontation between the new shogun and Oda Nobunaga. After the two of them had entered Kyoto the latter quickly took over the civil administration of the city, just as he secured the military control over the neighbouring provinces. He declined Yoshiaki’s offer to be appointed deputy shogun (kanrei) and began usurping his authority over those serving the shogunal house. By the end of 1569, he was in open conflict with the shogun, and the latter began to look for support for his cause amongst the country’s daimyō. Calling upon several of them, including Kenshin and Takeda Shingen, to make peace with one another and sending out written requests for military assistance, he tried have all the daimyō form a massive anti-Nobunaga front.32 Thus, as far as Kenshin goes, the need (or excuse) for advancing unto the capital had reappeared, and seen in that light, and in the light of the fact that Kenshin actually did advance into Kaga immediately after Etchū had been pacified in 1573, his Etchū involvement from the 3rd campaign (in the 3rd month, 1571), onwards, again takes on the appearance of being attempts to open the road to the capital

The relationship between Yoshiaki and Nobunaga came to a head in 1573. Encouraged by Takeda Shingen’s successful drive toward Kyoto against the forces of Nobunaga and his associate Tokugawa Ieyasu, a venture the Kai ruler had embarked upon after his subjugation of Suruga in 1570,33 and by his own relative success with establishing an anti-Nobunaga coalition, Yoshiaki tried to raise an army in the 2nd month that year.34 He also, as is clear from a letter he wrote on the 20th day of the 3rd month (1st May), requested that Kenshin make peace with Shingen and the Jōdo Shinshū and partake in an attack on Nobunaga.35 And even though the shogun was forced into submission by Nobunaga fairly quickly, he continued making plans for a showdown. Eventually, in the 7th month, he left Kyoto for the town of Uji close by where he mobilized. He was besieged and, on the 18th day (25th August), defeated by Nobunaga who subsequently exiled him to Kawachi Province. Though he was allowed to keep the title of shogun, the Ashikaga shogunate thenceforth ceased to exist.36

Kenshin apparently watched this development carefully. At least, a letter he wrote on the 29th day of the 7th month (5th September) to one of his associates is evidently a response to a previous report on the situation in Kyoto,37 and shortly thereafter, as if prompted by the events there to make an extra effort to reach the capital, he embarked upon the campaign that was to complete his subjugation of Etchū; the exact date of its commencement is not clear from any of the sources consulted, but on the
10th day of the 8th month (16th September), Kenshin wrote a letter to an associate, informing him about the battlefield situation, so obviously it must have been before that.\textsuperscript{38}

It is this letter that reveals that Kenshin must have continued directly to Kaga after having pacified Etchū because he writes about having attacked Asahi Castle, an \textit{ikkō} stronghold which was located in the former province just across to the border from the latter. He also writes about how the garrison of the castle made good use of firearms,\textsuperscript{39} and from another document dated the 22nd day of the 8th month (28th September), we learn that he had resorted to incineration before making peace with his Kaga enemies, and that he intended to return home the following day because he wanted to embark on a Kantō offensive.\textsuperscript{40}

Kenshin’s first advance into Kaga was thus a short affair, and so must the following Kantō campaign have been because a letter dated the 13th day of the 9th month (18th October) show us that by that date he was back in north-western Japan, campaigning. Interestingly, though, he had gone to Etchū rather than Kaga.\textsuperscript{41}

The details of this affair are not clear, but the Japanese scholar Kaneko Tōru has conjectured that since Kenshin returned so quickly from eastern Japan, a serious emergency must have occurred in Etchū,\textsuperscript{42} and that certainly seems very likely. So does the notion purported by Inoue Toshio, to wit, that it was the Jinbo and Etchū’s \textit{ikkō} followers who caused unrest;\textsuperscript{43} that especially the latter would have done so should come as no surprise to us, seeing as we have in the last section how persistent their opposition to Kenshin had been for several years.

Whoever Kenshin’s adversaries were in Etchū, however, the fact that he felt obliged to return to the province so soon after its pacification indicates that his grip on it had not been very strong. And it would seem that it remained weak for some years because there is no evidence that he attempted to advance beyond the province again until late in 1576,\textsuperscript{44} and then, as we shall soon see, only after further campaigning there and after having made peace with the Jōdo Shinshū’s main temple in Osaka, the Honganji.

As is clear from various documents, Yoshiaki still counted on Kenshin to help with restoring the Ashikaga to power during these years, and at least on five occasions between the winter of 1575-76 and late summer, 1576, he sent him requests for assistance.\textsuperscript{45} It is also clear from a letter the shogun wrote to a Buddhist priest on the 25th day of the 6th month (31st July), 1576, that Kenshin had expressed his agreement to make peace with his enemies and to help Yoshiaki return to the capital.\textsuperscript{46}

Also the Honganji turned to Kenshin for assistance. Being among those who had responded to Yoshiaki’s attempt to form an anti-Nobunaga front prior to the shogun’s being exiled to Kawachi, the temple had become the target of the full military might of Nobunaga. In 1570 the latter had begun taking action against the sect, thus initiating a conflict that would last for almost ten years,\textsuperscript{47} and with
the military situation evolving in this manner, it must, at least once its powerful ally Takeda Shingen had died in 1573, only have been a matter of time before the Honganji would approach Kenshin.

Jōdo Shinshū’s first contact with Kenshin appears to have been a letter dated the 13th day of the 6th month (30th July), 1575, in which he is requested to help with the sect’s fight against Nobunaga.48 And the peace agreement with the Honganji was apparently reached about a year later because a letter written by a Kaga warrior to some of Kenshin’s associates on the 18th day of the 5th month (24th June), 1576, alludes to its coming into being.49 About a month before that date, Nobunaga had begun attacking the temple in Osaka itself,50 and referring to this event, several ikkō followers from Kaga reiterated the request for military assistance on the 28th day of the 5th month (4th July),51 while in a letter dated the 11th day of the 6th month (17th July), Kenshin, for his part, stated his intention to make peace with the ikkō ikki of both Echizen and Kaga, and henceforth to advance to the capital the following autumn.52 The recipient of this last document was one Kobayakawa Takakage, an uncle to the powerful daimyō of western Honshū, Mōri Terumoto (1553-1625), who had joined Ashikaga Yoshiaki’s anti-Nobunaga front after Nobunaga had begun his attack on Honganji,53 and who himself, in a letter dated the 2nd day of the 8th month (4th September), would urge Kenshin to advance upon Kyoto.54

As indicated, Kenshin was also militarily active in Etchū after the “emergency” campaign in that province in the autumn of 1573, namely in the beginning of 1576;55 that much is clear from a letter he wrote on 20th day of the 3rd month (28th April), but the document reveals only a few details about his activities. Kenshin writes that on the 17th day (25th April) he had crossed Jinzūgawa, the river that flows from south to north close to Toyama Castle, with the intention of attacking two enemy strongholds in the north-western part of the province, Moriyama Castle and Yuyama Castle.56 It is not clear from the letter who the enemy was, but there is an entry in the chronicle Eitōga Sanshūshi according to which Kenshin in the 3rd month attacked a certain Jinbō Ujiharu in Toyama Castle, and how the latter escaped to Moriyama Castle. After having secured Toyama Castle, the chronicle has it, Kenshin crossed the river Jinzūgawa and advanced into the western half of the province in pursuit of Jinbō and his allies, whom he engaged in battle and defeated.57

So apparently it was still the Jinbō who caused Kenshin trouble, or at least a part of the family because we may surmise from Kenshin’s letter that he was also allied to one of them. But their defeat in the spring of 1576, if indeed Eitōga Sanshūshi is true to fact on that point, did not spell the end of his involvement in Etchū. On the contrary, it seems as if his subsequent activities there were fairly extensive, affecting a large part of the province, because in a letter he wrote to an associate on the 8th day of the 9th month (10th October) he tells about having captured two Etchū fortifications, Toganō and Masuyama Castles, which were located in the central and western part of the province respectively,
about having laid siege to Yuyama Castle to the north-west, and about having built two strongholds on
the road to Hida Province. 58

Kenshin did not venture beyond Etchū until towards the end of the year, and then, interestingly, he
did not advance into Kaga. Instead he went to Noto Province, and it seems that he was forced to act
thus by external circumstances; by unfriendly “allies” in Kaga and, in Noto, by the existence of a
potential threat to both his position in Etchū and advancement into Kaga.

Regarding the situation in Kaga, despite the aforementioned request for military assistance from
several of the province’s ikkō adherents (on the 5th month’s 28th day), and despite Kenshin’s having
subsequently stated his intention to make peace with them and join their fight against Oda Nobunaga
(on the 6th month’s 11th day) and his having made peace with their main temple in Osaka, there were
those amongst them who did not want to come to terms with him. 59 And we may surmise from a letter
written by Ashikaga Yoshiaki to a Buddhist priest on the 13th day of the 8th month (15th September)
that this prevented Kenshin from advancing into the province because in the letter the shogun tells
about having ordered Honganji to remonstrate with the Kaga leagues in order to secure free passage to
the neighbouring Echizen Province. 60

A few days after Yoshiaki wrote his letter, Oda Nobunaga began attacking all the ikkō strongholds
in Echizen, and he dispatched troops into Kaga, two gun of which they managed to subjugate. 61 But
still it would take a further three months before the ikkō adherents of the latter province overcame their
internal discord and accepted Kenshin’s assistance; on the 16th day of the 11th month (16th
December), they informed some of Kenshin’s associates that they intended to do so, and we can infer
from their letter that they had been pressured into submission by a messenger from the head priest of
the Honganji in Osaka. 62 So around two months would pass after Kenshin’s conquest of Toganō and
Masuyama Castles in Etchū before the situation in Kaga was beginning to be resolved to his benefit.

As far as Noto goes, the problem for Kenshin was the master of Nanao Castle, Chō Tsunatsuara,
who since 1574 had tried to establish friendly ties with Echigo. In that year Noto shugo Hatakeyama
Yoshitaka had died, leaving an infant son as his successor, and several of his vassals had consequently
begun seeking new alliances, some turning toward Kenshin, others toward Oda Nobunaga. But when
Kenshin went campaigning in Etchū in the autumn of 1576 and sent a messenger to Chō Tsunatsuara
with a proposal for an alliance, the latter declared his support to Nobunaga and began mobilizing
Noto’s ikkō leagues. 63

Kenshin invaded Noto towards the end of 1576. In a letter written to an Etchū temple early the next
year, he relates that he had entered the province and had laid siege to Nanao Castle, and he implies that
the whole province was completely in his hands. 64 The letter does not reveal neither when the campaign
had begun nor exactly how it had progressed up to that point, but if Uesugi Nenpu is to be believed,
Kenshin had already, by the middle of the 10th month, had a stronghold built in the province and installed some of his associates there, and according to another chronicle, Chō Kaki, he himself set out in the 11th month and advanced toward Nanao Castle where Chō Tsunatsura, his father and four brothers, and all his allies had entrenched themselves in a united defence after having abandoned their other strongholds in the province.

Yet another source, Ettoga Sanshūshi, tells us that Kenshin gave up the siege in the 3rd month, 1577, because Nanao Castle was impregnable, and that he instead rebuilt destroyed castles and took possession of all the positions that had been abandoned by the Chō and their allies; and finally that he placed some of his own commanders in charge of these castles before returning home to Echigo on the 4th month’s 12th day (9th May) in order to prepare for a Kantō offensive.

That is what can be pieced together from Uesugi Nenpu, Chō Kaki and Ettoga Sanshūshi concerning Kenshin’s Noto involvement from late 1576 to early 1577, and with the possible exception of the part about the building of a stronghold in Noto before the campaign had actually begun, it all seems likely enough; it certainly has been accepted, by and large, by some modern scholars, though the only corroboration of it is Kenshin’s letter to the Etchū temple mentioned above.

