Ultimately, I argue that competitive debate's exclusion of women is not tied to its adversarial format as much as it is tied to gender/sex exclusions built on power differentials. Society must grapple with these power differentials if it is to achieve egalitarian forms of citizenship and rich civic engagement. So, if you want to talk about debate and speech as civic education, you also better be talking about sex and gender. As of now, the WDI is the one place where this consistently, intentionally, and systematically happens in the United States.

To really conceive of speech and debate as liberatory forms of civic education, where our community is premised on a sense of wholeness rather than oneness,\(^6\) we need to reflect on the history of gendering/sexing/racializing debate and imagine how the radical performance of the debating woman, as well as the debating person of color, might transform how we understand debate, speech, civic engagement, and citizenship.

Between 1954 and 1966, the "debating both sides controversy" was the "most spirited and persistent controversy in speech education."\(^5\) As the twenty-first century began, the authors of this chapter argued that it was time to revisit that controversy because it provided important lessons for how to promote the ethical capacities required for deliberative citizenship.\(^7\) Unlike deliberative theories that avoid discussing the cultural interventions necessary to cultivate the ethical sensibilities of a deliberative citizen, the debating both sides controversy was mostly about the ethical challenges of an underappreciated cultural intervention (or cultural technology)—intercollegiate tournament debate. We argued that avoiding a discussion of the cultural interventions required for deliberative democracy allowed the universalization of discursive norms without attention to how "the techniques invented for [the internalization of these norms] have particular national and economic histories that disrupt their universal pretensions."\(^3\) It had long been accepted by those involved with debate that learning to debate is "training for democracy; it is training for citizenship."\(^4\) For us, however, investigating those moments when debate and its preferred practices were challenged provided an opportunity to recall the historical permutations of debate and how it was invested with productive powers to transform students into citizens.

The ethical problem that fueled the debating both sides controversy was the relationship between a student debater's convictions and the arguments he or she advanced in a given debate round for or against a policy proposal.
The growth of tournament debating had promoted the practice of switch-side debating, encouraging students to argue just as well on the affirmative as on the negative side of a resolution (balanced between an even number of affirmative and negative rounds during the preliminary stage of a tournament). We made two arguments: first, that the question of conviction was resolved by shifting its location outside of the personal belief of the debater (for or against a specific policy) and toward debate as a means of democratic decision making. At the heart of this reassignment of conviction was the investment of an ethical substance—free and full expression—within debate as a procedure of democratic decision making. The political conjuncture of the Cold War, we argued, provided debate with an opportunity to align with a variant of Cold War liberalism that promoted free speech as proof of American exceptionalism.

Our second argument was that the reassignment of conviction provided an antidote to those who worried that the gamification of debate hurt its political value. In contrast, the gaming of debate became an opportunity for the moral development of the student. In our words, debate became a "freedom game," as students learning switch-side debate were seen to be more empathetic and pluralistic toward minority points of view and, therefore, more open to the ethical demands of being persuaded by the force of the better argument. The problem we identified about these claims was that they failed to appreciate how this form of moral development was similar to the ethical distance that cultivated the claims of legitimacy for the emerging knowledge class after World War II. Thus, advocates of debating both sides displaced the (inter)nationalist and class histories of their favorite technique of self-fashioning while promoting the universalization of liberal variants of debate.

In this chapter, we wish to return to the debate between proponents of both sides controversy to acknowledge and engage those who have taken our original gambit as a point of departure. Alternative histories have been written about debate, and a new defense of debating both sides has emerged, often advancing criticisms of our earlier arguments about the role of conviction in debate. At the same time, our initial argument about how variants of liberalism are transformed by the movement of conviction toward the technology of debate has interacted with new challenges to how the debate game embeds certain racial logics of white supremacy. To account for the more recent uptake of our work and the controversy over debate tournaments becoming sites of social activism against the exclusions and normalizations of debate practices, we will advance the need for a more affective orientation toward conviction.

