PROTESTS CAMPAIGNS AND CIVIL WARS
CAN CONTINUOUS PROCESSES BE STUDIED WITH  
A ‘DISCRETE’ THEORY?

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Abstract

The presence of protests, sometimes during violent conflict and civil war, across the globe, seems to contradict the common view that civil war and protests are mutually exclusive episodes and do not belong to a continuum. Instead, peaceful – and less peaceful – protests can coincide with civil war and other forms of armed violence like civil war. This article reflects and questions the dominant understanding that violent conflict and protests are disconnected forms of conflict and contention. To achieve this aim, the chapter discusses how both phenomena have been explained and theorized.

The document starts examining similarities and differences in the definition and understanding of civil war, on the one hand, and protests and protest campaigns (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013). Departing from the important work of T.R. Gurr (2011) and others (Skocpol, 1979; Tilly, 2006), on protest, rebellion and violent conflict in the process of state-building, this article research aims to reevaluate how protest campaigns and civil war can relate to each other over time.

The document discusses under which conditions, processes such as protest campaigns escalate into a low intensity or high intensity civil war, and on the circumstances that define the de-escalation from civil wars protest campaigns. The article argues that in the aftermath of civil wars, protests are more likely to be observed in post-agreement scenarios. In addition, it argues that before civil wars, protests campaigns do take place, and where venues for negotiation with dissidents are closed and state capacity is weak and armed conflict is more likely.

The article proceeds to present a theoretical framework for understanding different possible ‘patterns’ of transition between protest campaigns and civil war, and from civil war to protest campaigns. The possibility that civil war and protest campaigns belong to a continuum is thus theorized through a series of trajectories. These trajectories are conditioned, by a series of factors that relate to the nature of the state where the contention is taking place.

KEYWORDS: Violence, processes, events, conflict, civil war, protests, armed violence, social contract, protest campaigns, inequality.
1. INTRODUCTION

No modern state can claim that their existence and their current institutional arrangements have not been defined or affected by protests or civil war. The emergence of the modern state is not spontaneous generation. The story of the nation state as we know it is a history of contestation and internal conflict; in some cases even a history of civil wars and revolts (Tilly, 2006; Skocpol, 1979; Braudel, 1958; Tarrow, 2011). Thus if the history of our unit of analysis, the state, has seen transitions between protests and violence, it is valid to try to understand under which conditions these transitions of escalation or de-escalation take place when civil wars transition into protests, or vice versa.

This article research reflects around the dominant understanding that violent conflict and protests are very different forms of conflict (Day, Pickey, & Chenoweth, 2014), and how these two sets of categories interconnect or ‘disconnect’ (Jacoby, 2007; Krause, 2016; Dudouet, 2013).

The work of T.R. Gurr (2011), T. Skocpol (1979) and C. Tilly (2006) on protest, rebellion and violent conflict in the process of state-building informs this research. The aim is to reevaluate their contributions – around the question of how processes of contention (protests campaigns and civil war) might interrelate within specific settings.

The article argues that protests campaigns and civil wars may be manifestations of the endless processes of renegotiation and contestation of particular social contracts between the state and different ‘publics’ (Tilly, 2006; Tarrow, 2011), and a such these processes can be understood as belonging to a continuum of contestation (Della Porta & Diani, 2009).

Processes of contestation differ in extent (local, regional, national or international), tactics (blockades, strikes, marches, and ambushes), claims (regarding local, regional or national agendas), impact (local, national, or international) and responses from the government (political, repressive, or violent). For this diversity in contestation, a series of different categories have been put into place in order to differentiate the different repertoires taking place: protests violence, turmoil, civil war, riots and disturbances are different words used to describe varying processes of political contestation of the social order (Tarrow, 2011). This difference has allowed us a detailed understanding of their specificities and the conditions that define particular performances that take place as a function of the contexts, agendas and claims set into motion (Tilly C., 2006; Tilly & Wood, 2016).

However, this can also lead to the understanding of these processes in isolation from other social phenomena. As the use of particular categories and analytical lenses makes of the categories we use a conditioning factor on how social processes are understood, conceptualized and observed. This conceptual difference on the categories we use to describe processes of contestation such as civil war and protests does not necessarily imply that protests and civil war do not relate to each other, it means that they are being studied independently from each other.

This article research proposes that social processes such as protests or civil wars can thus be studied as continuous processes in line with recent developments in the literature (Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017; Dudouet, 2013; Gustafson, 2016). Protests, violence, turmoil, civil war, riots and disturbances can thus be understood as related to each other and belonging to a continuum.

The theory is influenced by the analysis of history as a “longue durée” in which the study of social events gives analytical priority to long-term historical structures over particular events (Braudel F., 1958). The
concepts of the politics of contestation and of political repertoires are instrumental in appreciating protests and civil war in greater historical perspective (Tilly C., 2006). Thus mass mobilizations (protests and protest campaigns) and conflict (civil war) can be understood as part of larger historical processes of political participation embedded in the relationship of the citizens with the state.

The analysis of the emergence of a civil war, or of the protests taking place in post-agreement scenarios after a civil war, need to take into account whether these processes of contestation are related to previous processes of confrontation and contestation. If we overlook the possible links between protests and civil war we might be ignoring what defined the emergence of a particular type of contestation in a given country. For this, the document presents a theoretical framework for analysing the possible trajectories defining the transitions from one process into another (e.g. protests campaigns into civil war), for understanding under what conditions these transitions might take place.

The document proposes that these ‘different’ concepts (protests and civil war) should be envisioned as belonging to a continuum. An analytical model in which protest can be related to armed conflicts, and armed conflicts related to protest is presented for understanding possible transitions between civil war and protest (and vice-versa). For this the concepts of protests campaigns and civil wars are presented.

The document initially discusses the similarities and differences between the study of protests and of civil wars: the literatures dealing with ‘protests’ and ‘civil war’ are largely separate from each other, however, they employ similar concepts to analyse both phenomena. Despite the use of similar concepts to analyse both protests and civil war, these are typically considered in the literature(s) to be different in nature (Dudouet, 2013; Shaheen S., 2015; Krause, 2016).

An opportunity exists thus to link the literatures and use the shared concepts to explore both processes of contestation and their interconnectedness (Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017). For this the document proposes the analysis of transitions between protest campaigns and civil wars. Supporting evidence in the form of short case studies in relation to how one ‘phenomenon’ might feed into another one, informed by an inductive approach is presented looking at the cases of Colombia and South Africa.

The possible trajectories of transitions between protests campaigns and civil war are presented and described in relation to the concepts of political participation, inequality, feasibility, provision of public services and the legitimacy of the state.
2. PROTESTS AND CIVIL WARS AS PROCESSES

Protest and civil war can be studied as related processes, as they belong to a continuum in the state and the wider processes of contestation taking place within it.

This section of the document presents an analytical framework for understanding protest campaigns and civil war as processes that belong to a continuum. In doing so, the document draws on existing and previous scholarly work that has presented evidence and argued the case for the analysis of both civil wars and protests campaigns in contraposition to the separation of both processes of contestation within the social movements and civil war literature (Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly & Wood, 2016; Gustafson, 2016; Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017). We cannot assume that protest and civil wars are the same process, but we can depart from the assumption that they are connected, and thus previous protests might have some relation with posterior civil wars (and vice versa).

For this, the document begins presenting the discussion between civil wars and protests as events, and their difference with the analysis of civil wars and protests as processes. The document then reflects on how literature has considered the continuity/discontinuity between protests and civil wars.

2.1 Events or processes: Protests campaigns and civil war

Civil wars and protest speak to (of) the state in different ways, and have the state as a point of contention. In the case of civil wars they challenge the state in order to reform a social contract and acquire rights, political participation, resources, independence or secession. It relates to the state and its institutions, structures and organization. On the other hand, protests are actions undertaken by citizens of a particular territory who demand reforms, recognition, or inclusiveness from public institutions, appealing to the arbitration or intervention of the state. In the case of protests campaigns, these aim for structural changes where secession, regime change or the overthrowing of the current regime is the goal. Civil war and protest campaigns might be aiming for similar objectives (a deep reorganization of the state and the social contract), but seem to operate with different repertoires.

From a longer historical perspective, the literature on diverse forms of political violence ought to be more closely related (Gurr T., 2011; Krause, 2016; Houle, 2015; Skocpol T., 1979). The divergence between the analysis of social movements and protests and the research on civil wars have brought invaluable insights of detailed information of both processes, but this specificity has come at the expense of understanding the possibility of the connection among these processes.

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1 See section three for a detailed definition on protests campaigns.
2 Here I am speaking of protests that are directed towards government actors. Protests that challenge the behaviour of private actors are not being considered here in spite that these protests might relate with the public sphere and the existing social contract in a particular state.

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Then to claim that “the distinction between civil wars and other forms of political instability has been assumed rather than demonstrated” (Shaheen, 2015, pp. 34-35) is fair in regards to the fact that researchers departed from the assumption of the disconnection between protests and civil wars.

