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This chapter analyzes the intertwining of urban aspirations that drive migration to the megacity with religious media practices. Recent work on the anthropology of religion has emphasized the global dimensions of media-sustained religious activism (e.g., Robbins 2009). Against the backdrop of a global megacity, contemporary Twelver Shi'ite religious activism in Mumbai provides evidence of the importance of global processes of religious mobilization. I draw attention here to the parallels between the motivations behind newer media practices and the aspirational links between globalization and the spread of major religious traditions that emphasize the theme of transcendence. While there is a large literature on the role of contemporary media in processes of globalization—ranging from theorizations of “time-space compression” (Harvey 1989) to considerations of a media-sustained global imaginary (Appadurai 1996) that makes faraway desirable places and possible lives part of everyday sociality—the study of religion has only recently taken what some have called a “media turn” (Engelke 2010). In this strand of research, scholars are investigating the intrinsic links between media and religion, conceived as an interaction between religious practitioners and a religious otherworld, however conceived. Media form an integral part of these interactions, which many people seek to enhance in the present day, hoping for more direct relationships with the divine through the deployment of the latest media technologies. Religious media uses among Mumbai Shi'ites illustrate this dynamic but also show how the theme of more direct relationships with divine sources of authority exhibits close parallels to how those of migrant background envision their move to the megacity. Media practices are not just domesticated into the established
ritual dimensions of Twelver Shi'ite Islam and the processes of religious mediation they are part of. They also integrate Mumbai Shi'ites into long-distance networks of migration between North India, Mumbai, and the Persian Gulf. In the process, more standardized forms of Twelver Shi'ism have grown, as the influence of networks of marja'iyah, linking Shi'ites to high-ranking scholars and clerics in Iraq and Iran, has increased. This simultaneous connecting to the divine in seemingly more immediate ways and tighter integration into transnational networks of religious authority through media practices testifies to the close links among religion, media, and the global, links that are especially evident in Mumbai as a megalopolis.

The religious dimensions of globalization have drawn sustained scholarly attention only relatively recently. Not infrequently, scholars have cast them in a reactive relationship to what many consider the core of globalizing processes, the spread of neoliberal capitalism. Several have assumed that in a globalizing world, strongly perceptible religious practices and identifications have to be understood as stress symptoms among marginalized people whose lifeworlds have become increasingly uncertain and disrupted through processes of globalization. This argument is especially prominent in the study of “fundamentalism” understood in such a reactive sense (Habermas 2003, 3r; see also Castells 2004; Roy 2004). But more recent anthropological work on globalization has returned to a more Weberian perspective on the relationship between the religious and the socioeconomic, one in which the religious dimensions of the global play a key role and are taken seriously as driving forces of globalization (Rudnyckyj 2009). Anthropologists have emphasized that increasing numbers of people are interpreting their position and their aspirations in a globalized world at least partly through a religious lense. For example, Joel Robbins (2009) has stressed the homologies between the division of the globalized world into centers and peripheries and the cosmologies posited by some major religious traditions, such as Protestantism. According to him, religious cosmologies that resemble the center-periphery structure of such a world constitute an increasingly attractive frame for making sense of situations of being stuck in a periphery and wanting to reach the desired-for global centers.

It is highly tempting to approach religious activism in Indian megalopolises in a manner informed by these recent reformulations of the relationship between religion and globalization. Nowhere do such discussions of religion and the global appear more relevant than in the most globalized of all Indian megalopolises, Mumbai, which for decades has experienced massive migration from peripheral rural areas of India and has been the site of major religious mobilizations. Indeed, contemporary forms of religious activism often emerge from the conditions of urban modernity (Burchardt and Beci 2011), such as the availability of modern education, dense spaces of public visibility and urban soundscapes, and especially the practices of circulating discourse and images linked to them (Coleman 2009; Oosterbaan 2010). Religious activism in the most diverse settings increasingly draws on the techniques of mobilization associated with public spheres (Meyer and Moors 2006; Larkin 2008).