Continuing the debate about debate, this chapter approaches conviction as affective in nature. By that, we mean that conviction is not simply sincere belief. Rather, we contend that conviction is better understood as the affective investment in—and attachment to—a belief. Conviction, in other words, is how and how much a particular belief matters. Convictions, affectively, have an irreducibly embodied dimension; they emerge in and through sensation. Specifically, convictions, we believe, are first felt as pulsations of energy coursing through bodies as they enter into contest, or as they engage in the relational movements of attack and defense. Debates, of course, are such contests, and the convictions that animate any particular debate register on the bodies of debaters—for instance, in their vocal modulations, bodily tremors, and rhythmic breathing. Bodily responses, such as modulation, tremor, and rhythm, along with speed, volume, attraction, and repulsion, are experienced and measured in terms of their intensity, as a qualitative change in magnitude and force. This means, for us, that in a debate round, convictions are not only a property of the particular belief motivating the argument that an advocate makes. Convictions, we suggest, should be seen, instead, as a dimension of the visceral experience of debating.

The embodied nature of conviction does not mean, however, that convictions are best understood as the property of an individual body. In fact, convictions are never simply personal, because they arise in the encounter, in those moments when bodies confront and are confronted by other bodies. Convictions are relational; they are interactional and environmental properties. They form in and through the interaction of the advocates, along with all the other bodies and things present, in a round and beyond, circulating throughout the tournament space. Hence, conviction, more precisely, describes the intensity of a given encounter, the qualitative changes occurring in the moment-to-moment unfolding of contestation between advocates. Experienced and expressed as waves of intensive movement, the convictions circulating in and through a contest cannot be subtracted or divided without changing the character of that encounter.

Once framed in terms of the affective intensity of an encounter, convictions are better understood as collective feelings. And as these collective feelings traverse the bodies of advocates and the spaces those bodies inhabit, they generate an "affective atmosphere" that is "impersonal," in that it belongs to "collective situations and yet can be felt as intensely personal." Convictions, like all affects, are contagious. Constituted from a public stock of feelings and conceptions, convictions spread through and mobilize collective bodies to support or
challenge a policy, institution, candidate, or social practice, like tournament debating.

Thus, for conviction to be treated as a problem, as it has been since the advent of modern tournament debating, entails challenging the intensity of the affective relations that animate debates, which include not only the bodies of particular debaters but how their bodies are collectivized in and through complex assemblages of practices, spaces, temporalities, and procedures into an affective atmosphere.

Fear and Faith

While there were antecedents to the debating both sides controversy during the first two decades of the twentieth century, the peculiar history of the controversy was inaugurated during the 1954–1955 national debate topic: “Resolved: That the United States should extend diplomatic recognition to the communist government of China.” As Michael Bartanen and Robert Littlefield note in *Forensics in America*, the choice of recognition for the People’s Republic of China as a debate topic was “a curious community decision, given the political events of the time.” In the midst of McCarthy’s Red Scare, the service academies at West Point and Annapolis announced they would not debate the resolution. A group of teachers colleges likewise declared that they would not debate the topic, and some schools in Virginia, most notably Roanoke College, also refused. Why? Some were concerned that speaking in favor of the resolution might make debaters more open to the appeals of communist propaganda, while others argued that being in favor of the resolution would give aid and comfort to the enemy. The military academies were concerned that speaking in uniform for such a bold foreign policy reversal would position the cadets in opposition to U.S. foreign policy. Yet others suggested the topic was designed to bring out criticisms of Senator Joe McCarthy. Moreover, at least one director of debate avoided affirming the resolution because he feared students and others might be misidentified—and possibly investigated—as communist sympathizers.

The first semester of the 1954 debate season began after the Army–McCarthy hearings (held between March and June of 1954) and came to an end with the Senate’s censure of Senator McCarthy in December 1954. In the meantime, Karl Wallace, then the president of the Speech Association of America, was encouraged to intervene to change the topic, but both he and the National Intercollegiate Committee on Debate and Discussion refused. Moreover, public luminary Edward R. Morrow “backed Wallace’s position” on an episode of his *See It Now* television program in November 1954, just eight months after his famous March 9, 1954, episode crediting Senator McCarthy. With the tide turning against McCarthy, James MacGregor Burns defended the standards of argumentation in intercollegiate debate as superior to those of the politics of the time: “when questions are often dismissed with wisecracks, smears, half-truths, and the big lie.” Wallace’s steadfast defense of the topic, Morrow’s intervention, and the strong support of other debate programs for lifting the gag order on the military academies secured the “association between college debate and the First Amendment.” Furthermore, as others have claimed, the decision to keep debating the China topic even “may have helped rein in McCarthyism.”

