MOBILE TACTICS IN THE BRAZILIAN INDEPENDENT MUSIC INDUSTRY

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In the Brazilian record industry, the flexibility of a company matters in terms of how and why it adapts to the larger shifts of mobile and digital distribution such as those occurring in many parts of the world since the early 1990s. Smaller, independent record companies without ties to international conglomerates have been able to respond in sometimes surprising ways to the rapidly changing landscape of recording and distributing music through new, mobile channels. These independents are thriving in nearly an inverse relationship to their size and business lifespan mostly due to their unconventional attitudes toward risk-taking and innovation. Although the three major multinational labels (Sony/BMG, Vivendi/Universal, and Warner Music) have a strong presence in the recorded musical output in Brazil (as they do in many countries in Latin America), they are far from the dominant musical force there. Just as smaller record companies are out to survive financially, the ways that they negotiate the larger discourses of business and nation provide a unique window into local responses to global shifts of distribution for the music industries.

In spite of their relative lack of power with regard to their ability to shape cultural policy and larger global shifts in music distribution and consumption, the people who work for independent labels often find themselves in a much more nimble position than their major label counterparts. For the people I talked to in the Brazilian music industry, independent record companies are not beholden to contracts with the multinational record companies (the Big Three). Some independents may have distribution agreements with the majors for physical products, but often those contracts do not cover mobile forms of distribution. In many cases, the major record labels either follow established business models for selling mobile content in other markets, or they latch onto business models established by people originating in the independent music sector. This is especially the case in terms of mobile music consumption and distribution.

The division between independent and major labels is not a hard one but rather slightly porous; many independent personnel have direct and indirect experience in the majors and vice versa. The success of iMúsica illustrates the cross-relationships of people and ideas between the two sectors of the recording industry in Brazil. As I discuss in more detail further on, iMúsica is one of the main mobile content aggregators for the major and independent labels in Brazil. It is run by a former independent label director and many of its former staff now work for major labels in digital distribution divisions. In many cases, Brazilian independent record companies are the first to use new media as part of their promotional strategies, and they are much more willing to adopt new business models that emphasize mobile music commodities that allow them to continue to produce the artists they support. The majors, on the other hand, were slower to adapt to the shifts in the music industry and embrace mobile music strategies, and when they did start selling mobile content they worked exclusively with third-party consultants. There was no in-house plan.

That responsiveness (and rebelliousness) of the independent labels has been part of their reputation for quite some time. Due to Brazil's unique recent history of dictatorships and generational and class-based contestations around the country's redemocratization in the 1980s, independent labels and the music they produce have been important in the national imaginary. Those companies have been influential in the Brazilian music marketplace since the 1970s and 1980s when many smaller labels nurtured the creative energy growing out of local rock music scenes (also known as tribes), such as Lira Paulistana and later Baratos e Afins labels for the Vanguarda Paulista (Vanguard rock scene from São Paulo) and Cogumelo Records for the heavy metal scene in Belo Horizonte. That legacy gives many of the independent labels an air of resistance, allowing them to continue to nurture tribes while also helping them to bring in revenue; it is what has attracted some of the country's top recording artists from a variety of genres and regions to independent record companies, including Chico Buarque, Djavan, João Donato, Nação Zumbi, and Teresa Cristina. The general consumption figures for the Brazilian public make it unique in relation to other global music markets; domestic artists make up 70% of the music that Brazilians buy (IFPI 2010-19).

That independent labels felt motivated to shift their strategy to mobile music distribution demonstrates their competing needs to both make money and take part in (and support) domestic music production. Many of them only began to consider mobile music in the wake of the crisis in recorded music that saw plummeting music purchases alongside the growth of music piracy and illegal downloads. The majority of the labels in this study view their approach to mobile music from the perspective of unconventional frameworks, either as a guerrilla war fighter ("guerrilhaerdo" in the words of YB Music's Mauricio Tagliari) trying to survive in the global capitalist system, or as risk-takers willing to try anything (Marcela Boechat of Dubas Música, Eduardo Ramos of Slagg Records). In the following pages, I extend the metaphor of risk-taking guerrilla fighter to critique the struggles of the larger network of A&R personnel, producers, and marketing specialists who believe that they must respond to an increasingly unforgiving marketplace. Their tactics for survival underscore the tensions at the heart of attempting...
to maintain proprietary control over one's goods while also claiming a progressive outlook on the production and transmission of popular culture in a global marketplace. As is the case with most business communities, other trends in international business discourse appeared more regularly in conversation, such as "the long tail," the idea that online distribution means that businesses can profit by turning away from the blockbuster model (Anderson 2008a). As this locally and internationally oriented discourse intimates, the last few years of transition in the Brazilian record industry have caused a fair amount of anxiety and nervousness mostly having to do with navigating the choppy transition of music from the boundlessness of a physical commodity (i.e., Perlman 2003; Katz 2004; Sussman 2009) to a seemingly diffuse digital one (i.e., Sterne 2006; Morris 2010).

The metaphor of risk-taking and guerrilla warfare to describe the attitudes of underdogs in late capitalism is not unique to the Brazilian independent record industry. Paul Silverstein notes how Parisian rap artists used guerrilla warfare to describe their attitudes toward their record labels and the music industry as a whole (2006:293–95). In that context, the musicians from the poorest neighborhoods of the city sought to make money while also hoping to tear apart the music industry from the inside. As I will show, the situation for the independent label personnel is a smaller, less confrontational version of resistance. They do not wish to upend the music industries; rather, they seek to write their own new rules for how to survive and change the landscape of Brazilian music. The discourses at the center of this study are far from the counter-hegemonic forms of resistance that they purport to be; rather, they are examples of how capitalist enterprises adapt to appropriate terms often associated with very different aims, such as those affiliated with empowering dominated groups.

For this essay, I draw from an ongoing ethnography of independent record companies with offices located in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo that began in 2007. During that time, I have seen some companies pushed to near-extinction (and some disappear altogether) and others emerge as surprisingly more powerful. I have also watched as a few workers have moved in and out of positions, leaving what they considered to be a dying industry, or seeking alternative ways to support themselves in related industries. All labels at the core of this study have international distribution and sales as part of their business model. While the independent music labels lack the multinational infrastructure of the major record companies, many of them are able to respond more rapidly to the changing dynamics of the music industry due to their smaller size and lack of multinational financial interests. Rather than focusing on musicians and composers, I spoke with engineers, producers, distributors, and marketers in order to focus on a larger view of musical and cultural production. While these people are far from a homogenous group, they do identify and associate with each other the way that many people in similar professions do for the purpose of advancing mutually beneficial aims. They have trade organizations, and they also socialize with each other on a regular basis. One could describe this social group as work-based and typical of art and culture worlds (Becker 2008; Becker et al. 2006). In a sense, then, they are a test-case of Bourdieu's "Field of Cultural Production," coalescing around the shared goals of selling the best representations of Brazilian music to the farthest reaches of the world (1993).