In this chapter I address links between such religious mobilizations and globalized urbanscape, drawing on my research among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai, with their dense transnational networks. The salience of religious mobilizations in colonial and postcolonial India has often been remarked on and can be traced to a number of interconnected genealogies. Scholars have attributed the significance of religion in Indian anticolonial nationalism and postcolonial politics to a reactive engagement with the superiority of the British colonizer in the political, economic, and scientific realms (Chatterjee 1993). Anthropology and history have also contributed much to an understanding of the role that both Indian intellectuals' selective appropriation of orientalist scholarship and Western fascination with Indian spiritualities played in establishing religion as a central focus of nation building and anticolonial activism (Van der Veer 2001). Religious festivals and processions became a principle means of claiming public space and public recognition not just for emerging communities but also for political activism (Freitag 1989). Religion has also been a privileged space for the self-expression of a Western-educated middle class, an unintended result of what Christopher Pinney (2009) has called “iatrogenic religion and politics.” Strict colonial censorship aimed at the suppression of post-1857 indications of dissent and sedition in print media drew activists toward the putatively traditional and customary sphere of religious imagery, which aroused lesser degrees of suspicion among colonial censors. This nexus of religion and media is a main focus of this chapter, and the spread of media infrastructure has played an important role in recent processes of globalization that have further contributed to the salience of religious practices and identifications in postcolonial Indian politics. Scholars have amply documented how the availability of the latest audiovisual technologies has intensified religious mobilization in the most diverse settings around the world (see Eisenlohr 2013 for a recent overview), including India, where it has occurred against the background of the liberalization and weakening of state control over broadcast media (Rajagopal 2001).

Therefore, in a discussion of contemporary religious mobilizations in Indian megalopolises such as Mumbai, is it impossible to overlook the significance of media practices. That media practices are an important part of religious practices is to be expected, since religions constitute traditions of interaction between religious practitioners and a realm of the spiritual or supernatural, however conceived. Depending on the particular traditions involved, such interactions can be understood as mediating either between entirely separate worlds, such as communicating with a realm of the transcendent, or between the two poles of a continuum. The forms of mediation between these different poles or worlds that are intrinsic to religious practice and doctrine necessarily involve media in their technical aspects, such as scripture, images, and now also contemporary audiovisual media and the internet (Engelke 2010; Stolow 2005). Once one takes note of mediation and its technical aspects as intrinsic parts of religious practice (de Vries 2004), the burgeoning of religion in uses of the latest media technologies, such as audiovisual technologies and the internet, comes as no surprise. Several scholarly disciplines also consider the advent and spread of new media technologies one of the main forces of...
globalization, a chief means of time-space compression and instantaneous circulation of
discourses and images across borders. While such dynamics are certainly important in
guiding contemporary media practices, anthropologists of media have pointed out that
peoples' uses of media also have to be understood in terms of a diversity of stances and
appropriations that depend on local contexts (Abu-Lughod 2005; Mankekar 1999).

MUMBAI SHI'ITES AND THEIR ASPIRATIONS

Muslims in Mumbai are highly diverse and do not constitute a coherent community.
Muslim traders played key roles in the rise of the city to the status of a major economic,
administrative, and transport hub of the British Empire and have been among its longest
established inhabitants. Many are of Gujarati origin and are followers of various Shi'ite
traditions, such as the Isma'ilis Khajus and Bohras and the Ithna Ashari (Twelver) Khojas,
but Sunni Gujarati traders such as the Kutchi Memons have also been prominent in
positions of trade and leadership. These groups were closely linked to the rise of Bombay
as India's economic capital and finally as a global city, and they spread throughout
the Indian Ocean region to the countries of the Persian Gulf, eastern and southern Africa,
Madagascar, and the Mascarene Islands, maintaining dense links of kinship, intermar
riage, trade, and religious affiliation. These multiple long-distance connections also
sustained a dynamic religious economy of competing Islamic traditions and shrine-based
networks that sought followers among the rapidly rising migrant population in Bombay
(Green 2011). Since the nineteenth century, vast numbers of North Indians have migrated
to the city to work in the textile mills that used to be its industrial backbone or to take up
other employment. Among these migrants from rural and small-town backgrounds were
many Muslims, who have long greatly outnumbered Muslims in the established trading
communities of Mumbai, with whom they share a major religious tradition but from
whom they are set apart by boundaries of class, ethnicity, and religious affiliation, since
the North Indian migrants and their descendants are predominantly Sunni, while the
established trading communities mostly comprise Shi'ites. This migration from the north
greatly accelerated after independence and to this day shows no sign of abating. In all,
approximately 15 percent of Mumbai's current population are Muslims, whose prominent
role in the city greatly diminished after independence and partition and who suffer from
the severe marginalization and discrimination that Indian Muslims in general have
experienced since 1947.

