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RUMINATIONS ON MUSIC AS AN EXEMPLARY ART¹

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Music has a remarkable self-sufficiency. Faltering explanations such as language, symbol, emotion, or expression seem to reflect the preconceptions of the listener, the critic, or the theorist rather than the experience of the music. All claim to explain music in terms of something else. Where is the music in such explanations? Music loses its integrity through translation into similes, metaphors, or its accompanying effects. How, then, can we explain the fascination that music continues to exert on us?

Titles

As with other arts, music does occasionally exhibit referential features, and these are often identified in titles or descriptive phrases. Can titles avoid the pitfall of translation? They seem to speak directly of the imitative features that music may exhibit: its mood, non-musical sounds like cock's crowing and locomotives, or dramatic events. Titles seem to offer a means of overcoming the elusiveness in identifying musical sound.

Yet titles are misleading. They tend to be used as hooks on which to hang our explanations, easily overlooking the wall on which they are fixed. How, we think, can music embody the sea or night on Bald Mountain? Sound tends to recede before our focus on a visual image, dramatic narrative, or a strong feeling. We find ourselves waiting anxiously for the cock's crowing in *The Danse Macabre* or waiting to identify the fall of the guillotine in *Symphonie fantastique*. Again, what was to be an explanation tends to become a substitute for the sound itself. There are many instances where titles, whether assigned by the composer or the listener, displace the autonomy of sound. This seems to compromise the music. How should we deal not only with so-called program music but with musical works that have descriptive titles, such as the overly-specific "Moonlight Sonata"? If music is properly about itself, what of those works whose titles make suggestive, external connections between the music and something else such as through the wonderfully evocative titles Debussy gave his *Preludes*?

Several plausible explanations are possible. The title could reflect the descriptive source that suggested the piece, the object, situation, or mood that evoked the composer's musical response, a compositional device common in Impressionism. Or the title could act as a guide for the listener in making associations or suggesting a mood that could serve as a focal point for

attention. Even if such accounts do not lead us far from the progression of musical sounds, they cannot avoid dissipating our attention. Musical experience is hard to describe.

We are still left with a question: Is this connection of musical sound with something outside of music a more or less explicit reference that is comparable to the images in representational painting or the characters and situation in a realistic novel? On the other hand, is the title nothing more than a largely arbitrary linguistic stipulation? Should the listener emulate Debussy's practice and consider the title only after listening to the work? Or to suggest a third alternative, is the object, person, situation, or mood something that is wholly embodied in the work of musical art? Let me explore the last of these.²

A wordless sense of things

One of the most persistent similes for explaining the elusive art of music is language. Likening music to language seems almost undebatable and, to be sure, there are certain apparent similarities. Both are sensuous social media shaped into syntactical- structures. Both incorporate resonances of significance, although here it is not only the analogy, music with language, that is troublesome but the very manner in which meaning presumably occurs in each case. Much of the modern age of philosophy has, from the seventeenth century on, been preoccupied with exactly how language embodies meaning and expresses truth, and the quest for an answer seems even more complex and unattainable now than it did three centuries ago.³ And in the case of music, questions of meaning, representation, and truth remain puzzlingly inchoate, even though the goal of attaining meaning, of explaining how music means, may seem as necessary as ever to an understanding of that art.

A critical difference holds, however, between music and language. Except for proper nouns, language is highly abstract, and the explanation of the ontological status of abstract terms has long been a matter of contention. Are they shorthand for collections of particulars or do abstractions have some kind of inherent status of their own on the model of platonic forms? Yet unlike the necessary abstraction of language, music possesses unique particularity. It is easy enough to identify the aural modes in which music occurs, such as scales, harmonic and contrapuntal textures , and dynamic variations. Terms such as these lead directly to tonal conditions and are not as likely to carry one away from aurality, but they are hardly modes of meaning.