The people who work for these record companies are themselves in a much better position of power than the people who work for record labels in other parts of Brazil and the majority of the people I spoke to come from a place of socio-economic privilege. Their disadvantage, or their inability to direct the conditions to which they must respond, is that they are much smaller than the larger socio-economic forces at work in Brazil and in the larger world of music business at this moment of late capitalism. After an introduction of how the independent music industry works in São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, this essay will detail the mobile music strategies of independent record labels, from true-tone mobile phone downloads to digital distribution on the internet with a focus on three different companies, Música, Deckdisc, and YBMusíca. From the perspective of new business models as tactics of a guerrilheiro, I will offer a further critique of the effects of late capitalism and the discourse of modernity on the musical output of a country that is still very much arriving on the world stage of international prestige.

### The Shape of the Industry

Although there are record companies and recording studios all over Brazil, Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo are where the industry has its strongest influence. From a survey of record companies listed on the Brazilian music portal website, nearly 70% of the total number of record labels is concentrated in those two cities, with nearly half (42.44%) in São Paulo alone (Table 22.1).

The dominance of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro is not surprising considering that they are the two largest cities in Brazil. Despite their large populations and their language, Rio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Number (share) of Record Labels</th>
<th>Metropolitan Population (millions)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>São Paulo</td>
<td>73 (42.44%)</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rio de Janeiro</td>
<td>47 (27.33%)</td>
<td>14.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other cities</td>
<td>52 (30.23%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porto Alegre</td>
<td>6 (3.49%)</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belo Horizonte</td>
<td>5 (2.90%)</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Curitiba</td>
<td>5 (2.90%)</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Table 22.1 Record Companies in Brazilian Cities Based on Public Information from "Gravadoras," Portal da Música, http://www.portaldamusica.art.br/agenda/gravadoras.html (accessed May 20, 2010)
Dubas Música in Rio de Janeiro for *bossa nova* and new MPB (as well as back catalog re-releases from the 1960s). In contrast to focusing on a narrow ethos or set of genres, many other independent record companies take a much more eclectic approach to make a space for themselves in the popular music market. MCD World Music (São Paulo) and Rob Digital (Rio de Janeiro) license international music as well as a variety of domestic projects, such as MPB and *misica infantil* (children's music) projects (MPBaby series for MCD and children's singer Bia Bedran for Rob Digital), while also promoting artists geared toward immigrant communities (Sephardic Jewish singer Fortuna for MCD and Rob Digital's extensive catalog of French chanson). What is more common, however, is for a record company to take an even broader approach to the popular music traditions from Brazil to serve specific sales or licensing needs. Luís Discos in São Paulo, founded by MPB producer and songwriter Thomas Roth, covers many different genres of music explicitly from the lineage of samba, such as *bossa nova* and *samba de rote* (roots samba) while also promoting compilations for use in domestic coffee chains, such as Fran's Cafe—a move that is similar to Hear Music's relationship to Starbucks Coffee.

As cultural symbols, independent record companies have played an important role in Brazil since the 1960s and that legacy continues to influence how many of their employees view their role in Brazilian culture with independent labels as a difficult, but necessary path. As Júlio Moura, a former journalist who has worked for numerous independent labels, relayed about his experiences working at an independent in the mid 1990s right after the first explosion of Brazilian independent labels:

...tem também o Dubas de Ronaldo Bastos. E ali eu aprendi nem que um pouco de dura, assim que o Ronaldo falava, que era guerrilha. Um ato guerrilha. Então como eu sou jornalista e tudo, e naturalmente me caminhel para esta parte de comunicação. Mas, como desse equipe da gravadora era só quatro pessoas, pois um pouco de tudo tentava acompanhar. [4 minutes later] De uma maneira na época de Dubas, o Ronaldo me dizia "Ah, a gente funciona um pouco como no futebol, onde um clube menor é um pouco pequeno, revela os craques que amanhã estão ganhando os grandes." E esse pensamento dele há 12 anos!

(... you also have Ronaldo Bastos's Dubas. And there I learned it was not just a little hard, as Ronaldo said, it was *guerrilla warfare*. An act of *guerrilla warfare*. So since I am a journalist and everything, of course I went into communications. But, since the record label team was just four people, it was a little bit of everything in trying to keep up. [4 minutes later] It is like in the time of Dubas, Ronaldo said to me "Ah! We work a little like in soccer, where a minor club is a little small, reveals the superstars who will be winning the big leagues tomorrow." And that thought of his is 12 years old!)

Here Moura is relaying the attitude and spirit that many in the independent labels felt about their work and their loyalty to the cause of getting the best musicians (like soccer superstars on a minor team) out there while not working for a multinational corporation. Because of the limited resources of these smaller companies, everyone had to do a bit of everything and venture outside their assigned roles in the company (as an act of...
guerrilla warfare). That flexibility is part of what allowed him to transition into many roles in other independent labels, such as Biscotto Fino, Natasha Records, and Deckdisc. As he relayed throughout our conversation, “Eu nunca trabalhei direito com multinacional, e o que é uma trajetória bem característica assim” [I never worked directly with a multinational label and that kind of trajectory is very characteristic].

Throughout Brazil's popular music history, the government and multi-national corporations have had a strong hand in building the shape of what kinds of genres and artists were most successful.14 Considering the country's pattern of dictatorship, military coups, and democratic reform, it is not terribly surprising that the government’s propaganda arm would attempt to control what kinds of popular culture circulated for much of the twentieth century. In the years leading up to the military dictatorship, music became a major source of contestation in Brazil (Avelar 2000). After democratic reform took hold of the country in the 1980s, independent record labels flourished, and new artists began to take hold of the popular consciousness with a different kind of spirit and that energy continued into the 1990s when established, acts with the majors began to found their own record labels. Their development was not without contradictions. Eduardo Vicente (2002:38–39) argues that despite that reputation, many independent labels in Brazil were very much tied up in the technologies of production, marketing, and distribution that the major labels had developed in the 1980s. This was especially the case with distribution for the labels that were launched by MPB artists who had already had lengthy periods of success. This is similar to the discourse of major and independent labels in the United States—that distribution agreement allowed some independent record label personnel to assert that some labels were more or less independent than others—although the criteria often shifted depending on the label in question.15 The independents' claim to rebellion was more symbolic than literal due to their need to literally use the same tools and adaptive models of their major label counterparts. Since they did not have the same level of financial backing and stability of the majors, they were much more dependent on sales of recordings than other sources of revenue to stay in business.16

