A crusade over the airwaves: the Blue Division on Radio Nacional de España (1941–1954)

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The Blue Division, Spain’s most notable military contribution to the Second World War, has been examined from many different perspectives, though the role of communication has not featured among them. This study aims to analyse the role played by Spanish state radio in the creation and maintenance of Spain’s war effort in that period. In order to achieve this, we used documentary sources, and more specifically, reconstructed the radio programming schedules, mainly using the press, due to the lack of audio recordings from the era. Finally, this work explores the role of radio from the Blue Division’s inception through to its official disbandment; or, put another way, the transition from commitment to the Axis powers to gradual estrangement from them. A dual transition process occurred on Radio Nacional de España: firstly, from zealous glorification to the silencing of the divisionaries by official order. The second transition was from a radio station that, since the Civil War, had lost its persuasive power, to a new perception of propaganda based on the familiar and the emotional.

Radio Nacional and the impact of the Second World War in Spain

Spain’s foreign policy during the Second World War had two clear phases of development. The first phase, while Ramón Serrano Súñer was Minister of Foreign
Affairs, was characterised by neutrality, as proclaimed by Franco on 4 September 1939, albeit with pro-Axis sympathies which were overtly expressed. After Italy entered the war, this position changed to become even more pro-German in nature, with a move to ‘non-belligerency’ from 12 June 1940 onwards. Despite the political pressure from Hitler in his interview with Franco in Hendaya, Spain did not join the fray, at least not officially. However, when the Third Reich attacked the USSR in June 1941, the Spanish government decided to send a division of volunteers to fight communism: the so-called División Azul, or Blue Division, which fought on the Leningrad front.  

The second phase, which consisted in an increasing estrangement from the Axis, started on 3 September 1942. Francisco Gómez Jordana, a notorious pro-Allies politician, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs. During his term, Spain’s official stand was, once again, neutrality. The cooling of diplomatic relations with Germany – at least, in the public sphere – became increasingly more obvious as the Wehrmacht experienced more difficulties in the war in the East. In October 1943, Franco decided to repatriate the Blue Division. Nevertheless, several thousand Spanish volunteers disobeyed the order and chose to remain in the war, this time as part of the German army. 

In this context of assertion and exaltation of Hispano-German relations, the German attack on the Soviet Union took place on 22 June 1941, without a prior declaration of war. Two days later, Spain’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Serrano Súñer, took advantage of these circumstances to give an anti-Soviet speech at a spontaneous rally in the Falange’s Madrid headquarters. Serrano’s address was broadcast on all of Radio Nacional de España’s (hereinafter, ‘RNE’) stations and published in the newspapers linked to the Falange. This ‘spontaneous’ manoeuvre had, in fact, been planned. Two days earlier, the Germans had approved the dispatch of volunteers to the Russian front, and Franco had not opposed the initiative. The state propaganda machine orchestrated a campaign to support the formation of this ‘volunteer squadron’. As Franco saw it, this initiative did not break Spain’s neutrality, since it was presented as a crusade against Communism and not as a general military intervention, and certainly not as an intervention by the Spanish state. 

In this campaign, broadcasters, and RNE in particular, played a leading role in promoting the Spanish Volunteers’ Division, popularly known as The Blue Division. RNE had a series of advantages over other media. Firstly, it could achieve greater social penetration, given its capacity to reach a population that was excluded from the press by illiteracy and poverty, even in the larger cities. Furthermore, radio also had a greater capacity for immediate mobilisation than the press or cinema, particularly as the first NO-DOs did not come about until January 1943. The history of radio in Spain reinforced this perception. RNE was founded in January 1937 with the collaboration of Nazi Germany, and marked the completion of the Nationalists’ propaganda broadcasting project during the Spanish Civil War: namely, a unified radio voice against the multiple, diverse, radio stations of the Republicans. 

After the Civil War in 1939, Franco had two main objectives: developing a broadcasting structure able to host private enterprise while maintaining tight government control, and the popularisation of radio receivers: ‘may radio, as an
instrument of the State, reach the remotest village’. The state was well aware of the importance of the media, because ‘it had won battles’. However, there were doubts regarding how it should be managed. This had two consequences: first, only RNE was authorised to broadcast news programmes, so it had a monopoly of radio information; second, the jurisdiction of radio services was constantly changing from one Ministry to another during the 1940s and 1950s (Vice-secretariat of Popular Education, Ministry of National Education and Ministry of Information and Tourism). Nevertheless, it was soon obvious that the lack of resources hampered this plan, and the expansion of broadcasting was slow due to economic and social difficulties. The number of receivers was roughly reckoned from the number of licence fees paid. The drawbacks of this method were pointed out even by the foreign press:

Faith and faith alone must guide the radio time buyer in Spain, in as much as the country hasn’t gotten around as yet to such things as radio surveys. The Spaniard characteristically takes a rather jaundiced view of survey statistics of any kind. He accepts albeit lightly, the Government’s estimate that there are 800,000 radio receiving sets in Spain. He may be allowed his scepticism (sic) because of the manner in which the Government estimates that 50 per cent of the Spaniards are dodging this tax. Last year 400,000 paid their radio taxes; ergo there were 800,000 sets!

The aim of this study is to analyse how Spanish public radio (RNE) became a fundamental engine of the creation and maintenance of Spain’s war efforts in its contribution to the Second World War through the Blue Division. This is a topic that has attracted little attention from scholars, and it has mostly been tackled only in chapters or sections in broader studies.