In light of Richard Murphy’s widely read ethical challenge to the practice of debating both sides (published a few years after McCarthy’s exit), we spent less time on McCarthy’s role in the debate over debate in order to highlight the broader story about Cold War liberalism. For Murphy, requiring students to debate both sides as a precondition for tournament participation ignored how the debater’s conviction might condition his or her preference to argue one side or another of the resolution. Tournament debating had made an ethical imposition a precondition for participation. For Murphy, however, debate was a form of public speaking and, as such, to advocate regardless of sincere belief was to violate the rhetorical norm that a “public statement is a public commitment.” In contrast to Murphy’s ethic that debate was a form of public speaking, the advocates of debating both sides argued that debate was a pedagogical lab, a safe space for trying on different arguments and experimenting with differing beliefs about the topic.

In crafting a more micro-history of the controversy bounded by McCarthy’s decline, English and colleagues responded to our original argument by returning to how the advocates of debate valued the activity. In doing so, they provided an even more heroic story of debate’s triumph over demagoguery. For them, the lesson to be drawn from the earlier defense of debate was that “debating both sides encourages participants to dismantle absolutist ‘us versus them’ dichotomies.” Thus, debate appeared less as a cultural technology of American exceptionalism, as we argued, and instead represented a “civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against fundamentalism of all stripes.” In this tale of how debate fights against fundamentalism and Manichean dichotomies, a heroic narrative displaced our intellectual history describing the connection between free speech and conviction. In fact, the heroic narrative simply
conflicated fundamentalism and McCarthyism, with the aversion to Manichean dichotomies working to deflect sustained reflection on the ethical problematization of conviction, both as it occurred within that historical context and in present challenges to debate practice. As we argued previously, this slippage between conviction and fundamentalism mirrored later neoconservative efforts in the State Department to resituate debate as a weapon in the War on Terror, by enlisting it as a liberal technology of Islamic reformation. Here we want to focus less on the striking similarities between this heroic tale and the State Department's justifications, and, instead, seize the opportunity provided by this slippage between conviction and fundamentalism, with its concomitant historical leap from McCarthy to the War on Terror, to reconceptualize conviction as an affective relation. Put differently, the ethical problem of conviction is an affective problem of how intensely people attach themselves to particular configurations of debate.

The affective atmosphere of the McCarthy era has been generally described as one of fear. Geoffrey Stone writes, "During the McCarthy era, Americans were exhorted to fear not only Soviet agents but 'un-Americanism.' And [the United States] responded to this exhortation. [Americans] grew fearful not only about our national security but about the subversion of our religious, moral, and national values, our media, and our educational system. At the time, Francis Biddle, Franklin Roosevelt's former attorney general, published The Fear of Freedom, arguing that the fears of the U.S. public threatened their own freedoms. Biddle wrote, "Power in America rests on public opinion, which at present seems to be approving the slow abandonment of individual freedoms, so gradually achieved, so casually disregarded." Biddle argued that the real threat to freedom was a public "in fear of an imagined peril to their institutions of freedom" demanding that they be "secured by repressions that may ultimately stifle them." While the fear of communism stoked by McCarthy affected the decisions of some schools to refuse to debate the China topic, the collective response was not one of fear but faith: a faith in debate as a technique for securing free speech.

Our less heroic narrative requires an appreciation of how the value of free speech provided a means by which the ethical problem of conviction was transferred from the sanctity of a personal belief to a "fighting faith." Arthur Schlesinger Jr. in Vital Center, a founding text of Cold War liberalism, provides the broader context. For Schlesinger, the threat to democracy was internal: "the rise of totalitarianism . . . signifies . . . an internal crisis for democratic society. There is a Hitler, a Stalin in every breast." For Schlesinger, a democratic faith necessitated free discussion because it was the climate democracy requires for responsible decision. The affective response to fear was a democratic faith—a fighting faith for civil liberties, especially free speech.

What we want to extract from the controversy over switch-side debating in the McCarthy era is more than the fact that debate and free speech were tightly stitched. More importantly, the free speech defense of debate after McCarthy's exit from the public stage supports our story that free speech had emerged as a means to distinguish the United States as a "free society" from the totalitarianism of communism. The Princeton University Debate Panel called efforts to limit debate on the China topic "an invasion of free speech by civil and military authorities," arguing that to support the gag order was "an ominous imitation of the Kremlin." Intercollegiate debate had become an activity worthy of fighting for and part of the moral geography that separated the United States from the Soviet Union. It was this moral geography that, we argued, supported the claims of American exceptionalism.