The financial structures of the independents vary as do their relationships to major corporations. For example, Trama and Biscoito Fino have well-known relationships with banks and big business as the projects of children of major Brazilian business leaders. Trama was founded by Cláudio and André Szajman. Their father, Abram Szajman, was the president of VR (Vale Refeições), a dining and real estate credit firm (later sold to Sodexo for R$1 billion in 2007). Much of Trama’s early success in international markets (especially in Europe) had to do with what seemed to be its endless supply of capital. At one point they staffed an office in London. Biscoito Fino was founded by Kati de Almeida Braga and Olívia Hime. Braga is the daughter of Antônio Carlos de Almeida Braga, the former CEO of Banco Icatú, Atlântica Seguros and Bradesco Seguros—all major financial institutions in Brazil. Braga founded Biscoito Fino after Banco Icatú was sold to BBA (today controlled by Itaú). In 1993, due to co-founder Kati Braga's relationship with FUNARTE (Brazilian National Foundation of the Arts) and the patronage of the oil company Petrobras, Biscoito Fino has also reissued canonic recordings to maintain the archive of Brazil's musical past.18 Its focus has been less on making a profit than on cementing its reputation as an important label for an audience of privilege.19

The status of a Brazilian record company's independence is slippery. Other influential labels such as Deck (formerly Deckdisc) and Som Livre have questionable status as independent labels due to their relationships with other major corporations. At its founding in 1998, Deckdisc had clear relationships to the major multinational record labels: its founder, João Augusto, used to be the director of Virgin in Brazil and during its first three years the record company had a distribution deal with Universal Music for its eclectic array of artists. Augusto has a reputation of finding the newest stars (in the words of Júlio Moura, "uma característica dele é revelar o novo" [One of his traits is revealing the new]), and a few of the label’s biggest hit-makers, such as the Farró group Palamansa, were groups that he brought with him from his previous record companies, such as the now defunct Abril Music.20 Since 2001, the company ended its relationship with Universal and has proudly stated that it was "a primeira gravadora 100% independente no país" [The first 100% independent record label in the country]. Som Livre is best known as the label for music on the Globo television network, but it has also branched out to other artists, mostly emphasizing MPB and samba.21 All of these labels with ties to major business have amassed so much capital or are so well organized that others in the industry question their indie status and at times dismiss them as "practically majors." Deck’s roster, on the other hand, includes a wide variety of artists, including rock/pop, "indie" rock, electronic dance music, MPB, samba/pagode, rural genres such as Farró, andsertaneja, and licensed music from independent labels in North America or England. Depending on the label, they can release as many as four or five album-length CDs a year. Regardless of the strength of any given labels' catalogue and the variety of genres they may have, many of them went through a tumultuous period in the mid 2000s. Over the last ten years, independent labels have been going out of business at a rapid rate and only a fraction of them have found a way to thrive. By 2007, they all talked about their roster of artists and the strength of their catalogues only after describing the crisis of recorded music.

Nearly everyone I spoke with was in agreement about how the independent and major record labels got themselves into the predicament of selling a small fraction of the volume they sold just a few years earlier. Brazilian society is already extremely divided between the wealthiest and poorest people. The music industry took a very long time to respond to piracy and downloading because the wealthiest customers continued to spend between R$30 and R$50 per CD (by the current exchange rate between US$22 and US$30) while the rest of the Brazilian population stopped purchasing their music in traditional venues.22 Clearly, the poorest people were priced out of purchasing music while the ease of purchasing pirated CDs on street corners, and later illegal downloads, proved irresistible. At the same time, the typical music lover in Brazil continued to invest money every so often to see their favorite artists in concert settings. Artists responded to this change by charging more money for their concerts, often pricing out the majority of their fan-base. Record labels, on the other hand, made very few changes until consumer patterns were so well-established with the majority of the population participating in piracy, that they put themselves at a disadvantage with people who otherwise would
have been their main audience. The negative impact of these changes on the Brazilian recording industry is undeniable. According to a report by IFPI (the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry), music sales in Brazil fell by 40% between 2005 and 2009, and the record companies released just over one-tenth of the albums they did just ten years prior (2010:19).

As a result of drastic financial losses, many in the independent music industry began to look for other venues for sales and new models for profit. The most widely cited strategy by members of the record industry is Chris Anderson's (2006a) "long tail" theory of profits where selling less of more is the key to making money in a rapidly segmented population. This theory is opposed to counting on blockbuster sales on a few items to sustain business (the "head" of the graph in Figure 22.1). Anderson argues that in a market of near infinite supply, demand will exist for even the most obscure items beyond niche markets resulting in a long-tailed distribution. That a US-based discourse about technology's role in capital is so prominent in Brazil points to the enthusiasm that the emerging generation of Brazilian tech and industry leaders has for social media technologies (i.e., Facebook, Orkut, and Twitter). As recent reports from comScore show (2010), this enthusiasm for social media and new technology makes Brazil one of the most socially networked populations in the world.20

Although Anderson is not an economist or a media specialist, his position as editor of a media and technology magazine, Wired, allows his perspective to matter to industry insiders and new business gurus even if economists and business analysts disagree with his results.21 The primary source for critique is that many business analysts believe that there are only a few "aggregators" like Google, Amazon, and iTunes, and "mega-institutions" that are taking over for what used to be many businesses in the past.

What is more, in times of economic crisis, the head of the graph (Figure 22.1) gets even larger as more and more businesses merge to survive. As a result, the head of the graph has grown to make up 10% more of the market than when Anderson originally formulated his theory.

The enthusiasm with which many members of the record industry in Brazil embraced the "long tail theory" was not without its critics. Mauricio Bussab of Tratore, a digital consolidation company that serves only independent record labels, described the eagerness with which people in the independent music industry embraced Chris Anderson's "long tail theory" as yet another empty idea that does not actually translate into profits for record companies. According to Bussab, Anderson is one of the popular thinkers in business and media who have coined an idea that spread in the record industry that will not actually help record labels transform or alter their business model.22 From his perspective, not much has changed for these smaller record companies to fulfill Anderson's promise of selling less of more because the majority of them were already selling less.