There can be little doubt, however, that Ettoga Sanshūshi is true to fact as far as Kenshin’s being intent on embarking on a Kantō campaign in the early months of 1577 goes. On the 16th day of the 2nd month (15th March), a Kantō warrior named Kajiwara Masakage requested his assistance, and a couple of weeks later another did likewise, referring specifically to a recently commenced Hōjō offensive as the problem. Then, on the 18th day of the 3rd month (16th April), Kenshin wrote to two other eastern samurai, Yūki Harutomo and Mizunoya Katsutoshi, declaring his intention to go to Numata and Umayabashi Castles in the middle of the forthcoming 4th month.

There is no evidence in the historical sources, though, that Kenshin actually set out on a new Kantō campaign, and as the Japanese scholar Kaneko Toku has conjectured, the fact that Yūki Harutomo actually submitted to Hōjō Ujimasa in the 7th month after having been defeated in battle, and that at the same time other Kanto warriors, including one of those who had asked for help in the 2nd month, declared their alliance to the Hōjō, indicate that no campaign took place.

Perhaps this should come as no surprise to us. At least, it is not difficult to imagine why Kenshin would have chosen to postpone the Kantō campaign: because he was under pressure to push on towards the capital and a confrontation with Oda Nobunaga, and because the time of his return from Noto must have seemed altogether advantageous for such a push. In the 2nd month, 1577, Nobunaga had begun a campaign against an ikkō league in Kii Province, and some weeks later, in the middle of the 3rd month, Mori Terumoto had launched an eastward offensive from his power base in western
Honshū in an attempt to take advantage of his absence from the capital. Kenshin had been informed of Terumoto’s initiative by both Ashikaga Yoshiaki and Terumoto himself in two letters dated the 27th day of the 3rd month (25th April) and the 1st day of the 4th month (28th April), respectively, and both men had urged him also to utilize Nobunaga’s being in Kii and advance southward.74

Thus, when Kenshin returned home from Noto the middle of the 4th month, there must have been a real opportunity the for the anti-Nobunaga front to upset Nobunaga’s position in the central provinces, and, as noted, we can well imagine that it was this prospect that caused Kenshin to postpone the planned Kantō offensive. Still, Kenshin can hardly have regarded his position in Noto as completely secure, so if he really was intent on launching a southward drive, the thing for him to do, one should think, would have been to return fairly quickly to Nanao Castle and Chō Tsunatsura. There are no indications in the historical sources that he did, however, so maybe he was in doubt as to what was the best course to take at this point.

But while failing to take this initiative, his position in Noto was weakened; at least, that is what happened according to Chō Kaki and Etti oga Sanshūshi. If these two sources are to be believed, Chō Tsunatsura utilized Kenshin’s absence from the province and initiated an offensive against his fortifications in the 5th month, capturing two of them.75 The source collections contain no documents that corroborate this, but it is accepted as a fact by several modern scholars,76 and it does of course seem very likely; after all, Tsunatsura was allied to Oda Nobunaga and had been the target of Kenshin’s Noto campaign and survived undefeated.

Whether or not Tsunatsura was actually active after Kenshin had left Noto, however, there is no doubt that Kenshin eventually returned to the province to conclude the unfinished business, because a letter he wrote on the 8th day of the 7th intercalary month (31st August) tells us that he had left Echigo and had reached a place called Uozu in Etchū on his way to Noto.77 According to Etti oga Sanshūshi, Kenshin reached and laid siege to Nanao Castle on the 17th day (9th September), causing Tsunatsura to send a messenger to Oda Nobunaga in Ōmi on the 24th day (16th September) with a request for help.78 Another chronicle, Shinchōki, tells us about how on the 8th month’s 8th day (29th September) Nobunaga ordered his associates Shibata Katsuie and Toyotomi Hideyoshi, among others, to lead an army northward, and how that army presently reached Kaga Province.79

It is of course very likely that Tsunatsura would ask Nobunaga for help, and a letter written by Kenshin to a Kaga samurai named Shichiri Yorichika on the 8th month’s 9th day (30th September) indicates that Shinchōki is correct about Nobunaga’s sending an army northward into that province. We may infer from the letter that Yorichika had received information about Nobunaga’s forthcoming offensive and had asked Kenshin for help with stopping it, but Kenshin replies with an encouragement
to stand fast, and tells Yorichika that he will enter Kaga after having captured a stronghold called Suemori Castle.\textsuperscript{80}

Kenshin would be as good as his word to Yorichika, but not before having ensured the fall of Nanao Castle which is hardly surprising because it was there that Chō Tsunatsura had again entrenched himself. It is evident from a letter Kenshin wrote to one Lord Nagao, probably on the 29th day of the 9th month (19th November), that the castle fell on the 15th day (5th November) and that Tsunatsura and more than a hundred of his kin and followers were killed in the process. In the same document Kenshin also relates that he captured Suemori Castle on the 17th day (7th November),\textsuperscript{81} and with this, we may surmise from the document, he considered Noto more or less secure because his next step would be to advance into Kaga, just as he had promised Yorichika.

This advance, too, is touched upon in some detail in the letter to Lord Nagao. On the 18th day (8th November) Oda Nobunaga’s army, in Kenshin’s estimate consisting of several tens of thousands of men (and apparently unaware of the development in Noto), crossed the river Minatogawa in Kaga just to the south-west of the town of Kanazawa on its northward march. Upon learning this, Kenshin set out with troops taken from both Echigo and Noto in order to confront it, but when he reached Minatogawa on the night of the 23rd day (13th November), the enemy had already begun retreating back across the river. Still, he managed to attack a part of it, and more than one thousand enemy troops fell, while many others lost their lives trying to cross Minatogawa which happened to be inundated.\textsuperscript{82}

Kenshin continues the letter with the interesting observation that Nobunaga’s army had been unexpectedly weak, and that if it continued like that it would be easy for him to unify the country. And then he goes on to relate how he, by the 26th day (16th November), was back at Nanao Castle where he gave orders for it to be repaired and placed some of his allies in control of it before returning to Echigo, where he began preparing for a Kantō campaign.\textsuperscript{83}

So apparently Kenshin did not follow up the victory at Minatogawa, and the indication is that it was because he was worried about the situation in eastern Japan. We can of course well imagine that he genuinely felt this way; after all, earlier in the year he had, as we have seen, been intent on going to the Kantō but had cancelled the campaign only to find Hōjō Ujimasa forcing one (or more) of his allies into submission. But on the other hand, when viewed in the light of his low opinion of Nobunaga’s troops, and of the fact that Mōri Terumoto was still advancing toward Kyoto from the west, and that Honganji in Osaka was not yet defeated (this did not happen until 1580),\textsuperscript{84} his failure to attempt to secure the destruction of Nobunaga’s army and continue towards the capital does seem a bit strange.

Be that as it may, to all appearances he did not, but there also are no indications in the historical sources that he ever launched the Kantō campaign, though this time it can hardly have been because he had a chance of mind. A letter he wrote on the 10th day of the 2nd month (28th March), 1578, reveals
that he had received a new request for assistance from a Kantō warrior, that he intended to comply with the request, and that he about a month before had begun mobilizing his troops in the regions under his control, while other letters written around the same time are evidently responses to his calls for arms. One of them in particular shows us that he could count on massive support from the Echū warrior society, so to all appearances he was well and truly under way with preparations for an offensive in mid-spring 1578, but a month later he was dead.

Kenshin passed away, according to various temple registers as well as letters written by his adopted son Kagekatsu, on the 13th day of the 3rd month (29th April), and not surprisingly, his death has been touched upon by several chronicles in differing degrees of detail. Some mention little more than the date it happened, while others tell us more elaborately, and in fairly good accordance with one another, about his last days in this world and about how those close to him reacted. Thus, for instance, we find the following convincing account in Uesugi Kafu: “On the 9th day of the 3rd month [25th April] in the hour of the Horse [11 a.m. - 1 p.m.], Lord Kenshin suddenly showed symptoms of paralysis and he lost consciousness (...). Doctors were summoned from nearby and afar, and people were sent on vicarious visits to all the temples and shrines of the Buddhas and kami gods. No means were left untried as far as prayers and medical treatments go, but no miracle happened (...). By the 13th day the illness had not abated, and in the hour of the Sheep [1 p.m. - 3 p.m.] he passed away, as if falling asleep.”

Basically, this account appears to be corroborated by one of Kagekatsu’s letters mentioned above: “Having suffered an unexpected apoplectic stroke, Kenshin passed away on the 13th day without having recovered.” However, as far as the cause for Kenshin’s death goes, Kagekatsu’s letter is open to interpretation, and Uesugi Kafu and the other like-minded chronicles notwithstanding, several other causes have been put forward over the years: cancer of the oesophagus or of the stomach, assassination on Oda Nobunaga’s order, alcoholism, and the revengeful spirit of a deceased retainer who had fallen into Kenshin’s disgrace whilst alive.

There is no need for us to dwell on all these different (and more or less plausible) causes because the important thing in the context of this study is not how Kenshin died but the fact that he died at the time he did: while still very active militarily, but perhaps also without having revealed the true motives for his activities; “perhaps” because while some historical sources certainly do leave us with the impression that he was driven mainly by a wish to help those around him who had become the targets of others’ aggressiveness, it is not difficult to argue that he was actually soldiering for his own benefit and not for that of others.

Whether or not that was so is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 8: Kenshin’s motivation.

As has been amply demonstrated in the previous chapters, Uesugi Kenshin was a very active player on the politico-military stage of late-sixteenth century Japan. Like a true Sengoku daimyō he involved himself militarily outside his own domain (beginning with a Kantō campaign in 1552), but in stark contrast to contemporaries like Imagawa Yoshimoto and Takeda Shingen both of whom are thought to have strived for national supremacy, and of course to Oda Nobunaga who unquestionably did, Kenshin’s activities have earned him the reputation of being one who campaigned to help others with their fight against precisely people like Nobunaga and Shingen and to protect the Ashikaga polity.

Thus for instance we read in one modern history book: “No matter how you look at it, [Kenshin’s life and doings] were not those of a Sengoku commander. His military activities were completely undertaken out of reverence for the emperor and respect for the authorities, and to protect the order of things (…). In the violent world of ‘those below destroy those above,’ it was the goal of Shingen and Nobunaga and many other Sengoku daimyō, warlords without either kami gods nor Buddhhas but with a complete indifference to both the organization and the institutions of the society, to steadily ruin all that was old and to grasp the realm with their own powerful forces, destroying the weak one by one. Kenshin, however, could not act thus even though he knew it was so.”

And according to another modern work, Kenshin “remained loyal to the three heroic requests. These were, firstly, the imperial order to suppress the disturbance in the realm [i.e., restore the Ashikaga shogunate]; secondly, the request to help the Kantō kanrei Uesugi with the pacification of the Kantō provinces; and thirdly, the request to help the warriors of northern Shinano.”

Other Japanese scholars have painted a similar picture of Kenshin, i.e. that of a daimyō whose extra-provincial campaigns were motivated by loyalty towards the Ashikaga and, as a consequence of this, an unselfish desire to help others, but in fact, this picture tallies very badly with the picture imparted by a long string of documents pertaining to Kenshin’s relationship with Oda Nobunaga and his faction.

That relationship began in 1564 at a time when Nobunaga was heavily engaged with his conquest of Mino Province, and from that year we have a letter written by the Owari daimyō to one of Kenshin’s associates on the 9th day of the 9th month (23rd October). The letter is a fairly detailed, though apparently not quite truthful, report on the military situation in Mino and the Owari daimyō’s own exploits there, and in the summer of 1567, at a time when his conquest of the province was all but complete, Kenshin wrote to him personally, congratulating him with his victories.

Another communication between Nobunaga and Echigo has already been touched upon, to wit, Nobunaga’s attempt to act as a mediator between Kenshin and Takeda Shingen in the summer of
1568, and later the same year, on the 21st day of the 9th month (21st October), Nobunaga again contacted one of Kenshin’s associates, informing him that he (Nobunaga) was about to enter Kyoto.10

Thus, by the time Ashikaga Yoshiaki was appointed shogun, a cordial, if somewhat formal, relationship between Kenshin and Oda Nobunaga and his camp had already been in existence for four years, and not only did that relationship continue on a friendly note after Nobunaga’s association with the new shogun had begun to deteriorate, as for instance the continued exchange of gifts and information testifies to, it was also strengthened.