An inherent difficulty resides in the effort to determine musical meaning. Meaning may itself be an elusive and digressive path. It can signify a variety of different things, from literal cognition to metaphorical significance, and this contributes to making meaning inadequate and misleading in relation to music. In the case of cognition, one cannot evade the particularity of every musical sound and sound structure: there is no exact equivalence to a musical experience.⁴ This leads to the difficulties in explaining the relationship in combinatory art forms such as song and opera that join sound to text and between music and a dramatic situation, where incidental music may be used to enhance a film or a theatrical production. Metaphorical meaning is no better. It rests on associations that are primarily personal and thus provides no transferable content. The equivocal is music's normal regime since, as a 'language,' it bears meaning only indirectly and suggests without signifying.⁵

Rather than 'meaning' here, a term of unavoidable cognitive associations, it might be preferable to speak of 'resonance,' a word that at least derives its metaphorical significance from a musical source. 'Meaning,' then, is inadequate and misdirected: there is no equivalence to a musical experience.⁶ What, then, is left of musical meaning?

Let us set aside such metaphorical explanations of music as language and having meaning and consider music in the light of its inherent characteristics, as a wordless sense of things. Literal, direct features of musical sound, the modes of its sonic materials, so to say, are well known: pitch, volume, timbre, texture, harmony, melody, rhythm, tempo, and dynamics. Important as these are for musical analysis, they identify rather than explain the features of music.⁷ It is possible to note other, less literal but equally intrinsic traits of musical sound that are less particular, such as its multi-dimensional auditory *presence* that imparts both a temporal and a spatial aura to the sonic experience. Music also exhibits degrees of *intensity* and kinds of *density*. These general characteristics result from the skillful combination of musical materials, especially spatiality, texture, and tonal quality or timbre of patterns of sounds or groups of instruments. Related to intensity but different from it is *force*. Oddly, we might seem to be describing a quasi-physics of musical sound by referring to its space, time, and force. Critically important in these two kinds of characterizations of music beyond words is that both the specific sonic features and especially the last group of pervasive features must be understood to apply to music as heard, that is, to the musical situation, for it is essential in understanding music always to consider it in its situational context as played and heard.

Motion

There is yet another aesthetic element that music reveals, a dimension of experience often hidden in other arts and rarely noted even in musical ones. This trait is motion. In one sense, ascribing motion to music seems obvious. I want to suggest, however, that it is neither obvious nor simple, and that motion underlies nearly every other musical dimension and can be found working its arcane influence in other arts, as well.

Motion is inherent in musical experience. One is reminded of Hanslick's famous definition of music as "tonally moving forms."⁸ Motion seems, at first, to apply to performance, to the activation of a musical score, but I want to contend that only in the aurality of music does music truly exist. That is to say, without being heard what remains of music is nothing more than vibrations in the air, just as an unseen painting is no more than pigment on canvas. Appreciative engagement is necessary for the art to exist. For music, this may occur in performances, but it may also take place in listening to recordings. The musical score, like the title of a composition, is actually a path to sound, not the sound itself.

It is important here to distinguish between motion and movement. Movement is readily recognized as one of the dimensions of musical material. It has to do with the division of time into regular groups of pulsation (meter), at varying speeds (tempo), duration (note values), and patterns (rhythm). We can speak here, too, of melodic movement, harmonic movement (in which cadences are an important framing device), textural development, and perhaps of tempo, the general pace of movement, and the degree of suspense (unresolved or deceptive cadences, the extent and pattern of unresolvedness). Some of these forms of movement may involve misleading or otherwise frustrating our expectations in the succession of musical sound.

However, it is possible to identify another sense of movement that is less formal: its dynamic, somatic character. I am thinking here of something more like force, the pressing impulse of movement, the somatic experience of time. This is what I want to call motion as distinct from movement. It is the processive feature of all experience. Indeed, music takes this dynamic quality of time, central in perceptual experience, and gives it shape. Like all temporal *experience* (in contrast with metric *chronology*), musical motion is elastic. It is replete with accelerandos, ritardandos, fermatas, cadences, and other variations of the musical pulse.

It might be said that music is centered on motion through the use of sound and silence. Music is thus understood as a sonic process. But this is no less true of the other arts: painting is a visual

process, cinema a filmic process, art in general a perceptual process. Because motion is central in music more clearly and directly than in most other arts, music is exemplary as a focused perceptual process.