Another critique is more subtle: Anderson, like other commentators in a marketplace of infinite possibilities, takes for granted that the utopian business models only include people with the socio-economic stability to access services like broad-band internet. In other parts of the world, for example, the hit-making machine that Anderson (2006a:31–32) claims to have ended in 2000, is still alive even if sales figures are blunted by massive piracy. Techno-theorists Kodwo Eshun and Steve Goodman (2009) expand the critique of long tail theory by describing it as a symptom of the growing marketization and financialization of the lives of music fans and producers. That so many in the Brazilian music industry separately mentioned the "long tail" further demonstrates not only how effectively the idea spread as jargon, but also how these professionals function as a social group; they place their hopes in the same new business theories in search of a way to survive the changes in the industry, even if that theory is by large based on the promise of a future that has yet to arrive.

In Brazil these transformations in music consumption and listening practices often take on a local character, or micro-economic climate, thus influencing how new artists promote their music. For example, with the genre of tepobrega, an electronic dance version of a highly sentimental popular ballad style ("brega" literally means "tacky" in Portuguese) that became popular in the 1970s, the DJs and producers of this music actually work in conjunction with networks of CD pirates to sell their music to promote their shows.23 This new model of music distribution is working and catching the attention of scholars from many walks of life (Tor4 2011; Lemos and Castro 2008). Also, former Brazilian Minister of Culture and MPB star Gilberto Gil ushered in government-sponsored "pontos de cultura" or "cultural hotspots" that rely on Creative Commons licensing and financial support to encourage underprivileged communities to engage in creative activities (Gil 2007). Often, the government grants particular communities funds to purchase recording technology; the looser structure of Creative Commons licensing promotes musical styles that rely on remixing pre-recorded music to flourish without breaking the law.24 However, these alternatives to production and distribution exist in a largely different paradigm than the promise of widespread mainstream success that underpins the very structure of the music industry based in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Despite the praise that Gil's program has received from "copyleft" observers, some independent record company personnel dismissed the music coming
out of Gilberto Gill’s program as not being a viable financial alternative to their business model and not of a high enough quality to represent Brazil on the internet or abroad.\textsuperscript{13} Further, some in the industry were quick to point to what they saw as Gill’s hypocrisy regarding his own publishing company’s attitude toward copyright enforcement.

**DIGITAL SALES ON THE INTERNET**

The majority of the people who work for record labels consider international sales and digital licensing to be a difficult terrain to navigate and, as of this writing, not a reliable or predictable source of income. Over the course of 2007 and 2008, I watched many labels tentatively begin to sell their music through established online music retailers such as iTunes, eMusic, and Rhapsody. When iTunes or eMusic came up in interviews during mid-2007, many of these labels were still in the midst of working through the details of how they would license their music for online sale. It took until December of 2011 for iTunes Music Store to open to Brazilian and Latin American markets, mostly based on complications with import taxes, thereby leaving the purchase of music through iTunes for most of the last decade to international sales (the iTunes Store did, however, sell Apps for the iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad to Brazilian markets from the beginning). Thus, whatever decisions labels made about selling through iTunes were about international markets, especially anglophone and diasporic ones. By December of 2007, many independent labels had contracts with such digital consolidation services as The Orchard, IODA, and INGrooves, who work with independent labels over the complicated laws involving music licensing in different countries and breaking independent artists to new markets.\textsuperscript{14} Since these services were such a new component of their strategy, they had no concrete data to support the transition away from physical products; rather, they understood online sales as the last clear hope for direct consumer sales. For many of the labels I studied, their approach to digital distribution through the digital consolidation services was one of chance, akin to one of many tactics where the odds of succeeding were completely unknown.

Licensing agreements, differences in copyright law, and different types of taxation complicate the transition to online international sales thereby causing additional challenges for these companies. Those challenges often mean that internet distribution is still unknown and is not a clear path to survival. Such a lack of certainty also causes delays in negotiating these contracts. Marcela Boechat of Dubas Música said that it took her record label over two years to fully make the transition to online sales through IODA:

\[\text{Nosso primeiro contato com IODA foi ótimo. Assim, muito bom mesmo. Acho que foi um grande "start" assim da gente, "não, vamos entrar para a era digital!" Assim, sabe? Foi o grande "start," para a gente até tinha alguns problemas com distribuidores brasileiras, mas o mercado brasileiro ainda é muito aquém do mundial.}\]

(Our first meeting with IODA was excellent! You know, really good. I think that it was a great “start” for us, “No, let’s enter the digital era!” Like that, you know? It was

As of late July 2008, she and Dubas faced the task of attempting to understand what had changed. After six months, they had piles of data from IODA that they had not quite figured out how to use. As she put it: “O problema é você entender que eu acho assim, agora aqui no momento. Você vai atrair. E aí do retorno, você tem que tentar entender o que você fez o retorno naquele ponto específico” (I think it’s like this—The problem is for you to understand the here and now of the moment. You shoot without knowing who or what your are going to hit. There from the return, you need to try and understand why your shot returned at that specific point).\textsuperscript{24} In other words, if a record company is going to understand how it is doing, and if it is continuing to reach a desired niche public, the new modes of digital distribution are forcing them to radically change how they work in order to ensure that they are succeeding. Fernando Tranjan of Biscoito Pino went one step further in stating that as of 2008, they were not really making any money off digital sales (“esse novo canal do digital, ele está chegando agora pra gente. A gente não está fazendo dinheiro com isso de uma maneira geral… Fico que vire o digital hoje em dia, já é uma bonus” [that new digital channel, it is currently arriving for us. We aren’t making money with that in a general way. Everything that might come from digital today is a bonus]).\textsuperscript{24} For Biscoito Pino, online sales were difficult to navigate and his label just began to conduct an analysis of what sells where and why around the same time as Boechat. Both of them alluded to the random feeling of working in digital distribution, and they mentioned not being able to predict what albums would do well abroad, and that the revenue (renda) was extra. The entire process of digital sales signified lack of control when dealing with international markets, even with the help of these services actively promoting the music to established pod-casters.

The attitude of many of these labels toward digital sales is not that digital sales will save them or be the magic bullet that will lead to profits or even long term survival, but rather that it combined with many other approaches will allow them to continue. When guerrilheiro came up in conversation, it was to describe this flexible approach that was fundamental to running an independent label. In the example following, it referred to differing revenue streams and an unconventional attitude toward artist rights that had little to do with physical CD sales or even guerrilla marketing. For an intricate example, I reproduce some of my first interview with Maurício Tagliari of YB Music, where he brought up the concept of “guerrilheiro”:

**TAGLIARI:** ...o que a gente tem em fazer, a gente aqui tem uma, a gente anda meio que como guerrilheiro. E assim a gente tem uma, duas pontas. Na ponta digamos de “publishing”, de gravação, e “stuff” da arte, bacana. E na ponta a gente trabalha também com licenciamento e sincronização. Esta por exemplo, a gente aqui tem uma “advertising music house production.”