As we have seen, the deterioration of the Nobunaga-Yoshiaki relationship began within the first year or so of their entry into Kyoto, and it resulted in that the shogun began trying to mobilize the country’s daimyō for an anti-Nobunaga coalition.11 And two documents from that period illustrate both the continued cordiality and the strengthening of Kenshin’s ties to the Nobunaga camp. Firstly, in a letter he wrote in the 5th intercalary month, 1569, he reveals that he had sent a hawk as a present to Nobunaga in celebration of his successful entry into the capital the year before,12 and in another document, written on the 8th month’s 22nd day (12th October) to one Matsudaira Chikanori, he declares his willingness to enter an alliance with Chikanori’s master, Tokugawa Ieyasu,13 who of course for his part was firmly allied to Oda Nobunaga since 1561.14

An alliance of some sort between Kenshin and Ieyasu did indeed materialize because a letter written by the latter to the former on the 8th day of the 10th month (15th November), 1570, is a pledge that he (Ieyasu) will sever all relations with Takeda Shingen and that he will follow Oda Nobunaga’s advise and co-operate with Kenshin.15 And a few months later, in the spirit of true friendship, Ieyasu sent a sword to Kenshin in celebration of the coming of the spring.16

Furthermore, a letter written by Ieyasu to Kenshin on the 3rd month’s 5th day (9th April), 1571, is evidently a response to a previous inquiry on Kenshin’s part into his health,17 and a letter Kenshin wrote to Ieyasu on the 1st day of the 8th month (31st August) reveals that the latter had sent him a kara no kashira as a present, and that he responded with a present of his own, namely a horse.18

From the autumn of the following year we have a letter from Nobunaga to Kenshin, in which the latter is informed about the activities of Asakura Yoshikage,19 the daimyō of Echizen who had been Nobunaga’s enemy for some years,20 and later the same year, on the 7th day of the 11th month (21st December), Nobunaga wrote to one of Kenshin’s associates, declaring himself willing to let Kenshin adopt one of his sons,21 a sure sign that an alliance was in the making.

The chronicle Uesugi Nenpu contains a reference to this letter and has it that the adoption plan was never realized,22 which certainly seems very likely because there are no further documents to prove that it was. But a letter written by Nobunaga to Kenshin early the following year reveals that a true alliance between the two of them had indeed been established, and Nobunaga declares his intention to stand shoulder to shoulder with Kenshin against Takeda Shingen.23
Yet another document, a letter written by Tokugawa Ieyasu to Kenshin on the 4th day of the 2nd month (17th March), 1573, is evidently a response to a message of sympathy sent by Kenshin on the occasion of Ieyasu’s having been thoroughly defeated in a battle against Takeda Shingen, and Ieyasu takes the opportunity to request that Kenshin embark on a Shinano offensive in order to relieve Shingen’s pressure on himself and Oda Nobunaga.24

As we have seen, it was in the same month that shogun Yoshiaki began mobilizing an army for a confrontation with Oda Nobunaga, and in the following month that he called upon Kenshin to come to his aid.25 But, evidently, this did not result in Kenshin’s severing his ties to Oda Nobunaga’s camp. On the 24th day of the 4th month (4th June) he thus informed one of his Kantō allies that he meant to help Nobunaga and Ieyasu by confronting Shingen and the Hōjō in the Kantō.26 And a few months later he informed another Kantō associate of his intention to contact Oda Nobunaga in order to make plans for the coming autumn’s activities.27

Neither did Ashikaga Yoshiaki’s ultimate defeat at the hands of Nobunaga in Uji later in the year28 cause discord between Kenshin and the Nobunaga camp. On the 20th day of the 8th month (26th September), Nobunaga, for instance, wrote to him, reporting on the Uji affair and other matters pertaining to the situation in the central provinces and encouraging him to invade Kaga Province,29 while early the following year he himself informed one of Tokugawa Ieyasu’s associates about how he intended to concentrate his military efforts on Shinano and the Kantō region in the future because the situation in Etchū was now settled.30 And when he shortly thereafter began preparing for a Kantō offensive, he informed another of Ieyasu’s associates of his plans and requested that Ieyasu and Nobunaga reinforce him.31 Also during the actual campaign in the Kantō, as has been mentioned in a previous chapter, did Kenshin keep in touch with Ieyasu as well as with Nobunaga,32 and it is clear from various documents that he and Ieyasu coordinated their activities, with the latter campaigning in Tōtomi and Suruga to put extra pressure on Takeda Katsuyori who was also active in eastern Japan on this time.33

Later in the year, in the 3rd month, Oda Nobunaga presented Kenshin with a set of folding screens decorated by the famous artist Kanō Eitoku,34 and various documents prove that the two parties kept in touch until at least the middle of the 6th month the following year (1575).35 The last of these documents is a letter written by Nobunaga to Kenshin — a report on military matters together with a request that the latter begin a Shinano offensive — and it is dated the 13th day of the 6th month (30th July), exactly the same date as the letter that appears to have been the ikkō sect’s first attempt to get Kenshin to join its fight against Nobunaga. A year later, as we have seen, the sect succeeded with this endeavour.36
The inconsistency between the Kenshin-Nobunaga relationship outlined above and the picture of
Kenshin as an Ashikaga loyalist is obvious: For between five and a half and six and a half years
(from some point in late 1569 when the deteriorating Nobunaga-Yoshiaki relationship became one of
open conflict, to the breakdown of Kenshin’s relationship with the Nobunaga faction somewhere
between the 6th month, 1575, and the establishment of his alliance with the Jōdo Shinshū around the
5th month, 1576), Kenshin not only failed to come to the aid of shogun Yoshiaki, he also allowed his
relationship with Oda Nobunaga and his camp to strengthen.

Such behaviour is surely incompatible with the notion of Kenshin as an unselfish partisan of the
Ashikaga and their polity, so that notion can hardly be correct. And the only reasonable explanation,
then, for Kenshin’s declaration of loyalty to Yoshiteru during his second trip to Kyoto in 1559 and for
the various promises he made over the years to advance upon Kyoto in order help first Yoshiteru and
then Yoshiaki is that he wished to legitimize extra-provincial military campaigns motivated by self-
interest.

There would of course be nothing remarkable about such a policy in that day and age — just think
of Oda Nobunaga whose entry into Kyoto and subjugation of the faction behind shogun Yoshihide in
1568 was done on behalf of, though not out of true loyalty to, Ashikaga Yoshiaki — and in
Kenshin’s case it is likely that his motives was firstly to protect his position as ruler of Echigo, and
secondly to reach the long-term goal of establishing a new national hegemony. As far as the first
motive goes, it is likely because, as indicated in Chapter Four, for several years after the subjugation of
the Ueda-Nagao in 1551 his position as ruler of Echigo was rather weak due to the situation in the
province being unstable, and because Kenshin can hardly have been ignorant of the fact that extra-
provincial campaigning would be the way to strengthen it; his father, Nagao Tamekage, had been in a
similar situation when he in 1514 had emerged from the Eishō Rebellion victorious yet not sufficiently
strengthened to allow him to take complete control of the Echigo warrior society, and he had actively,
and successfully as it were, sought to improve his position by leading the Echigo samurai to war in
Etchū in 1519-21. And, as we have seen, Kenshin would also lead the Echigo samurai to Etchū and
to the Kantō region and Shinano as well, and as mentioned in Chapter Four, by doing so he would
indeed strengthen his grip on them.

With regard to the second motive, we have already seen in Chapter Seven that most of Kenshin’s
Horuriku campaigns (all with the exception of the Etchū campaign in 1569) to all appearance were
attempts to open and secure the road to the capital, and we have of course now excluded the possibility
that he did this out of a desire to come to the assistance of the Ashikaga. The one plausible explanation,
then, is that it was his aim to reach the capital in order to take control of the symbols of national
authority, which there can hardly have been other reasons for doing so, than a desire to the establish
one’s own ascendancy over the whole country.

But if Kenshin really felt it necessary to obtain legitimization before involving himself in extra-
provincial campaigning, how do we explain the fact he actually sent an army to the Kantō (1552) and
himself embarked on a Shinano campaign (in the 8th and 9th months, 1553) before he had received the
desired legitimization (the imperial edict received during his first Kyoto trip in late 1553)?

Well, it would seem that these two campaigns must have been motivated by more than just a need
for Kenshin to strengthen his grip on the Echigo warrior society, something serious enough to make
him decide upon them despite the lack of legitimization. And as far as the Kantō campaign goes, a
reasonable guess would be that that something was a concern for Echigo’s security. Because we have
seen how the campaign was preceded by Hōjō Ujiyasu’s advancement to Numata in Kōzuke and his
building of a stronghold there, and as Numata lay only about twenty-five kilometres from the Echigo
border, we can well imagine that Kenshin would have regarded that castle there as a potential threat to his
province.

Concern for Echigo’s security also seems to have been the motive behind the Shinano campaign;
indeed, the indication is, as already suggested, that it was the motive behind his whole involvement in that
province. The six Kawanakajima campaigns between 1553 and 1564 (with the possible exception of
the fourth, the circumstances of which are not quite clear) all took place relatively shortly after
periods of Takeda activity in northern Shinano. The first one was of course preceded by Shingen’s
defeat of Murakami Yoshikiyo and the other Shinano warriors who came to Kenshin for assistance;
the second by Shingen’s campaign during Kenshin’s effort to suppress the revolt of Kitajō Takahiro in
Echigo, the third by Shingen’s conquest of Katsurayama Castle; the fifth was preceded by
Shingen’s offensive during Kenshin’s Odawara campaign, and the sixth by Shingen’s Shinano
offensive and Echigo raid during Kenshin’s third post-Odawara campaign in eastern Japan.

This concurrence between Kawanakajima battles and Takeda activities in northern Shinano, together
with Kenshin’s apparent change of policy after 1564 (to wit, his giving Shinano a much lower priority
as Shingen shifted his resources to other fronts), strongly indicates that his campaigns in the province
were reactions to what he perceived as individual threats to Echigo.

So in the early 1550s Kenshin may have considered it important to obtain legitimization of the extra-
provincial campaigns he felt necessary to embark upon in order to strengthen his control over the
Echigo warrior society, but when first Hōjō Ujiyasu and then Takeda Shingen came uncomfortably
close to the Echigo border, the perceived urgency to confront them overrode that consideration.
Needless to say, the two campaigns allowed him begin the process of strengthening anyway, and when
he shortly after the last of them received the imperial edict, he could of course let it continue in earnest.
But interestingly enough, for several years he did not. He would continue to advance into northern Shinano to confront Takeda Shingen (1555, 1557, 1558), but he engaged in no other extra-provincial military activities until 1560.

As mentioned in Chapters Five and Six, it seems plausible that this lack of initiative was caused precisely by Shingen's presence in northern Shinano, but actually, as far as the period up to the autumn of 1556 goes, it seems even more plausible that it was caused by fundamental doubts in Kenshin's mind as to what direction his life should take, doubts that were fuelled by a Buddhist faith.

There can be no doubt that the adult Kenshin possessed a strong Buddhist faith; it is for instance clearly revealed by his behaviour at the time of his first trip to Kyoto in 1553-54. We know for example that he during that trip made a pilgrimage to Kōyasan, the sacred mountain in Kii Province, where he visited the famous temple Kongōbuji and attended religious lectures delivered by the priest Seiin. And he visited another famous religious institution, the Zen temple Daitokuji in Kyoto: "In the 12th month," according to Uesugi Nenpu, "he was given a jukai letter by the Daitokuji head priest, Tesshū [Sōku]. He had had his first audience with the head priest at the time of his arrival in the capital (…), and having [since then] engaged in lively conversations with him about the secrets of Zen, he was initiated into its esoteric principles. Then he asked for a Buddhist name. (...) In Tesshū's jukai letter was written: 'From now on Lord Kagetora has the Buddhist name Sōshin.'"