Nevertheless, this disconnection is not binding and should not limit us from analysing the possibility of connections (or disconnections) between these processes. If protest campaigns and civil wars take place in the same territory, in the same polity, and are connected or overlapping in time; then there should not any be apparent reason to deny the possibility of researching on the possibility of their connection (or disconnection). This idea is supported by the possibility of analysing the common properties of the terms of protests and civil wars share (Shaheen, 2015, p. 6; Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017; Dudouet, 2013; Krause, 2016) which should allow us to understand their interaction and possible relationship with each other.

Attempting to address the possible interactions between these processes could bring insights into the conditions that explain the transitions between civil wars and protests, and could allow us to understand what conditions define the transition from a protest to a civil war and vice versa.

2.2 A theoretical understanding of the connections between processes of contestation: Civil war and protests

This document retakes the discussions on the early literature on civil war, social revolutions and political contestation in the decades of 1960’s and 1970’s that presented a series of arguments that theoretically made the case for understanding protests and civil wars as belonging to a continuum, but lacked the empirical support to evaluate these claims beyond particular case studies. Recent developments in the literature seem to provide information about the possibility of this continuum (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 329; Dudouet, 2013; Krause, 2016; Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017).

Many of the theories about conflict from the 60’s are really claims about if conflict will happen, made without necessarily explaining why this conflict manifest itself as a riot, protest or civil war. Thus, the literature on conflict in the 60’s could be seen as explaining civil war, civil protests and riots alike as part of the existence of “conflicts” or “contestation” processes (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 328). This generalizability on the emergence of processes of contestation such as protests, civil wars or riots suffered a problem as a result of their generality. Theories were explaining conflict, but were failing to differentiate the outcomes of these social processes, thus not being able to theorize why civil war emerged instead of other forms of political violence (Cristina & Elbadawi, 2007, p. 3).

The transitions between different types of conflict take place in a space, a territory, and are conditioned defined by a series of norms, rules, practices and regulations. We refer to this space as the ‘modern’ nation state. These transitions are defined by multiple possible trajectories that do not necessarily conform to a particular pre-defined path, where uncertainty, path dependence, instability and even the collapse of the state is plausible (Hegre H., Ellingsen, Gates, & Gleditsch, 2001; Goldstone, 1998).

Testing if variables and concepts could explain both civil wars and protest and the transitions between these processes presents interesting opportunities. Can the concepts that explain civil war explain also
explain protests (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 329)? If this question has a positive answer, then current theories of civil war could apply to a broader set of phenomena and may have the potential extending our understanding of conflict (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 341), bringing together the insights from social movements literature, and linking these findings with the original claims of the conflict literature about the connection between protests and civil war.

Examining how different types of violence contribute to each other is thus a promising research agenda (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 339). Such research can contribute to the civil war and social movement literature, as researching the conditions that determine the ways in which violence manifests (Cristina & Elbadawi, 2007, p. 10) might bring insights into why protest politics and the existence of civil wars take place (Norris, 2006, p. 1).

Revolutions and civil wars have been argued to possess characteristics also present in protests and riots (Tilly C., 2006). Thus it is possible to argue that one form of political violence is a positive and significant predictor of other forms of violence within states (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 339). For example, a social uprising may start as a non-violent movement but if the government is excessively intransigent, the situation may escalate into a non-negotiable demand for regime change (Shaheen, 2015, p. 85; Cunningham & Lemke, 2014). In addition, other authors such as Dudouet (2013), have presented a battery of hypothesis outlining particular mechanisms that can explain de-escalation transition dynamics between civil war and protests.
Recent research has found that there is empirical evidence on the possibility of a connection between these processes, as found by the research by Cunningham and Lemke (2014, p. 337), Shaheen (2015), and the Hegre et Al. (2017). These findings are consistent with scholarly work that finds that violent protest can be linked to the escalation of violence into civil war (Cristina & Elbadawi, 2007, p. 20).

We may in fact gain a greater understanding of civil war by examining the processes of escalation and de-escalation associated with the periods leading up to the outbreak of civil conflict and civil war or processes of de-escalation away from civil wars (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 341). If factors identified as affecting civil war have a similar effect on a variety of other types of internal violence (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 339), we might consider using these concepts for analyzing different types of conflict, which could help us to understand about the dynamics of conflict escalation (Cristina & Elbadawi, 2007, p. 3), and de-escalation. They could in fact provide vital information for conflict prevention and peace building (Dudouet, 2013).

The question is thus what has conditioned the escalation/de-escalation of one process towards each other (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 523). To engage this question I propose to analyze the transition from civil war to protest campaigns, and protest campaigns to civil war, in order to understand the conditions under which these transitions happen (see figure one). In fact, the possibility of a continuum in contestation debates the assumption that conflict and contestation are equal to violence and civil war. The first one (conflict and contestation) is not necessarily violent. Peaceful conflicts define and redefine the nature of states and its political arrangements (Tilly, 2000). This research has the potential to bring insights and evidence around the connection between conflict processes beyond the idea that a conflict equals violence or that the absence of violence equals peace (Jacoby, 2007).
3. UNDERSTANDING KEY TERMS: PROTESTS, PROTEST CAMPAIGNS AND CIVIL WARS

The text proceeds to present the definitions of and the differences between the concepts of civil war, protests and protest campaigns.

The document explores how protest campaigns and civil war are explained in relation to political participation, inequality, feasibility, provision of public services and the legitimacy of the state, and how the emergence, existence and prevalence of protests and civil wars has been theorised through these concepts. It is argued that through these concepts we could understand the possibility of transitions of escalation and de-escalation between protest campaigns and civil war.

3.1 Processes, protests and civil wars

Interrogating the definition(s) of protests and civil wars is necessary in order to explore how we can understand the connections between these processes. However, the terms are defined variously; different authors use the terms ‘protest’, ‘conflict’, and ‘civil war’ to mean different things (see table 1). Thus, it is imperative to surface some of the definitions used to ‘define’ civil wars and protests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TERM</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protest</td>
<td>&quot;sites of contestation in which bodies, symbols, identities, practices, and discourses are used to pursue or prevent changes in institutionalized power relations&quot; (Taylor and Van Dyke 2004;: 268 cited on Della Porta &amp; Diani, 2009, p. 165)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Conflict</td>
<td>A positional difference, regarding the values relevant to a society, the conflict items between at least two decisive and directly involved actors, which is being carried out using observable and inter-related conflict measures that lie outside established regulatory procedures and threaten core stable functions, the international order or hold out the prospect to do so (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2015, p. 8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Conflict</td>
<td>Any confrontational activity by domestic non-governmental actors that disrupts and challenges any government actor, agency or policy. This includes verbal threats, as well as violent and nonviolent actions since group violence ordinarily grows out of violence actions which are not intrinsically violent (Carey, 2006, p. 2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Resistance</td>
<td>&quot;[T]he sustained use of methods of nonviolent action by civilians involved in asymmetric conflict with opponents not averse to using violence to defend their interests...&quot; (Schock, 2013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolt</td>
<td>Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such change or any successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central government (Cunningham &amp; Lemke, 2014, p. 334)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolution</td>
<td>An effort to achieve political change through actions such as mass demonstrations protests, strikes or violence (Shaheen, 2015, p. 36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social uprisings</td>
<td>Violent or non-violent intra state acts of defiance (covers demonstrations, revolutions, riots, revolts, crises, strikes or coups). Groups of citizens include political parties, organized groups, students and workers as well as the general public (Shaheen, 2015, p. 37)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riot</td>
<td>Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force (Cunningham &amp; Lemke, 2014, p. 333)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Violent Action</td>
<td>[...] A phase in other forms of collective action, caused by the same forces that move people to other, 'normal' assertions of collective interest (Piven &amp; Cloward, 1991, p. 436)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Conflict</td>
<td>Any confrontational activity by domestic non-governmental actors that disrupts and challenges any government actor, agency or policy. This includes verbal threats, as well as violent and non-violent actions since group violence ordinarily grows out of violence actions which are not intrinsically violent (Carey, 2006, p. 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guerrilla warfare</td>
<td>Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by independent bands of civilians or irregular forces armed at the overthrow of the present regime (Cunningham &amp; Lemke, 2014, p. 333)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>All conflicts between a state and one or more rebel groups that generate at least 25 battle deaths per year (Buhag, Cederman, &amp; Gleditsch, 2014, p. 423)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>To qualify as a civil war a conflict must oppose the government and a politically organized group, and involve at least 1,000 combatants on each side. The conflict also needs to cause at least 1,000 battle related deaths over its course and 100 deaths per year (Houle, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>Civil war requires a conflict to occur primarily within one state, a significant level of violence, this violence is carried out by organized forces and the state participates in the violence (Cunningham &amp; Lemke, 2014, p. 329)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For example, the terms revolution, collective violence, group conflict, riot, internal war, political strikes, turmoil, electoral mobilization and demonstrations can all refer to different aspects of social movements and contestation (Tilly C., 2006; Tarrow, 2011; Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Shaheen, 2015, p. 5). The exact characteristics of what constitutes the difference between these terms should be made explicit, as this can allow researchers to ground empirically the meanings of the concepts used. In the absence of this, the meanings of different terms can bleed into each other, blurring the analysis of different processes and their relationship to each other.