**GOLDSCHMITT:** Sim.
TAGLIARI: Então, a gente tem muita oportunidade de fazer o Curumin entre o comercial de Nike, da Miller. [Tangent about frequent licensees Six Degrees Records and Crammed Discs] Então o que acontece, por padrão de disco brasileiro a gente trabalha desde o começo com a gente para licenciar e recebe um advance bom que é bom para a artista e para a gente. É legal, mas a gente fica com a preferência dos direitos para sincronização, que é nosso foco para cinema e longametragem—a "feature films"—documentários, no televisão, comerciais, né? E é isso que tem... nosso foco e esse. Agora, com o CD que antes já foi uma coisa, já foi um recurso, hoje a gente faz licenca pro artista, o artista pega novos CDs, vende shows, vende onde de quiser, trabalha de guerilheiro mesmo, né?

GOLDSCHMITT: Sim.

TAGLIARI: Então assim a gente acaba tendo um lado que quando tem dinheiro é muito dinheiro, mas é mais caro, e o outro [lado] a gente no simetria a gente só ajuda a artista. Então já tem ajudado a criar uma rede bacana de artistas.

(TAGLIARI: The thing that we are trying to do, we have a—we act like a guerrilla fighter [guerilheiro]. It's like this: we have one, two points. Let's say in one we have "publishing" recording, and "stuff" of art, great. And to that end we also work with licensing and synchronization [licenses]. For example, we have "advertising music house production.

GOLDSCHMITT: —right.

TAGLIARI: —so we have many opportunities to do [YB artist] Curumin in Nike and Miller's commercials. [Tangent about Six Degrees Records and Crammed Discs]

TAGLIARI: So what happens via the standard of the Brazilian CD, we tried from the beginning to license and receive a good advance that is good for the artist and for us. It's cool, but we continue to have the rights for synchronization, which is our focus for film and feature-length films—the "feature films"—documentaries; on television, commercials, right? And it is that [synchronization] that has... our focus is that. Right now with the CD that previously was one thing, it was the resource—today we do licenses for the artist, the artist gets new CDs, sells shows, sells where he wants, works as a real guerrilla fighter [guerilheiro], right?

GOLDSCHMITT: Yeah.

TAGLIARI: And so because of this we stop having a side that when we have money, it's a lot of money, but it's more expensive, and on the other [side] we help the artist in symmetry. So we've already created a great network of artists.

This issue of balancing a record company's rights with the rights of the artist was one significant way that many of these independent labels viewed digital distribution and their role in getting the music out to the people who wanted to hear it. Most of the record label personnel viewed publishing and intellectual property rights as the main obstacles to helping to establish international distribution. Fernanda Brandt, formerly of iMúsica and currently at Warner Brasil, echoed other statements about the obstacles coming from publishers, "the publisher market is hectic, it's crazy, like, they own the music market."26 Because there was so much competition for artists between the independent labels and the majors, those that proved the most nimble in negotiations over digital distribution and licensing tended to be the ones who found themselves expanding their operations rather than cutting back in the face of crisis.

Other companies like Deckdisc (known within the industry as "Deck") sell audio files on their website at a relatively reasonable price. Fabio Silva, who works with new media at Deckdisc, told me that his company is by and large against DRM (digital rights management, software encoded in certain digital formats to prevent piracy) and avoids it whenever possible because they understand that music sharing can help promote artists. They realize that their anti-DRM policy may make their company vulnerable, but as one of the largest independent labels and publishers in Brazil, they are willing to take the risk. Silva, along with other record industry personnel, blames the high prices of legal downloads through such services as Terra.com.br and UOL.com.br, popular online hubs owned by major media conglomerates similar to Yahoo, for discouraging willing customers from legal downloads.27 These sites were originally supported by the major record labels as convenient portals for consuming many different types of media. On these sites, customers who want to buy digital music pay prices that are the equivalent or higher than the physical CD in a store, prices that are not competitive with piracy and illegal downloads. In such an environment, these policies actually discourage audiences from paying for music when many illegal digital alternatives exist. The source of the high prices is not the record labels themselves but the music publishers who for years had resisted forging agreements on mechanical licenses with digital distribution companies.

Increasingly, companies like Deckdisc encourage their artists to use an in-house publisher to avoid worrying about licensing and pricing standards. Deckdisc's placement of downloadable files directly on their website allows them to address the local concerns of promoting and selling their music to domestic audiences—the website will link users directly to an external service through iMúsica. Their tactic is about control and eliminating the steps where parties can disagree. Many companies like Deckdisc are in the process of adopting vertical approaches to the music business, seeking to control the music from recording, publishing, promotion, distribution and concerts. For example, SomZoom in Fortaleza is known throughout the forró scene in Ceará for having so much control over the promotion of their artists by also controlling radio stations and live venues that they give away CDs at concerts to boost already large attendance figures. That vertical approach is spreading among other labels in Fortaleza and it has an adverse affect on non-affiliated artists in the area who depend on concert CD sales to keep afloat. These record companies are expanding to mirror the behaviors of major labels as they learn to thrive financially.28

By and large, online licensing agreements represent a loss of control for many of these companies. The old model of releasing a unified album—controlling the track order and what image the artist and label presented to their publics—was very important to the record label personnel's sense of purpose. Without that structure, they rely on non-monetary measures of success that are still undefined. Compound this lack of control and clear direction with the need for another agent, either in the form of a digital consolidation company (IOMA, the Orchard, INGrooves) or someone skilled in new media marketing, and the anxiety is completely palpable in conversation.

By and large, new models of music sales defy decades of industry practice and simultaneously usher in a new group of (largely younger) workers with a different set
of priorities. The generation gap in attitudes about the internet and mobile and digital distribution is pronounced. People born after 1980 have been taking on positions of influence in the various independent record companies, distributors, and marketing companies and they are enthusiastic about the new opportunities to use social media, mobile phones, and viral marketing to help their artists succeed. However, the biggest difference emerging from the influence of the younger generation of record label personnel is their attitude about what kinds of genres and repertoire their label should promote. They do not echo the older generation's burden of representing Brazil to the rest of the world; rather, they treat their country as only increasing in global influence with the potential to grow beyond its past.