Jukai, literally "receiving the commandments," is a term referring to a believer's initiation ceremony upon entering Buddhist lay priesthood (or priesthood). In other words, Uesugi Nenpu is telling us that Kenshin entered lay priesthood and became the disciple of Tesshū Sōku, and this is indeed corroborated by a letter included in Uesugi-ke Monjo; written by Tesshū Sōku on the 8th day of the 12th month (21st January, 1554), it is evidently the jukai letter: "I bestow upon Echigo's Lord Kagetora of Taira descent the secret principles and a Buddhist name. And I bestow upon him the Five Commandments and a belief in the Three Treasures. He shall be called Sōshin."

Another religious place Kenshin seems to have been visiting during his Kyoto stay is the well-known mountain temple Enryakuji on Hieizan. According to Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, Kenshin called upon the temple and gave two hundred gold pieces to cover the expenses for some repair work on the lecture hall, and it seems very likely that he did just that. Because earlier in the year the temple's head priest had written to him, soliciting precisely such a donation.

All in all Kenshin's first Kyoto trip had a prominent religious element, so prominent, in fact, that it appears to have been undertaken not just for political but also for religious purposes; if the solicitation of shogunal support and co-operation from Honganji in Osaka was a motive for the trip, a desire to advance along the path of religious insight seems to have been one no less. The Japanese scholar
Nakazawa Hajime has conjectured that it was precisely during the trip that Keshin began harbouring a wish to retire from worldly affairs and become a Buddhist priest, but in fact the trip's dual motive seems to suggest that that wish was not entirely foreign to him even as he set out from Echigo for the capital. In other words, it would appear that he went to Kyoto with some doubt in his mind as to whether he was to throw himself into territorial expansion in earnest or whether he should enter priesthood and concentrate on the religious path.

We find an even stronger indication of this doubt in the fact that Keshin a few years later actually did chose to concentrate on that path, only to change his mind in less than half a year. The earliest mention of his decision to retire from worldly affairs is a letter written by Ueno Ienari to Honjob Jitsuno on the 23rd day of the 3rd month (12th May), 1556, in which it is related how the business of the provincial government had come to a standstill in consequence. Then in the 6th month, according to Uesugi Kafu, "Kagetora cut his hair. He intended to leave the province and make his way to Koyasan in Kii. He dispatched a letter to Chokeiji." This letter is the one already referred to several times in the preceding pages. Chokeiji, it will be remembered, was the temple to which Keshin's old teacher Tenshitsu Koiku moved after he had left Rinsenji in Echigo, and Keshin evidently wanted to explain the reasons for his decision to retire from the post as Echigo's ruler: He begins by saying that he had brought peace to Echigo after many years of unrest, and then he relates how he became involved in Shinano. He believes that his two Kawanakajima confrontations with Takeda Shingen has not only prevented the total destruction of Murakami Yoshikiyo and the other warriors who came to him for assistance but also saved them from further danger at the hands of Shingen. But he also believes that he has failed to establish a good relationship with his retainers and to prevent them from being selfish, and he therefore thinks that he has to part ways with them. This he can safely do, he writes, because he has restored his family to prominence after the weak rulership of his brother Harukage, so his job is done.

Of course, Keshin did not remain retired from the secular world. In a letter dated the 17th day of the 8th month (30th September) he informed Nagao Masakage that he had allowed himself to be persuaded to return to the post as Echigo's ruler by him and others, and if Uesugi Kafu is to be believed, this change of mind came about because his vassals and associates, Masakage among them, became so worried over his leaving Echigo that they decided to send a delegation after him. Catching up with him at a place called Sekiyama in southern Echigo close to the Shinano border, the chronicle has it, it remonstrated strongly with him and argued that the time was not propitious for him to abandon Echigo because of the danger posed by enemies in the neighbouring provinces.

There are no documents to prove that it happened this way, but it seems very probable that Masakage and the others used outside dangers as one of their arguments to persuade Keshin. Because,
as we have seen, it was at this time that Ōkuma Tomohide allied himself with Takeda Shingen and mobilized an army in Etchū in order to invade Echigo, and that Shingen was himself active in northern Shinano (with Katsurayama Castle being his main objective). And Kenshin would indeed turn his attention toward these two dangers after his return home to Kasugayama Castle.66

Later, as the pressure on Echigo’s border weakened, Kenshin would of course also turn his attention toward the problem of strengthening his position by extra-provincial expansion,67 so any doubts he may have harboured as to the direction of his future must have been expelled by then. And apparently he must have reached the conclusion that a life of soldiering did not prevent him from advancing further along the religious path; a ceremony he partook in early 1575 certainly indicates that that he had managed to do just that. He himself touched upon the ceremony in a gannō some months later: It was one that initiated him into the Shingon sect as a hōin daishō — a Buddhist priest of the highest rank.68

Presumably it was the already mentioned Sein of Kongōbuji who initiated him because in a letter the priest wrote later in the year he referred to the ceremony and mentioned, in the same breath so to speak, that he had established a teacher-student relationship with Kenshin.69

In conclusion we note that Kenshin was very much a man of his time. While still quite young, he was used by the Nagao leadership as a means to bolster the family’s authority in central Echigo, and possessing both interest in and talent for martial matters since his earliest childhood years he would, once he had come of age in 1543 and found himself in the middle of a rebellion, prove to be the right person for the job.

The military success he obtained in that and the following years resulted in his beginning to be seen as the future leader of Echigo by the Nagao retainers. It also seems to have resulted in a personal ambition to rise to political and military prominence because when he got the chance to replace his brother as Echigo shugodai, he took it, and from then on he was clearly intent on staying in power. Like so many other Sengoku daimyō he adopted a policy of territorial expansion (realizing that that was the way to do it), and when the opportunity for such an expansion presented itself in the form of Uesugi Norimasa’s plea for help in the summer of 1549, he grabbed it, though without actually taking any military action due to the lack of legitimation for doing so. The legitimation was obtained during his first Kyoto trip in late 1553, and until then his only military activities outside Echigo (the dispatch of troops to the Kantō the year before and the first Kawanakajima confrontation earlier the same year) were responses to what he perceived as concrete threats to the province: Takeda Shingen’s activities in northern Shinano and Hōjō Ujiyasu’s building of a fortress at Numata in Kozuke.

The Takeda threat reappeared several times in the decade following upon Kenshin’s return from Kyoto, and on each occasion he would respond to it with a Kawanakajima offensive. And until late
1560 he would limit his military activities to these confrontations plus the attempts to counter the new threats Shingen’s desire to conquer northern Shinano gave rise to (Kitajō and Ōkuma’s revolts in 1555 and 1556, respectively, and the alliance between Shingen and Jinnō Yoshiharu in early 1560).

Thus, despite the legitimation obtained in Kyoto in 1553, he failed to embark fully on a course of territorial expansion (i.e. on further Kantō offensives), and the prominent element of religious activities that is discernible in his life during this time suggests that to begin with, it was his Buddhist faith that made him hesitate and begin to consider whether or not to retire from the secular world altogether and lead a religious life. Eventually, in the face of Ōkuma’s rebellion, he chose not to give up his worldly life, but still he refrained from any Kantō involvement. It appears that Shingen’s presence in northern Shinano made him think it ill-advised, or simply left him with too little time or resources, to consider it, and first when it became noticeable that the Kai daimyō’s activities on other fronts were leading to a weakening of that presence, he could turn his attention toward eastern Japan.

By then the formidable “Alliance of the Three Provinces” had come into being, and the shogun had more than once failed to support Kenshin in his fight against Shingen in spite of his having ordered him to “subdue and punish the parties that harbour antagonistic inclinations in his own domain as well as in the neighbouring provinces” during the first Kyoto trip, so further legitimation was needed, and Kenshin went to the capital for a second time in 1559.

It is this trip which furnishes us with the earliest indication that Kenshin had an ambition to unify the whole country, to wit, the promise he made to shogun Yoshiteru to return one day and suppress Miyoshi Nagayoshi and his followers. And when he the following year advanced into Echigo because the alliance between Shingen and Jinnō Yoshiharu threatened the flank of future Kawanakajima offensives, he also took the first step towards fulfilling that ambition: the first step on the road to Kyoto. He was successful in his fight against Jinnō Yoshiharu but not in securing his hold on Echigo, so the following campaigns there (save the one in 1569), while undoubtedly serving the purpose of removing potential threats to the borders of Echigo, were likewise attempts at reopen and secure the road to the capital, and so were the rest of his Hokuriku activities (in Noto and Kaga).

These attempts were legitimized by the plight of Yoshiaki and the specific requests for assistance he sent out, and Kenshin died before reaching the point where he had to show his hand and enter into an open conflict with the central authorities. Therefore, and because he altogether gave the appearance of soldiering to protect the Ashikaga polity, he has come down in history as an unselfish Ashikaga partisan and protector of the weak. The fact seems to be, however, that he differed little from Oda Nobunaga, Imagawa Yoshimoto, Takeda Shingen and probably a lot of other contemporaries as far as political and military ambitions go.
Notes.

Notes to Introduction.
1 It should be mentioned that Japanese names are given in accordance with their native form, with family name preceding personal name (except in references to Japanese authors writing in English). It should also be mentioned that Kenshin changed his name several times during his lifetime, as was common in that day and age. Thus, “Uesugi Kenshin” is just one of several names by which he is referred to in the historical sources, and, being the one by which he is best known today, the one used throughout this study (except in quotations from sources that refer to him by one of his other names). He appears to have begun using the name in late 1570 (Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, tokubetsu zukan: Uesugi Kenshin no Shōgai, p. 77).
2 My MA paper entitled Uesugi Kenshin.

Notes to Chapter One.
2 Takinami Sadako: Nihon no Rekishi 5: Heian Kento, pp. 327 and 360.
3 Irumada Nobuo: Nihon no Rekishi 7: Musha no Yo ni, p. 20.
4 Kuwata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; kokô no seigoku bushô no nazô to jitsuzô, p. 14.
5 Ibid. Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 127. A shōen was public land that had been made into a private estate with tax immunity and immunity from entry by civil authorities.
9 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chûsei Echigo no Rekishi; ...., p. 107.
12 Ibid., p. 87. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 27.
13 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chûsei Echigo no Rekishi; ...., pp. 116-17 and 391. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 27.
14 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chûsei Echigo no Rekishi; ...., p. 117. It is not generally accepted that Kagetame was the first Nagao to become an Uesugi retainer. According to Takizawa Sadaharu, it was one Kagehiro (Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 40). It is not clear when Takizawa holds this to have happened, but according to Hanagasaki Moriaki (Uesugi Kenshin, p. 391), Kagehiro was the grandfather of Kagemochi, who died, as we have seen, in 1247, five years before the Uesugi had even entered the Kantô region.
16 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 386.
17 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 41.
18 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 127.
20 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 128.
26 Ibid., pp. 183-86.
28 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chûsei Echigo no Rekishi; ...., p. 68.
Notes to Chapter One.

30 Hanagasaki Moriai: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., pp. 18 and 68.
32 Hanagasaki Moriai: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 68.
33 Ibid.
37 Ibid., pp. 200 and 231.
38 Ibid., p. 200.
39 Ibid., pp. 231 and 253-55.
40 Ito Kiyoshi: Nihon no Rekishi 8: ..., p. 240.
41 Ibid., p. 242.
44 Ito Kiyoshi: Nihon no Rekishi 8: ..., p. 242.
46 Ibid., p. 174.
52 Ibid., pp. 203 and 205.
56 Hanagasaki Moriai: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., pp. 117-18.
57 Ibid., pp. 118-19.
58 Ibid. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 28. Abe Youseke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., pp. 93 and 96. The shugodai branch has become known as the Funai-Nagao, with Funai being an alternative name for Echigo’s capital, Naoetsu.
60 Ibid., p. 203.