The Blue Division on the air: sources, bibliography and methodology

The abundance of literature on the Blue Division contrasts with the real impact this unit had on the theatre of operations of the Second World War, suggesting a discrepancy between the Division’s significance and the academic output which has contributed to mythologising it. The myth was designed to create an exaggerated and benign, even idyllic, reading of the members of the Division on the Russian Front for two reasons. First, the Blue Division was Spain’s only significant contribution to the twentieth century’s two world wars. Second, the high survival rate among the Blue Division’s soldiers, and their generally high levels of education, meant that a significant amount of information was disseminated in the form of biographies, studies and memoirs, some of which went on to become the subject of cinematic reconstruction. This trend towards mythologisation, which the current historiography has tried to reframe along more realistic lines, has its origins in the classic study by Kleinfeld and Tambs, which laid the foundations for a new direction in research on the Blue Division.

In order to explain the role played by RNE in the military intervention of the Blue Division, we took current historiography as our starting point, since it provides a context which sheds light on the regime’s radio broadcasting initiatives.
We selected a research method which used a wide number of primary sources of various types. It must be noted that attempts to analyse radio messages from this period meet many obstacles, the most significant of which is the (near) total absence of recorded or transcribed written sources.¹⁸

This constraint was overcome through the use of other official sources (circulars, correspondence and programmes which were approved by censors) found in the Archivo General de la Administración (hereinafter, ‘AGA’). The AGA houses a wide variety of documentation which provides an insight into official thinking and the objectives which were set for RNE. We found references to remarks about the Blue Division made by foreign broadcasters in the archives of the Spanish Foreign Office, as well as in the Deutsches Rundfunkarchiv (German Radio Archive) in Frankfurt am Main. References to the Blue Division found in these archives include reports, transcripts and recordings. The reason behind the use of official sources is to see the arguments presented in the preambles of the relevant laws as a self-justification exercise. From these, it is clear that the legal framework regarding the media was based on interventionism and state control. Of course, it must be taken into account that the mere enactment of a law does not necessarily entail that it will be observed.

The study and analysis of published documentary sources was another focus of this research, as was the national press (ABC and La Vanguardia). Additionally, the magazine which served as a mouthpiece for the state broadcaster during this period, Radio Nacional de España (1941–1945), has been used to examine the most official view of discourse on the Blue Division. In both cases, the documents serve to focus our analysis, showing the changing impetus that Francoism tried to give to the Blue Division during the war. This group of sources allow for the study of the discourses presented in the media, which were the only points of view that Spaniards of that time were exposed to.

Somewhat paradoxically, we used written material, since it enabled us to pinpoint the tone of the discourse broadcast about the war by RNE during the Second World War, as well as its activity on two fronts: both abroad (addressed to the members of the Blue Division on the Russian front) and domestically (addressed to the civilian population, those who would have to bear the cost of the war). The study’s structure is based on the three main phases of the Blue Division’s activity. The first stage covers the Division’s formation, from the recruitment period up to the pledge of allegiance to the flag in Grafenwöhr at the end of June 1941; the second stage runs from the Division’s entry into the war on the Russian front until the gradual silencing of its activities which occurred as Spain sought to distance itself from the Axis powers (and in particular, from the appointment of Francisco Gómez Jordana as Minister of Foreign Affairs on 3 September 1942). In the final stage, any issues related to the Blue Division were shrouded in silence. This silence lasted beyond the end of the Second World War, until the arrival of the Semiramis, which brought 286 Division members back to Spain in 1954. The conclusions show that, for the regime, the Blue Division signified a new way of understanding radio, in a different context to that of the Civil War and the early years of Francoism.
State broadcasting’s new crusade: the Blue Division

Serrano Súñer’s forceful address in support of the German invasion – under the slogan ‘Russia is guilty’ – marked the beginning of the campaign to create a favourable climate for enlistment. Two days later, on 26 June, volunteer enrolment lists were officially opened at the Falange’s headquarters. In the news sphere, the deputy secretary for Popular Education, the agency that set the guidelines of the government’s censorship, set out the obligation to ‘publish, with special prominence, any note that reflects the people’s desire to enlist for the Russian front, including all of those details which may help give recruitment a nationwide character’.

Within just six days, 18,000 volunteers had come to enlist – more than 40 times the set number. It is hard to pinpoint the exact role played by state radio in this context of patriotic exaltation because the campaign was supported by the Spanish media as a whole. What is beyond doubt is that a medium like radio could act in a more immediate way and bring the issue closer to the audience. Radio Nacional magazine’s weekly summary of current affairs on radio offers a clue to assessing RNE’s role in the campaign:

Listeners to our broadcasts have been able to form a clear idea of the progress of operations on the Eastern front and of the victories of the German troops – which, at the time of writing, have broken the Stalin line […]

[1 July, a note from Madrid] spoke about a highly topical issue: falangist volunteers from Madrid signing up to go and fight against Communism, describing scenes which reveal the enthusiasm and style of our boys.

In other words, there was broad consensus about the seemingly imminent military defeat of the Soviet Union. Therefore, in keeping with orders, the triumphal departure of the volunteers had to be well positioned and give them all the necessary warmth, though it was forbidden to mention some ‘illustrious’ names who accompanied that expedition.

On 12 July 1941, the first two detachments of volunteers left Madrid. Of course, Radio Nacional broadcasted the event along with impassioned speeches by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ramón Serrano Súñer, the Division’s General, Agustín Muñoz Grandes and Miguel Primo de Rivera, brother of the founder of Falange. In the pages of Radio Nacional magazine, the exaltation of the event was described as one of the Spanish state radio broadcasting organisations’ finest moments:

From the event, and the inexpressible emotion of the departure of the second battalion of Madrilian falangist Blue Division volunteers to fight Soviet Communism. Amid hymns, cheers and applause, our first speaker, Fernández de Córdoba, could hardly make himself heard during the inspired and extremely moving report he gave from the event. Its grandeur and emotional force made it impossible to describe, and […] the Blue Division – we said into our microphone- is like an ambassador of Spanish heroism and resolve, always ready for any endeavours, and we are certain it will lift the name of Spain up high.
From that moment on, RNE would begin daily coverage of the vicissitudes faced by the divisionaries. The chronicle began on the day the first expedition arrived at Grafenwöhr for training. The head of Sección Femenina (a female auxiliary organisation of Falange) in Berlin, Celia Giménez, was in charge of the radio bulletins. The daily broadcasts to Spain took place each evening and their main objective was to maintain the triumphant atmosphere that had preceded the division’s departure. A brief note offers interesting clues as to how this was achieved:

In the news programmes from the Blue Division, we offer reports broadcast by Radio Berlin in its extraordinary programmes at five thirty in the afternoon. The interesting news provided in these reports, and the prominence of the people who take their turn in front of the microphone at the camp where the Blue Division is based, mean that this information is followed with great interest by our listeners.  