The destruction of the Babri Masjid in the North Indian city of Ayodhya by Hindu
nationalists in December 1992 was a dramatic turning event that led to riots across India,
including Bombay, and to pogromlike attacks in Bombay in January 1993 that killed
more than a thousand Muslims and injured many more (Hansen 2001b; Masselos 1994).
Large numbers of Muslims lost their homes and businesses through destruction or
expulsion in this period, and about 250,000 fled the violence, moving from mixed areas
to parts of the city with a Muslim majority, many of them never returning to their old
homes. This ghettoization and marginalization were exacerbated by the 1993 bombings
(Rao 2007) with around three hundred victims in the city's business district and other
locations that were widely attributed to the gang of the notorious and quasi-mythical
Dubai- and Karachi-based gangster Dawood Ibrahim and were considered retaliation for
the anti-Muslim pogrom some months before. Ever since these attacks, the authorities
have treated the predominantly ghettoized Muslims as a unified security problem, a posi
tion reinforced by the 2006 suburban train bombings and the spectacular November
2008 terrorist attacks on some of Mumbai's most prominent landmarks. In fact,
Pakistan-based Muslim militants were responsible for the latter. Along with the securitiz-
ations policies imposed by the local and national governments, the largely marginalized
Muslims have been on the losing side in the intense contests and struggles over urban
space and housing for which Mumbai has become notorious in the academic and non-
academic literature, including their violent and criminal dimensions (Appadurai 2000).
However, the Hindu middle classes often associate Muslim neighborhoods with mafia-
like activities, terrorism, and other forms of crime, this stigma further reinforcing Mus-
lim ghettoization and marginalization.

Much of the literature on Mumbai Muslims has focused on how they, especially the
women, have tried to cope with the aftermath of traumatic violence and ongoing forms
of severe spatial and socioeconomic exclusion (Chatterji and Mehta 2007; Contractor
2012; Khan 2007; Nilesh 2011; Rajan, Dhanraj, and Lalita 2011; Robinson 2010). The
remaking of Bombay as Mumbai in 1995 under pressure from the Hindu nationalist
and Maratha regional chauvinist party Shiv Sena, whose followers were among the main
perpetrators of the anti-Muslim pogrom of 1993 (Hansen 2001b), was an attempt not only
"provincializing the global city" (Varma 2004) but also downplaying the key role of
cosmopolitan Muslim networks of trade, migration, and religious activism in the rise of
Bombay. On the other hand, the large shadow of Hindu nationalist violence, securitiza-
tion policies, and ghettoization does not always feature prominently in intra-Muslim
debates on religious authority, morality, and identity or more generally in the socioeco-
nomic and religious aspirations that bring Muslims to the city and that in many ways
organize and guide their lives there (Hansen 2001a; 2001b). Indeed, one of the most
remarkable findings is the disjunction between the expectations among many research-
ers that the recent history of majoritarian violence and marginalization directed against
Muslims in Mumbai must play a crucial role in their sense of belonging, and the relative
absence of a threatening Hindu other in the production of identities and internal debates
among local Muslims, who seem to be more concerned about deep sectarian differences
and contesting claims of authority within what outsiders typically conceive as a Muslim
community.

Many of the conversations I had during my research among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumb-
ai confirmed this dynamic. Instead of positioning themselves and their aspirations in
contrast to a Hindu other, most of my interlocutors appeared more worried about intra-
Shi'te Muslim sectarianism and what they perceived to be intense and troubling anti-Shi'ite
Shi'ites in Mumbai, through religious foundations and organizations tied to the leadership of Iran.