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Notes to Chapter One.


70 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 33.


72 Ibid., p. 387.


74 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., pp. 24-25.


83 Ibid., p. 16.


86 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 388.

87 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 79.


89 Nagahara Keiji: Nihon no Rekishi 10: ..., pp. 21 and 24-25.

90 Imatani Akira: Nihon no Rekishi 9: ..., pp. 32 and 91.


94 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., pp. 25 and 77.


97 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 35.


100 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 36.


102 Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., pp. 103-106.

103 Ibid., p. 104.

104 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 12 and 36-42.


106 Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., p. 104.

107 Ibid. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 43-44.

108 See p. 6.

109 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 44.

110 Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., p. 104.
Notes to Chapter One.

111 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 42.

112 Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., pp. 104-105.


114 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 45.


117 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 45.


121 Nagahara Keiji: Nihon no Rekishi 10: ..., pp. 30-33.


124 Ibid., pp. 277-78.

125 Nagahara Keiji: Nihon no Rekishi 10: ..., pp. 33-34.

126 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 45-46. Hanagasaki Moriaiki: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 120.

127 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 47-48. Hanagasaki Moriaiki: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 120. The quote is from Inoue.

128 Nagahara Keiji: Nihon no Rekishi 10: ..., pp. 33-35. Imatani Akira: Nihon no Rekishi 9: ..., p. 104. In some history books one reads that Mochiuji was killed by the enemy troops. One also occasionally reads that Yoshihisa managed to escape to another temple in Sagami where he committed suicide some weeks later.

129 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 77.


133 Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 78.


135 Ibid., p. 204.


137 Ibid., pp. 280-81.


139 See p. 9.


141 Nagahara Keiji: Taikei Nihon no Rekishi 6: ..., p. 287.

142 Ibid., p. 281.


144 Hanagasaki Moriaiki: Chiisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., pp. 120-21.


147 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 49-50.


150 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 51-52.


Notes to Chapter One.


Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): *Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten* ..., p. 78.


Inoue Toshiro: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 52.

Kuwata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden*: ..., pp. 15-16.


Inoue Toshiro: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 55. Actually, Inoue writes that it happened in 1454; see note 166 below.

Ibid., pp. 55-56. Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chisei Echigo no Rekishi*: ..., p. 121. The quote is from Inoue.

Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chisei Echigo no Rekishi*: ..., p. 121.

Yasuda Motohisa (ed.): *Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten* ..., pp. 19 and 78. Modern history books often give the date of this incident, and hence of the commencement of the wars in eastern Japan, as 1454. This seems to be due to the convenient but incorrect equating by historians of the Kyotoku period's 3rd year (the year the historical sources give as the year of the incident) with 1454. The Kyotoku period's 3rd year corresponds in fact to the period 7th February, 1454 - 26th January, 1455, and if one is not heedful of the fact that Noritada was killed late in the year, namely after it had changed from 1454 to 1455, one will inevitable pass on the wrong Gregorian calendar equivalent.


Nagahara Keiji: *Nihon no Rekishi 10*: ..., p. 311.

Nagahara Keiji: *Nihon no Rekishi 10*: ..., p. 311.

Imatani Akira: *Nihon no Rekishi 9*: ..., p. 221.


Inoue Toshiro: *Uesugi Kenshin*, pp. 55-56.


See pp. 24-25.


See p. 6.


Nagahara Keiji: *Nihon no Rekishi 10*: ..., p. 311.

See p. 12.


Notes to Chapter One.

192 Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*: ..., p. 60.
194 Omegashō (ed.): *Nihon no Meizoku 4*: ..., p. 96.
199 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): *Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ...*, p. 686.
200 Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*: ..., pp. 73-74.
202 Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*: ..., pp. 74-75.
207 See p. 19.
208 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*: ..., p. 107.
209 See pp. 6 and 15.
212 Inoue Toshio: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 60.
213 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajō*, p. 18.
214 See p. 25.
217 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajō*, pp. 18 and 21.
218 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 123. Kuwata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden*; ..., p. 16 (the quote is from Kuwata).
219 Inoue Toshio: *Uesugi Kenshin*, pp. 77-79.
220 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajō*, p. 35. Kuwata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden*; ..., p. 16.
221 Inoue Toshio: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 74.
222 *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73. Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*; ..., pp. 124-25. Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*: ..., p. 130. Funyū literally means "no entry," while a gunji was a local official, administrating a district — a gun. The privilege is sometimes referred to as shugo funyū or shugoshî funyū. Shugoshî literally means "a shugo messenger."
223 Inoue Toshio: *Uesugi Kenshin*, pp. 74-75.
224 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*: ..., p. 130.
225 Kuwata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden*; ..., p. 17.
226 See p. 31.
227 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*: ..., p. 130.
Notes to Chapter Two.

1 Kuvata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Mono shiri Shiden; ..., p. 17.
3 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 77-79. Kuvata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 17 (the quote is from Inoue).
5 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., p. 142.
6 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajo, pp. 35-36.
7 Kuvata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 18.
8 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 82-83.
9 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., pp. 114-17.
12 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajo, p. 37.
14 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajo, p. 37.
16 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., pp. 142-43.
20 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 92.
21 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajo, p. 38.
22 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 92.
24 See p. 30.
25 Sugiyama Hiroshi: Nihon no Rekishi 11; ..., p. 76.
26 Yasuda Mototsuka (ed.): Kamakura-Muromachi Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 541.
27 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 82.
28 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 563.
29 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 86.
30 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., p. 165. Sugiyama Hiroshi: Nihon no Rekishi 11; ..., pp. 76-77.
31 Sugiyama Hiroshi: Nihon no Rekishi 11; ..., p. 77.
32 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 96.
33 Sugiyama Hiroshi: Nihon no Rekishi 11; ..., p. 77. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., pp. 131 and 134.
36 See pp. 62-63.
37 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., p. 143.
38 Ibid.
39 Ikegami Hiroko: Nihon no Rekishi 10; ..., p. 130.
40 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chüsei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 20.
41 Sugiyama Hiroshi: Nihon no Rekishi 11; ..., p. 128.
42 Abe Yoshuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9; ..., p. 143.
Notes to Chapter Two.

43 Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*; ..., p. 128.
44 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 20.
45 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*; ..., p. 144.
46 Ibid.
47 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 64.
48 Ibid. Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*; ..., p. 144.
49 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 46. Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*; ..., p. 144.
50 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*; ..., pp. 144-45.
51 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 52.
52 Inoue Toshio: *Uesugi Kenshin*, pp. 103-105.
53 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., pp. 46-51.
54 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
57 Abe Yōsuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9*; ..., pp. 145-46.
58 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., pp. 74, 85 and 390.
61 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., pp. 93 and 97.
62 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): *Uesugi Kenshin no Subete*, pp. 33-34.
63 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi*; ..., p. 111.
64 See p. 47.
Notes to Chapter Three.


3 Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, jōkan, pp. 98-99.

4 Ibid., p. 98.

5 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p. 51 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 25.


7 Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, jōkan, pp. 98 and 100.

8 Ibid., p. 98. A shōbu sword was a toy sword used for decoration at the annual Boys’ Festival. Sashimono were small flags planted in the ground of battlefields as markers.

9 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 12.


11 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 51-52 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, gekan, p. 17 (Uesugi Sandai Nikki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, jōkan, p. 100 (Hokuetsu Gundan). Yooita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 25-26. It was widely accepted by modern scholars that Kenshin indeed entered Rinsenji in 1536, but the notion that he left it in less than a year is a disputed point. Hanagasaki Moriaki and Inoue Toshio, among others, have it that he stayed there until 1543 (Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chūsei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 112. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 140), while Kunitaka Tadachika and Hayashi Seigo have voiced opinions more in line with Hokuetsu Taiheiki and the other chronicles referred to above (Kunitaka Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 26. Nitta Jirō et al.: Uesugi Kenshin; ..., p. 57).

12 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 231.

13 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p. 52. The mention of muskets is clearly an embellishment of history, as these weapons had not yet been introduced to the country.


15 Ibid., pp. 28-29.

16 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 52 and 75 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, jōkan, p. 100 (Hokuetsu Gundan). In Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, too, the adoption plan is mentioned, though without specific references to when it might have happened (Yooita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 26).

17 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 52 and 75 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, jōkan, p. 100 (Hokuetsu Gundan). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, gekan, pp. 17-18 (Uesugi Sandai Nikki). Kurokawa Shindō (ed.): Echigo Shishū, ..., p. 5 (Kasugayama Nikki).

18 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 131 (Rekidai Koon). By the time Kenshin wrote the letter, Tenshitsu Kōiku had moved to a temple called Chōkeiji (Kunitaka Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 25).


20 Takizawa Sadaharu has written that “the view also exists that Kenshin was brought up by his mother’s real family in Tochio after his father’s death” (Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 35). And according to Hayashi Seigo, Kenshin was brought up by one Honjō Yoshihide, also in Tochio (Nitta Jirō et al.: Uesugi Kenshin; ..., p. 57).

21 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 131 (Rekidai Koon).

22 Yooita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 32-33.

23 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 54-55.

24 See p. 41.

25 See p. 45.

26 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 129 (Rekidai Koon).

Notes to Chapter Three.
28 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chisei Echigo no Rekishi; ..., p. 93.
29 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajô. pp. 41 and 221.
33 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 496.
34 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 11.
35 See pp. 46-47.
36 Imaizumi Takujirô et al. (eds.): Essa Sôsho, ..., pp. 47-51, 53 and 76-77 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-renpu, ..., pp. 29-32.
37 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 310.
38 Imaizumi Takujirô et al. (eds.): Essa Sôsho, ..., p. 47 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryôshî, jôkan, p. 110 (Hokuetsu Gundan). Actually, the latter work calls Nagao Toshikage for “Heirokorô” rather than “Heiroku.”
39 Imaizumi Takujirô et al. (eds.): Essa Sôsho, ..., p. 49 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-renpu, ..., p. 29.
40 Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryôshû, jôkan, p. 111-27 (Hokuetsu Gundan). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryôshû, gekan, p. 18 (Uesugi Sandai Nikkî). Actually, Hokuetsu Gundan does not mention Kuroda Hidetada. Instead, a certain Kuroda Hidenaka figures as one of the leading participants of the rebellion Hokuetsu Gundan’s editor, Inoue Toshio, has implied that this probably is due to the Chinese character for “tada” ( tà ) in Kuroda’s name having been confused for the similarly looking character for “naka” ( 中 ).
Notes to Chapter Four.
1 Inoue Toshio (ed.). Uesugi Shiryōshū, jōkan, p. 126.
3 For instance: Kuwata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 29. Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Suibetsu, p. 35.
4 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten, ..., p. 704. The Chinese characters for Honjo’s personal name (実乃), rendered here as “Jitsuno,” are in some modern work given as “Saneyori.”
5 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 3, p. 866 (Uesugi Kafu). The editor of Essa Shiryō equates this military episode with the “defensive fight” mentioned by Kenshin in his letter to Tenshitsu Kōiku (see p. 46). Inoue Toshio, too, appears to have been of the opinion that the two letters are in fact referring to the same battle (Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 140-41). As has been already been noted, however, Kenshin’s letter seems in fact to be referring to an affair that is described in Uesugi-ke Gonenpu and Hoketsu Taiheiki as having taken place in late February, 1544, five months after Harukage wrote his letter (see pp. 46-47).
6 Some scholars have voiced the opinion that the battle at Tochio in 1544 was Kenshin’s baptism of fire (Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 12. Kuwata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 31), an opinion it is impossible to subscribe to when one takes into consideration Nagao Harukage’s letter to Honjo Jitsuno.
7 It has been implied in some modern works that Kenshin was rather busy campaigning at this time, at least, Inoue Toshio and others have voiced opinions to the effect that he in 1543 managed to subdue the area around Tochio — or even the whole of central Echigo in one case (Inoue Toshio: Kenshi Shizuru 15: Niigata-ken no Rekishii, p. 110. Wakita Haruko: Taikai Nihon no Rekishii 7, ..., p. 322. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten, ..., p. 132) Such opinions are of course impossible to subscribe to, because to do so would be to dismiss the sources (Hoketsu Taiheiki and Uesugi-ke Gonenpu) that tell us that preparations for a major attack on Tochio Castle were being made from the 10th month, onwards (see pp. 46-47).
8 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 54-57. The two chronicles are very close in their narrative so there is no reason to dwell on both versions here. The comments on the credibility of Hoketsu Taiheiki given below hold good for Uesugi-ke Gonenpu, too.
9 Yoshihide was evidently allied to Kenshin. He reappears several times in the present account but hardly figures in the modern works examined for this study.
10 Also known as Sadayuki (?-1564). He was possibly the son of Usami Fusatada who was, as has already been mentioned, one of Uesugi Sadazane’s allies during the Eishō Rebellion in 1513. Sadamitsu was the master of Biwajima Castle in Kashiwazaki and had fought against Nagao Tamekage during the Great Tenbun Rebellion (Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryōshū, jōkan, pp. 129-30. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten, ..., p. 142). In Hoketsu Taiheiki he is actually referred to as “Sadayuki” and not “Sadamitsu.” “Sadamitsu,” however, seems to be the name by which he is generally known — hence the use of it here and in the following.
11 I have failed to establish the meaning of the word sekki, written 切寄. Perhaps it is some kind of fortification built close to three enemy strongholds.
12 The central part of Echigo. Present-day Chūetsu area.
13 According to Hanagasaki Moriaki, Nagao Fusakage was in fact not of the Ueda line but of the Koshi line, the headship of which he took over in early 1496 (Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 393). Masakage (?-1564), was the master of Sakato Castle and a son of Nagao Fusanaaga (d. 1542) of the Ueda line. The genealogical details of this line are unclear (Ibid., pp. 130 and 392. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten, ..., p. 565).
14 Ōkuma Tomohide (?-1582), also known as Nagahide, was the master of Mikaburi Castle in southern Echigo and out of a family that had served the Echigo shugo as tax officials (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten, ..., p. 173. Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chūsei Echigo no Rekishii; ..., p. 319). I have not been able to identify Ō Shō Sanetame, but shinzaemon no jō was an old magisterial title.
15 Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Gonenpu, ..., p. 35.
Notes to Chapter Four.