There was a continuous supply of information in this period, with programmes broadcasted in the night time slot every day, usually between ten and eleven o’clock. Thus, the national radio station fulfilled its role of keeping the rearguard – i.e. the domestic front – active, communicating, satisfying a growing demand for information, as they so vehemently remark, ‘in all of our broadcasts, […] the latest news about the Spanish volunteers, news which is listened to with the greatest interest, as we know from the numerous letters we receive’.  

The propaganda effort was not limited to RNE, and in some cases foreign radio stations – mostly German ones – were used to send messages to Spain, or to counteract foreign propaganda. Shortly after his arrival in Grafenwöhr, Dionisio Ridruejo, poet and former propaganda chief of Nationalist Spain, responded to ‘the republican propaganda’ which was broadcast on the BBC with the assertion that ‘what is here is the best of the Falange’. He also wished to convey the divisionaries’ euphoria: ‘All is happiness and enthusiasm in the camp. […] We feel supported by the affection and the camaraderie of the Spanish Falangists’. He was not alone in his efforts. Also on Radio Berlin, Celia Giménez interviewed the volunteers, whether they were personalities such as Agustín Aznar, pilots from the Blue Legion or lowly privates from the division. Volunteers sending greetings to their relatives were always included.

In addition to the daily chronicles in the regular time slots, some special programmes were made about the Blue Division. The first of these, on 24 August 1941, was about the pledge of allegiance to the flag in Grafenwöhr, which had taken place at the end of July that year. The beginning of this special programme noted that

behind the Blue Division stands the whole of Spain, the Party, which through the Falange is the representation of the New State, and the indelible memory of a war in our country against the same enemy, in which our Caudillo was the first Victorious General.

Thus, the most popular slogans from the Civil War were reprised, from a time when Franco had been heralded as the victorious leader of the first battle waged against Communism in Europe.
Prior to the programme about the pledge to the flag, a feature by Jacinto Miquelarena had been published in the ABC newspaper dated 1 August 1941, which described the controversial phrasing of the oath. Neither Franco, nor his country featured in the wording of the pledge, and an order prohibited the ‘dissemination of the pledge taken by Blue Division volunteers in the German camp’. When RNE broadcast the pledge, which had been recorded on disc by the Reich’s radio service, it was described as a ‘brilliant event which made a lasting impression on those who were present’, in which ‘the falangist volunteers swore by God, their honour and Spain, to fight to the death against Communism’. In the original oath they also swore loyalty to Adolf Hitler, but for the Radio Nacional broadcast ‘Spain’ was added to the pledge, while Hitler’s name was omitted. This manipulation was done to avoid raise unnecessary tensions between the influential, non-falangist Army officials. The official discourse identified all of the volunteers as members of the Falange (in spite of the fact that a significant number of soldiers in the Blue Division were not Falangists).

RNE’s programmes added anecdotes which underlined national characteristics in order to highlight the contribution the Spanish soldiers could make, such as their winning attitude, vast degree of commitment and strong fighting spirit. For example, one of the programmes told of how a peasant, who had got lost in Madrid on the day of departure, had managed to get to Bavaria by his own means and rejoin his companions. The programmes also provided information for relatives on how to send correspondence to the divisionaries. Similarly, they featured a great deal of hymns, military music, parades, etc.; even more than was usual for the time. The report concluded with one final rally from Muñoz Grandes to the Spanish people.

Next, the Blue Division would transfer to the battlefront where it would see military action. Until that point, the government radio station had taken an active role in generating excitement about the war and had even contributed to the formation of the Division. Furthermore, radio was defining itself as an emotionally powerful medium the political control of which was fundamental, as the practical experiences in III Reich had proved. The period which followed was marked by the main tragic consequences of the war – casualties – as well as difficulties of broadcasting.

Radio Nacional de España’s second war: the Blue Division on the Russian front

The Blue Division’s march from Grafenwöhr to their designated positions on the Soviet front (between 20 August and 11 October 1941) hindered the broadcasts to which the audience had become accustomed. Friends and relatives of the divisionaries began to receive less news just when they needed it most: in times of actual combat. In the early stages, some information came through the German media, but this soon proved insufficient as it was vague and lacked real content. From a technical perspective, it was more difficult to broadcast regularly due to the conditions of movement. Furthermore, military security prohibited the transmission of ‘any news story which refers to the position or movement of the units in which
the Blue Division are embedded, as well as the actions of the same unless previously authorised by the superior authority’. 38

All of this posed serious problems. The strong demand for information could not be met. The tone – patriotic, anti-communist and falangist – was repetitive because the content could not be updated or satisfy the demand for swift and relevant information about their loved ones that the audience called for. 39 Some emergency measures were taken to solve the problems. For example, recorded events which had been broadcast already, such as the pledge to the flag, were repeated. Among the few novelties that could be offered in the first few days of this stage, in late August, was the broadcast of interviews with members of the Blue Squadron (the Blue Division’s air force) which was still in Germany, 40 and the dispatch of nurses from the Women’s Section of the Falange to the Division. That event was treated as a second farewell. 41 However, the fundamental shortage continued: there were no firsthand accounts as to what was happening to the Blue Division, its position, status, etc., yet these were the things that were important to the people closest to the volunteers on the eastern front. During the autumn of 1941, another solution involved broadcasting the numerous events that took place in homage to the division. The broadcasts, like the events themselves, were loaded with anti-Communist significance. This style of programme featured anti-Communist speeches which had been pressed onto gramophone discs and were then broadcast on radio stations in the Axis countries. Of course, Serrano Súñer’s address was one of them. 42