However, at this point in the history, conviction had not yet been reassigned to debate as a method of decision making. In fact, the debating both sides controversy was rather muted during the public controversy over the China topic. The problem of conviction in debating both sides would play out in terms of a different question: Should debaters have a conviction, or sincere belief, before they argued for or against the policy under discussion, or should debate itself be a means for creating sound convictions? Recent apologists for switch-side debate continue to repeat the claims for sound conviction promoted by the critical thinking effect of debate. However, this epistemic defense of debating both sides fails to account for the affective way that conviction was rewired into the defense of debate as a means of democratic decision making. The most important essay for moving conviction from a personal belief toward debate as a procedure for democratic decision making was provided by Dennis Day. As we recently summarized Day's position:

Day argued that the real threat to democratic life was the surfeit of conviction, the rise of "true believers" to power . . . The best means to combat fanaticism was to require students to argue against their convictions. Through rigorous training in debating both sides of a question, debaters became skilled in articulating the convictions of others. The result, Day argued, was a transfer of conviction: a disinvestment in the sanctity of personal belief spurring a fierce commitment to debate as a technology of democratic decision-making . . . Day argued the willingness to embrace
this technology demonstrated a genuine commitment to full and free expression, the commitment that differentiates liberalism from all varieties of totalitarianism.  

Day did more than claim, as the Princeton Debate Panel did, that an intervention into whether teams should debate was a violation of free speech. Day made sure that conviction for debate became the precondition for one's first-order conviction for any policy option. Our point here is that this transfer of conviction should be appreciated affectively—as a move away from belief as an individual truth and toward an intense encounter with the activity of debate. The transfer of conviction works affectively to recharge the intensity one experiences in and for debate. As the advocates of debate insist, to abandon debating both sides is to abandon debate's value for correcting fundamentalism and dogmatism. Debate becomes a faith worth fighting for as it generates an affective relationship toward debate as proof of one's commitment to democracy. This affective relationship is made collective through imitation and repetition every time a debater debates. In "Lost Convictions," we described this affective relationship in class terms.  

We began by noting the similarity between Day's central claim—that debaters must, first, detach from the affective investment (conviction) they may have in a particular belief that some act or policy (e.g., abortion) is right or wrong in order to properly participate in debate (e.g., one concerning the distribution of reproductive rights), and that debate's continued success demands, second, the debater transfer that affective investment (conviction) to the process of debate itself, to emotionally invest in playing the game, to have a fighting faith in the power of this game. This is because robust debate between open-minded and tolerant advocates is the only legitimate procedure for making decisions in a democratic polity comprised of irreducible moral difference—and the claim made by aesthetic educators that any critic-in-training must, first, learn to detach from their affective investment in the pleasure given by the content of a work of art (which is necessary to be more than a fan), and second, transfer that affective investment to the process of criticism itself, so pleasure derives from the act of assessing the work in terms of its relationship to the compositional forms and processes of perception involved in its creation and interpretation. We noted that the ability and willingness to detach and transfer conviction is not natural but must be cultivated through immersion in particular pedagogical techniques, such as those involved in aesthetic education or debate training. Given that this cultivated disposition is not evenly distributed throughout the population, but has, indeed, long served as a sign of social class, we, following Bourdieu, argued that switch-side tournament debating could be seen as a technology for cultivating the "dispositions (habitus) characteristic of different classes and class fractions."

Specifically, we extended this analogy to suggest that the distance between first-order convictions (the affective investment in a particular belief) and second-order convictions (the affective investment in the power of democratic procedures) demanded by switch-side debating is similar to the way the "knowledge class" asserts its objectivity and impartiality, which allows analysts to proclaim the legitimacy and autonomy of their judgments. We concluded that the distancing effect of the game of debate participates in an educational process that aligns debating both sides with a technique of class formation.