Ibid., p. 872 (Uesugi Genpu). Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p. 57 (Hokutetsu Taihei). 

Yaota Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 36. The Chinese characters for Hisaaki’s personal name, 尚顯, are, according to some works, pronounced “Yoshiaki.”

Yaota Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 36. Dai Nihon Monjo, ietake 12: Uesugi-ke Monjo, vol. 1, p. 410 (document no. 435: Go-Nara Temō Rinji). Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and the other two chronicles referred to in the previous note all have Hisaaki arrive in Echigo on the 4th month’s 20th day, the same day as the imperial decree was written. But surely a document written in Kyoto on a certain day can hardly have been presented to someone in the provincial capital of Echigo on the same day at Kenshin’s time. As indicated, the letter is authentic and the date written on it is the 4th month’s 20th day, so we must assume that Hisaaki actually arrived in Echigo a few days later.


Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayamajō, p. 58. Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 141. It ought to be mentioned that both these works treat Kuroda Hidetada’s activities in 1545 and 1546 as two isolated instances of revolt and not as parts of a rebellion that stretched from the early 1540s to the 2nd month, 1546, or beyond.

Yaota Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 39-40. Actually, Kenshin was fifteen (by Japanese count) at the time of the battle at Tochio.

Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 129 (Rekikai Koran).

Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 4-5. Uesugi Kaki is actually referring to an older source called Yonezawa Gaishi.

Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 2 (Ueno Monjo).


Hanagasaki Moriaki: Chisei Echigo no Rekishi, ..., p. 57.

Ibid., pp. 47 and 81.

His family name, written with the characters 羽田, appears as “Tairaku” or “Hirako” in some modern works. “Tairago” is the reading given by Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu and Hokutetsu Gundan.

Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 12.

Ibid., p. 13. Masakage was married to a sister to Kenshin (Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 14).

Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 149.


Ibid., pp. 36-37 (Matsumoto Monjo).


Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., p. 167.

See pp. 89-91 and 97-98.

Abe Yosuke (ed.): Sengoku Daimyō Ronshū 9: ..., p. 167.

Ibid.
Notes to Chapter Five.

1 See pp. 24-30 and 36-38.
4 Ibid., p. 89.
6 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
7 See p. 58.
9 Saemono daibu was a military position in the old imperial bureaucracy.
10 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 63-64.
11 Ibid., p. 56.
12 Ibid.
13 For instance: Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 56-58 (Satake Kaku, Uesugi Nenpu).
16 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 59. The Takeda chieftain at this time was Takeda Shingen (1521-73) (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 482).
18 Sources differ on the point of when it happened. Uesugi Nenpu, for instance, has it that it happened on the 23rd day of the 4th month (26th May), while according to Uesugi Kaku and other chronicles, it was in the 5th month (3rd June - 1st July) (Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 73). The source compilation Uesugi Komonjo contains a letter written to Kenshin on the 5th month’s 26th day (28th June). In this he is addressed danjō no shōhitsu, so obviously it must have happened before that date (Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 70-71). Some modern scholars consider Uesugi Nenpu’s date, or at least the 4th month, to be the correct one (for instance: Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 336-37. Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 14).
19 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 69-70.
20 Ibid., p. 74 (Bushi Monojo).
23 Kuwata Tadachika: Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden; ..., p. 103.
24 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4. p. 78 (Shōda Monojo).
26 Ibid.
30 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 94. The emperor at this time was Go-Nara (1496-1557) (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 337).
31 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 93.
32 Ibid., p. 131 (Rekidai Kōan). The dagger has survived to the present day and is now in the possession of the Rinsenji temple museum in Jōetsu, Niigata Prefecture.
33 Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 60.
Notes to Chapter Five.

34 Dai Nihon Komonjo, iewake 12: Uesugi-ke Monjo, vol. 1, pp. 429-30 (document no. 459: Go-Nara Tennō Rinji). Apparently, the document has suffered some kind of damage over the years because as reproduced in Dai Nihon Komonjo, the day and month of its composition are missing. It is only clear that it was written in the 22nd year of Tenbun (1553). Strictly speaking, the document was not written to Kenshin but from one imperial official to another.

35 Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ... p. 58. Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 94 (Uesugi Nenpu). The shogun at this time was Yoshiiteru (1536-65), the thirteenth Ashikaga ruler and the son and immediate successor to Yoshiharu (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 38).


37 See pp. 87-88.

38 See p. 117.

39 Sōgō Bukkyō Daititen Henshū Inkaikai (ed.): Sōgō Bukkyō Daititen, jōkan, p. 744.

40 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 95. It is this entry that reveals that Kenshin was in the Kyoto-Osaka area at this time — more specifically, en route to Sakai.

41 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 181.

42 Ibid., pp. 181-82.

43 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 98 (Ueno Monjo).

44 See pp. 117-119.

45 See pp. 89-93.


49 Ibid., pp. 264-67.

50 Ibid., pp. 264-67 and 269-71.


53 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 174. Matsunaga Hisahide (1510?-77) was a close associate of Miyoshi Nagayoshi (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 732).

54 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 194-95 (Uesugi Komonjo).


57 Ibid., p. 173.

58 Ibid., pp. 171-72.

59 Ibid., pp. 178-79.

60 Ibid., pp. 179-80. Danjōchū is the name of a position in the police department of the imperial government.

61 Ibid., p. 180.

62 Ibid., p. 177.

63 Ibid., p. 181 (Uesugi Nenpu).

64 Ibid.

65 See p. 69 and note 54, above.


68 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 120.


70 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 199.

71 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 120.


74 Ibid., p. 201 (Uesugi Nenpu). Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., p. 96.
Notes to Chapter Five.

75 For instance: Watanabe Keichi (ed.): *Uesugi Kenshin no Subete*, p. 119.
76 Abe Yosuke (ed.): *Sengoku Daimyō Ronshi 9*: ..., p. 301.
77 Ibid.
78 Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): *Essa Sōsho*, ..., p. 83.
79 For instance: Kuvata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shiden*; ..., p. 105.
80 For instance: Inoue Tosho: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 337.
81 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, pp. 223-30.
82 See pp. 66-67.
83 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, pp. 240-41 (Isa Sō Monjo).
84 Ibid., pp. 241-42 (Fukuoji Monjo).
85 Ibid., p. 250 (Uesugi Monjo).
86 Ibid., p. 251 (Hokuetsu Kasho).
88 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, p. 254.
89 Yaoita Sanin et al.: *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*, ..., pp. 124-25. Umayabashi was in Kōzuke (the present-day city of Maebashi, Gunma Prefecture).
91 Ibid., pp. 268-69 (Matsushara Jirō Monjo).
92 Ibid., p. 265 (Makabe Monjo).
93 Ibid., pp. 269-70 (Maeda-ke Monjo. Bushū Monjo).
94 For instance: Ibid., pp. 290 and 293 (Sōshū Heiran Ki. Odawara Ki.). Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): *Essa Sōsho*, ..., p. 84 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki).
95 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, p. 296.
96 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): *Sengoku Jinmei Jiten* ..., p. 684.
97 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, p. 279.
98 Ibid., pp. 296-303.

*Hyōbu* and *shōyū* are the names of two positions in the old imperial bureaucracy.

99 Imagawa Uijizane (1538-1614) was the son and successor to Yoshimoto (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): *Sengoku Jinmei Jiten* ..., p. 121). The latter, it will be remembered, had formed the “Alliance of the Three Provinces” with Hōjō Ujiyasu and Takeda Shingen in 1554, and he found, as is well known, his death in 1560 during the famous Battle at Okehazama, the event that launched Oda Nobunaga (more of whom later) as a major player on the politico-military stage of Japan.

100 Hōjō Ujimasa (1538-90) was Ujiyasu’s oldest son. He had succeeded his father as Hōjō chieftain (in name, at least) in late 1559 or early 1560 (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): *Sengoku Jinmei Jiten* ..., p. 685). *Sakyo no daibu* was an old magisterial title.

101 At this point *Uesugi Nenpu* lists eighty-odd names of local warlords from Echigo, Musashi, Kōzuke etc. who had rallied around Kenshin for the campaign. The number seems very probable, considering the number of warlords who had shown up in Echigo to pay their respects after Kenshin’s second Kyoto trip.

102 “Koraisan” in some modern history books.

103 A reference to an ancient Chinese belief, according to which the sky is suspended by four giant ropes, and to the belief that the Earth is mounted on a solid axle which penetrates it through its centre.

104 “Crane Wings” and “Fish Scales” are the names of battle formations — two of eight basic ways, allegedly of Chinese origin, to array one’s troops on the battlefield.

105 The Ōta’s war banners were depicting a kaburaya, a whistling arrow, *i.e.*, an arrow with a turnip-shaped head that makes a whistling sound as it flies through the air. The motive on the other war banners, the *mitsu urokogata* or “Three Scales Pattern,” was an equilateral triangle formed by three highly stylized scales (themselves, in fact, equilateral triangles).

106 *Nakatsukasa* and *shōyū* are the names of two positions in the old imperial bureaucracy.

107 *Shuri no daibu* the name of another imperial position.

108 Hōjō Soun, of course.

109 According to the Japanese way of reckoning age.

Notes to Chapter Five.