Thus music lies in the amalgam of sound, performer, and listener, and its embodiment is situated in the conjunction of the ongoing sound, the execution, and the listening. This has important implications for the ontology of music, which has often veered far from this mark.⁹

Musical experience

“To live in the music is like walking on a woodland trail.”¹⁰ For music to *be*, one must participate in the living sound. This is a contextual experience. It brings together the participation of composer, sound, performer(s), and listener in an experiential synthesis, together with all the situational conditions of atmosphere, location, acoustics, technology, sociality, historicity, and other such circumstantial factors. Understood in this way, music is actually a social environmental experience. Its occasions can be profound and sometimes transformative. Although much of what I have said about music applies to most genres of music, what I especially have in mind here are those occasions when music dominates as the center of experience and is not made into a peripheral accompaniment as a space or time filler, or is not employed as a commercial or social facilitator (or seducer). I am thinking of musical occurrences when the music is the center of focused attention, especially of art music broadly construed.

Despite Walter Pater's famous claim that “All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music,” music has seldom been understood in its own terms.^{11 12} Even more rarely has music served as a standard for understanding other arts and activities. The prototypical arts are painting and literature. These, joined to the model of language with its attendant concepts of symbol, syntax, and semantics, have commonly been taken as the basis for grasping artistic forms, structures, experiences, and significance in general. Yet I have tried to show how musical processes do not fit these convenient molds. Moreover, some of the distinctive traits and capacities of musical art, such as direct and immediate sensation, intrinsic sensibility, temporality, intangibility, and an almost complete dependence on the activity of performance, are often overlooked or suppressed. While these features are present in other arts, music offers them with a clarity and directness not often found elsewhere. Music thus provides its own standard and may serve to advantage as a heuristic model for explaining the other arts. Let me

first explore the distinctive features of musical experience and then consider how they may be adapted to other arts and the implications of doing this.

1. direct and immediate sensation

Whatever else happens in music (and much else does), it is an experience of sound. Skillful listening requires the ability to listen attentively and directly to sounds themselves. This is not confined to momentary sensation, a serious misunderstanding of perceptual immediacy. One hears in a temporal aura, in the mnemonic shadow, so to say, of what has been heard and with a projected umbra of anticipation of what may follow. This varies in degree with the extent of the music's familiarity but it is always present in close listening. It is evident that the capacity to attend to the intrinsic sensibility of music has to be cultivated, for attention easily wanders and is an easy victim to distraction.

2. temporality

To call attention to music's temporality is to state the obvious, and I have already mentioned the critical role of memory in the temporal experience of music. But temporality is not just an abstract property of music: it is a qualitative experience. Music is not only *in* time but it *constitutes* time. To live in time is to participate in a process, and the processive character of musical sound is overt, present, and distinctive. While this may seem obvious, I say it because, as we shall see, every art is a processual experience.

3. intangibility

This is worth mentioning although it, too, may seem evident. Unlike other, more "material" arts such as painting, sculpture, and architecture, the material of music, sound, is elusive. It can be "grasped" only in passing because it has no tangible substance. In this respect, music is close to dance, whose "substance" is movement, not human bodies. Lights can dance and so can falling leaves, as well as elephants and horses (e.g. the Lipizzaner stallions).

4. performance

For music to happen, it requires the overt activity of performance. The composer, in a sense, is the first performer. The composer fashions the presence and succession of sounds, whether by playing an instrument, notating a score, or programming an electronic instrument. When music is re-performed, which is the status of public performance, the process goes on before an audience through an intermediary. Performance is where music acquires its actuality. Everything

else is contributory and peripheral. That is why it is impossible to locate a musical object in the way one can identify a presumed pictorial or visual one. Such an intent is vastly misleading because it thinks to locate the art in an object, whereas the art is actually in the experience in which the object participates.

It is needless but necessary to note that these features are not separate and independent. Rather, they have been extrapolated here from integral musical experience only for the purpose of identifying and articulating its characteristics. Nor are these features unique to musical experience. They are present in other art modalities, too. Painting, for example, is a processive and performance art, not only for the artist in making (i.e. performing) the painting but for the viewer, as well, in actively examining and engaging with the features and qualities of the pictorial surface. Appreciation thus becomes a quasi-performance, and not only in music but in the aesthetic appreciation of poetry, fiction, dance, and architecture. One can discover other characteristics of musical experience in these arts, too, such as intrinsic sensation and temporality. Even intangibility is present, since the arts, in the sense in which I have been speaking of them, do not consist in objects such as painted canvases, stone, or structures but in our aesthetic experiences of them. These arts, too, become complex modes of perceptual experience.