The definitions of protests\(^3\) and civil war face the challenge of connecting concepts with evidence. On the one hand, these definitions are trying to link concepts with the realities they are trying to describe. At the same time, they are trying to connect concepts with evidence. The latter requires the measurement of social phenomena; something that demands the existence of coherent methods, systems and mechanisms for measurement across countries, something that is commonly absent for qualitative and quantitative researchers.

\(^3\) The social movement literature has thus preferred to reflect on processes of contestation as a movement than as an event (Della Porta & Diani, 2009), thus the social movement category.

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Therefore, researchers oftentimes observe realities on the basis of events, whilst trying to make sense of these observations with the processes they might be part of. Thus, it is common to observe that research on these social processes can describe them as either events or processes.

Defining protests or civil war as events could lead us to forfeit the path dependence that defines these processes (Goldstone, 1998). While events and observations are important and bring relevant information for analysis, we might be trying to explain a wider pattern on the basis of a single observation. Events constitute important markers within a timeline for a process, but they cannot replace processes by themselves; they symbolize important events within processes, but they do not replace them (Goldstone, 1998). For this, and in order to take into account a wider historical perspective, I argue that for analysing the interconnectedness(or disconnection) between civil war, protests and protest campaigns a process lens might support such an analysis.

3.2 Civil war and civil conflict

Civil wars have been defined in the recent literature mostly in relation to the understanding of what defines/signals what a civil war is or when one is observed (see table one). These definitions have been centred on the thresholds and conditions that define the existence of a civil war. This might be a by-product of the interest in providing empirical evidence for explaining the existence of conflict and its onset, as well as understanding the specific conditions that define the emergence of armed conflicts (Sambanis N., 2004).

A common element in the definition of a civil war is the existence of an (or several) organized armed group(s), the existence of armed violent conflict in a given territory (this presents challenges in understanding of internationalized civil wars4, non-state armed actors, the use of mercenaries, or civil wars with international involvement or support). The definition of civil wars usually does not base the distinctions on the repertoires used in the confrontations, thus tactics are not as important in the definition of what constitutes a civil war. Tactics are a response to the terrain, the conditions that define the feasibility of particular repertoires and the resources at the disposal of the state and its challengers.

Central to the definitions of civil war is the importance of specialized structures whose solely purpose is the use of violence for tactical or strategic (political) purposes. The existence of a political agenda by the warring parties or those who the armed groups claim to represent is a salient feature, as well as their capacity for exerting their role as a sovereign in part of the territory, thus signifying the absence, or the weakness of the monopoly of force by the state (Sambanis N., 2004).

Some authors refer to civil war as being indistinct from guerrilla warfare, but doing so suffers from a tactical and a historical confusion between the definition of a phenomenon and the tactics employed. Guerrilla warfare is a particular set of tactics used in warfare that is meant to support asymmetrical warfare in internal and external war between different groups (Arreguin-Toft, 2001).

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4 An internationalized non-international armed conflict is a civil war characterized by the intervention of the armed forces of a foreign power. This research is not considering internationalized civil wars.
Civil war is defined in this research as the armed contestation of a social contract within a particular state by an armed group led and constituted by mostly nationals of that particular state. For this, there should be an institutional failure to resolve conflict peacefully, such that the forces behind discontent take the form of large scale violence (Murshed M. S., 2010, p. 135).

For this, an important distinction is the existence of dedicated armed organizations with a military purpose that supports or defends a particular political objective. The sovereignty and the monopoly of violence is thus not held by the state, and in some areas of the country there is control by the contesting armed groups, or there is an oligopoly of violence. In these areas of the country contesting organizations can co-create institutional settings where dissent or disputes are mediated through them giving a particular order to the social relations in the areas under their control.

Research within this field has focused on understanding recurrent patterns that can explain a conflict’s existence, prevalence or onset given a particular set of conditions given by the environment and existing political arrangements. For this, large datasets have been used in order to understand how conflict and civil war relate to political participation (Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009; Gurr T. R., 1995), inequality (Stewart F., 2008), economic performance, feasibility (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004), the presence of ethnic groups (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Other developments in regards to the nature of the data and the use of geo-location data are looking at similar questions and present different approaches in terms of the unit of analysis and the unit of measure, looking at conflict dyads, or at group dyads (Cederman & Gleditsch, 2009).

On the basis of the previous distinctions, interpretations and claims have varied. As Sambanis has shown (2004), changes in the nature of the definitions and measurement units impact the outcomes of research. In addition, the type of models used to research can vary, affecting the findings and explanations brought by research. For summarizing these claims the text proceeds to summarize the main findings in regards to how political participation, inequality, feasibility of rebellion, legitimacy of state institutions and the provision of public services by the state can present a framework for understanding the configuration of different institutional settings within particular contexts and the presence of civil wars.

3.2.1 Political participation

The consideration of political participation has been present in research on conflict and civil war since the 1960’s, with focus given to the impact of exclusionary policies and the likelihood of them triggering conflict and grievances (Gurr T. R., 2011). Thus, it is expected that in countries where groups of citizens are denied political participation, civil war will be more likely. Using the same line of reasoning, armed

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5 There the possibility of foreign nationals, mercenaries or even private companies could be part of a civil war, as they could be acting on behalf of the state or of rebel groups.
conflict would be less likely settings where political participation is more open. This branch of the literature has commonly been framed as contrasting autocratic and democratic regimes and centering their importance in relation to civil war. However, it perhaps speaks more directly of the capacity of citizens to access the political sphere and the manner(s) by which their participation is funneled within the political establishment by the existing institutions (Gerschewski J., 2013; Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2017).

3.2.2 Inequality

One is unequal in relation to someone else, a particular group or a particular benchmark (Sen, 1992). Inequality speaks of difference between actors, or groups inside of a society with regard to different elements, including income, salaries, provision of public services, etc. (Milanovic, 2010).

The debate about the role of inequality and the existence of civil war and protests has different claims about them (Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014; Dabla-Norris, Kochhar, Suphaphitkat, Ricka, & Tsounta, 2015; Cramer C., 2003; Tilly, 2003; Gurr T. R., 2011), which could be seen as different. However, these are better understood differentiating these claims by the type of inequality being analysed: Horizontal\(^6\), or vertical inequality\(^7\). With regards to vertical inequality, it has been found that vertical inequality is not statistically related to the onset of civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Fearon & Laitin, 2003); however horizontal inequality has been found statistically significant in describing the emergence of armed conflicts (Mursched & Gates, 2005; Stewart, 2008; Østby, 2008; Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch, 2011). However, it is accurate to state that prevalent vertical inequalities have the potential to destabilize the social contract, and this can be manifested in processes of contestation that could escalate into civil war (Mursched M. S., 2010).

3.2.3 State strength and the Feasibility of rebellion

Feasibility of rebellion refers to the likelihood that an armed group will be able to effectively contest power from a particular state. Feasibility speaks of the capacity of an organization to challenge a particular state, determined by a range of factors. These factors include terrain (combat is facilitated and state capacity weakened in rougher terrain), size of the country (in larger countries state control is less likely, thus revolutionary movements are more feasible), size of the population (greater pool of people to recruit from), the size or strength of the opposing force (weak armies or police forces make rebellion more likely), and the capacity to fund their war through profits from natural resources or other rents (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohnær, 2009). The core claim is that only rebel organizations that control sufficient material and organizational resources will be able to challenge the state violently (Buhaug, Cederman, & Gleditsch, 2014, p. 421), specially when the state capacity is weak (Fearon & Laitin, 2003).

\(^6\) The inequalities between individuals belonging to different groups. For example, wealth inequality between black and white citizens of a country.

\(^7\) The inequality among individuals in a unit of analysis. For example wealth inequality in a country.
3.2.4 Legitimacy of state institutions

The relevance and role of the legitimacy of state institutions has been more assumed than proved in the research on civil war. Asking whether a state is legitimate while suffering civil war might sound like a non sequitur. It is expected that a viable social contract should be sufficient to restrain conflict, however the working of a social contract implies that the state must be able to enforce laws, property rights and contracts. Legitimacy is a function of the capacity of the state to exert its duties within the social contract (Murshed M. S., 2010, p. 139; Gurr T. R., 1968; McLoughlin, 2015).

However, the assessment of the legitimacy of state institutions is not being analyzed in relation to how this explains the emergence of civil war. Legitimacy can be understood as a perception; as such it is not constant and might be subject to external forces that affect it, and the challenges on its measurement (McLoughlin, 2015).

Scholarly research has assumed that democracies inherently have more legitimacy than other models of state, but have not explained the relationship between states, civil war and legitimacy. It has been found that the risk of conflict is lower in well-established democracies and autocracies (Murshed M. S., 2002). Could it be the case that strong autocracies are, at least in some cases, legitimate for their constituents (not the international community), explaining why civil war is less likely in autocracies?