Direct online sales through digital consolidation services are far from the only tactic being employed by independent record companies. Many of these companies actively seek to profit through licensing deals with national and international outlets, either for compilations abroad, or increasingly, for commercials, video games, television, and film. As Roberto Ruiz of MCD World Music told it, many companies began to license their music when the crisis in the industry was at its most critical and they thought they were about to lose everything. In his words, “a festa já acabou” (the party was over).33 Since that critical juncture, many record companies have been more judicious with how they license their music. Due to this, extant recordings from these companies are often available through the digital distribution of those companies that licensed those recordings for compilations. Those companies that licensed the music then distributed the music through a digital consolidation service. Sometimes the sale in question is three or four steps removed from the traditional distribution model resulting in an additional level of confusion and alienation from the track's performer. However, as Ruiz argues, most consumers who buy compilations based on moods rather than artists (for example, a Bossa Nova chill compilation) generally care more about the music's affect than the artists involved in the recording.

**Mobile Digital Sales: Deck and iMúsica**

A few independent record companies in Brazil have taken an aggressive approach to new opportunities for revenue growth that, from an outsider's perspective, resemble much of what has been happening in North America. This is mostly in terms of how these companies understand their role in producing content for mobile phones and synchronization licenses.34 Many of the people involved in these new ventures view their approach as completely outside the norm of relationships between record label and consumer. These tactics have been so successful at helping these companies thrive that, in many instances, they are outperforming major multinational record labels.

Let us consider the case of Deckdisc and its relationship to iMúsica as a source for mobile phone content. Deckdisc was founded in 1998, a period when CDs were the main way that music was distributed. For years, the company went by the nickname "Deck" since the industry increasingly moved away from CDs as the primary medium for distribution. In 2010, Deckdisc officially changed its name to "Deck" as a clear response to the rapidly shifting modes of musical consumption. Record labels like Deck work with digital distribution and promotion companies like iMúsica to encourage customers to purchase ringtones and full tracks through their mobile phones. As the standard way for mobile phone users to legally download audio files directly to their phones, Truetones initially seemed like they would be the magic solution to declining sales among independent labels. As former iMúsica employee Fernanda Brandt put it, all of the labels and aggregators noticed the growth of the Truetone downloads; there were huge profit margins when customers were paying between R$4 and R$6 per tone. What was more, apart from a few standout stars, the download distribution was spread among many artists from independents and major labels alike. Due to that trend, the industry quickly expanded to full track downloads, often in the form of MP3s or proprietary formats.35 As of the writing of this essay, the record industry still refers to Truetones and mobile downloads of full tracks as a growing rather than shrinking source of revenue, partially due to the vast price difference between content purchased online through a PC (ranging from R$1 to R$1.70 each) and those purchased directly on the phone (at R$4 each, but sometimes incurring additional data fees of up to R$6 for pre-paid mobile phone users).36 Although they did not freely grant any figures about any sales or licensing revenues, iMúsica did give a general picture as to where the money came from and how they were seeing purchasing trends consistent with "the long tail"—there were a few superstars, but download purchases were really spread around to many different independent labels.

iMúsica began as an experiment combining music journalism, criticism, and digital distribution for independent labels in 2001 with the backing of venture capitalist firm iDiasNet. It radically changed its orientation to being a content aggregator when they saw that the iTunes Music Store would not be available in Brazil. They hired Felippe Llerena because he was an independent record company veteran (he was co-founder of Natasha and also runs Nikita) and could communicate more effectively with other people in the independent music industry. Between 2005 and 2006, iMúsica expanded to include all of the major record companies in Brazil. In 2007, iMúsica expressed unbridled optimism about their expansion plans for getting their client's (incuding Deckdisc) music to consumers through their phones in multiple countries in Latin America. Many of Deck's artists have international appeal across Latin America (especially Brazilian rock artists like Pitty and drum 'n' bass artists like Marcelinho da Lua) and, due to Música's dominance among South American mobile phone carriers, their music is sold via mobile full-track download. In some examples, the MP3s of a popular artist comes with the phone.

One aspect of their mobile music strategy is championing the top artists through partnerships between the label, the digital consolidation service, and mobile phone manufacturers. This was especially the case with Pitty, the stage name of rock singer Priscilla Novaes Leone, where mobile phone content has been at the forefront of Deckdisc and
guy who never bought CDs, never actually had money to buy CDs, was starting to get pirated CDs in the streets. But at the same time these guys spent a lot of their time either commuting or staying at home without cable TV ... These people are the ... emerging mobile market. It has two effects: one is that finally the class C and D gain a lot of purchasing power. So their status, symbolic status was mostly based on their mobile. So, you've probably seen a lot of these people using fancy, amazing mobile devices ... And they realize that they have this powerful device in their hands, and they actually don't know how to access LimeWire, and at the same time they spend hours commuting home. So they ultimately ended up buying music because they realized that they can download a song and listen straight out of their device. So, if you are asking what has really changed? I mean we are now mostly geared on selling full-tracks.46

From Llerena's perspective, mobile music purchases of full tracks are succeeding due precisely to gaps in knowledge and access to technology that are a product of class imbalances. While iMúsica is trying to encourage mobile phone carriers to offer more affordable subscription plans, they had difficulty implementing them due to differing goals among the carriers. As is evidenced by the success of Nokia's CWM plan, there is potential for the imbalances to be lessened (to a degree). However, those without the financial stability to get good mobile phone contracts will still be paying more for the ability to have mobile music.

On its own merits, iMúsica commands a huge influence in the world of Brazilian mobile music; it is the main source of musical content for all cellphone carriers throughout Latin America (over 16 countries), they are sole the provider for the mobile phone corporation Móvil (serving Columbia and Mexico, among others), and they are also the provider for cell phone carriers in Brazil, Chile, Argentina, and Peru.47 iMúsica, like IODA, INGrooves, and the Orchard, also licenses music to digital download services. However, its main role for companies like Deckdisc is coordinating the licensing and marketing strategies for their top artists through mobile phone downloads. Now that the use of smartphones is on the rise across Latin America, iMúsica's game/application cross-promotional model for Deckdisc will likely become more pronounced.

