on ‘Concepts of Reflection’, we come across formidable blocks: ‘If one is a transcendental philosopher and faces the reflective problem, the first question he asks is to what cognitive faculty these concepts belong?’ (243). Then we can see what kinds of concepts Kant has in mind. There are ‘four pairs of concepts, which determine to his mind Leibnizian metaphysics. These are Identity and Difference, Agreement and Opposition, the Inner and the Outer, and Matter and Form’ (ibid.).

One is stuck if we take the situation of philosophy today in general and Kantian thought in particular. And the recurring issue is the ‘reality’ of concepts temporal and real, empirical and cognitive. As tools, concepts are ‘predicates of possible judgments ... concepts are the rules of synthesis [and] concepts are sets of marks’ (113). One example is ‘intuition’ and Kant’s view is: ‘Intuition is a representation which is antecedent to any act of thinking’ (43). The author’s explanation is: ‘If we cannot intuit what we are thinking about, then our thought is to that extent empty, its intention is frustrated’ (ibid.). And finally the Kantian view, if I read correctly, is ‘intuition ... does not need thought’ (ibid.).

Anticipating, I suppose, the ambiguity, Mohanty comes to our rescue: ‘We have to remember that for Kant most definitions are real. In nominal definition, we substitute words for words. In real definition we are saying something which belong to the nature of things which are being defined’ (195). Identifying the implicit aim of Kant, Mohanty says: ‘What Kant wanted was that for each pure logical concept or category, a temporalized form, which would be directly applicable to the data or the representations’ (196).

Purity or pure are the keys. But as Wittgenstein, with his gentle tenor puts it: ‘Taking the area of mathematics—is indeed of the highest certainty—though we only have a crude reflection of it’ (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G E M Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), 226e).

One gets the feeling in conclusion that Kant’s reflections on philosophy are logically original but his life itself was miserably, anguishingly intolerable: Did he realise what Michael Foucault tells us: ‘The world after Kant’s critique appears as a city to be built, rather than as a cosmos already given.’ Contradictory responses marked his work: ‘Many of his students had no idea what he was talking about’ and he added in a reply to a correspondent ‘I don’t understand myself. Such overly refined hairsplitting is no longer for me.’ He may have realised that the view that ‘thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind’ (*The Philosophical Life*, 266, 304).

But then, recent studies show a deeper humanistic dimension. Martha C Nussbaum points to a wider philosophical intervention drawing from Greek and Roman cultures who focus on ‘equal respect for the worth of humanity in each and every person— a Stoic idea that exercised great power over Kant, who captured the idea of world citizenship in his doctrine of the “kingdom of ends”’ (Martha Nussbaum, *Philosophical Interventions: Reviews 1986–2011*, (Oxford: Oxford University, 2014), 172).

Mohanty’s volume is, as everything that he has written or spoken, thorough and makes itself an indispensable manual for the study of Immanuel Kant. And thanks to his former students who have edited the volume. The only trouble is: absence by and large of relevance to life, in spite of profound dialectics. The basic textual theme is provided by Mohanty. We need to proceed from there.

*Prof. M Sivaramkrishna*

Former Chair, Department of English
Osmania University, Hyderabad

---

**All Thoughts Are Equal: Laruelle and Nonhuman Philosophy**

John Ó Maoilearca


Published in the series *Posthumanities*, this book presents the author’s attempt to analyse François Laruelle’s Non-philosophy. He does this by a non-conventional method, circumventing the orthodox philosophical ways, and following the framework of Lars von Trier’s film *The Five Obstructions*. Precisely because of this novel approach, Maoilearca is able to clearly bring out the unique features of Laruelle’s thought and the power of nonhuman philosophy. An essential
Galloway critically examines how François Laruelle’s non-standard philosophy subverts the digital question. Clarifying the philosophical nature of the digital concept, Galloway proceeds to show that non-standard philosophy is an attempt to come out of the authoritarian stance that traditional philosophy takes and to show that there could be a non-binary view of things. One of the best introductions to Laruelle, this volume seeks to ‘superimpose Laruelle onto digitality, resulting in a new unilateral posture vis-à-vis both digitality and philosophy’ and shows that ‘Laruelle’s non-standard theorization and axiomatization of the philosophical infrastructure may also be applied to the digital infrastructure’ (xxxv). A must read for anyone wanting to understand Laruelle.