3.2.5 Provision of Public services by the state

The provision of public services has been central to the conception and practice of the state. The social contract is an agreement guaranteeing the recognition of the state as a sovereign in exchange for certain benefits or services (Rousseau, 1762). The provision of services can be used to buy consent, incorporate different actors who had grievances against the government. The functions of the state are important in maintaining the cohesiveness of society, which in turn are central to a functioning social contract (Murshed M. S., 2002, p. 139). However, the provision of public services does not necessarily mean a lower likelihood of conflict, as the possibility of unequal growth can create new grievances and fuel tensions that might create the seeds of future conflicts (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Gurr T. R., 2011). The gap between the promise made by the social contract and its practice can create a sovereignty gap where the state’s ability to provide basic public goods such as security or accountability can explain a failure in the social contract and the emergence of violence (Murshed M. S., 2010, p. 130; Gurr T. R., 2011).

3.3 Protests and protest campaigns

Protests are inherent to the state, the existing social contract, and the consolidation of the nation state. Protests have been present in the processes of transformation of states in both the north and the south of the globe as an extension of conventional politics by other means (Nyar & Wray, 2012, p. 24; Tilly C.,
Protests aim to challenge and/or disrupt government institutions and make of the protest an antenna to broadcast grievances to the government and the other constituencies of the state (Della Porta & Diani, 2009).

Actors involved in protests have been usually the citizens of a particular country. This presents challenges in understanding trans-national or inter-national protests taking place more commonly now (Tarrow, 2011; Nam, 2006). Participants in protests can be members of political parties, organized groups, students or workers organizations as well as the general public. However, this does not exclude the possibility of protestors emerging without a ‘clearly’ visible affiliation to particular institutions or organizations. For example, as protests are now organized through an assortment of different technological platforms, affiliation appears to be more fluid and diverse, having structures that operate under diverse frameworks (Tarrow, 2011; Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Ruijgrok, 2017).

The emergence of protests, sit-ins, hunger strikes and the like are the outcome of a historical processes of innovation in politics that in some countries spanned for more than 200 years (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly C. , 2006; McCurdy, Feigenbaum, & Frenzel, 2016), and in the case of newer states, take root even before their transition to statehood or their transition away from colony (Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Dedieu & Mbojd-Pouye, 20016). In both “old” and “new” countries, protests have mostly consolidated themselves as valid and acceptable means of contestation and dissent with particular repertoires that are specific to the contexts where contestation takes place (Tarrow, 2011). Modern protest could be described as the outcome of an evolutionary process where successful practices survived, were reproduced and evolved to adapt to the new environments where they take place (Tilly C. , 2006). Then for example, in some protests in South Africa, “toyi-toying” is a feature of protests where dancing, and singing is common of public manifestations, however it might look to the uninformed eye more like a celebration than a protest. Then, how to account for all the possible repertoires of protests and contestation?

A protest action can in some cases be indistinguishable from an art performance, or a public gathering. Repertoires used in protests obey to the existing codes, symbols and cultural representations that resonate within the polity where the protests are taking place (Tilly C. , 2006), whilst at the same time incorporating new repertoires and features. Protests symbols are means of communication; as such

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8 This research is not taking into account transnational protests or international protests.

9 One could bear in mind the example of the protests against the illegal imprisonment of alleged terrorists in Guantanamo bay, where protestors wore orange overalls, and had their faces covered as the victims of torture in Abu Ghraib.

10 One could consider the Black Lives matter protests as incorporating new symbols and repertoires, whilst being informed by the civil rights movement in the United States, they include the use of the “hands up don’t shoot” sign and chant, as a response to a particular event that occurred in the U.S.A and is now in some cases a “common” feature of Black Lives matter protests.
they use the tropes used in the society where the protests take place, and change with the variations in language as well.\textsuperscript{11}

Protests and its research have two main biases that must be discussed.

Literature on protests seems to have a blind spot in regards to right-wing protests. Theories and reports of protests mostly speak of left wing politics, whilst ignoring the role of protests that promote values such as racial supremacy, nationalistic values, gender differences and the like (Edelman, 2001). Because of this, usually we observe theories dealing with protests reflecting a language that speaks of class, inequality, grievances, and justice; but not about protests related to racial supremacy, entitlement, or righteousness. As these protests are usually labeled as irrational and researchers are less likely to engage in these, we know less about them (Edelman, 2001). Whether we like it or not, right-wing protests that advocate for the limitation of human rights of other citizens constitute a political plea, speak to a particular vision of a social contract, and envision a particular notion of the state that they aim to redefine (Pullum, 2014).

Information collected is biased towards reporting violent acts of protests, while academic research might be playing more attention to peaceful protests. The literature has defined protests as mostly taking a peaceful form, where peaceful protests are equivalent to “peace” (Jacoby, 2007). At the same time violent protests are more likely to be reported upon, and as Jane Duncan argues, media seems to have a bias towards “riot porn” thus reporting on protest mostly when they are or turn violent (2016), thus overrepresenting violent protests as opposed to peaceful protests. Thus, it might be the case that there are far more protests taking place, and when we speak of violent events we do not refer these as protests, but rather as something different.

The distinction between what is a protest and what is not a protest will be always difficult to make. Protests historically have involved clashes, confrontations and violence (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly & Wood, 2016). Violence plays and will continue playing a tactical and strategical role within protesting organizations. Violence can help to foster a core group of committed members, can give resonance to the claims being made, but can limit the appeal of protest movements to wider constituencies and deter other members of the citizenry to join them while justifying the use of violence from the state. However, given the subjective nature of what can constitute violence (and peace), researchers are left with ways to figure out, measure, report and code what is violence.

The use of new tools such as social media as part of protests has created further challenges to the research on protests and contestation. The emergence of a new series of communication tools allows for new tactics for communication, organization, and repertoires for protests (Tarrow, 2011; Merlyna, 2012). Because of this, several questions in regards to how the concepts used for analyzing protests apply to “new” protests. Protests have changed in their operation; but not their nature: to exert pressure on a

\textsuperscript{11} One could have in mind the emergence of the intersectionality discourse and its incorporation in the protests taking place in South Africa. Whereas the term has been part of feminist discourse for a long time, it has been mainstreamed in the discourse of tertiary education student protestors in South Africa in recent years.
particular government (Tarrow, 2011). Then a protest that is organized through Facebook and coordinated in the ground via Whatssap is still a protest. People are harnessing the new tools at their disposal, as early protests did with printed pasquins or leaflets before the emergence of radio and television. The means have changed, the ends are similar.

In addition, since the 1990’s, the emergence of international protests and campaigns have presented new challenges for researchers. These protests are playing a more salient role in current and future movements, and is trans-nationalizing protests\(^\text{12}\) (Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Smith, Plummer, & Hughes, 2017). As the world became “globalized” protests, and the norms regulating these did as well (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006).

The nature of states matters, but protests are not solely a phenomenon of strong democratic states. While protests are typically dealt with peacefully/responsively by institutions in fully democratic states (Tilly & Wood, 2016), they are received with a mixture of repression and both unofficial channels and official venues for institutionalizing the demands of protestors in countries where democracy is not fully consolidated, or is absent (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly & Wood, 2016).

When protests are reported upon, usually they are quantified in the literature as events (Nam, 2006), we describe them indistinctively as events or processes (in a similar way as civil wars), as constituted by individuals or groups, as having an organized structure or lacking a clear structure, with private or public demands. However, for the purpose of this theory, protests are understood as processes that show some degree of organization, and involve several participants\(^\text{13}\). For this research, although virtual protests such as mail bombs\(^\text{14}\) twitter campaigns, and email campaigns, are important processes to take into account given their capacity to exert pressure on the governments (Tarrow, 2011), they will not be taken into account for understanding the possible transition between protests campaigns and civil war.

For this research, the definitions of protests do not exclude the possibility of violence or conflict. The use of violence however is not the sole or most salient feature of protests (Tilly C., 2006; Goldstone, 1998). Protests are a symptom of conflict, thus protests where violence might emerge can occur in spaces commonly defined as peaceful environments (Jacoby, 2007). Therefore, protests are not conceived of as an abnormal phenomenon, but rather accepted as a normal repertoire used within social movements in some states (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). This research grounds its understanding of protests in relation to the state and the public sphere, as demonstrators mostly address their claims and grievances to national governments as they are seen as the legitimate policy making institutions obliged

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\(^{12}\) This research will not analyse these protests.

\(^{13}\) This does not deny the importance or relevance of considering other protests. As the immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi showed, individual events can link and even trigger greater protest dynamics, however this research is interested in analysing the latter, not the former.

\(^{14}\) A mail bomb is the sending of a massive amount of e-mail to a specific person or system. A huge amount of mail may simply fill up the recipient's disk space on the server or, in some cases, may be too much for a server to handle and may cause the server to stop functioning.

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to respond to its citizens (Ortiz, Burke, Berrada, & Cortés, 2013, p. 6), therefore protests directed towards private institutions or international institutions are not being considered in this theory.