114 See p. 73.
115 Hanagasaki Moriake: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 22.
118 Ibid., pp. 286-87 (Kokon Shūsokushū, Buke Jiki).
120 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 285 (Shiko Monjo).
123 Ibid., p. 512 (Kaburagi Monjo).
124 Ibid.
125 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 287 (Katano Monjo). Hojo Ujikuni (1541?-97) was Ujiyasu’s third son (Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 683).
126 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 512-13 (Kaburagi Monjo).
127 Ibid., pp. 317-18 (Shiko Monjo).
128 Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shirōshū, gekan, p. 23 (Uesugi Sandai Nikki). Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 84-85 (Hoketsu Taiheiki).
132 Ibid., p. 332.
133 Hanagasaki Moriake: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 24-25 and 380.
134 Ibid., pp. 25-26 and 381.
135 Ibid., pp. 26-27 and 381.
136 Ibid., p. 29.
137 Ibid., pp. 30-31 and 381. Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yamihon, ..., pp. 66-67. Kenshin’s hesitation about advancing into the Kantō in 1565 may in part be explained by a decision to campaign in Shinano instead, a decision that apparently was never carried out, though (see pp. 98-99).
141 Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yamihon, ..., p. 78. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 132.
142 Hanagasaki Moriake: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 36 and 383.
143 Ibid., pp. 37 and 384. Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yamihon, ..., pp. 82-83. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 481. Apparently, Kenshin broke off a Kaga offensive in order to embark on this Kantō campaign, and broke off the Kantō campaign because some emergency situation arose in Etchū (see p. 105).
146 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Sabete, pp. 74-76.
147 Ikekami Hiroko: Nihon no Rekishi 10: ..., pp. 141-42.

136
Notes to Chapter Six.


5. Imaizumi Takujiro et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 73-74 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki). Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryōshū, gakan, pp. 73-74 and 109-11 (Hokuetsu Kidan. Kawanakajima Gokado Kassen no Shidai).


8. Ibid., p. 92 (Osuka Monjo). Of course, it should come as no surprise to us to learn that Kenshin was not militarily engaged in Shinano in the 11th month because at that time he was on his first Kyoto trip (see pp. 65-66 and note 40, p. 134).


10. Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 16. This seems to be a widely accepted explanation. Abe Yōsuke, however, has argued against it and has voiced the idea that Takahiro’s revolt was caused by internal Echigo problems of some sort (Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, ..., p. 50).


12. Ibid., pp. 115-16 (Mōri Monjo).

13. Ibid., p. 117 (Nakamura Tōhachi-shi Shozō Monjo).


See p. 84.


18. Ibid., p. 118 (Haga Monjo).

19. Ibid., p. 119 (Komono).


24. Imaizumi Takujiro et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 199-200.


26. Ibid., pp. 135-36 (Rekikai Kōan).

27. Ibid., p. 136 (Ueno Monjo).


31. Ibid., pp. 141-42 (Irobo Monjo).

32. For instance: Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-renpu, ..., p. 69. Kurokawa Shindo (ed.): Echigo Shishū, ..., p. 50 (Kasugayama Nikki). Imaizumi Takujiro et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p. 81 (Hokuetsu Taiheiki).


34. Ibid., p. 147 (Irobo Monjo).


36. Ibid., p. 158 (Buneiji Monjo).

See p. 69.


39. Ibid., pp. 212-14 (Hemen Monjo).

40. Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, ..., p. 56.

41. See p. 72.
Notes to Chapter Six.

42 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 241-42 (*Fukuōji Monjo*).
43 See p. 73.
44 See pp. 73 and 80.
45 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): *Sengoku Jinmei Jiten*, p. 483.
46 Sugiyama Hiroshi: *Nihon no Rekishi 11*, pp. 115-16.
47 Sources differ on the point of when it happened. *Hokutsu Taiheiki*, for instance, gives the 8th month as the start of the campaign (Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): *Essa Sōsho*, p. 86), while according to *Hokutsu Gundan*, it was in the 7th month (Inoue Toshio (ed.): *Uesugi Shiryōshū, jōkan*, p. 386).
49 A good many chronicles deal with the Kawanakajima confrontation of 1561, for instance: Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): *Essa Sōsho*, pp. 86-87 (*Hokutsu Taiheiki*). Yatoa Sanin et al.: *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*, pp. 171-78. Kurokawa Shindō (ed.): *Echigo Shisshi*, pp. 62-67 (*Kasugayama Nikki*). Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 354-60 (*Kōyō Gundan*). The various chronicles are far from being identical in their accounts of the battle, and they are not completely consistent with one another. But they all convey the same direct and uncomplicated nature of the confrontation as well an atmosphere of intenseness and decisiveness.
50 Inoue Toshio (ed.): *Uesugi Shiryōshū, jōkan*, pp. 389-90.
51 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): *Uesugi Kenshin no Subete*, p. 144.
52 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 357-58. Actually, *Kōyō Gundan* does not use the name "Kenshin" in the passage quoted here, mistakenly it calls him "Terutora." Kenshin’s name at the time of the Kawanakajima battle was in fact "Masatora," and it was not until early 1562 that he was given the last character of shogun Yoshiteru’s name, changing his own to "Terutora" (Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 380).
54 Ibid., pp. 349-50 (*Rekidai Koan*).
56 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 383-84 (*UesugiKomonjo*).
57 Ibid., pp. 468-69 (*Rekidai Koan*).
58 Ibid., pp. 475-76 (*Oshih Aizu Shike Gōkō*).
59 Ibid., pp. 474-75 (*Oshih Aizu Shike Gōkō. Odagiri Monjo*).
60 Ibid., p. 476 (*Rekidai Koan. Irobe Monjo*).
61 Ibid., p. 479 (*Izuka Hachiman Jinja Monjo*). Harunobu is of course Shingen.
62 See p. 88.
63 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 486-87 (*Yahiko Jinja Monjo*).
64 Ibid., pp. 487-89 (*Uesugi Monjo. Hotta Jirō-shi Shozō Monjo*). A *kankojo* is a place in a Zen temple reserved for silent readings of sutras. According to Hanagasaki Moriaki, the *kankojo* in question was located in the Kasugayama Castle compound (Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin*, p. 28).
65 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 500 (*Tomoioka Monjo*).
66 Ibid., pp. 509-11 (*Rekidai Koan*).
69 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 512-14 (*Kaburagi Monjo*).
70 Yaita Sanin et al.: *Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu*, pp. 227-34.
71 Ibid., p. 234-36.
73 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 833-34 (*Younji Monjo*).
75 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 526-27 (*Kennyo Shōnin Go-Chosatsu Arnyū*).
77 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō, vol. 4*, pp. 650 (*Odagiri Monjo*).
78 Hanagasaki Moriaki: *Uesugi Kenshin*, pp. 32-33.
Notes to Chapter Six.

For instance: Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 279-314. Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., pp. 97-98 (Hokuetsu Taiheiikī).


Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 659 (Rekidai Kōan).


Ibid., pp. 64-65.


See p. 83.


Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 405-406.

Kurokawa Shindō (ed.): Echigo Shishi, ..., p. 84.

See p. 116.
Notes to Chapter Seven.

1 See p. 92.
2 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin to Kasugayama no, p. 53. It ought to be mentioned, firstly, that according to Hanagasaki Moriaki, the Jinbo in question was called “Nagamoto” rather than “Yoshihara.” And secondly, that according Hanagasaki, Kenshin’s reason for wanting to subjugate Jinbo was that he wanted to help another Etchu warrior with his fight against him (Jinbo) rather than that he saw the latter as a threat to future Shinano campaigns. And thirdly, that Hanagasaki gives a third reason for Kenshin’s campaign (in addition to his wanting to subjugate Jinbo and secure the road to Kyoto), namely that he felt Echigo’s security threatened.

Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-nenpu, ..., pp. 251-52. Imaizumi Takujirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p. 96 (Hokoku to Taiheiki).

3 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 118.
4 See p. 72.
5 See pp. 73-83 and 93-94.
6 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 38.
7 Takahashi Yoshio (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 470 (Rekikai Kōan).
8 Ibid., p. 525 (Uesugi Monojō).
10 Hanagasaki Moriaki: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 34. Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Reki Shi Yomihon, ..., p. 75.
11 Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Reki Shi Yomihon, ..., p. 78.
14 Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Reki Shi Yomihon, ..., p. 82.
16 See pp. 73, 95 and 98.
17 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 39.
20 Ibid. Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 37.
22 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 159.
23 Takahashi Yoshio (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, pp. 543-44 (Uesugi-ke Komonjo).
24 Ibid., p. 546.
25 Ibid., pp. 557-59.
26 Ibid., pp. 566-67.
27 See note 100, p. 135.
32 See p. 97.
34 Takahashi Yoshio (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, pp. 167-68 (Matsudaira Yoshiyuki Shozō Monjō).
36 Takahashi Yoshio (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, p. 185 (Rekikai Kōan).
38 Ibid.
40 Ibid., p. 198 (Kuribayashi Monjō). For the Kantō campaign, see p. 85.
41 Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Reki Shi Yomihon, ..., p. 83.
42 Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, p. 313.
Notes to Chapter Seven.

Several chronicles do have Kenshin campaigning in, or sending troops to, provinces adjacent to Echū between 1573 and late 1576, for instance Kasugayama Nikki (Kurokawa Shindo (ed.) Echigo Shishū, ..., pp. 86-87), Ettoga Sanshūshi (Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, p. 329), and Uesugi Sandai Nikki (Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, gekan, p. 29). But these accounts are not corroborated by documents or the like.


Ibid., p. 342 (Uesugi-ke Komonjo).


Ibid., p. 333 (Kawada Monjo).


Ibid., pp. 336-37 (Fukuyama Shiryō).


Uesugi Sandai Nikki (Inoue Toshio (ed.): Uesugi Shiryūshū, gekan, p. 29) and Hokutesu Taiheiki (Imaizumi Takajirō et al. (eds.): Essa Sōsho, ..., p.106) have Kenshin campaigning in Echū in 1574 and/or 1575 as well. It is of course very conceivable that he did, but there are no documents to prove it in the source collections consulted for this study.


Ibid., p. 356 (Kuribayashi Monjo).

Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, ..., p. 89.


Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, ..., p. 89.


Inoue Toshio: Uesugi Kenshin, pp. 318 and 320.

Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, p. 368 (Sunkin Zatsuroku).


Ibid., p. 368.

Ibid., p. 382.


Ibid., pp. 372-73 (Yoshikawa Kinzō-shi Shozō Monjo).

Ibid., pp. 376-77 (Sōma Monjo. Watanabe Hideji-shi Shozō Monjo).

Takahashi Chihaya (ed.): Bessatsu Rekishi Yomihon, ..., p. 90.

Atsuta Kō: Nihon no Rekishi 11: ..., p. 117.


Ibid., p. 394.

Ibid., p. 395 (Mizuno Seien-shi Shozō Monjo).

Ibid., pp. 409-10 (Rekikai Koan). Kenshin’s letter is actually dated the 19th day of the 9th month, but as the editor of Essa Shiryō has conjectured, that seems to be a slip of the brush, with the correct date probably being the 29th day. Be that as it may, as Kenshin in the letter refers to something that had taken place on the 26th day, he must of course have written it after that date.

Ibid., p. 409.

Ibid., pp. 409-10.

Atsuta Kō: Nihon no Rekishi 11: ..., pp. 128 and 141.
Notes to Chapter Seven.