The older Twelver Shi'ite trading groups have long led a trend toward greater standardization and orthodoxy, which has had a major impact on the religious practices of the poorer Twelver Shi'ites originally from rural or small-town Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. This trend has its origins in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century transformations of religious activism in colonial India connected to the emergence of a modern public sphere. In North India, the British termination of the Shi'ite dynasty of Awadh after the rebellion of 1857 ended court patronage for 'ulema and Shi'ite institutions of higher learning, leading to a profound crisis in Shi'ite religious life. However, by the end of the nineteenth century a new generation of scholars had successfully positioned themselves as guides of a large Indian Shi'ite public, while new Shi'ite institutions of learning, publishing houses, and volunteer movements were increasingly visible (Jones 2012). The postpartition situation was again one of upheaval and crisis, mainly because of the departure of the wealthiest and most prominent Shi'ite zamindars to Pakistan and the economic decline of the remaining community in newly independent India. Nevertheless, there was a pronounced turn toward more visible piety and orthodoxy in the 1980s in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution, this time more strongly connected to transnational networks of marja'iyah (the Shi'ite religious establishment). One reason for this intensifying of long-distance links was that in marked contrast to the situation before independence, after 1947 few Indians were able to attain the highest rank of marja' in the world of Twelver Shi'ite Islam (222-23). For Mumbai Shi'ites, the closer integration into transnational networks of marja'iyah is also tightly connected to Mumbai's role as a global city. Long-distance migration and its resulting ties both in India and transnationally, especially labor migration to the Persian Gulf (Hansen 2001a), have contributed to this development. In their display of pious cosmopolitanism centered on a major transnational religious tradition, members of the established trading elites have become important role models for the majority of Mumbai Twelver Shi'ites of rural or small-town background. This cosmopolitanism also constitutes an alternative vision to the severe forms of exclusion and marginality that many of them have experienced as Muslims in the city and in India generally.

Let me give an illustration from my ethnographic work among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai that speaks to the intersection between religious mobilizations and socioeconomic aspirations in this global city. One of my main interlocutors, a man in his early fifties whom I'll call Jafar, in contrast to many others has realized many of the ambitions that draw migrants from different parts of India to the city. Brought to Mumbai as a child from the rural Azamgarh district in Uttar Pradesh (UP), where members of his extended family still live, he has managed to build a small construction supply and scrap metal business that is not only able to feed his family in the city but also enables him to support relatives back in eastern UP. Some years ago, he moved from Mumbai, a poor and remote suburb with a large Muslim population, to a satellite town with a mixed population in

Campaigns conducted by Muslim opponents they referred to with the blanket term Wahhabi. With this they designated not only Wahhabi- or Salafi-affiliated Sunni Muslims and the Indian groups linked to them, such as the Ahl-e Hadith, all of which are represented in Mumbai, but also more mainstream purist Sunni reformists, such as the Deobandi-affiliated Tabligh Jama'at, which are also known for their rejection of Shi'ism. In some ways, this is an aspect of global Muslim politics that Mumbai Shi'ites partake in. They have certainly played a role since the beginnings of Bombay as an imperial hub, and they have become only more relevant with the strengthening of major orthodox traditions of Islam and their global networks in recent decades. On the other hand, there is an important, specifically Indian context to this assessment of purist Sunni Muslims as the principal threatening other and the main danger for Shi'ite aspirations. Several of my Shi'ite interlocutors voiced a distinct patriotism grounded in their consideration of India as a favorable environment for Shi'ites because of its marked religious pluralism and the freedom it provides to publicly cultivate Shi'ite traditions, practices, and identities, unlike many other parts of the Muslim world. The repeated instances of anti-Muslim violence and overall Muslim exclusion and marginalization in India seemed at times to be less relevant to them than the laudable absence of specifically anti-Shi'ite violence and discrimination, especially in comparison with neighboring Pakistan.