Measuring and understanding protests as events entails the difficulty of being able to observe the connection of particular protest events to wider processes and the claims behind these (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013; Tarrow, 2011). As we attempt to understand processes on the basis of events focusing on data points (the events), not being able to connect them temporarily creates an analytical challenge. As Chenoweth and Lewis argue, doing an analysis of protests as events and trying to relate them to a series of variables would be akin to trying to analyze battle events and armed clashes for understanding the existence of a civil war (2013, p. 417).

Thus, in order to understand the idea of protests as part of a process, we should consider how different protests events might be linked as a process. For this, the research starts from the understanding of a campaign. “A campaign is a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective […]. A campaign is continuous and lasts anywhere from days to years, distinguishing it from one-off events […].” (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 416).

Protest campaigns are defined in this research as the denunciation and contestation of a social contract within a particular state by a group (or alliance of groups) that are constituted mostly by nationals of that particular state, and who direct a series of protests at the state and aim to undertake a major reform of the existing social contract and political arrangement in place in a particular country. These protests campaigns are consciously acting with specific objectives in mind such as regime change, secession, or changes in the social contract for the citizens within the state (Chenoweth & Lewis, 2013, p. 417).

This definition does not differentiate among the repertoires used in protest campaigns, thus different actions undertaken in these campaigns will be not seen as categorical distinctions, but as emergent properties of the particular settings and histories of protest and contestation of power of the different countries (Tilly C., 2006).

For exploring the possibility of a transition between protests campaigns and civil war, I argue that the concepts of political participation, inequality, feasibility of rebellion, legitimacy of state institutions and the provision of public services by the state can present a framework for understanding the configuration of different institutional settings within particular contexts and the emergence of protests.

### 3.3.1 Political participation

The relationship between political participation and the existence of protests and protest campaigns can be understood in relation to the political conditions that favor or limit political participation. Thus one could claim that the presence of protests and protest campaigns depend on the political opportunities

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15 What is referred in the civil war literature as maximalist campaigns (Chenoweth, 2013).
available to the populations (Sutton, Butcher, & Svensson, 2014, p. 1280), but also inform the agendas of protestors. Thus, in authoritarian regimes, opposition and protests are limited as a consequence of the lack of institutionalized channels that accommodate popular discontent and opposition (Carey, 2006, p. 4), while political opposition and protest is expected to flourish in more ‘democratic’ systems (Schatzman C., 2005, pp. 291-292) and in weak autocracies (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2014).

Democratization and the lower expectation of repression both favor and make protests and protests campaigns more likely. The existence of opportunities for political groups to bring their agendas into the public sphere is more likely to happen in democratic regimes (Schatzman C., 2005). In less strong autocracies, protests and protest campaigns are less likely. Repression or the threat of it can deter citizens from participating in these; however recent evidence such as the cases of the Arab spring have shown that even in the absence of spaces for political participation, protests and protests campaigns can emerge (Bethke & Bussmann, 2011); while in other cases repression has been swift so protests have not relapsed after the initial protest movements nor managed to become protests campaigns, such as the case of Bahrain in 2011 (BBC News, 2011).

### 3.3.2 Inequality

Many of the earlier studies on the existence of protests and conflicts were interested in testing arguments that political violence was the result of relative deprivation (Gurr T. R., 2011). Deprivation speaks of inequality, and the differences between groups in society in regard to political rights, their economic conditions of living, or their perceived treatment or mistreatment by the state. This research stream has generally found that levels of political violence were higher where individuals and groups had higher grievances relative to their expectations (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 331), or where perceived inequalities were higher (Gurr T. R., 2011). The classical argument for people to engage in protests is that deprivation creates grievances and discontent is illustrated (White, 1989, p. 1277; Gurr T. R., 2011) by recent protests across the globe which highlight the current importance of inequalities as a mobilizing subject for protest movements (Della Porta & Diani, 2009; Tarrow, 2011).

The research on inequality and its relation to the emergence of protests speak of inequality without differentiating between vertical or horizontal inequalities. Here the insights from the differentiation between vertical and horizontal inequalities by civil war studies could constitute a venue for future research on this topic.

### 3.3.3 State strength and the Feasibility of rebellion

The feasibility of protests and protest campaigns in a particular state can be related to the effect that repression might have on them. The findings have been contrasting, as repression on protests has been found to have a radicalizing effect in some cases, and a stifling effect in others (Opp & Roehl, 1990, p. 521). In the case of fragile states (weak democracies and weak autocracies) the feasibility of protest is
higher, as these countries are the most vulnerable to political instability (Norris, 2006, p. 8). Discussing the strategic nature of decisions by protesting organizations and the repertoires used in their contestation as a function of the expected value of the actions undertaken (Lichbach, 1987) relate tactics and the feasibility of rebellion in relation to the strength of the state. The effect of the strength of existing social movements in relation to the strength of the state and their impact on the existence of protest campaigns is also an area for further research.

Feasibility also can speak of the resources and the organizational capacities of protest movements to mobilize protests and protest campaigns, and how these capacities affect the likelihood of them taking place (Tarrow, 2011). Such a research would require a characterization of the organizational structures of protesting organizations. Nevertheless, being able to characterize the nature of an organization and its features constitutes a difficult task. Social movements that organize and undertake protests could have an operational structure, but might not have a clear institutional setting. An example of this is the ICBL-International Campaign to Ban Landmines. This organization had a clearly defined objective, operational functioning and working mechanisms that managed successfully to achieve their campaign goals; however it lacked elements of a formal institutional structure, for example having a bank account (Edelman, 2001, p. 305).

3.3.4 Legitimacy of state institutions

The legitimacy of state institutions is vital for understanding of the emergence of protests. If actors do not believe in the possibilities of protesting within their particular frameworks, then we would expect other kinds of repertoires to be drawn on. However, protest seems to be normalized in some states, and somehow mainstreamed within political systems as a “common” repertoire (Norris, 2006).

Legitimacy can have an ambivalent effect on the presence of protests. Researchers are left to try to describe, define and answer the question: what is to be legitimate? Can we have legitimate governments and illegitimate institutions? What is the connection between them, and how this affects protests and protests campaigns? The legitimacy of a state is something that is called upon, and is usually stated or assumed, but cannot be clearly proven in relation to protests or protest campaigns. Do people protest because the government is illegitimate? If so, why are they making use of protests instead of armed tactics? The existence of legitimacy is usually associated with governments that are transparent, accountable and where there is space for political participation (Schatzman C., 2005, p. 292; McLoughlin, 2015). Protests can emerge in both legitimate and illegitimate governments, whereas protests with maximalist goals (protest campaigns) could be more likely against governments that are perceived as illegitimate.

3.3.5 Provision of public services by the state

When scholars have detected a decrease on protests, this either happened through the consolidation of social contracts, or the granting of new rights; both of which speak of the consolidation of the nation
state and the strengthening of the provision of services (or the promise of) by the state (Cederman, Gleditsch, & Wucherpfennig, 2014).

Different countries have different schemes for the provision of public services; whereas in some countries public services have been outsourced and privatised, in other countries these services are provided by state companies. In addition, provision does not equal access. For example, a water pipe is connected to a house, but if people cannot afford the payment for a water bill, could we qualify this as a failure of provision of these services?

The case of South Africa brings to the fore this dilemma, as in the particular covenant taking place in South Africa, protests are usually referred as “service delivery” protests (Duncan, 2016), while citizens are in fact having a better access to public services, they are still not able to afford some of these services. From this, one would expect that where public services are provided, the likelihood of protests or protests campaigns is lower. However, we must be aware that different constituents demand different services, and ascribe to them different values (running water on a tropical rainforest may not be as important as in a deserted area). The granting of public services will not preclude the emergence of protests or protests campaigns for other reasons. The case of Libya presents an interesting case in point. These protests started in spite of the existence of the highest Human Development Index in Africa before a protest campaign that transitioned into a civil war emerged (UNDP, 2016).
4. THE RELATION BETWEEN PROTEST CAMPAIGNS AND CIVIL WARS WITHIN THE STATE

The document has presented the idea that protest campaigns and civil wars can be studied as related processes that belong to a continuum in the state and are part of processes of contestation taking place. In addition, the document has presented a series of concepts that could constitute an analytical framework for understanding the contextual elements that define the state and the presence of protest campaigns and civil wars.

For representing the transitions between these processes, an analytical framework that incorporates a historical perspective around the concepts of state strength and the degree of protected consultation is presented.

For this, the document begins presenting the framework, and it proceeds to present preliminary evidence of the possibility of transition between processes of protest campaigns and civil war for the cases of Colombia and South Africa.

4.1 An analytical framework to understand transitions

As the state as the unit of analysis is used for the analysis of both civil war and protests campaigns, we could consider using a framework for analysing the state as a mode of reference.

For this, the research uses the framework proposed by Charles Tilly (2006) based on Robert Dahl model to analyse political regimes (1973). The analytical framework consists of a two axis plot (see figure number two) that allows us to represent different regimes. The horizontal axis represents the concept of protected consultation and the vertical axis represents the concept of government capacity, and as such could allow us a partial representation of some of the features ascribed to the state (presented in section three).