The uncertainty generated by the lack of information was exploited by British intelligence. In Spain, they tried to act against Germany by taking advantage of the interest falangist propaganda had stirred up about the Division. The British did this mainly by using the same weapon: radio propaganda. Specifically, the programme Azulejos, broadcast by the BBC in Spanish, reported irregularities in the recruitment of divisionaries, such as the possible absorption of prisoners into the squadron. The Franco regime’s public denials of this served to further spread the allegation among the Spanish people. Later on, Azulejos toned its story down, and denied having stated that the entire Blue Division was made up of prisoners, but maintained that it was true that there were some prisoners among the ranks. 43

In this atmosphere of denials and confusion about the divisionaries’ voluntary status, the first authorised news of the Division’s entry into combat was received. The news arrived in Spain on 15 October 1941. Three days later, Spaniards found out that the Blue Division was fighting in the northern sector of the front. The treatment of news about the Blue Division’s entry into the war had also been considered by the censors, who warned that ‘newspapers shall not, under any pretext, refer to the Blue Division’s entry into battle. Until such time as this office receives new orders from the Deputy Secretary of Popular Education, the newspapers will abstain completely from addressing this subject’. 44

The first news of the Blue Division to arrive after the period of silence once again created an atmosphere of euphoria among the Spanish population. This euphoria was dampened by the news of the first casualties amid the Blue Division’s ranks. From that moment on, there was a change in the official discourse. It now stressed that ‘this price in blood was the unavoidable price of Spain’s victory over Communism’. 45 However, censorship could not avoid that news regarding a highly
sensitive issue as casualties were broadcast. The account of a battle between Soviets and Spaniards on 27 December 1941 provides an example. ‘It was four o’clock in the afternoon when the battle ended. We had relatively few casualties. Barely 100 dead and wounded’. The news caused concern among relatives and friends. The need for more concrete details – such as who the dead and injured were – became clear. This account was selected for study as it caused great ‘anxiety among the families of the courageous companions who fight in the Blue Division’. This type of incident prompted new directives

that the most exquisite care should be taken in the broadcasting of news, of whatever type and origin, which might cause the slightest concern for the families of our fellow soldiers in our heroic Blue Division, who are fighting on the Eastern front to crush Communism.

This set of circumstances created two more battlefronts for the regime; the mobilisation of the rearguard to fund the war effort, and the scheduling of special programmes to keep morale high, both on the domestic front and overseas. State radio was to spearhead this propaganda effort.

**RNE as a mobilising force on the home front**

Mobilisation of the home front began at Christmas 1941. The Blue Division’s ‘Christmas box’ was an important collective display of support orchestrated by the regime and falangist propaganda. This campaign, initially scheduled to run until 19 November 1941, actually lasted until the end of the year and beyond, with some late contributions made in January 1942. The basic means of collaboration required the work and effort of all Spaniards and radio took an active role in the broadcast of this kind of message:

The appeals made by the Women’s Section, asking all women in Spain to dedicate the greatest possible amount of time to making warm garments for the heroic volunteers of the Blue Division, have been broadcast on various programmes, as a filler.

Another form of collaboration was through monetary donations. Radio Nacional ‘rewarded’ these initiatives through a relationship with the individuals and organisations who contributed in this way. A list was made of ‘donations collected in the Blue Division offices, with the intention of supporting the Spanish volunteers who have gone to Russia to fight against Communism’. The RNE programmes tried to spur on those regions which were least receptive to the campaign. Barcelona was one example, and a warning was sent of the danger of ‘suffering the shame of falling too far behind’ in this meaningful contest. It stood out as the exception in ‘an example of magnificent perseverance, (since) all the Spanish provinces kept up an admirable fight to help Christmas presents reach the sector of the Eastern front occupied by our men’.

Once Christmas was over, the regime sought to maintain the civilian population’s interest in the Blue Division. Any reason would do, from a special tribute on the anniversary of the volunteers’ departure for the USSR, to warnings of the
impending Russian winter, broadcast during the summer months. The campaign was kept up until late 1942, when in light of the coming Christmas season, Radio Nacional asked that ‘all of Spain make a contribution so that the heroic combatants of the Blue Division can enjoy a splendid Christmas box’.

**RNE and combatants’ morale: the special programmes**

Despite the important role played by state radio in this type of events, the special programmes dedicated to the Blue Division were RNE’s true frontline. The programmes came in response to two factors: firstly, the broadcaster wanted to avoid the problems which silence and lack of information about the Blue Division had caused in July and August of 1941. Secondly, it aimed to revive the Spanish public’s mood after the news of the first setbacks (and deaths in combat) of the Spanish expeditionaries.

Following this logic, the first special programme for the Blue Division was made, and broadcast on 8 December 1941. The aim was ‘to allow news about the soldiers who, in the faraway frontier lands of the East, on the edge of Europe, stand guard against Russian barbarism, to reach all the relatives of the Blue Division and all Spaniards’. Therefore, the objective was to bolster both fronts, building bridges ‘between our Blue Division companions and the constant memory of their loved ones […] Radio Nacional will be their voice and the messenger between them’.