Just as Muslims in Mumbai are highly diverse, the same is true of Shi'ites in the city. While the large majority originated from northern India, long-established trading communities dominate their elites. These are largely Isma'ili (Nizari and Musta'li), such as the Agha Khani Khojas and the Dawoodi Bohras. Among Twelver (Ithna Ashari) Shi'ites, another Gujarati trading community, the Ithna Ashari Khojas, and an Iranian trading community locally known as Mughals—whose founders migrated from Qajar Persia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and whose members have in the meantime largely moved into the real estate, restaurant, and construction businesses—play such roles (Masoudi Nejad 2012). They have established and control most Twelver Shi'ite institutions in the city and are markedly different in class and ethnicity from the Urdu-speaking Twelver Shi'ites of North Indian background, who are mostly of ayyad but also of ansari caste background and who constitute the large majority of Twelver Shi'ites. The latter have moved to Mumbai from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, especially since independence, and are overwhelmingly poor. However, some, such as the Rizvi builder family, have prospered and have invested part of their wealth in building religious institutions, so that even among Twelver Shi'ites the networks of religious trusts, mosques, imamburaz, and educational and charitable institutions have become rather diverse. All of these institutions are part of larger transnational networks of religious authority in the Shi'ite world that center on affiliations, financial and institutional ties, and relationships of accreditation with senior scholars recognized as marja'-e taqlid (sources of emulation) and the foundations they direct. In Mumbai, as in India as a whole, Ayatollah Sistani in Najaf is by far the most influential marja', but the supreme leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, is also vying for followers and influence among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai, through religious foundations and organizations tied to the leadership of Iran.
Greater Mumbai. Compared to structurally neglected Muslim-majority neighborhoods and communities not only in Greater Mumbai but also throughout India, this new location offers more amenities and educational opportunities for his children. For example, Jafar was able to get building permissions and a bank account only after moving away from Mumbai. His socioeconomic rise has gone hand in hand with a greater involvement in religious orthodoxy. He has set up a Shi'ite association (matam asajnan) in his neighborhood, having added a floor to his house to accommodate it. Such neighborhood sites of Mashhad, Qum, Najaf, and Karbala in Iran and Iraq. Importantly, Jafar has not only financially supported the extended family back in UP but has also built small religious structures there, replicas of an aramag̣h (place of rest) for Imam Hussain, the grandson of the Prophet who perished in the Battle of Karbala in 680, and of a raza (mausoleum) for Hazrat Abbas, Hussain's half-brother and another victim of the battle. These are, as he said, "investments that bring true value." Jafar's life history is one in which those on the periphery are looking for means to reach the desired centers. The migration of poor Shi'ites from rural and small-town northern India to Mumbai can certainly be understood as a movement from a global periphery to a global center that has coincided with religious mobilizations, and modern media practices play a key role in both processes.

In Mumbai, the importance of contemporary media practices for religious mobilizations in an urban environment is highly visible. There is above all the multitude of "small media," such as cassettes formerly and now CDs and DVDs, through which Muslims in the city circulate religious performances, speeches, and other content. Among Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai, these are recordings of the devotional poetic mourninggenres of marsiya and nauha, which commemorate the tragic events of the Battle of Karbala and in emotionally charged ways express deep sorrow for the death of Hussain and other members of the family of the Prophet who perished in the battle or in its aftermath. Audio or audiovisual recordings of the sermons and speeches of well-known Shi'ite 'alim religious groups (Chatterjee 2004). Muslim men in Mumbai have developed a variety of strategies and models of selfhood in response to these challenging circumstances. They range from plebeian assertion centered on the handy bravado and toughness often associated with the figure of the dada (a local strong man with a reputation for violence and success in illegal activities) to pious and more respectable transformations of the self through engagement with Islamic reformist or activist movements (Anand 2008; Hansen 2001). Clearly, Jafar's conduct of life evokes the latter image of selfhood. In the next section of this chapter, I focus on one particular aspect of such pious transformations and aspirations to live lives seemingly more connected to centrally located places in a globalizing world. Media practices are highly relevant to the Shi'ite religious mobilizations I am concerned with here and play a key role in accounting for the links between religion and globalization.