Through the lens of successfully surviving an unforgiving music marketplace, labels like Deckdisc are outperforming the major record labels, not just through direct online sales and vertical integration, as mentioned earlier, but also in their ability to negotiate with major mobile phone carriers like TIM (through intermediaries such as iMúsica) for musical content to come with the phone as its default. From a distance, these approaches are not significantly different from what is happening in the United States or Western Europe with MP3 players and cellphones becoming the same item (the original impetus for Apple's iPhone). As Sumanth Gopinath (2005) has shown, cellphone ringtones were the most promising source for profit with music sales and provide a useful lens for understanding late capitalism in terms of technology and the music industry (although they subsequently fell in 2008 and 2009). When I first began my interviews in 2007, the industry was split about the potential of mobile music consumption to resuscitate a dying industry. Most likely due to drops in sales, digital distribution shifted
YB Music and Streamlining Synchronization Licenses

Mobile phones are far from the only aggressive new alternatives to digital sales that enterprises record companies are attempting to use to thrive in the new music marketplace. Maurício Tagliari from YBMusic (known as "YB") in São Paulo believes that the most effective strategy for keeping his company afloat is to make the process for licensing to film soundtracks and commercials less complicated. YBMusic was founded in 1999, and its catalog consists of new and old ideas of what Brazilian music can be. On one hand, they have a label called Selo Instituto, run by the members of the Instituto production team that records, remixes, and produces compilations geared toward sample-based urban music. The members of the production team include Rica Amabis, Daniel Ganjamado, and Rodrigo Silveira. All members of Instituto have side projects on other record labels. For example, Ganjamado is a high profile hip-hop producer, and Rica Amabis's collaboration with Pupilo (of Nação Zumbi) called 3NaMassa was distributed through Deck and won many awards. The three members I met in 2008, Amabis, Ganjamado, and Damasceno, do most of their work on soundtracks (trilhas) and occasionally record other projects, like their National Collective CD, a collection that reflects their varied tastes and combines any number of urban musical styles: hip hop, electronic, funk, dub, as well as regional electronic mixtures. National Collective received so much critical attention from the international music press that Instituto went on a European tour playing for audiences that Ganjamado described as young, urban, and hip. The members of Instituto were actually surprised that the album finally found success years after they originally released it in 2004. Apart from Selo Instituto, YBMusic has many high-profile artists, including classical music, regional music from the Northeast, as well as many members of the bubbling, cross-genre São Paulo music scene that combines an MPB aesthetic with rock, funk, and sampled beats (Rocha 2010). Due to its broad catalog and connections with other urban music scenes and distributors in Europe, YB was in a good position to formulate a different strategy for continuing as a record company.

Many in the industry complain of the difficulties of getting a good licensing deal with other countries, often resulting in a very small return for loss of control. These complications sometimes encourage copyright holders to resort to murky, cash-only deals to avoid the complications of taxes and middlemen between the two countries. In recent years, Tagliari has shifted the focus of the company away from being solely a record company into something closer to a trailer and soundtrack specialty label. Since music supervisors and music editors, specialists who work with film and television directors to coordinate synchronization licenses, are not professions that really exist in Brazil, companies like YBMusic fill a lacuna by offering up their services by either arranging for original soundtrack composition or by securing licenses from their back catalog of artists. As Tagliari related, this transition began with the licensing of CDs abroad through UK labels such as Sterns Music and Quanum. In 2006, one of YBMusic's artists, Curumin, garnered the attention of Quanum Projects, and later Nike licensed one of his songs, "Guerreiro" ("fighter") as part of their international campaign for the World Cup soccer tournament. The song's use in advertising soundtracks was reaffirmed when Miller licensed the same song for advertisements to promote their new "Chill" beer. As both Tagliari and Benoni Hubmaier relate, soon many companies began to request Curumin's "Guerreiro" in other contexts, such as FIFA video game soundtracks. Through its embrace of synchronization licenses and soundtrack production, the company transformed itself to be a hub of many roles that would otherwise require three or four different parties.

As the interview transcription presented earlier relates, Tagliari first mentioned the licensing deal surrounding Curumin's song "Guerreiro" (fighter) in passing when attempting to explain what he meant by his company's guerrilhaire approach to doing business. The discursive link between the two words—based on the root for "war" or "fight"—is difficult to ignore and merits some unpacking. In Curumin's song, he uses "Guerreiro" to describe his attitude of going through the streets to seek out his romantic interest through metaphors and slang originating in soccer (Goldschmitt 2011). The song's title, and the repeated use of the idea of flexibility in a struggle or on the street, relates to the larger backdrop of getting by in Brazil; the culture celebrates improvisation, flexibility, and artful invention that others have linked to soccer (the gingas, or sway, of a soccer player) or artfully navigating bureaucratic red tape ("o jeitinho") (Pardue 2002). It is no wonder that the idea of succeeding through invention (and not trying to destroy or upend the record business as a whole, as some others have used the term) as a guerrilhaire was at the forefront of Tagliari's thoughts; it is linguistically close to the song title for his company's most fruitful licensing deal, and thus, a model for success.

YB has also modified the process through which enterprising directors can request synchronization licenses through a model that resembles digital sales. At the 2006 Cannes Film Festival, YB launched a website, EZSoundTrax.com, to make it easier for people in the film industry, such as sound editors and music supervisors, to audition and purchase a musical license from YB's catalog as well from a few partnering independent record labels, such as Sterns Music and Ninja Tune. The website was started as a joint venture between YB, Instituto, and the publisher AlterNetMusic even though YB continues to run and maintain it. Once a client has an established relationship with YB or another label on EZSoundTrax, they may download some MP3s for free to sample them before buying a license. The only restrictions have to do with how open the music publisher and copyright holder are to this method of promotion and distribution, and unfortunately a significant portion of catalogs are not available for MP3 preview.

A major component of EZSoundTrax is musical and geographic diversity: there are numerous artists from a variety of genres and over 16 countries represented by the
catalog. There are also other Brazilian independent labels represented, such as Dubas Música. What is most impressive about the website is how it takes great pains to not appear as a Brazil-only enterprise in order to be more user-friendly for filmmakers in the United States or the United Kingdom: all descriptions and instructions are in English. The "about" section of the website describes its contents as "unique" and "underground," but the actual musical contents are of little consequence; the site is intended to facilitate the process of synchronizing the music to the film from the start of the film's editing for directors, so as to avoid the time-consuming process of searching for rights. The website claims to get clients overnight pricing so as to ensure a smooth and professional process.

Since YB's emphasis is on soundtracks for commercials and films, it informs how they approach their A&R operations. When they produce a new artist, they have synchronization licenses in the back of their thoughts. During a conversation in 2010, Tagliari already had a song from Tulipa's soon-to-be-released album licensed for use in a FIFA game. As Bethany Klein has shown, this change in record industry priorities in A&R due to advertising revenue is not unique to YB but rather is informing how new music is discovered and conceptualized by many in the record industry (2009). Under the "Portfolio" section of their website, potential clients can see how YB's catalog can work for selling products, including Coca-Cola Brasil, Petrobras, and TIM, all central products in Brazil.