89 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 5, p. 432.
91 With regard to Kenshin’s death, our understanding of the letter hinge on the meaning of two characters, 虚気, usually taken to mean “apoplexy,” “cerebral stroke” or the like. One scholar, Sugiuura Morikuni, has suggested that they mean “abdominal pain” (Kuwata Tadachika: *Uesugi Kenshin Monoshiri Shinren*; ..., p. 199).
Notes to Chapter Eight.
1 See p. 64.
3 Watanabe Keichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, pp. 21-22. “Those below destroy those above” is a translation of the word gekokujō, the Japanese term often used by historians to epitomize one of the basic characteristics of the Sengoku period, i.e., the rise of the “new forces” and their often successful overthrow of the shugo daimyō.
4 Murooka Hiroshi: Kōkodō Bukkusu, vol. 3: ..., p. 94.
6 Atsuta Ko: Nihon no Rekishi 11: ..., p. 45.
7 Ibid.
8 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 609 (Katō Monjo).
9 See p. 98.
10 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 672 (Kaburagi Monjo).
11 See pp. 103-104.
13 Ibid., p. 817 (Rekida Kōan).
14 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 540.
16 Ibid., pp. 64-65 (Uesugi Monjo).
17 Ibid., p. 73 (Uesugi Monjo).
18 Ibid., p. 84 (Rekida Kōan). A kara no kashira was a helmet of non-Japanese origin adorned with ornaments made of hair from the tail of yak or some similar animal.
19 Ibid., p. 141 (Onko Sokuchū).
20 Abe Takeshi & Nishimura Keiko (eds.): Sengoku Jinmei Jiten ..., p. 31.
23 Ibid., pp. 151-52 (Rekida Kōan).
24 Ibid., p. 159 (Kokon Shōsokushū).
25 See p. 104.
26 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, pp. 175-76 (Rekida Kōan). Obviously, Kenshin cannot have been aware that Takeda Shingen was already dead by the time he wrote the letter. Shingen had passed away on the 4th month’s 12th day (23rd May) (Hayashiya Tatsusaburō: Nihon no Rekishi 12: Tenka Ittō, p. 162).
28 See p. 104.
29 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 5, pp. 192-93 (Honganji Monjo). As we have seen, by the time Nobunaga wrote this report, Kenshin had already invaded Kaga. Indeed, he was about to discontinue the invasion because he wanted to embark on a Kantō campaign instead (see pp. 104-105).
30 Ibid., p. 203 (Rekida Kōan). Of course, the situation in Etchū was not really settled, as Kenshin was soon to discover (see p. 105).
31 Ibid., p. 207 (Sakakibara-ke Monjo).
32 See p. 85.
34 Ibid., p. 219 (Uesugi-ke Jishō Mokuroku).
36 See p. 106.
37 See pp. 69, 100, 103, 105 and 106.
38 See pp. 103-104.
39 See p. 60.
40 See pp. 39-40.
41 See p. 60.
42 See pp. 64-65 and 87-88.
Notes to Chapter Eight.
43 See p. 99.
44 See pp. 91-92.
45 See pp. 87-88.
46 See pp. 89-90.
47 See p. 91.
48 See pp. 92-94.
49 See pp. 95-97.
50 See pp. 97-99.
51 See pp. 67 and 89.
52 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 96 (Meiji Tenshō Naietei Go-Shorui Mokuroku).
53 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 111.
54 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 96.
55 Ibid. The Five Commandments are the five basic precepts (against killing, stealing, adultery, falsehood and drinking) a Buddhist believer must observe. The Three Treasures are Buddha, the Buddhist doctrines and the Buddhist clergy.
56 Yaoita Sanin et al.: Uesugi-ke Go-renshu, ..., p. 61.
57 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 85 (Uesugi Komonjo).
58 See p. 66.
59 Watanabe Keiichi (ed.): Uesugi Kenshin no Subete, p. 113.
60 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 128 (Ueno Monjo).
61 Takahashi Yoshihiko (ed.): Essa Shiryō, vol. 4, p. 132.
62 See pp. 45, 46, 47, 56, 65, 88 and 89-90 and notes 18, p. 129, and 5, p. 131.
64 Ibid., p. 134 (Uesugi Komonjo).
66 See pp. 90-91.
67 See pp. 92-93.
69 Ibid., p. 307 (Kōyasan Monjo).
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- Maruta: *Hokuetsu Kidan*.
- *Uesugi Sandai Nikki* (Uesugi Gunki).
- Seino Sukejirō and Inoue Hayatonoshō: *Kawanakajima Gokado Kassen no Shidai*.

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From the compilation *Essa Sōsho*, vol. 5, ed. by Imaizumi Takujirō, Imaizumi Seizō & Shimizu Jun (Nojima Shuppan, 1974):
- Unan: *Hokuetsu Taihetki* (Hokuetsu Gunki).

From the compilation *Essa Shiryō*, vols. 3, 4 & 5, ed. by Takahashi Yoshihiko (Meicho Shuppan, 1971).*

- *Akami Monjo*.
- *Anazawa Monjo*.
- *Anyōji Monjo*.
- *Buke Jiki*.
- *Buneiji Monjo*.
- *Bushū Monjo*.
- *Chō Kafū*.
- *Chō Kaki*.

- *Chō Monjo*.
- *Echigo-Nagao Keizu*.
- *Ettoga Sanshūshi*.
- *Fukuōji Monjo*.
- *Fukayama Shiryō*.
- *Haga Monjo*.
- *Hagino Yoshiyuki-shi Shozō Monjo*.
- *Hasegawa-shi Shozō Monjo*.

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*I am indebted to the National Diet Library in Tokyo for having photocopied for me almost the whole of *Essa Shiryō*, vol. 4, from which I have quoted extensively in the preceding pages.*
- Heisei Nagao Keizu.
- Hennen Monjo.
- Hokuetsu Kasho.
- Honganji Monjo.
- Honganji Shōnyo Shōnin Nikki.
- Honjō Monjo.
- Honseiji Ki.
- Hotchi Monjo.
- Hotta Jirō-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Iizuka Hachiman Jinja Monjo.
- Ikushimatarushima Jinja Monjo.
- Inatsuki Monjo.
- Irobe Monjo.
- Isa Sō Monjo.
- Iwafune Monjo.
- Jōkōji Monjo.
- Kaburagi Monjo.
- Kanhashi Kosenroku.
- Kanji Denki.
- Kanō Kōkichi-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Katano Monjo.
- Kaiō Monjo.
- Kawada Monjo.
- Kawakami Monjo.
- Kenryo Shōnin Go-Shosatsu Anryū.
- Kenshin Ichidaiki.
- Kinko Shūjō.
- Kobun Shōsha.
- Kokon Shōsokushū.
- Komonjo.
- Kosuge Jinja Monjo.
- Kōyasan Kakochō.
- Kōyasan Monjo.

- Kōyō Gunkan.
- Kurata Monjo.
- Kuribayashi Monjo.
- Kyōto Shōgun Kafu.
- Mōda-ke Monjo.
- Makabe Monjo.
- Matsubara Jinja Monjo.
- Matsudaira Yoshtuki Shozō Monjo.
- Matsumoto Monjo.
- Meiji Tennō Naitai Go-Shorui Mokuroku.
- Miya Saburō-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Mizuno Seien-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Mōri Monjo.
- Musashi no Kuni Ryūenji Nendaiki.
- Myōhōji Ki.
- Nakajō Kiyosuke-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Nakajō Monjo.
- Nakamura Naoto-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Nakamura Tōhachi-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Nishina Moritada-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Odagiri Monjo.
- Odawara Ki.
- Ōhashi Monjo.
- Onko Sotuchō.
- Ōshū Aizu Shike Gōkō.
- Ōsuka Monjo.
- Oyama Monjo.
- Rekidai Koan.
- Rinzenji Kakobo.
- Rinzenji Kyūkakochō.
- Rinzenji Kyūreihaisha.
- Sakakihara-ke Monjo.
- Sasō-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Satake Kafu.                      - Uesugi Kafu.
- Satake Monjo.                   - Uesugi Kaki.
- Shinchoki.                      - Uesugi-ke Jūhō Mokuroku.
- Shinyōgyoku Shōkan.             - Uesugi-ke Komonjo.
- Shōda Monjo.                    - Uesugi-ke Kyūzō Shōreihō Kakemono.
- Shōjashinin Kakochō.            - Uesugi-ke Monjo.
- Shōkō Monjo.                    - Uesugi Komonjo.
- Shūko Monjo.                    - Uesugi Monjo.
- Sōma Monjo.                     - Uesugi Nenpu.
- Sōshū Heiran Ki.                - Uesugi Terutora-kō Ki.
- Sōshū Monjo.                    - Wakōin Wakan Gōun.
- Sumon Jinja Monjo.              - Watanabe Hideji-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Tairago Monjo.                  - Yamanouchi Monjo.
- Tochikabomura Youemon Shozō Monjo.  - Yasuda Monjo.
- Tokanō Zenpen.                  - Yoshie Monjo.
- Tomioka Monjo.                  - Yoshie Shizō Kakochō.
- Tōranki.                        - Yoshikawa Kinzō-shi Shozō Monjo.
- Ueno Monjo.                     - Ōunji Monjo.
- Zusōki.

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Resumé.

Usugi Kenshin (1530-78) blev født i provinsen Echigo (nutidens Niigata Præfektur) i det nordvestlige Japan. Hans fader var Nagao Tamekage, en højt rangerende provinsembdsmand indenfor Muromachi-shogunatet, og han selv kom til at regere over provinsen på en tid, da de væbnede konflikter, som havde hærget landet lokalt og regionalt siden midten af det femtende århundrede, hastigt var ved at udvikle sig til en kamp om det nationale overherredømme. Kenshin var fra midten af det sekstende århundrede selv en særdeles aktiv deltager i den udvikling, og hans politiske og militære aktiviteter har sikret ham omdømmet som én, der i loyalitet overfor de centrale myndigheder drog i krig for at beskytte den eksisterende politiske struktur og ikke egne interesser.

Dette omdømme gør Kenshin til lidt af en ener blandt det sekstende århundrades krigsherrer, men faktisk synes han at havde været helt igennem tidstypisk. Allerede i hans tidligste barndom blev han brugt af Funai Nagao-familien til at værne om dens interesser, og han forsøgte med dette, efter at han selv havde overtaget familiedederskabet. Således tøvede han ikke med at drage i felten mod potentielle fjender, som kom for tæt på Echigos grænser under deres erobringstogter i naboprovinserne. Og med tiden, efter nogle år hvor religiøse overvejelser tilsyneladende fik ham til at holde igen med militære aktiviteter, begav han sig selv ud på erobringstogter for at styrke sin position som Echigos hersker; og i sidste ende også for etablere et nyt nationalt overherredømme.

Disse erobringstogter blev legitimert af shogun Yoshiterus underforståede accept af Kenshin som den fremtidige Kantō kanrei i 1559 og senere af Ashikaga Yoshiakis anmodninger om militær assistance og af hans truede position i det hele taget. De fandt således sted helt indenfor rammerne af den eksisterende politiske struktur, og Kenshin døde, inden hans egentlige hensigter ville have bragt ham i åben konflikt med de central myndigheder, og han sikrede sig dermed omdømmet som den uselviske Ashikaga-støtte og de svages beskytter.
Summary.

Uesugi Kenshin (1530-78) was born in Echigo (present-day Niigata Prefecture) in north-western Japan as the son of Nagao Tamekage, a high-ranking local official of the Muromachi shogunate, and he came to rule over the province at a time when the military conflicts that had ravaged the country, locally and regionally, since the middle of the fifteenth century were quickly developing into a fight for national supremacy. He himself was a very active participant in this process from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards, and his activities have earned him the reputation of being one who let himself become involved in the conflicts of the day, not out of consideration for his own interests but out of loyalty for the central authorities and the Ashikaga polity.

This reputation makes him a bit of a rarity among the warlords of that period, but in fact he seems to have been very much a man of his time. From his earliest childhood, he was used by the Funai-Nagao as a means to protect their interests, and after he had taken over the leadership of the family, he continued to do so. Thus, he did not hesitate to confront potential enemies who came too close to the borders of Echigo when engaged in military conquests in neighbouring provinces. And in time, after some years of indecision caused, apparently, by religious considerations, he would also adopt a policy of territorial expansion in order to strengthen his position as Echigo’s ruler and, ultimately, to establish a new national hegemony.

Kenshin’s territorial expansion was legitimized by shogun Yoshiteru’s tacit acceptance (in 1559) of his assuming the post of Kantō kanrei, and, in subsequent years, by the plight of Ashikaga Yoshiaki and the specific requests for assistance he sent out. It was hence undertaken well within the framework of the Ashikaga polity, and Kenshin died before reaching the point where he had to show his hand and enter into an open conflict with the central authorities, thus securing for himself the reputation of an unselfish Ashikaga partisan and protector of the weak.
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