**Urban aspirations and media**

Uses of contemporary media technology play crucial roles in the link between global dynamics and political theologies, as they testify to the intertwining of urban socioeconomic aspirations and religious mobilizations. Media practices among Muslims in Mumbai are also diagnostic of the interactions between those ambitions that can be located in the frameworks of globalization. Media practices, in particular those linked to contemporary electronic media, have a capacity to shape senses of being in time and space. They do so by enabling experiences of minimizing temporal and spatial distance to the point that from a phenomenological perspective, such media, if operating in unexpected ways, may sometimes seem to erase themselves in the act of mediation, affording seemingly direct and immediate access to worlds and interlocutors far removed in time and space, in a movement from "here" to "there." This dynamic in turn feeds into the cosmologies of center and periphery that are at the heart of the globalized world and in which those on the periphery are looking for means to reach the desired centers.
are also popular. Many Shi'ites in Mumbai, for example, listen to CDs of these poetic genres performed at devotional gatherings known as majalis (plural majalis; Qureshi 1989) or view and listen to parts of such performances on local Shi'ite cable television networks, on video CDs, or by downloading such recordings from the internet. Indeed, in the past thirty years, newer media have played an important role in creating an awareness of and a much greater public visibility for Twelver Shi'ite orthodoxy. Some of my older informants pointed out how among working-class Shi'ites in Mumbai, the everyday listening to film songs became a contested activity and was at least in part replaced by listening to such Shi'ite devotional media. The growth of religious audiovisual media use among Shi'ites in Mumbai has gone hand in hand with a greater influence of more standardized forms of religious tradition. For Twelver Shi'ites in Mumbai, this means that doctrines and practices explicitly authorized by leading clerics in Islam who can claim the status of marja'-e taqlid have become much more central to religious and social life.\(^4\)

One key characteristic of such media use is that the genres and the sensibilities stirred while attending a majalis as a devotional event held at a particular time extend to other, more everyday settings, enabling a cultivation of the emotions and moods that characterize the live performance of the event. In multiple respects, performance is indeed the key term here, because by listening to the mournful genres of the majalis, the listener ideally becomes powerfully transformed by the sorrow and highly charged empathy that the ritual and poetic commemoration of the tragic events of Karbala provoke (Paldstani 2007; Schubel 1999). Tears and feelings of mourning for the virtuous members of the shelab (the family of the Prophet) who suffered and were murdered at Karbala will tend to those subjected to the performative effects of the majalis into better Muslims, who through their bodily experienced attachment to the family of the Prophet will gain enormous spiritual merit (sawab). In many ways, devoted participation in a majalis involves a spiritual journey from “here” to “there,” a vivid and visceral experience of revisiting the events of Karbala as if one had been present there oneself.\(^3\) Such performances remain linked to the periodic ritual contexts they have traditionally been part of, especially in the month of Muharram, culminating in the large public Ashura commemorative processions of the tenth of that month. These processions play a key role in marking certain parts of the city as specifically Shi'a, thus contributing to and exemplifying urban processes of “religion taking place” (Burchardt and Becchi 2003), while the ability of actors capable of crossing the internal boundaries of a highly segmented city to read such performances and their material signs is also part of what Hansen and Verkaik have called “urban charisma” (2009). At the same time, these dramatic performances, with their turning of urban space into Shi'ite localities, publicly affirm the right of Muslims to be recognized as belonging to Mumbai, a claim that Hindu nationalists and Maratha regional chauvinists have violently denied in recent decades. In Mumbai these processions also involve highly dramatic displays of mourning, and in the part of the commemorations that one of the religious foundations of the Iranian Shi'ite community organizes, they also feature reenactments of events that occurred at Karbala (Khan 2009). Sound and video recordings of such performances enable them to transcend their received ritual contexts and become integrated into everyday life activities. At the same time, listening to and viewing such recordings often extends the witnessing position that participants in majalis inhabit vis-à-vis the events at Karbala. The desire to gain a more straightforward connection to the events at Karbala through modern media technology points to the widespread paradox of religious practitioners in the contemporary world seeking more direct, “immediate” connections to spiritual authorities through the deployment of ever more complex technical apparatuses (Eisenlohr 2009).