Aesthetic appreciation

Earlier in this discussion we approached the experience of music, not by simile or metaphor, which is common, but by dwelling on the intrinsic features of musical experience. Carrying over these distinctive features of musical experience to other arts and examining how they function, *mutatis mutandis*, is revelatory as well as instructive. Considering music as exemplary transforms the aesthetics of the arts. How would we project a general aesthetics if we used music as the model? This is a suggestive question and its response has far-reaching implications for our understanding of arts other than music and for aesthetic theory in general.

Consider the usual way in which aesthetic appreciation is understood. Here the visual arts are taken as the model. We face an object, usually a two-dimensional object--a painting or other graphic object, and we are invited to gaze at it from a respectful distance, contemplating it disinterestedly (following Kant) for its own sake alone, and using our knowledge of art history to help us grasp the visual array. How we understand this appreciative experience will vary with one's educational and artistic background, leading us perhaps to apprehend what we are seeing as representation, to search for a social record or a meaning in the work, or to abstract it as a

purely graphic presentation. Implicit here is the characteristic dualism of viewer as subject and the art work as contemplative object. This is a familiar model that is easily exported to other arts, albeit with occasional violence to the experience, as in confounding literature with a printed text, or in regarding sculpture as essentially two-dimensional to be contemplated from a single direction at an intervening distance and, in yet another instance, considering architecture as a visual configuration of forms. The distortion implicit in the examples of sculpture and architecture is clear: when sculpture is deprived of its mass by being exhibited against a gallery wall and a building is torn from its physical complex and function and reduced to the surface, color, and planes of a three-dimensional visual object.

Because of its elusive substantiality, music, fortunately, cannot be dematerialized so easily. It possesses body in the texture and mass of sound, and its distinctive temporality is multi-dimensional. Besides forward movement, music may embody the coexistence of separate lines of sound, as in polyphony, and the movement of inner voices and of the bass line in primarily homophonic music. Music also embodies the mnemonic presence of past sound and the auditory anticipation implicit in present sound. Indeed, music seems to lie beyond the paradigmatic configurations of visual art appreciation. There is no comparable object, no perceivable distance, no necessity to supply meaning and, indeed, no "body" at all except as a metaphorical construction. Music thus requires its own ontology.

It would be helpful, therefore, to delineate the outlines of aesthetic appreciation using music as the paradigm. It is interesting how our very language leads us with metaphors toward conceptions that are visual and spatial. Searching for a place, a starting point, even a direction puts us in a physicalistic realm where the distinctive qualities of musical sound are, so to speak, out of place.. Let us try to sketch this out.

The musical occasion

We cannot be far off if we start (and end) with the perception of sound. Although the physical explanations of sound and its reception are important for acoustic engineering and for the psychology of perception, the listener is ordinarily unaware or inattentive to them. Moreover, language to describe the auditory experience is not readily available and we seem obliged to take recourse in metaphor. What would a literal descriptive account look like? For while the basic material (so to speak) of music is sound, sound does not subsist in isolation. It is produced and heard on an occasion and in a situation.

What music requires is fourfold: an originator, an activator, an acoustic event, and a listener. These four functions may be combined in the same individual, such as a singer or a jazz improviser, but more usually, as in a classical concert, music involves separate contributors. These four functions seem to be present on any musical occasion and may be called a musical or more generally, an aesthetic field.¹³

What is notable here is that these functions take place in a context of mutual interdependence to which each contributes but never stands alone. Thus the auditory function (the listener) cannot be separated from the sound or the performer or, indeed, the composer. Gone is the analytic-synthetic distinction; gone is the perceiver-object division. The musical event offers a distinctive context that is instantiated and thus realized on each occasion. Questions of identity, style, originality, and the like must be clarified with reference to the entire field. As Justus Buchler has observed, there are no simples, only complexes.¹⁴

It is illuminating to apply this model to the other arts. Of course, each art modality requires its own account, but many things become clearer, such as aesthetic appreciation and the identity and differences of the arts. Developing a descriptive analysis will give richness and resonance to our understanding of their distinctive qualities and values of the various arts.