This two-part programme went out in the after-lunch timeslot. The first part was entitled ‘Newspaper on the wind’ and featured the participation of literary figures of the day, followed by some lines from José Luis Arrese about ‘the Army and the Falange’ and a speech by Girón, the minister for Labour, entitled ‘Deliberate Liars’. Despite its title (‘Current affairs in the spotlight’), the second part also had a literary component. The programme’s conclusion was under the direction of the National Delegation of the Youth Front’s cultural advisor, who read a speech to the Blue Division soldiers. We cannot know with any certainty what kind of reception this first programme of homage to the Blue Division got, though there are two pieces of evidence which suggest relative disappointment. Firstly, in the province of Alicante, the comment was made that the ‘programme got a cold reception from the public because of its excessively official nature and lack of humanity’. The second indication is that, days later, a new RNE director was appointed, with Ismael Herraiz replacing José Rodiles Pascual.

The new director brought the organisation of new programmes about the Blue Division under his direct control. On 28 December 1941, he began by recording them in the presence of a live audience, to break away from the rigidity of official discourse and give them greater emotional charge. Keeping the morale of the combatants and the civilian population high depended on the success of the programmes. Ismael Herraiz issued the following assessment to the National Delegation of Propaganda after ‘RNE’s extraordinary programme Cara al público’:

In spite of all the flaws that you were able to observe, yesterday’s programme was a resounding success in terms of the profound and authentic humanity
which we were able to achieve. We moved masses of Spaniards, who had previously found all of the distortions of propaganda intolerable, to tears. I believe that all of the ‘dilettantism’ which went before us in the manipulation of the tools of radio broadcasting and propaganda did not achieve as much as we have in just one programme.\footnote{Herraiz’s assessment of almost ‘reinventing propaganda’ was not a total exaggeration, and it gives us an idea of the role that the RNE director wanted to bestow on radio in this context. Days later, Torres López, in his role as representative of the National Delegation of Propaganda, acknowledged this work, noting: ‘I consider the programme Cara al público, broadcast to the Blue Division, to be a prime example of the return that can be obtained from the service that you run’.\footnote{Ismael Herraiz’s report to the National Delegation of Propaganda sheds light on the functions of radio in general, and of these programmes in particular. Herraiz was getting closer to the ‘magic formula’ so often sought by the Franco regime for its radio programmes. He tried to convey these ideas in reports explaining how programmes should be made:}

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It is possible that there will be a good deal of criticism of the musical part of the show, which some might say featured an excess of Cuban music and dance. Firstly, I must state on record that personally, I am completely in favour of using this type of orchestra. We are addressing soldiers, and many of them know the names of these orchestras from records, the radio, public places, etc.

[...] I think that a programme dedicated to soldiers should have an informal and youthful tone, avoiding excessive use of familiar stories, even if they please the audience, like Fernández de Córdoba’s tale about his poor mother who he had the misfortune to lose when he was very young.\footnote{The aim was, therefore, to put an end to programmes which featured a grandiloquent tone, official propaganda and music for the ‘elite’, opting instead for a more human and emotional form of radio broadcasting. This emotion was further intensified by the men of the regime themselves. For example, radio presenter Thomas de Carranza declared that ‘there was not one single person in the theatre who was not in tears; not one artist, not one musician, not one worker among those of us who were in the wings’.\footnote{The most moving part of the programmes was the exchange of greetings and news between members of a family (usually between mothers and their sons), separated by distances of thousands of kilometres, highlighting the feeling of nostalgia for the ‘beloved homeland’. The programme’s effect reached beyond the atmosphere that was created in the theatre and among those who listened to it. The whole performance was recorded onto discs that were sent to the divisionaries on the Soviet front:}

The recording of the discs that I listened to from beginning to end yesterday, which were sent to Berlin on the same night, was perfect: the voices of the volunteers’ mothers, the background of applause and cheers and the overall
development of the programme were reproduced with absolute clarity and I think our companions in the Blue Division will feel as if they were in the audience at yesterday’s gala.\textsuperscript{65}

There was a perception that, in just a short period, the fundamental objectives of keeping morale and fighting spirit high, both among divisionaries and all Spaniards, had been achieved. This sense of euphoria marked a turning point as officials were reminded of radio’s potential for achieving propaganda aims: ‘when radio is put to the service of the only everlasting values that are worth taking into consideration, the technique loses its cold, soulless affectation to become one of the most sincere vehicles of the human heart’.\textsuperscript{66} This perception was also reflected in a series of in-depth articles published by Radio Nacional on the subject of radio as a weapon of war, which demonstrate the level of consideration the authorities gave to the propagandistic potential of radio, even in peace-time.\textsuperscript{67}

This approach was applied to another programme in RNE’s \textit{Cara al público} series, broadcast on Sunday, 22 February 1942, from the Teatro Español.\textsuperscript{68} It followed similar lines to the previous programme with a slot from 10 pm to 10.15 pm in which a group of mothers addressed their sons. In the grandiloquent rhetoric typical of the time, it recognised the importance of ‘hearing the emotion in the accent of a mother who is speaking directly to her son, and though she cannot see him, knowing that her words will reach straight to his heart. The wonders of modern techniques at the service of element of emotional propaganda, and it was beneficial to use them’. Thus, radio’s importance in acting like an umbilical cord between the men on the frontlines and the homefront was established: ‘At the end of the transmissions to Europe, five mothers of Blue Division volunteers send a greeting over the microphones, and messages from volunteers’ relatives are also broadcast’.\textsuperscript{69}

According to official propaganda, ‘the moment when the mothers addressed those heroic sons of theirs, sons of our Spain, to send them their greetings and news, their eyes filled with tears, was deeply moving’.\textsuperscript{70} From 15 March 1942 onwards, the most popular aspects of these \textit{Cara al público} programmes were exploited to excess, being broadcast daily.\textsuperscript{71} Behind this triumphalism, some important doses of reality were left out. For example, recruiting for the next Blue Division became more difficult from the beginning of 1942 onwards. The heroic proclamations which were broadcast on the radio and other media were sufficiently encouraging to persuade people to venture out to the USSR.\textsuperscript{72} Measures were taken to stimulate enlistment and the propaganda from the state controlled media outlets was further bolstered, resulting in the draft’s departure for Russian territory on 4 March 1942.