The bridging of the temporal and spatial gap to the events at Karbala in 680 is thus a process of religious mediation in which religious practitioners undergo a rapprochement with a religious otherworld, and media—with their technological and material dimensions—provide the indispensable infrastructure in which this process can unfold. At the same time, religious media such as audiocassette and video CDs with devotional content sustain long-distance transnational networks in the Shi'ite world by disseminating images of marja'iyaa and authoritative discourses and statements from religious authorities. There is also a plethora of audio and video CDs circulating that feature recordings of majalis and lectures performed among Shi'ite migrant communities of Indian and Pakistani origin in the United Arab Emirates and Great Britain.\(^4\) Listening to and watching these recorded events is a way of experiencing reformist and contemporary Shi'ite traditions connected to networks of marja'iyaa as a web of global linkages, increasing the association of these traditions with more centrally important parts of the world that contrast with the rural or small-town North Indian hinterland left behind for the promises of the megacity.

But contemporary Shi'ite media practices also comprise the watching of television programs that provide direct guidance in practical self-fashioning. In the predominantly Shi'ite south-central neighborhood of Dongri, World Islamic Network (WIN), a Shi'ite media center began with the distribution of Islamic books and brochures and free evening tutoring sessions for high school students, not only produces and disseminates "small" devotional media such as video and audio CDs, largely recordings of majalis and lectures, but also runs a website and a cable-television channel with its own production facilities. Younger people especially are interested in question-and-answer-style programs with Shi'ite 'ulama and more "rational" programs that approach social issues and life problems from an Islamic perspective. In terms of aesthetics and forms of participation, these programs are very different from recordings of devotional events centered on lamenting the events at Karbala. The latter are highly emotional performances that are geared to awake powerful feelings of grief and attachment in those who witness them. In contrast, the more "rational" programs, as some of my Shi'ite interlocutors referred to them, are much more sober and professional in their appearance, mainly feature deliberative engagement, and are more popular among younger viewers. As one of the producers at WIN put it, "The youth want logic and less emotion."
In some sense, such programs are a continuation of the center's long-standing ambition to promote modern education among Mumbai Shi'ites, which is evident in the photographs and lists of laureates and high performers at school exams at the entrance to WIN Academy, where after-school lessons and study sessions take place. One of these programs is the WIN-produced Hadees-e zindagi, which usually features a young woman in a hijab interviewing a younger maulana (a respected Muslim religious leader, or a graduate of a religious educational institution) in a sleek-looking modern studio setting, asking questions that viewers had sent in by email or were posing via telephone live on air. The questions were above all about practical matters, requesting advice on how to tackle problems in an Islamically appropriate way. Another topic generating interest was the reasons for a particular religiously sanctioned conduct of action. My interlocutors at WIN stressed that these programs are more popular among the younger generation, responding to their higher educational ambitions while also intended to provide support for them. Here Shi'ite traditions become directly integrated with urban aspirations, such as educational advancement, that bring migrants to the megacity. This recasting of Shi'ism evident in the program is an example of a more activist tendency in the Shi'ite world since the Iranian Revolution, which reinterpretates Shi'ite tradition as granting a new sense of agency and ambition to change social and political conditions and therefore to strive to change one's fate in line with modernist narratives of hope, development, and progress that, among other things, influence people's migratory movements in a globalized world. Hadees-e zindagi frames aspirations for better education, a greater sense of control over one's life, and rational self-improvement in terms of religious tradition.