We did not argue, therefore, that debaters should argue from first-order convictions. What we think is important—and what we wish to emphasize here—is that this distancing effectively limits the range of democratic models that debate, as a social practice and pedagogical institution, can promote. To understand why some debaters argue that a genuinely liberatory form of debate demands that participants, including the judges of those debates, mute the intense affective attachment they have to the liberal values embedded in debate as a democratic procedure—something quite difficult to do, especially for those whose entire careers, as debaters and coaches, have been structured around such an affective investment—we must be willing to entertain different affective economies of conviction. This begins with the recognition that every model of debate, including both switch-side tournament debating and its performative alternatives, functions, first and foremost, as an "attunement" mechanism to calibrate one's affective relationship to debate's democratic claims.

For the Love of the Game

It bears repeating that our position is not one that requires a model of technological or class determinism. It is the curious demand that debate be attached to liberal values. The work debating both sides does for the problem of conviction is, for us, historically and institutionally generated in ways that secure the liberal framework within which citizens are formed. What we are trying to emphasize here is that the debating both sides controversy is also a story of affective relations to this liberal framework. It is the affective atmosphere of a shared commitment to the liberal framework of debate that has become the site
of controversy. Thus, tournament policy debate requires an affective relationship from those who participate in it. It demands a love of the game. To love the game requires an attachment to the ethical framework of debate. To do otherwise is to upset the affective atmosphere of the tournament, which produces conviction in and for debate. In this section, we turn to how the critique of debate's racial assumptions puts in relief another challenge to the affective relationship to debate's liberal framework.

In responding to our initial arguments about the history of the debating both sides controversy, some have referred to the emergence of critiques of tournament debate practices that call out U.S. policy debaters for perpetuating styles of argument that exclude and/or normalize minority participants. Our historical interruption into what seemed a controversy long dead intersected a set of new criticisms of debate practices that challenged the way U.S. policy debate normalized dominant speaking practices. Writing from within the general consensus that debate should be approached as a game, Ede Warner Jr. noted that “over twenty years of various diversity efforts . . . have failed to substantially change the racial, gender, social and economic composition of interscholastic policy debate.” And for Warner, “the reason is simple: [white] privilege . . . creeps into more subtle, covert spaces, like the essence of why and how people ‘play the game.’” Warner especially emphasized the stylistic requirements of participation: “rate of delivery, note-taking techniques, what qualifies as evidence, and other technical presentation issues.” The first thing one notices when watching an intercollegiate policy debate round is that participants talk very, very fast. To respond to the history of exclusion or normalization required by debate’s performance barrier, Warner argued it would be necessary to allow “debates that fight for different styles and identity constructions offering different methods to access questions of policy.” The critique of performance styles is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young’s call for a communicative democracy that prevents the exclusions and normalizations she associates with deliberative democracy. If debate is a game, its rules and its presentation styles need not be treated as one and the same. If the educational value of the game is to be redeemed, debate must be open to recognizing the value of alternative performance styles.

The distancing effect required of the game of debate—a process we identified as a key element in generating cultural distinctions of class—is, for Warner, a racialized technology. Shanara Rose Reid-Brinkley described the distancing effect as a whitening: “Racially and/or ethnically different bodies must perform themselves according to the cultural norms of the debate community. . . . Students of color are performatively ‘whitened.’” Moreover, she describes the media coverage of urban debate initiatives as a social mobility narrative of “Ghetto Kids Gone Good”—a narrative that renders urban outreach programs to promote debate programs in communities of color as a story of educational and moral uplift. More recently, Lawrence Grandpre has argued that the debate community is a microcosm of the white supremacy at the heart of liberalism. Grandpre, invoking Marimba Ani, argues that debate embodies the Eurocentric philosophical tendency to remove ethical claims from lived bodies and place them within an abstract system separating word from deed. This rhetorical ethic insinuates itself in the debate game as black suffering is treated as a negative or positive reason to support a policy proposal but not a reality to be engaged by the debaters themselves. What matters is how the argument of black suffering tracks to create a victory or a loss for a team. One of the ironies of this situation is that the game of debate can allow white students to use black radical traditions against the black students they were intended to empower. The separation of word and deed—and the separation of the debate round from the world the students come from and return to after the tournament—allows the debaters to advance arguments removed from their own specific histories, deploying them for competitive advantage. For Grandpre, debate, like liberalism, is ultimately structured by a politics of antiblackness that pivots around the simultaneous affective orientations of negrophobia and negrophilia. Reid-Brinkley’s “Ghetto Kids Gone Good” expresses both the fear of black youth and the love of black youth debating.