Music makes a special contribution to our understanding of aesthetic experience and value. By its direct and powerful sensory presence, music returns us to the purity of direct perceptual experience. It offers compelling testimony to the perceptual model depicted by the aesthetic field in contrast to cognitive accounts, such as Kant's. For him, cognition underlies all three treatises, and he undertook to devise distinctions and categories to explain orders of beauty and pleasure even though there may be none.¹⁵ This is not to say that concepts and distinctions may not be useful but rather to affirm that they must be derived from perceptual experience, authenticated and dependent on such experience, not the other way around. Pursuing this line of thought, it becomes clear how frequently what Dewey called the philosophical fallacy is committed in thinking that we can control the world by cognizing it.¹⁶ This is a strong temptation for those who are philosophically inclined, and it is appalling to realize how widespread is this tendency. Returning to the musical occasion, we have a complex situation of many factors and functions. Music is apprehended from a somewhat different perspective through the function of the composer from that of the performer, and similarly from the listener, although all four functions are present in each.

Applying this model to the other arts is equally illuminating. If we give the prime place to the perceptual experience of painting, for example, we recognize the interplay of creation and appreciation where the perceiver becomes active as a quasi-performer of the work, and matters of style and technique are meaningful only as they affect perceptual experience. The same is the case with sculpture. In literature, where perception is almost entirely imaginative, the sensory presence is no less important as the reader collaborates with the author in the imaginative sensory evocation of the narrative.

This account of aesthetic experience as a complex field displays the inadequacy of disinterested contemplation as a model of aesthetic appreciation. With all four functions intricately entangled, there is no separation of listener or viewer and object. That is why I have been led to describe such appreciation as perceptual engagement, as aesthetic engagement in the occasion.¹⁷

A perspective on perspectives

While not yet widely recognized, this insight into perceptual experience has been explored from many directions over the past century. We can exemplify it concretely by the example of perspective in the visual arts. In his extended essay, "Reverse Perspective" (1920), the Russian scholar Pavel Florensky (1882-1937) took issue with the usual account of visual perspective that considers it an accurate rendering of visual perception.¹⁸ Visual perspective, as usually described, depicts, he argued, not our actual perception at all but only one of several possible, essentially symbolic renderings of visual reality. "[A] perspectival picture of the world is not a fact of perception, but merely a demand made in the name of certain considerations which, while they may be very powerful, are absolutely abstract."¹⁹ Single point perspective is only one of several schemes of linear perspective for rendering space by abstracting from perceptual experience. There can be two, three, and four-point perspective, as well. Still other forms of perspective exist, such as aerial perspective, depicting distance by differences in tone, hue, and distinctness, as well as the extraordinary isometric perspective, common in Asian art, in which proportions are not distorted but remain equal. Moreover, visual perception, taken alone, abstracts only a single sensory channel for apprehending distance. As Florensky noted, "Leaving aside the olfactory, gustatory, thermal, aural and tactile spaces that have *nothing in common* with Euclidean space..., we cannot overlook the fact that even visual space, the least removed from Euclidean space, turns out on closer inspection to be profoundly different from it."²⁰ In multiple ways, then, visual perspective is an abstraction from perceptual experience and not a direct and unequivocal rendering.

Pictorial perspective illustrates in specific ways what is true of perceptual experience in the other arts. While specific sense modalities predominate in some arts and different ones in others, the full range of perceptual sensibility is involved in varying proportions and degrees in all the arts. To bring this back to our starting point, the appreciation of music is an engaged somatic experience that can produce a heightened physical response involving heart beat, muscle tension, and proprioception overall, as well as perception in aural, visual, and haptic sensory modalities.

All four functions—originative, performative, perceptually focused, and appreciative---join and participate in the musical field. As the music moves onward, the performer follows the sonorous course shaped originally by the composer, recreating it in the way laid out by the composer, re-composing, as it were, the musical movement. And the active, participatory listener does both, empathizing directly with the performer in following the course set out by the composer in realizing the sound. None of these functions proceeds independently of the others. Appreciation is an engaged, integrative experience of living sound.