Protected consultation refers to “mutual rights and obligations binding governmental agents to whole categories of people who are subject to the government’s authority, these categories being defined chiefly or exclusively by relations to the government rather by reference to particular connections with rules or to membership in categories based on imparted durable traits such as race, ethnicity, gender or religion” (Tilly C., 2006, p. 6). This concept could thus be seen as an aggregate or “average” of provision of public services, political participation, existing inequalities and state legitimacy.

Governmental capacity is “the extent of governmental agents control over changes in the conditions of persons, activities and resources within the territory over which the government exercises jurisdiction” (Tilly C., 2006, p. 6). This concept could thus be seen as an aggregate or “average” of the state strength and the feasibility of protest campaigns and civil war.

16 This also allows us to represent the variability on the unit of analysis.
On the basis of this diagram, we have four broad categories that refer to general typologies of states. Despite the fact that some of these categories are used to qualify governments, for the purpose of the understanding of the model proposed in this document they should be understood as categories that broadly describe types of regimes.

Figure Two. Representation of categories for different political regimes.

Strong autocracies are regimes in which citizens can have weak civil rights. In these regimes the state apparatuses and administrations control the monopoly of violence and authority, and fulfil the role of a sovereign (Gerschewski, 2013). One could use Saudi Arabia as an example of a strong autocracy, a country with a clear monopoly of force in which citizenry is limited. In a strong autocracy, dissent and protests are treated with repression effectively and swiftly, minimizing the expressions of discontent and deterring protestors and protest campaigns from challenging the state.

‘Anocracies’ or weak autocracies refer to countries in which instability prevails. Weak autocracies are states that do not completely exert the monopoly of force in a country, in which citizen rights do not afford full citizenry and where the institutional mechanisms to incorporate dissent within the political system are feeble (Regan & Bell, 2009). Thus violence, instability and repression co-exist. An example of a weak autocracy would be Burundi.
Weak democracies are countries in which the strength of state institutions and their capacity is not full. A Weberian monopoly of force might not be fully in place, this makes of this kind of states more prone to the emergence of crises. However, their institutional setting allows dissent to occur and somehow it embraces political challenges to the state through the political system. Bolivia and Ecuador endured protest campaigns that brought turmoil to both countries in the late 90’s without spilling into a civil war, functioning as weak democracies (Massal, 2014).

Strong democracies are those countries in which state institutions exert full sovereignty over its citizens and territory, citizens are granted full citizenry and the institutions in place have a series of avenues to incorporate dissent into the policy making and the political system. In these states repression is limited, and legitimacy is strong. Examples of these cases are Finland, Sweden and Norway.

The utility of using this diagram is its capacity to position countries according to the possible combination of factors derived from the interaction of legitimacy, provision of public services, inequality between citizens, political participation state strength and legitimacy of particular states and the possible trajectories that these factors may combine to produce. Also it allows us to see the changing nature of the state across time. As such, this presents a cartographic scheme for the mapping of the transitions from civil war to protest campaigns and protests campaigns to civil war with regard to the factors considered in the model (See figure three for an example of the cases of Colombia and South Africa).

4.2 Escalation and de-escalation - Preliminary evidence from the case studies

The cases of South Africa and Colombia present interesting evidence about the possible patterns that the transition between war and protest campaigns could observe, as well as the possibility of the simultaneity of both of these phenomena (see figure three and four).

The Colombian conflict has been one of the longest civil conflicts in the world since 1948 (Sánchez Gómez, 2008). After the assassination of Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, violence flared up and the capacity of citizens to express their political opinions was limited by bipartisan violence. Between 1958 and 1974 a political arrangement was achieved between the leaders of the main two political parties; this agreement allowed the state to increase its capacity but effectively closed political participation for those who did not belong to the two main political parties (see figure three). In this period is where the main guerrilla groups of the country FARC-EP and the ELN emerged (Sánchez, Gutiérrez Sanín, & Wills, 2006). Between 1974 and 1990 the state saw a limited increase in state capacity as well as the limited opening for political spaces, political dissent could be expressed more openly, but still not fully for those who divorced themselves from mainstream politics in Colombia17. The end of this period brought a new political constitution that enshrined the nature of the state as a multi-party democracy. Between 1990’s and early 2000’s there was an improvement in the consultation of the citizens and a decrease in the capacity of the state due to the rise of paramilitary forces and the FARC-EP. The arrival of the Uribe government in 2002 brought an increase in state capacity and a reduction in the spaces for political contestation within Colombia, however the taxation and military capacities of the state improved in the

17 An example of this is the politicide of the members of the Patriotic Union political party in the mid 1980’s.
country (Diaz & Murshed, 2013). The start of the peace process with the FARC-EP in 2012 brought an increase in the capacity of the state to embrace dissent.

The analysis on stages of protest campaigns and civil war in Colombia seem to point to the simultaneity of both phenomena (see figure four). The existence of continuous protests campaigns might be related to the existence of the armed violence, but preceded the emergence of armed confrontations. Although armed violence within the civil war has increased and escalated, the presence of protests has been constant throughout the conflict. However, with the start of the peace process between the Government and the FARC-EP, a series new of different protests campaigns emerged in the country defending indigenous, agrarian, and educational agendas among others (Diaz, 2013). This might be a consequence of a greater political openness by the government (as a by-product of the peace process). It could be also as a by-product of the reduction on the use of repression by the state and other actors.

The case of South Africa (see figure three) could be described as a state whose state capacity was higher than Colombia; however since its inception racism and the politics of exclusion took hold in the practices of a nation that was built following the guidance of their colonial overlords (The United Kingdom and The Netherlands) (Welsh, 2000). This process of institutionalization of state power came together with the further exclusion from non-whites from power positions in the country. This was supported by the implementation of the Bantu system and repression of protests like the Sharpeville
massacre (Welsh, 2000). With the banning of the ANC and other political parties the state consultation of their citizens was further reduced, however the military challenge to the state monopoly implied a reduction in its capacity (Simpson, 2016). The state capacity was further reduced by the waging of regular and irregular wars in the neighbour countries. Political participation (as well as state capacity) was marginally increased with the unbanning of the ANC, and the process of democratization that brought in 1994 the first democratic elections to the country. After 1994 and the Mandela presidency, two main periods emerge, the Mbeki and Zuma presidencies that saw a reduction in the consultation of different constituencies (an unexpected outcome of a one party democracy) (Duncan, 2016).

Figure four. Representation of protests and intensity of organized armed violence
text.

![Graph showing protests and conflict intensity](image)

Source: Own elaboration based on NAVCO V2 and UCDP/PRIO V4 datasets.

The case of South Africa is an example of a process that also seems to present simultaneity, and where protest campaigns seem to signal the start and the aftermath of an armed conflict (see figure four). Before the banning of the ANC and other parties opposing the regime of Apartheid, there was no armed resistance to the government. But after this, protests campaigns were paralleled by the emergence of an armed resistance. In the case of South Africa, it is interesting to note how protest campaigns where still taking place while civil conflict took place, but their recording was being censored by the state

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18 The protest series (protests campaigns) refers to the existence of protest campaigns taking place in the country according to the NAVCO (V2) dataset (cero- no protest campaigns, one protest campaigns). The conflict intensity series refers to the intensity of armed violence representing different thresholds of battle deaths (1- 25 battle deaths per year, 2- more than a thousand battle deaths per year) according to the UCDP/PRIO (V4) dataset.

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(something likely to affect datasets on protests). Protests campaigns subsided a couple of years after the armed conflict stopped, showing the possibility of a sequencing process between protest campaigns and civil war (in the case of the emergence of armed conflict), and between civil war and protest campaigns (in the de-escalation from civil war). In South Africa, there has been the emergence of a new wave of protests starting in early 2000 and has taken the shape of student protests, mining protests and service delivery protests that could conform a new wave of protest campaigns (Duncan, 2014).
5. PATHWAYS OF ESCALATION AND DE-ESCALATION: A THEORETICAL PROPOSAL

The document so far has placed the understanding of conflicts, protests campaigns and violence within the realm of a continuous process, in which protest campaigns and civil wars are related to each other. In addition, the document has presented a framework to understand how these processes and their transitions can be understood in relation to a series of concepts that could be used to describe the nature of the states where these transitions take place. This section presents a series of possible trajectories for the possible transitions between protest campaigns and civil wars. These can be read as pathways explaining the different transition conduits between civil war and protest.

This section aims to outline possible paths and conditions that explain the different possible transitions between protest campaigns and civil war.

The document introduces several possible trajectories: The transition from protest campaigns to civil war. The de-escalation from civil war to protest campaigns. Protest campaigns and their prevalence across time and cases where civil war seems to be a steady state. Also, the cases of escalation from low intensity civil war to high intensity civil war, and de-escalation from high intensity civil war to low intensity civil war are presented. In addition, the case in which and the transition from a victor’s peace causes the de-escalation of conflict, yet it inhibits protests campaigns, or protests altogether is presented.