The last of these special \textit{Cara al público} programmes took place on 3 May 1942 and was put together on the occasion of Celia Giménez’s arrival in Spain, who, after 2 years as liaison in Berlin, had become quite known as the ‘godmother of the Blue Division’.\textsuperscript{73} This third programme had more or less the same contents as the others, and was regarded by Ismael Herraiz as a brilliant success.\textsuperscript{74} This third programme followed the same lines as the previous ones and was also described as a resounding success by Ismael Herraiz.\textsuperscript{75} The programme marked the end of a phase which could almost be described as experimental, whereby Herraiz’s
methods were put into practice in a series of special programmes, made in a short period of time with meagre resources, and which were not initially planned to have a long run. Once the success of these methods had been demonstrated and the suspicions of the official institutions overcome, the *Cara al público* programmes would be broadcast regularly.

**From the return of the heroes to 10 years of silence**

Days after the third *Cara al público* broadcast, the heroes of the Blue Division returned. Naturally, Radio Nacional took to its microphones to provide an account of their return. Over several months, reports about 'our heroic volunteers' were broadcast, continuing to hide the difficulties at home and abroad. However, communication policy was becoming ambivalent: the special programmes had given way to regular broadcasts for the divisionaries, yet official silences began to get longer. It is important to note that there is a lack of documentation from this period about major programmes on the Blue Division. The sudden silence is all the more significant, given the intense coverage the division had previously received.

This change in mood had also been perceived on the home front, and sectors of the Falange attempted to compensate for it. In August 1942, the Women’s section put together a team of 200 female Falangists to act as war godmothers, which involved exchanging letters with one or two soldiers each to keep moral high and show them that, ‘although Spain’s political evolution was perceptible, the women had not forgot’. They collected Christmas boxes for the soldiers again that year, but this time with much less institutional support.

In short, it was becoming increasingly clear that the Blue Division was an increasingly uncomfortable subject for the regime. Between mid-1942 and the end of 1943, the international situation had undergone significant changes. The triumphalist euphoria, prevalent when victory for the Axis powers seemed certain, turned to disappointment in the face of the Germans’ obvious defeat in Soviet territory. The war was far from over, but the final outcome was becoming more and more evident. The volunteers of the Soviet Front were living proof of Spain’s involvement with Nazi Germany, which it suited the regime to ignore.

Finally, a note from a RNE broadcaster in La Coruña (found in its almanac) endorsed the relegation of programmes for the Division to the early morning timeslot. Later, an official order was given to terminate not just the regular programmes, but also any reference to the Blue Division whatsoever on RNE from November 1943 onwards:

Programmes dedicated to the Blue Division were monitored directly – especially the direct message service, which was broadcast at 22h15, immediately after the Radio Nacional service, until the month of June. At that time, on the advice of the volunteers themselves, it was broadcast at 0h55 when the reception in Russia is much better. These programmes were suspended last month according to orders from the highest authority.

The silence would last for 10 years. The epilogue to the story of the Blue Division would come on 2 April 1954, with RNE’s broadcast of the arrival of the *Semíramis*
into port in Barcelona. The Turkish boat, chartered by the Red Cross, had departed from the Black Sea with 286 Spanish repatriates from the USSR on board, with ex-combatants from the Blue Division and ‘children of the war’ among them. From 31 March onwards, Juan Manuel Soriano and Federico Gallo presented a special programme which mainly consisted of the broadcast of hundreds of people’s heartfelt greetings to their relatives on the Semíramis, which they listened to via an on-board receiver.

This report gained particular magnitude, not only because of its extraordinary length, (with several breaks, the programme ran from the afternoon of 31 March to the night of 2 April), but also because it coincided with a period of great falangist ‘euphoria’, presided over by Jesús Suevos in the General Bureau for Radio Broadcasting. This landmark event was so important in the collective memory that it was used as the climax of the most notable film about the return of the divisionaries, Ambassadors in Hell.

A historical perspective on this example of Spanish participation in the Second World War was espoused by RNE’s Barcelona bureau. Each Wednesday from October 1954 onwards, it broadcast a series called Division 250, which was based on the novel by writer and Blue Division soldier Tomas Salvador, and adapted by María del Carmen García Lecha. Ten years on, it marked the end of one of the Franco regime’s great radio broadcasting and military accomplishments.

Conclusions on state radio broadcasting and the Blue Division

In strictly military terms, the Blue Division was of scant significance. Nevertheless, it did acquire crucial importance in the Spanish political framework, in that it was a symbol which transcended the ‘neutrality versus belligerence’ debate and came to reflect the internal divisions of the fledgling regime. This made it unique in both the news context and the political context of Francoism. As we have seen, radio propaganda about the Blue Division went through two basic stages before the period of silence noted above. The first stage, heroic exaltation, was followed by the need to mobilise the population on the home front in the face of the initial negative reports. In the process, the way the Franco regime made radio programmes also underwent a transformation: from grandiloquent and rhetorical in tone, with a top-down approach, to persuasion through the use of popular culture and sentimentality. In making propaganda for the Blue Division, Francoist radio rediscovered its capacity to mobilise, which had been lost since the Civil War.

In this line of thought, Francoism envisioned public broadcasting as a way of conveying principles and ideology and ensuring control of information. Because of this, the Blue Division was a highly sensitive topic that worked very well with a broader programming approach, aimed at engineering a consensus between the Spanish people and the acceptance of the dictatorship. Spanish society was specially open to these kinds of messages due to the context of poverty and lack of horizons. The problem, therefore, was how to formulate such messages in an appropriate way.