Music is realized, then, in this complex situation I call the aesthetic field. Taking any of its components alone distorts the situation and is the source of many of the insoluble problems that arise in attempting to explain the music, the performer, or music appreciation apart from the other constituents of the field. The sound originates with the composer, re-originates, so to speak, with the performer, and is re-embodied in the immediately ongoing auditory experience of the listener. When this all comes together in living presence, it is, as Glenn Gould once described 'ecstasy,' a "delicate thread binding together music, performance, performer and listener in a web of shared awareness, of innerness."²¹

Music as exemplary

By taking musical experience as the exemplar, it is revealing to re-cast our understanding of the other arts. One of the interesting consequences of a musical model is recognizing the central place of music's most salient characteristic, its performative feature. Music requires performance, whether through actions by a live musician or indirectly by someone controlling an electronic playback device. Yet all the arts require some form of activation in order to be experienced. Recognizing a performative feature in art is to realize the constitutive contribution of the appreciator in arts that seem to have no overt performer, such as painting, architecture, and literature. Appreciating the visual arts needs more than passive receptivity; it requires an active eye to note the details, tonalities, and movement of the visual array. But more than the

eye is involved. Changing the distance to the pictorial surface and the direction from which it is viewed can transform the visual appearance. Moreover, there is a further somatic component in responding to the height from which a painting is viewed and by the body's response in muscle tone, tension, and posture, as well as in varying the distance and direction to the painting. There may also be a perceptual influence from the cognitive contribution of art historical knowledge and from technical information on the media and craft that are used. Moreover, in sculpture the body makes an overt, active contribution to the experience: the apprehension of the sculptural material, of its mass, spatiality, and volume, requires physical engagement. Experiencing sculpture's three-dimensionality is a somatic activity in which the viewer engages the sculpture from different directions and at different distances, as well as by responding physically to its mass, volume, and surface. All these processes of appreciation exemplify the activity I have termed aesthetic engagement: the activation of art in appreciative experience rather than by distancing oneself subjectively through disinterested contemplation.²²

It might seem difficult at first to locate a performer in the appreciation of literature until we recognize that the material of literature is not words, as such, but the imaginative experience that language evokes through linguistic sound, meaning, and force. The reader thus becomes a performer of the text: through active imagination, the reader contributes sensible substance to the dry fabric of language. Perhaps this imaginative process is most directly visual, but other sensory modes may also be evoked, sometimes literally: sound, touch, bodily tension, respiration, and movement. Once we recognize that full appreciation is not passive reception but requires active engagement, we can discover a performative function in literature and indeed in every artistic mode.

The musical object is also elusive. Despite the efforts of some aestheticians to ontologize music by somehow constructing it into an object that can be appreciated and judged, this is pure fabrication. No object can be located because there is no object. Musical sound is embedded in the occasion, in the many-faceted experience of active listening. As on every occasion of aesthetic appreciation, there is a perceptual focus. Often this can be located in an object but an identifiable object is not necessary. Focused experience is central. And such focus is not exclusively auditory or visual or the province of any single sense receptor. It is the experience of perceptual engagement of the whole person as a bio-cultural being embedded in society and history. The usual way of describing this as disinterested aesthetic contemplation, as psychical distance, to use Bullough's term, is unsatisfactory. This psychologizes the experience,

rendering it subjective and wholly mental, ignoring the body's contribution, the effect of the setting, and the other contextual factors that influence appreciation.²³

A more accurate description of appreciation is, then, to consider it an occasion of aesthetic engagement. This is a salutary consequence of basing our understanding of the arts on appreciative experience, and it suggests that there may be no object as such in any art.²⁴ The painting must be seen, the music heard to be appreciated. Without being actively engaged in experience, the painting is merely a physical object, a canvas coated with pigment, and the music only a sonic event. Similarly with every other art.

Literature offers a comparable example of an art whose object is elusive. Is the printed text the literary object, the poem on the page, the book in the hand? Clearly, here, too, the aesthetic focus must be the experience of literature, the development of the text as it is read and entered in experience as an imaginative perceptual process of living through the narrative sequence, the sounds and images, the meanings and evocations. As in appreciating music, the interplay of such features in the field experience of literature constitutes the aesthetic occasion. There is a creative contribution in the focusing, performance, and response of perceptual experience in literature so that these functions fuse and are described in relation to one another as an activity of sensibility.

On such accounts of the arts, music becomes truly exemplary. It liberates us from convoluted subjectivism and misleading objectification, from inherited presuppositions, and from other such obstacles to free and engaged aesthetic appreciation. Living in the sound is living in perceptual experience. It is the exemplar of every mode of artistic perception and the true substance of appreciation.

16 Apr 18

¹ This is a composite version developed from two papers published in *New Sound*: "Ruminations on Music as an Exemplary Art," *New Sound* 40/2 (2012), 201-8; and "Further Ruminations on Music," *New Sound, International Journal of Music*, Issue 50, 2017, 129-137.