One response of debaters and their coaches to the liberal demands of the activity is a more forthright rejection of the norm that affirmative teams must advocate an argument in support of the resolution. Instead, teams might challenge the resolution itself for how it requires student debaters to distance themselves from their own particularities or histories. To resist affirming a policy proposal embedded in the terms of the resolution challenges what has been long treated as one of debate’s essential constitutive procedures. Topicality is a reworking of the classical rhetorical stasis point of jurisdiction, which assigns and regulates the appropriate forum for arguments. To challenge topicality as an affirmative burden is not new for intercollegiate policy debate (at least it was normal to do so when we were more closely aligned with the activity as participants and coaches from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s). What is new, however, is the challenge to topicality in and through an explicit critique of debate as an exclusionary and normalized activity. The challenge to the stock issue of topicality is part of an effort to transform the debate round into a site of social activism.
It is unclear to us whether this activist strategy is a violation of switch-side debating (where students are assigned a side) or simply a competitive tactic to displace topicality as a regulative ideal. Critics of this strategy are concerned that the refusal to affirm a policy in the language set forth by the resolution is a means for some debaters to assert that their personal experience, now formulated as a conviction-cum-ethical demand, must be given priority, which, in effect, protects that conviction from attack, in such a way that displaces the very essence of debate as a democratic procedure for critically testing the generalizability of these convictions and the implicit models of interactional justice they advance. To interpret the practice of debating without affirming the resolution misidentifies this student practice as an ethical problem of conviction. The ethical problem is not a problem of conviction but rather a problem of decorum (the appropriateness of the proper place and style for arguments). As an ethical problem of decorum, the new apologists for switch-side debating might be said to be protecting the liberal framework of policy debate as an affective regulation of how one might engage the activity of debate. If the game requires the liberal framework to be the same game for all, then the affective intensity of the debater’s encounter with the game as a liberal freedom game must be enforced. To do so requires debaters to stay within the effective limit of the resolution, by affirming that resolution in its own terms. It is the desire to shield the game from a radical critique of its affective implication in antiblackness that calls forth a new round of defenses for switch-side debate.

At first blush, the challenge to the affirmative burden of topicality would seem to be allowed by the game. If an affirmative team can win the argument that the material histories of exclusion and normalization animating debate should be open to debate in the debate round, then the competitive character of the game has been rewarded. The educational value of debate gets reassociated with free and full expression without the need to traditionally affirm the resolution, because topicality is now experienced as a restriction on free and full expression. To follow Warner, transforming debate into a site of activism by challenging the procedure of topicality does not require a first-order conviction, just a desire to win the game by making its substantive and stylistic procedures open to revision in a debate round.

However, Grandpre suggests a problem with the game as played. Such a series of argumentative moves may simply expand the liberal framework of antiblackness by putting black suffering on display within an affective regime of negrophobia/negrophilia. What is needed is the rejection of the metrics of gamesmanship (wins and losses) as the only measure of success, especially for debaters of color. The motivating force or affective intensity required is to move beyond the debate tournament—and outside the debate round—to the community at large. For Grandpre, the alternative affective orientation is a fidelity to the black radical tradition that articulates debate as a project for promoting community empowerment. Debaters of color should participate in debate as a tool for “black institution building as a corrective for liberal white supremacy.”

From this perspective of institution building, debaters can develop argumentative skills and critical knowledge they can bring to a community of activism, while the lessons learned from activism return to the debate round and to the liberal academy as a site of criticism and transformation. A different affective atmosphere—different from the motivating force of wins and losses—is being offered to debaters of color. The use of the debate round as a site for challenging the liberal framework of debate attempts to articulate debate in terms of a different affective relation than the democratic potential of debate.

Conclusion

We should not rule out of order alternative affective relations to debate or foreclose the potential for those relationships to transform the encounter between the students who debate and the citizens they are becoming. The transformation of debate into a game, with pretensions of inculcating the ethical habits of deliberative citizenship, often relies on debating both sides to resuscitate one’s conviction from a sincere belief worth debating toward debate as a method of democracy. In this chapter, we have explicated how the debate over conviction has revealed that conviction is better approached affectively. The conviction-debate relationship puts into relief the intensity of one’s encounter with debate as a cultural technology. Yet this intensity is not personal. It is an atmospheric force attuning the argumentative practices of the different bodies debating to tournament debate as a practice of ethical self-fashioning. Debating conviction, through the years, provides insight into the problematizations of (or, we might say, disturbances to) the affective atmosphere of tournament debating. This atmosphere requires the motivating force of wins and losses to extract debate’s educational value as a liberal technology.