Ismael Herraiz’s appointment in December 1941 was a fundamental turning point for the radio. The implementation of his policies was rewarded with
immediate success. That success was largely due to three key innovations: the change to programmes made in front of an audience, popular music that might genuinely have been of interest to a soldier in the Division, and most importantly, the use of the combatants’ mothers. The regime emphasised that ‘several Spanish mothers, chosen from the thousands who pray and dream about their heroic sons who are fighting on the Russian front, had the opportunity to address them directly’. This success in connecting with popular feeling was cut short, however, by the swift end to the programmes of homage to the Blue Division.

The motives for championing the Blue Division had as much to do with domestic as with foreign policy, but the ultimate aim was to take part in the Axis powers’ victory, and to treat the volunteers as an advance party for Spain’s potential intervention in the war if the Germans managed to defeat the Soviet Union, or to settle Spain’s moral debt if they did not. Defeat in the battle of Stalingrad (between August 1942 and February 1943) changed the international situation radically. Those who had appeared to be the sure victors were, in fact, vanquished, and the Spanish – Falangist – contribution to the defeat of international Communism turned into a fiasco which neither the government, nor its radio station, was willing to accept.

However, the Blue Division had become an uncomfortable subject for the regime long before that. The arduousness of the war on the eastern front meant that the supply of volunteers began to dwindle, and the returning soldiers started to become a political nuisance. Dionisio Ridruejo, whose enlistment in the Division had been given a prominent place in the regime’s propaganda, returned to Spain disillusioned, and criticised Franco severely. In May, Ridruejo had a meeting with Franco in which he voiced his concerns, but the split became irreparable when Ridruejo sent a letter in which he expressed his desire to distance himself from Francoism completely. In June of the same year, Franco had ordered General Muñoz Grandes’ replacement because of the excessive esteem in which Muñoz was held by the Germans, who, it was rumoured, wanted to make him head of the government in order to guarantee Spain’s participation in the war.

The change of Minister of Foreign Affairs in September 1942, from Germanophile Serrano Súñer to the pro-allies Count of Jordana, only helped precipitate the dissolution of the Blue Division, largely as a gesture towards the Anglo-American allies (whose armies were at that time just on the other side of the Gibraltar strait) and ward off their threats to block imports into Spain.

The media silence surrounding the Blue Division, which had become politically awkward both at home and abroad, would extend beyond the Second World War, to the toughest moments of diplomatic isolation for the regime. The Blue Division’s return to RNE’s airwaves coincided with the return of prisoners of war aboard the Semíramis in 1954. More importantly, it coincided with Spain’s twofold return to the diplomatic stage, via the Concordat with the Catholic Church and the [Pact of Madrid] agreements with the United States in 1953. These agreements in particular signified Spain’s unofficial admission into the American defence framework, against the backdrop of the Cold War. Franco had contrived that his regime’s anti-communist stance carried more weight than its earlier support for the Axis powers. Although the return of the Blue Division myth to the airwaves overlapped with the publication of the majority of the books written by surviving
soldiers, this did not come about purely by chance. The regime exploited the
adventures of the Spanish volunteers whenever it was politically expedient, in
order to highlight its decades-long struggle against Communism.

So the memory of the Blue Division was a good tool for changing Franco’s
portrayal, from a fascist dictator to an anti-communist, unyielding leader and West-
ern ally. Moreover, after the hard years of isolation and poverty, the Blue Di-
vision could be presented in the domestic sphere as proving that the regime had
always been right in its decisions, and that all the suffering had a cause. The rest
of the world only then, years after the war, recognised Spain’s fight against Com-
munism. The weight of propaganda discourse had already drifted from the Falange
to Franco himself, ‘the first general in the world that had defeated Communism on
the battlefield’, as the slogan said. In sum, by exalting some features of the Blue
Division – its anti-communism – and conveniently forgetting others – its closeness
to the Nazis – the volunteers became, even after their defeat, a diplomatic tool to
ensure the survival of the dictatorship.

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Notes

1. X. Moreno Juliá. La División Azul: Sangre española en Rusia, 1941–1945 (Barcelona:
Critica, 2006), 120.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., 109.
4. For a further analysis about the events of early 1943 see J. Tusell, Franco, España
y la II Guerra Mundial. Entre el Eje y la neutralidad (Madrid: Temas de Hoy,
6. Unlike other forces of volunteers in the Wehrmacht, the highest ranks of the
Blue Division were entirely composed of members of the Spanish Army, which
also was tasked with its recruitment and organisation (J. Gil Pecharromán, La
política exterior del franquismo (Barcelona: Flor del viento, 2008), 74–5).
7. ‘News and Documentaries’: state controlled cinema newsreels.
Regarding RNE, see Davies, A. ‘The First Radio War: The Broadcasting in the
Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Televisi-
9. C. Barrera, Periodismo y franquismo. De la censura a la apertura (Barcelona: Edi-
ciones Internacionales Universitarias, 1995), 82–4, and ‘Una conversación sobre
Radio con el Excelentísimo Sr. Ministro del Interior’, Radio Nacional, November
13, 1938, 1.
10. ‘Una conversación sobre Radio…’, 1. About the performance of radio in
Spanish Civil War, see J. Cervera, ‘La radio: un arma más de la Guerra Civil


13. For example, brief references in the chapter about the rearguard in Moreno Juliá, *La División Azul*, 295–498, or in A. Balsebre, *Historia de la radio en España*, vol. II (Barcelona: Cátedra, 2001), 37–42.


19. A broad overview about Germany at war during Second World War is provided by R. Evans, *The Third Reich at War 1939–1945. How the Nazis Led Germany from Conquest to Disaster*.

20. AGA, Section Ministerio de Cultura, Collection Vicesecretaría de Educación Popular, (3) 49.01 File 21/76, slogan of 28 June 1941.