² I have argued for this last alternative at greater length in "What Titles Don't Tell," *Aesthetics beyond the Arts; New and Recent Essays* (Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012), Ch. 2.

³ See John Hospers, *Meaning and Truth in the Arts* (University of North Carolina Press, 1948).

⁴ See Arnold Berleant, *The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas 1970).

⁵ See, re the paradoxical mutuality of 'being-in,' the miracle of reciprocal inherence, Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable* (Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press, (1961) 2003).

⁶ Further ramifications include how to explain the relationship between music and text, between music and a dramatic situation. These are external relationships and do not bear as directly on music as sound. Cf. Leonard Meyer, *Emotion and Meaning in Music* (Chicago: U.C. Press, 1956) *Music, The Arts and Ideas* (Chicago: UC Press, 1967).

⁷ I have discussed these in a somewhat different context in "What Music Isn't and How To Teach It," *Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education*, 8/1 (April 2009), 54-65. <http://act.maydaygroup.org/php/current.php>. Reprinted in Arnold Berleant, *Aesthetics beyond the Arts* (Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2012).

⁸ Eduard Hanslick, *On the Musically Beautiful, A Contribution toward the Revision of the Aesthetics of Music*, trans. G. Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986).

⁹ See Arnold Berleant, "Art without Object," in *Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts* (Farnham, UK & Burlington

¹⁰ *Anon.*

¹¹ Walter Pater, "The School of Giorgione," *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry*, 2nd ed. (1877) and subsequent editions.

¹² Schopenhauer was a notable exception.

¹³ See Arnold Berleant, *The Aesthetic Field: A Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience* (Springfield, Ill.: C. C. Thomas 1970).

¹⁴ Justus Buchler, *The Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1966).

¹⁵ Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §5.

¹⁶ John Dewey, *Later Works*, 6:5 cf. 1:51. See Gregory Pappas, *John Dewey's Ethics: Democracy As Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008).

¹⁷ This is developed in my book, *Art and Engagement* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991) and elaborated in subsequent writings. Cf. "What Is Aesthetic Engagement?" *Contemporary Aesthetics*, 12 (2013); *Aesthetics in Action, International Yearbook of Aesthetics*, Vol. 2014, pp. 17-19.

¹⁸ Florensky's studies centered on Russian icons but also included Renaissance painting. See Pavel Florensky, *Beyond Vision, Essays on the Perception of Art* (London: Reaktion Books, 2002).

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 250. [A perspectival artist] "is an observer who brings nothing of his own to the world, who cannot even synthesise his own fragmentary impressions, who, since he does not enter into a living interaction with the world and does not live in it, is not aware of this own reality either, although in his proud seclusion from the world he imagines himself to be that last instance. Yet on the basis of his own furtive experience he constructs all of reality, all of it, on the pretext of objectivity, squeezing it into what he has observed of reality's own differential. This is precisely how the world view of Leonardo, Descartes, and Kant grows out of the soil of the Renaissance; this is also how the visual art equivalent to this world view--perspective--arises." *Ibid.*, p. 264.

"...physiological space cannot be made to fit within it [a Euclidean schema]. Leaving aside the olfactory, gustatory, thermal, aural and tactile spaces that have *nothing in common* with Euclidean space..., we cannot overlook the fact that even visual space, the least removed from Euclidean space, turns out on

closer inspection to be profoundly different from it. And it is in fact [visual space] that lies at the core of painting and the graphic arts...." p.266

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 266.

²¹ Glenn Gould, quoted on Kultur DVD #D2822.

²² "What Is Aesthetic Engagement?", *Aesthetics in Action*, ed. Krystyna Wilkowszewska. International Yearbook of Aesthetics, Vol. 18/2014 (Libron: Krakow, 2015), pp. 17-19. Also downloaded on academia.edu and ResearchGate.

²³ Cf. Arnold Berleant, "Beyond Disinterestedness." *The British Journal of Aesthetics*, 34/3 (July 1994). Reprinted in Arnold Berleant, *Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts* (Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004). Also see Arnold Berleant and Ronald Hepburn, "An Exchange on Disinterestedness," *Contemporary Aesthetics*, 1 (2003).

²⁴ See Arnold Berleant, "Art without Object," in *Re-thinking Aesthetics, Rogue Essays on Aesthetics and the Arts* (Farnham, UK & Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), pp. 179-193.