A disturbance in the affective atmosphere occurs when student debaters refuse their abstraction or the requirement to distance themselves from their particular histories and communities in order to succeed at the game. The fear of demagogues, fundamentalists, and dogmatists has been, and still is, deployed
to regenerate the faith in the liberal framework of debate, while negrophilia/negrophobia is covertly advanced as its affective foundation. During the Cold War, the storm generated by conviction's ethical problematization for debating both sides was resolved in practice long before it was resolved in theory. Debaters accepted the terms of the game before debating both sides was reattached to its public warrant as a democratic procedure for promoting free and full expression. This time, atmospheric disturbances may be less transient, as the liberal framework of the game becomes the stasis point of debate practice and its existential test.

II

DEBATERS AS CITIZENS:
RETHINKING DEBATE FRAMEWORKS TO ADDRESS
THE POLICY/PERFORMANCE DIVIDE

SARAH STONE WATT

Policy debate, an activity known primarily for its depth of research into public policy issues and its rapid rate of speech, has undergone significant changes in both style and substance. Historically restricted to a single topic and often characterized by highly technical jargon, this form of debate has recently become more malleable as debaters have taken it upon themselves to reflect not only on the policies circumscribed by the annual topic but also on how that topic was chosen, how debaters and coaches behave, and the social norms and practices of the debate community. While policy debate remains a strong training ground for aspiring lawyers and politicians, it has also become a space for students to explore their criticisms of those fields and to engage in social activism. Rather than modeling behaviors suited to a courtroom or Congress, some policy debaters now engage in performances of citizenship writ large and are expanding their focus from weekend tournaments to debate as civic engagement. For these debaters, citizenship is less about legal membership in a state and more about our "basic habits of interaction" on topics that affect our ability to live together.

As the content of arguments has changed, so too has the form and the evidence offered as support. While debaters continue to recognize the value of law review articles and government documents, they have broadened the scope of conventional resources to include the literature of critical cultural studies, artistic expressions, and lived experience. This evolution of the activity has debaters increasingly asking questions about identity and political agency vis-à-vis...
14. Ibid., 305.
22. Ibid., 55.
25. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
34. bell hooks, Outlaw Culture: Resisting Representations (New York: Routledge, 1994), 79.
36. Ibid., 54.
37. Ibid., 284.
38. Ibid., 285.
39. This is a play on Gayatri Spivak’s conception of strategic essentialism. And, like strategic essentialism, the separatism is intentionally political and temporary, constantly reflecting on what the separatist location can, and cannot, do. See Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, The Spivak Reader, ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean (New York: Routledge, 1996). The boundaries of this separatism are always in discussion, so the WDI’s trans inclusion policy makes clear. "Trans Inclusion Policy," Women’s Debate Institute, March 2014, https://womensdebateinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Trans-Inclusion-Policy.pdf. For details about the camp, see http://womensdebateinstitute.org/ (accessed February 14, 2016).
41. Beth Mendenhall, e-mail message to the author, October 30, 2014.
42. Carly Wunderlich Watson, e-mail message to the author, October 30, 2014.
43. Kate Shuster, e-mail message to the author, October 30, 2014.