21. Concretely 641 officers, 2,272 noncommissioned officers and 15,780 soldiers, plus a wing of multipurpose planes and 111 guardiaciviles as military police (J. Gil Pecharromán, *La política exterior del franquismo*, 74–5).


23. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Section Cultura, Collection Ministerio de Información y Turismo, (3) 49.01 File 34/1140, slogan of 28 July 1941.


29. ‘El camarada Ridruejo se dirige a las familias de los voluntarios españoles’, *La Vanguardia Española*, July 29, 1941, 3.
34. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Section Cultura, Collection Ministerio de Información y Turismo, (3) 49.01 File 34/21.
35. As a matter of fact, due to the reluctance of the Army about letting Falange have an important military unit, it was decided during recruitment that only the third party of the available vacancies would be covered by falangists, while at least the half would be Army professionals. Muñoz Grandes, who was at the same time militar and falangist, was put into command, as he would be accepted by the Army and Falange (J. Gil Pecharromán, *La política exterior de Franco*, 74–5).
38. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Section Cultura, Collection Ministerio de Información y Turismo, (3) 49.01 File 34/351, slogan of 28 August 1941.
39. Most of the time, RNE only broadcasted official speeches, which were limited to jingoist rethoric, as Serrano Suñer’s (‘Alocución anticomunista del presidente de la Junta Política y ministro de Exteriores, don Ramón Serrano Suñer’, *La Vanguardia Española*, October 29, 1941, 6).
42. ‘Alocución del Presidente de la Junta Política y Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores, Don Ramón Serrano Suñer’, *Radio Nacional*, November 2, 1941, 3. The German and Italian Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop and Galeazzo Ciano, also spoke.
43. X. Moreno Juliá, *La División Azul*, 310–1. There are transcriptions of the programmes broadcasted by BBC in AMAE, R1080/26 and R1020/13.
44. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Section Cultura, Collection Ministerio de Información y Turismo, (3) 49.01 File 21/1354, slogan of 24 September 1941. The authorisation would take several days more, and it was received earlier by foreign media. Muñoz Grandes was interviewed by Berlin Radio about the first combat action of 250th Division (‘El general Muñoz Grande (sic) exalta el heroísmo de nuestros voluntarios y dirige un emocionado saludo al pueblo alemán’, *La Vanguardia Española*, October 26, 1941, 1).
45. *Arriba*, December 21, 1941, 2.
46. Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Section Cultura, Collection Ministerio de Información y Turismo, (3) 49.01 file 21/1622, report of 10 February 1942 of the acting National Counselor of the Propaganda Delegation to the Coronel-chief of Soldier’s Educational Breaks.

47. Ibid.


49. ‘La semana ante nuestros micrófonos’, Radio Nacional, August 21, 1941, 7.


51. X. Moreno Juliá, La División Azul, 324.


54. ‘Aguinaldo para la División Azul’.


56. Original Spanish title: ‘falsificadores intencionados’.

57. Partes mensuales de diciembre de 1941 y de febrero de 1942 de la Jefatura Provincial de FET y de las JONS de Alicante. (31 December 1941). Archivo General de la Administración (AGA), Delegación Nacional de Propaganda, file 34/1668.

58. ABC, December 16, 1941, 14.


60. Programme name translates as ‘In front of an audience’.


63. Report from Ismael Herraiz, RNE’s director, to the National Chief of Propaganda (29 December 1941). AGA. Reference (3) 49. Box 21/113.


67. E.g. ‘La guerra de las ondas’, Radio Nacional, 166, January 11, 1942, 1; and ‘La propaganda radiada, nueva arma de combate’, Radio Nacional, 173, March 1, 1942, 1.

68. ABC, February 24, 1942, 18.


70. Ibid.


72. So difficult became the recruitment that Army had to resort to compulsory draft (B. de Riquer, Historia de España volumen 9. La dictadura de Franco (Barcelona: Crítica, 2010), 86–7).
75. Ibid.
76. ‘¡Gloria a los héroes!’, Radio Nacional, 186, May 31, 1942. The coverage of RNE and the National Cinema Service was remarkable from the very moment of their arrival (‘Indescriptible recibimiento del pueblo madrileño. Los más preciados huéspedes de honor’, La Vanguardia Española, May 26, 1942, 2).
77. L. Suárez, Crónica de la Sección Femenina y su tiempo (Madrid: Asociación Nueva Andadura, 1992), 142.
78. ‘Resumen de las actividades de la emisora de la Coruña de la red española de radiodifusión (redera) durante el año 1943’ (January 1944). AGA, Cultura 21/1632.
79. A. Balsebre, Historia de la radio en España, vol. II, 42.
82. The main foreign reason was to achieve an appeasement of Germany, which claimed insistently the incorporation of Spain to the war, as well as a counterpart for the Condor Legion and the nazi material help in Spanish Civil War (it should be noted that the costs of Blue Division were deducted from Spain’s debt with Germany). The internal reason was officially to satisfy the pledges of Falange, which had to be compensated for the loss of weight in the Government. Probably, Franco wished to send far away the most radical falangists. See J. Gil Pecharromán, La política exterior del franquismo, 70–3; and E. Moradiellos, La España de Franco (1939–1975) (Madrid: Síntesis, 2000), 232–6.
83. ‘This is no es the Falange that we wanted, nor the Spain that we need. And I myself cannot let that you may count me as a stalwart. I am not. […] Which direst misfortune might I expect, that to be executed in the same wall as general Varela, coronel Galarza, Esteban Bilbao and mister Ibáñez Martin, for example? It is not my wish of avoiding death. But for God’s sake!, is my wish of not dying among those I hate’. See F. Morente, Dionisio Ridruejo. Del fascismo al antifranquismo (Madrid: Síntesis, 2006, 317–24 and annexes).
84. J. Gil Pecharromán, La política exterior del franquismo, 77–8.

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