5.1 Escalation to civil war: From protest campaigns to civil war

The case of Sri Lanka is illustrative of the escalation from a protest campaign into a civil war.

Internal grievances were key elements that led to the emergence of civil war. The post decolonization years saw the country moving towards a natural change in structures and power distribution in Sri Lanka that implied the reallocation of resources and entitlements between Tamils and Sinhalese. These changes created tensions that fuelled protests that claimed that the Tamil population were being marginalized within a national project more centred on the Sinhalese ethos (Devotta, 2005; Höglund & Orjuela, 2011). As the internal politics and the pressures from radical sectors within the Tamil movement undermined the possibility of non-armed dissent in the transition from colony to an independent nation state, a radical wing overtook the voice of the Tamil social movements radicalized (as did some Sinhalese movements), thus fuelling the emergence of riots and pogroms that coexisted with protests that sought for a greater political recognition within Sri Lanka (Frerks & Klem, 2005).

The emergence of civil war in Sri Lanka was the outcome of tensions that prevailed for a couple of decades within the framework of protests (sometimes violent), where other repertoires such as riots, pogroms and lootings were also common (Sivanandan, 1984). The emergence of a formal protest campaign looking for secession required of several things to be into place. First, the legitimacy of state institutions was eroded for a segment of the population, and thus appeal to the arbitration of the state in conflicts will be seen as something unnecessary. In addition, the moderate voices in the Tamil and Sinhalese sectors were stilled by chauvinistic rhetoric that also used violence against moderates.
Secondly, complaints regarding the economic or social conditions of Tamils, or the provision of public services to particular groups fuelled grievances were not responded by the government. The process was additionally facilitated by the inequality on the provision of services brought by the state, with an increase in the deprivation of Tamils. This, in addition to the high unemployment rates facilitated the recruitment and mobilization of young Tamils into that started to wave the secession agenda (Abeyratne S., 2004).

As these tensions were further fuelled, the use of political means and the established mechanisms for dissent (parliament, protests) lost credibility against the radical sectors who promoted armed confrontation which managed to make of the confrontation the only venue, where the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state as a space of negotiation had been undermined.

5.2 De-escalation from civil war to protest campaigns

The de-escalation from civil wars towards protests campaigns can be seen as the outcome of a Post-agreement scenario, or the change in the strategic choices of the contenders of power (provided political participation is feasible).

In the case of post-agreement scenarios, one could expect protests campaigns being less likely, as an agreement should recast the structure of the state and give venues to the claims of the contesting parties, protests campaigns might be less likely to occur. However, in the case where there is the multiplicity of actors, and structural transformations have not taken place yet (the promise of them is stated in agreements), or the agents waging civil war do not represent all the groups and interests, actors might contest the political establishment with protest campaigns. This, as agreements themselves do not constitute the effective change in the state, but they create the framework for implementing measures that might defuse the structural reasons that made civil war feasible (Abrahamsen, 2013).

The case of Mozambique could be presented as an example where agreements and peace treaties were followed by instability, protest campaigns, and uncertainty with regard to relapse into civil war, yet violence did not escalate into a full-fledged civil war again. The peace process, supported by a new constitution opened the space for political participation and the contestation of power within a democratic framework for the inclusion of RENAMO within the Mozambican polity (Funada-Classen, 2013). In practice, after the signing of the peace processes Mozambique has maintained mostly a one party structure, that just until recently seems to be contested by the emergence of the MDM party and

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\[19\text{ It is important to notice that in this time Sri Lanka observed the emergence of the JPV insurgency which was a Sinhalese insurgency that looked for a regime change, and whose agenda was informed by the grievances and unemployment of Sinhalese (Abeyratne S., 2004).}\]

\[20\text{ Resistência Nacional Moçambicana}\]

\[21\text{ Movimento Democrático de Moçambique}\]
the possibility of RENAMO joining the local elections in 2018\textsuperscript{22}. The transition from civil war towards peace sought for a settlement that would redistribute power between both actors across the country. It was assumed that a democratic system could function as the vehicle for the redistribution of power in the country. Elections were introduced as early as in 1994; just two years after the signature of the peace agreement (de Brito, Castel-Branco, Chichava, Forquilha, & Francisco, 2013). However, tensions about the redistribution of have led to frictions that have threatened the elections and their outcomes since 1994.

The consolidation of a one party state structure has produced a state can be seen as dismissive of, even aggressively antagonistic towards, opposition. Political structures which were subservient to the party rather than to the state were consolidated and fostered tensions. Protests occurred from both citizens and former RENAMO rebels in different provinces and during different years between 1994 and 2013 (de Brito L., Castel-Branco, Chichava, Forquilha, & Francisco, 2014). These protests have not reached the level of a protest campaign, however they have advocated for a series of elements that relate to the concept of regime change, thus could be seen as having some of the elements of a protest campaign.

In Mozambique, thus, the agreements facilitated participation and the emergence of protest movements that could advocate for agendas that could be framed as protests campaigns. This has been made feasible, as political participation was widened, and the danger for mobilization and protests is not prohibitive. In this case, it is important to notice that RENAMO has embraced a twofold strategy where regime change is advocated, while protests take place in the areas where they exert control (mostly remote or rural areas in Mozambique), while at the same time the threat of violence is used (and exerted), yet not to the extent that could be categorized as a low intensity civil war/civic conflict.

5.3 Protest campaigns, turmoil, instability yet no civil war

How can we understand and explain the cases of those countries in which civil war does not emerge, but instability, protests campaigns, revolts and even revolutions prevail? These countries might in fact represent the upper limit of what could be the threshold between instability within protest campaigns and the emergence of a civil war. The case of Ecuador is illustrative of this, as Ecuador had suffered instability and social unrest within protests campaigns looking for regime change, but where civil war did not emerge during the turbulent period it experienced in the decade of the 1990’s.

In this case one can observe a series of grievances, such as the low provision of public services in a context of high inequality between different groups (horizontal inequality between indigenous and non-indigenous population), and tensions caused by economical misfortunes such as hyperinflation and devaluation (Massal J., 2014).

\textsuperscript{22} RENAMO has been part or vetoed a series of electoral processes taking in Mozambique since 1992, thus the peace agreement seems similar to an armistice than to a peace agreement, with some confrontations occurring since 1994 but with a low number of casualties.
Another element to consider within the Ecuadorian case is that, in spite that the country has been referred as a democracy, effective political participation had been historically limited because of restricted notions of citizenship (indigenous groups and communities were considered to be lessor citizens). Thus the indigenous population were nominal citizens, but were effectively outcasts within their own society (Beck, Mijeski, & Stark, 2011).

Civil war did not emerge, despite the fact that the terrain and the conditions could be regarded as favourable for rebellion: enough mountainous terrain, vast territories, strong cohesion among groups, their military is not decisively strong, a limited presence of state institutions in the fringes of the state, a weak provision of public services, and low opportunity costs for recruiting cadres for an armed group

In Ecuador, protests campaigns have been channelled through the protest action as an “established” political tactic; in addition, the absence of the use of extensive repression by the police and military (as well as the lack of use of armed violence by protesters) has avoided the escalation of violence. In addition, the leadership of the protests campaigns movements have mostly managed to avoid confrontations and the presence of moderate views that allowed for political compromise prevailed. Therefore, in spite that during this period the long term grievances (such as political participation, economic crisis and citizen rights) were not fully responded through the political system, protestors somehow relied on the system and used the existing mechanisms (including the de facto mechanisms without resorting to violence). The effectiveness of these, showed its capacity to oust governments through peaceful means. Protests campaigns managed to keep rolling and ousting running governments, having the strange case of a country with nine different presidents between 1996 and 2002 (including a coup d’état) under different banners.

After 2005, the state has managed to normalize the process of dissent and its processing democratically, without the use of violence and new protest campaigns have emerged without escalating for armed confrontations as a means to challenge and change the state. The state is still seen as a legitimate state and a space of contention; the government might be ousted, but not defied militarily (Massal, 2014).

5.4 The intractability of civil war (low and high intensity civil war)

The cases of Somalia, The Central African Republic and the Congo are archetypical of spaces in which civil war prevails and constitutes an almost steady state within civil war. In these scenarios statehood is weak and not consolidated, thus a series of actors are able to challenge state sovereignty and monopoly of force in different parts of the territory of these countries and are able to establish particular societal arrangements and organize life.

In the countries fulfilling the conditions of this trajectory, the feasibility of rebellion is quite high, and the legitimacy of existing proto-state institutions is feeble, as there are different actors able to challenge

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23 One should note that in 2005 there was a coup d’état in 2005 against Lucio Gutiérrez, which ousted him away from power in replacement of his vice president. In addition there was a police uprising that was labelled by some analysts as a failed attempt by police forces against President Rafael Correa in 2010.
the state monopoly of violence. However, protests are less likely as there is no institutional setting established that could work as a platform for embracing dissent and discontent.