Chapter 10
3. Greene and Hicks, "Lost Convictions," 120.
5. Not all tournaments required switch-side debating; some tournaments allowed teams to debate only one side of the resolution (affirmative or negative) consisting of four debaters (often referred to as "four-man" [sic] debate), but this required an even number of affirmative and negative teams to efficiently run a tournament.
19. Ibid., 2.
20. Ibid.
28. A. Craig Baird, "The College Debater and the Red China Issue," Central States Speech Journal 6 (1993): 5–7. We provide a comprehensive story about how conviction moved from a first-order belief for or against a policy proposal toward a second-order belief in debate as a procedure in Greene and Hicks, "Lost Convictions," 102–12.
32. Greene and Hicks, "Lost Convictions," 100–126.
34. William M. Keith has asked how different the debate over debating both sides was in the early twentieth century from the one we tell during the Cold War. One answer is that the argument that debating both sides can transfer conviction to debate as a method of democratic decision making had not occurred, so the affective relationship between conviction and debate in the earlier debate was worked out in favor of debate as a game and not as debate as a democratic method. However, the peculiarity of the game debate at this time might reveal more nuanced answers. Conversely, the gamification move does participate in the class formation of the emerging middle classes. One might argue that O'Neill's defense of debate as an "intellectual sport" was also a defense of the speech discipline as a rightful partner in the educational development of the professional middle class and a claim to a class interest of autonomy by the speech profession as part of this emerging knowledge class. See William Keith, Democracy as Discussion: Civic Education and the Americas Forum Movement (Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2007), 209, and James O'Neill, "A Disconnected Editor and Others," Quarterly Journal of Public Speaking 1 (1951): 80. For a broader discussion of the earlier version of the debating both sides controversy in the first two decades of the twentieth century, see Keith, Democracy as Discussion, 68–70, and Hicks and Greene, "Managed Conviction," 99–101.
38. Ibid., 66.
39. Ibid., 77.
42. Shanna Rose Reid-Brinkley, "Ghetto Kids Gone Good: Race, Representation, and Authority in the Scripting of Inner-City Youths in the Urban Debate League," Argumentation and Advocacy 49 (2012): 77.
44. Ibid., 55–60.
45. Young provides a description of this argumentative tactic within a discussion of "performance debate." See Young, "Impossible Convictions," 3–7. It should be noted that the affective turn in this chapter shares with Young his concerns about the ability to locate convictions within a personalized notion of sincere belief as opposed to their iteration in practice. We want to describe this iteration in affective terms to highlight how the debate over conviction is more about the intensity of attachments to debate and its affective atmospheres.
47. We recently aligned this activist turn in debate toward the assignment of conviction to debate’s technological form as a means of social justice; see Hicks and Greene, “Managed Convictions,” 107.

Chapter 11

5. Danielle S. Allen, Talking to Strangers: Anxieties of Citizenship Since Brown v. Board of Education (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 5. In this chapter, I refer to citizenship as that process of public interaction in relationship to the political, rather than as a definition of who is conferred legal status as a citizen of the United States. Citizenship, as it is conceived here, is the practice of engagement with the state and the people living in it rather than a legal title.
6. See Tiffany Y. Dillard-Knox, "Against the Grain: The Challenges of Black Discourse Within Intercolligate Debate" (master’s thesis, University of Louisville, 2014), and ShanaRose Reid-Brinkley, "The Harsh Realities of 'Acting Black': How African-American Policy Debaters Negotiate Representation Through Racial Performance and Style" (Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia, 2008). Dillard-Knox argues that many of the performative debates in debate coincide with the increased emphasis on diversifying the debate community. Many of the performative style debaters are employing, she explains, "are derived from a set of Black discourse practices, values, and perspectives. Unfortunately, most of the members of the Intercolligate Policy Debate community are unwilling or under-prepared to fully understand the functionalities of these new methods," which is part of what has caused increasing divisions between traditional policy debaters and performance debaters.
7. Reid-Brinkley, "The Harsh Realities of 'Acting Black,'" 126.
10. Identity and performance debates are often grouped together because teams who use more artistic styles, such as poetry, music, and art, typically make arguments about identity. However, there are also debaters who engage issues of identity without using the performative style. Still, they are often grouped with performance debaters because of their integration of personal narratives.
13. Ibid., xx.
14. Dillard-Knox, "Against the Grain"; Hicks and Greene, "Managed Convictions," 104. These sources focus primarily on the element of race, but I include gender because it is represented in a growing number of these debates.
18. Carew Kraft, "Hacking Traditional College Debate."
22. The leadership of CEDA is comprised of professional debate coaches and professors. After the national tournament, most of these individuals are responsible for either preparing their own students for the NDT and/or returning to teach at their home university.
23. See Johnson, "Never Meant to Survive the Debate," for an explanation of the experience of hypervisibility and invisibility.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., 35–36.
28. Dillard-Knox, "Against the Grain"; Reid-Brinkley, "The Harsh Realities of 'Acting Black.'"
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