CONCLUSION
In this chapter I have investigated several ways that Shi'ite traditions in Mumbai articulate with urban aspirations that bring migrants to megacities in a globalized world. These include the channeling of ambitions for socioeconomic mobility into "investments that bring true value," as my interlocutor Jafar put it, meaning pilgrimage to Iran and Iraq and the setting up of local Shi'ite associations by funding buildings and sacred structures in Mumbai and in North Indian places of origin. Further, many Mumbai Twelver Shi'ites identify the cultivation of standardized Shi'ite traditions with a form of global connectivity that they experience as empowering and supportive of their urban aspirations while countering their very real marginality in Mumbai and in India generally. In the context of Mumbai, the activist bent that has become much more pronounced throughout the Shi'ite world since the Iranian Revolution has led to a stress on education as one of the chief urban ambitions. Finally, the links between urban aspirations in the megacity and Shi'ite tradition crystallize in a range of media practices that permit not only the bridging of the temporal and spatial gaps between present-day Shi'ites and the pivotal events at Karbala but also the sustaining of long-distance networks through the transnational circulation of recordings of devotional events, lectures, and images of marja'iyya. As the example of the WIN-produced Hadees-e zindagi shows, there are also newer media engagements that aim at a fusion of Shi'ite tradition and education. Such programs identify Shi'ite tradition with the spreading of rational knowledge to be used for Islamic self-fashioning and for addressing the challenges of contemporary social life in the megacity. Many Mumbai Shi'ites engage with their religious tradition as a form of pius cosmopolitanism that supports the potential realization of urban aspirations centered on the themes of socioeconomic mobility and new imagined lives starkly different from those in peripheral locations that migrants hope to leave behind. At the same time, religious practices, including their mediatic dimensions, provide possibilities for global connectivity that undergird the aspirations that are an important part of life in the megacity. Such practices not only illustrate the dense links between religious mobilizations and globalizing processes but also show how megacities such as Mumbai become privileged settings for their interplay.

NOTES
1. Having worked among Twelver Shi'ites in Hyderabad, Toby Howarth has recorded comparable observations: "In an overwhelmingly Hindu nation... [Shi'as] feel the heat of a rising Hindu nationalism. At the same time, however, Shi'as often feel closer to Hindus than to Sunnis because of the antagonism between the Islamic sects and because of the devotion that many Hindus show towards Hussain and Fatima" (2005, 132).
2. The Ithna Ashari Khojas are a nineteenth-century split-off from the larger and wealthier Isma'ili Khoja community (Masseles 1997, 131), which, like other Gujarati trader communities, spread throughout the Indian Ocean region, notably east Africa, and in the nineteenth century to Great Britain and North America. The secession of the Ithna Ashari Khojas under the influence of a cleric from Najaf, which was formalized in 1899 with the building of a Khana Ithna Ashari mosque in Dongri, even led to violence, as had the secession of the Sunni Khojas in 1850 (Daftry 1993, 519). Ithna Ashari Khojas remember as martyrs the two among their community's founders who lost their lives in the process and have integrated their example into the larger narrative of Karbala (Khoja Shia Isnaashari Jamaat Mumbai India, n.d.).
3. Certainly the strengthening of orthodox religious leadership has a longer history which, for example, in the last decades of the nineteenth century Presentation, souvenir magazine, 1998). See also http://khojamat.org/, accessed May 5, 2012.
4. The move toward more standardized forms of orthodoxy among Shi'ite Muslims has a long history in the city. For example, nineteenth-century Bombay witnessed the transformation of the Khojas from a trader caste with amorphous religious allegiances and practices into a clearly delineated community of Naqari Isma'ilis under the tight control of the Aga Khan, who had arrived in Bombay from Persia in 1844 after a failed rebellion against the Qajar ruler of Persia Muhammad Shah. As a result of the increasing control of the Aga Khan, two groups of Khojas seceded from the main community (see n. 2). In the end, Khojas had aligned themselves with three forms of standardized orthodoxy. British colonial courts played a key role in establishing and ratifying the new boundaries among Khojas (Daftry 1992, 515-16; Green 2011, 173; Masseles 1978).
century, neighborhood strong men and plebeian leaders, or dadas, largely controlled the rituals and processions surrounding the making and carrying around of the tabuts (elaborately decorated representations of Hussain's bier or tomb) that were the central component of the festivities of Muharram. Following urban violence and other disturbances between rival groups during the processions, in 1913 the British colonial authorities banned the carrying around of tabuts through the city. The character of Muharram in Bombay then changed from a20th-century folk festival to an Islamic ritual of commemoration, strengthening the authority of Shi'a religious leaders (Masselos 1976, 82; Masselos 1982, 58–60; see also ch. 5).

5. Jim Masselos's reading of nineteenth-century sources on the dramatic dimensions of majalis among Shi'ites in Bombay makes him conclude that "it was as if Hussain and his followers were dying then and there" (1982, 57).


REFERENCES