Given the absence of a proper monopoly of force, the possibility of the granting of civil rights as part of a social covenant is limited, positioning these countries within the category of weak autocracies/‘anocracies’. The strength of existing state institutions is undermined by state weakness and political participation is restricted to the whims by the dominating factions on particular spaces.

The term ‘fragile state’ is a fair description of countries trapped in civil wars (Stewart & Brown, 2009). Fragile states are characterized by instability and poverty, institutions are weak, security is not guaranteed to its citizens, and there is a lack of political participation, corresponding to that of medieval states. Fragile states are vulnerable to the risk of political instability toppling the existing regime, whether democratically elected or autocratically led (Norris, 2006, p. 8).

In this case one could expect the emergence of protests (although this might be unlikely), yet no protests campaigns, as protests campaigns presume the existence of a clear authority that is to be contested. A clear statehood to be challenged and whose dismissal, secession from or ousting is looked for might not be present even for protesting actors. As there is an oligopoly of violence and sovereigns within the same state, protests campaigns will not emerge, and protests (when they are not responded with repression) will be directed to the actors contesting power in these areas (but not to a national state, rather to a feudal or proto-state).

5.5 Escalation from low intensity civil war to high intensity civil war

Colombia in the decade of the 1990’s and the early 2000’s shows two processes of military escalation in the confrontation from low intensity civil war to high intensity civil war (see figure four). Interestingly, the escalation was undertaken by initiative of different actors on both episodes. In the late 1990’s, the escalation in the confrontation was led by the FARC-EP in their attempt to change their confrontation from a guerrilla warfare to a turf warfare. In this process, the FARC-EP managed to oust government forces from several military bases in the country, and in some cases managed to take control for a couple of days of a province capital gaining territorial and political control of some areas in the country.

In the early 2000’s another escalation phase in the confrontations came in the form of an “all-out war” by the Colombian government, under the sponsorship of the “Plan Colombia”, developed during the late part of the failed peace process in the late 90’s between the Colombian Government and the FARC-EP (Diaz & Murshed, 2013).

In both processes of escalation, it is argued that the military escalation of confrontations were related with the attempt to win an upper hand and leverage negotiations, so that in the late 90’s it could be the FARC-EP was looking to position their ideas in the negotiation table that took place between 1999 and 2002, whereas the government escalation in the conflict was a response to the FARC-EP lack of commitment to the peace process, and a means to force the guerrillas to move to a negotiation table.
In both cases, the escalation of the confrontations meant a closure of the political system, where protests and social movements lost visibility and traction given the fear of being caught on the crossfire between rebels and government forces.

5.6 High intensity civil war to low intensity civil war

Colombia presents both the case for a military escalation from a low intensity civil war to a high intensity civil war as well as a de-escalation process. With the transition from the Uribe government into the Santos government, there was a series of changes in the political sphere that involved a wider government acceptance to protest movements, and the public recognition of Colombia having an internal conflict. Whereas in the early 2000’s protestors and opponents were labelled as “friends of terrorists” and “unpatriotic” (El Tiempo, 2007), the discourse of the government changed with the arrival of the Santos government, giving more space for public dissent against the government and state institutions.

As the peace process between the Santos Government and the FARC-EP unfolded, a series of social mobilizations and protests (not protests campaigns) by truck drivers, peasants, judges, teachers and other constituencies emerged. This was preceded by the exit of an authoritarian regime in power between 2002 and 2010, during which dissent was perceived as supportive of the guerrilla groups, and an all-out war military policy was followed in order to defeat armed groups and oblige them to negotiate with the state (Diaz & Murshed, 2013).

The change in the political regime opened the avenues for participation and contestation of power to different social movements, as the retreat of an authoritarian framework enhanced the possibilities of protest. However, as the peace agreement has been reached between the government and the FARC-EP armed violence has not ended yet. Thus this case might illustrate the possibility of a transition between civil war to low intensity civil war between the government and the FARC-EP. As of now, fatalities in this conflict dyad do not constitute a civil war.

5.7 A victor’s peace

The end of Sri Lankas’ civil war was preceded by a military escalation. A military campaign was launched by the Sri Lankan government to use the full military might of the armed forces. By 2007, the LTTE presence was diminished (Shastri, 2009), this occurred while a cease fire was still in place; by late 2007 the government had officially abandoned the cease fire and peace negotiations. By 2008, the LTTE announced that it would declare a unilateral ceasefire, but the proposal was dismissed by the government (Höglund & Orjuela, 2011).

In the turmoil of the scorched earth tactics being played by both government and LTTE forces, more than 200,000 civilians were displaced in the latest round of fighting, and more than 20,000 were killed (Human Rights Watch, 2009).

By April 2009 the military campaign had reduced the area under the control of the LTTE to 10 km². In 2009, the LTTE finally admitted defeat on May 17, 2009, after the loss of all of the main territories

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under their control, and the death of some of their top leaders (among them the notorious Prabhakaran). With the defeat of the LTTE, the political landscape in Sri Lanka could be reframed, and a victorious discourse, centered on the Sinhalese ethos, emerged. Post war policies focused on the physical reconstruction of war torn areas, where Rajapaksa (the president at that moment) became a national hero in spite of allegations of authoritarianism, and violations of human rights during the offensive against the LTTE.

The aftermath of the victory, was the consolidation of an authoritarian regime that drove Sri Lanka towards a highly autocratic model, protests and protests campaigns around Tamil grievances were not to be seen, and a salient military presence marked the landscape in the country. This repression was illustrated by the arrest of opposition members. As the military victory was consolidated, and in spite of exiting inequalities and grievances from Tamils, the strength of the state muffled any act of protest and challenge to the victorious state. However the legitimacy of the government was great (in non-Tamil areas), which gave the political capital to the government to implement their policies.

The arrival of the government of Sirisena changed the landscape with a series of reforms, restoring the division of powers in the country, and creating the space for civil society organizations to bring their voice, giving space again to political participation and contestation. However, protests campaigns have not emerged as grievances are being channelled through the existing Sri Lankan institutions (Human Rights Watch, 2016).
6. CONCLUSIONS

The document has presented a theoretical framework for understanding different possible ‘patterns’ of transition between protest campaigns and civil war, and from civil war to protest campaigns and protests. The document has made the case for understanding both civil wars and protest campaigns as belonging to a continuum in the state in order to analyze its possible interaction, the objective of this article research.

The analysis of how different processes of contestation can be related to each other is a promising research agenda (Cunningham & Lemke, 2014, p. 339) that has gained salience in recent years (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017; Dudouet, 2013; Hegre, Nygård, & Ræder, 2017). Such a research agenda can contribute to understand the conditions that determine the ways in which protest politics lead to civil wars in some cases (Norris, 2006, p. 1), and how processes in which countries move away from civil war take place. The latter might hold a significant promise for peace building (Dudouet, 2013).

Civil wars and protests have been presented in the literature as completely different processes. However civil wars and protest speak to (of) the state in different ways, and have the state as a point of contention. Both protests and civil wars, relate to the state, its institutions, structures and organization (Tilly C., 2006; Skocpol T., 1979; Gurr T. R., 2011). On the other hand, protests and civil war can be seen as actions undertaken by citizens and aim for changes in the state, even in some cases looking for a deep reorganization of the state and their social contract. Thus we can observe that protests, protest campaigns and civil war can be related to each in their objective for changing the state, opening the question if they could be understood as connected with each other.

Understanding protests and civil wars as processes is central for the understanding of the connection between them. Events can be easily observed and accounted for, as opposed to processes. However, the capacity of events for explaining processes is limited. The analysis of processes can allow us to see on a longer perspective how events of contestation are connected to wider processes (events as part of protests campaigns, clashes as part of civil wars) and among different processes (protests campaigns and civil wars). Thus from a theoretical perspective for the understanding of the transitions between protest campaigns and civil wars, processes must be analyzed as opposed to events.

Assuming that processes of contestation such as protests and civil war are disconnected is valid. However, this assumption has driven the understanding of both processes in isolation from each other. If we aim to understand how the escalation from protests to civil war, or how the de-escalation away from civil war takes place, we need to inquiry on the conditions that define these transitions and their path dependence (Goldstone, 1998).

For understanding the possibility of these transitions between both processes of contestation, understanding the state on a longer historical perspective can prove helpful for analyzing if changes in the nature of the state seem to reflect different repertoires (protests, protests campaigns or civil war) and possibilities of contestation (Tilly C., 2006). I argue that the structural arrangements of states condition the emergence of difference repertoires and their evolution.
The transitions between civil war and protest campaigns and between protest campaigns can be theorized through a series of trajectories. Transitions can be explained in relation to a set of structural variables such as inequality, legitimacy of the state, provision of public services, political participation, and strength of the state and the feasibility of rebellion, in line with recent suggestions from the literature (Chenoweth & Ulfelder, 2017).

The theoretical framework proposed can help us analyze if the emergence of a civil war, or of the protests taking place in post-agreement scenarios after a civil war, are related to previous processes of confrontation and contestation.


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