Of the record companies I visited, YB's response to the crisis of piracy and illegal downloads is the most atypical. It is the most aggressive in its determination to survive through licensing its most urban-sounding recordings. It is also the least caught up in promoting and representing a type of Brazilian identity through its activities; this is especially evident on EZSoundTrax.com and even on its company website. Such a discursive distance allows the company to release other recordings that would likely not turn a profit but would still satisfy the record company's mission: to record and promote music that they find interesting even if it does not fit the tastes of the executives. Of the companies I spoke to, YB was also the most aggressive in recording and promoting a vast array of artists from multiple sensibilities, including hip hop and experimental art music.

By employing a broad swath of approaches, YB and Deckdisc (among other independent labels in Brazil) embody different types of flexibility in adversity, employing whatever new means necessary to survive and find a way to succeed.44 These two companies combine traditional tools and negotiations to unconventional ends to maintain their independence within the global capitalist system. In this formulation, companies like YB and Deckdisc are opposed to the dominant multinational major music companies in a fight to continue. Many people who work in niche markets understand themselves as underdogs working against a larger system. In this case, the force that is causing the new challenges for independent record companies in Brazil is not necessarily within the power of any individual agent; there are larger, global shifts at work. In place of a revolution is the struggle to survive (and make money). More to the point: since all of the people I interviewed are part of a transitory, petite bourgeoisie, they are the underdogs of this business community, and only some of them are attempting to create new models of doing music business. While YB and Deckdisc may have an adventurous attitude about the role of a record company as the arbiter of a new Brazilian culture, they can only do so much before their responses begin to mirror, or even anticipate, the moves of the Majors.

All of the approaches that independent record labels in Brazil take to digital distribution and mobile music dissemination force a reorientation of independents in the larger cultural milieu of Brazil. The shotgun approaches they use, and the deals with big corporations they make to succeed, show that individual and collective responses to market pressures matter. On one end, independent labels can continue to claim to be independent while also having access to forms of distribution and money making that are weighed down by the radical reversal (or hypocrisy) of who is paying for music with the working poor supporting the industry, as is the case with Deck and Música. On the other end, the need to find one's public through whatever means are available (or go so far as to create those means if they do not already exist) shows that in many respects, the independent labels are able to find a way to get their music to the fans who would happily pay for their music. These responses show that even as these independent record companies have varying relationships with the Majors, either through personnel or through other means, as a community, they strive above all to continue to get what they think is the best music out there. Whatever compromises they make, they are showing an adept adaptability to the new music market that likely would not have emerged from a music industry made up of only a handful of players. That is a cultural benefit of diversity in the recording industry.

Notes
1. One example is José Celso Guida, the former vice president of the Brazilian Association of Independent Music (ABMI). He worked for EMI for many years, later became an important player in the independent record industry, and was recently an independent consultant for providing music for fashion shows. José Celso Guida, interview with author, July 17, 2008.
2. See Knopper (2009).
3. This expansive view of musical production builds off the projects of Howard S. Becker (2008:10–11) in his analysis of art as collective, social action and Christopher Small's concept of musicking (1989:9–10) to include a variety of tasks including janitorial services.
6. Funk carioca is a beat-based genre of music from the poorest neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro. For more, see Sneed (2008).
7. Samba is a dance music in duplo meter of Afro-Brazilian origin that features interlocking syncopated rhythms and an emphasis on the second beat. Choro is an instrumental genre originating in nineteenth-century Rio de Janeiro that is related to samba and features virtuoso soloing. Música sertaneja music is a rural genre, mostly associated with the interior of São Paulo state. The most successful sertaneja singers perform in duo. Forró is a rural dance genre combining many folk dances that is strongly associated with the northeast but popular throughout the country, especially during the June festivals associated with Catholic saints, especially St. John's Day. For more on these genres, see Browning (1995), Livingston-Isenhour and Garcia (2005), Dent (2009), and Crook (2005).
10. Bossa nova is a song-based version of samba that emerged in the late 1950s and early 1960s in Rio de Janeiro and became popular all over the world. Musically, it is mostly known for its complex harmonies, intimate singing style, poetic lyrics, and subdued samba rhythms. In 2000, Acari partnered with Biscoito Fino to form the samba label Quelê.
12. For governmental control from 1930 to 1945, see McCann (2004). For the period immediately following the military dictatorship, see Vicente (2002).
13. Vicente, like US critic Michael Azerrad (2001), assumed that a corporate strategy for the label was to work with local labels to make a series of albums that are independent and not commercially successful. Early on, Dubas was initially distributed through Warner (Vicente 2002:319), and later through Universal Music (Marcela Boechat, interview with author, December 12, 2007).
15. Indeed, Biscoito Fino's attitude toward making money often drives away its employees with a stronger focus on marketing and record distribution. (Miguel Gonçalves, interview with author, April 10, 2007; Fernando Tranjan, interview with author, July 24, 2008.) Tranjan stopped working for Biscoito Fino six months after our interview (January 2009), while Gonzalez left in 2006 and later replaced Tranjan in 2009.
16. Júlio Moura, interview with author, December 12, 2007. Abril Music was the music arm of the Brazilian media giant Abril, the largest publisher of magazines in Brazil. It was an infamous case of a record company falling apart due to piracy. When Abril closed its music operations, its remaining assets went to other record companies, most of them majors. Abril is partially owned by a few international investors, including Capital Group from Los Angeles and Caspers from Cape Town, South Africa, which owns a 30% stake in the company (Lash and Lury 2007:61).
17. This is similar to the role of Hollywood Records in the United States. Since 1989, Hollywood Records has been owned by the Walt Disney Company and was originally founded to focus on releasing Disney television and film soundtracks. Only later did it expand its catalogue.
18. For a study of music piracy in Brazil, see Bishop (2004, 2005).
19. Since 2009, social media analysts have noted that Brazil is one of the top markets for Twitter and one of the fastest growing markets for Facebook (comScore 2010; Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina 2011).
20. See, for example, Anita Elberse (2008) and Anderson's response (2008b).
22. This is far from the only instance where a musician has sanctioned the illegal distribution of their work to increase their exposure, but these DJs' use of such a vast network in the current period of IP litigation makes it noteworthy.
24. Roberto Carvalho, interview with author, December 10, 2007. Michel Perrin, interview with author, April 17, 2007. At the time of the interview, Carvalho was the outgoing president of ABMI, the Brazilian Independent Music Association.
25. Terra is owned by Grupo Globo, and UOL is owned by Abril and Folha (Lash and Lury 2007:18).
26. Special thanks to Michael Silvers for sharing this information with me.
28. Synchronization licenses are for when music is synchronized with video content. Generally speaking, these are the kind of licenses used in television advertising, film and television soundtracks for programming, and video game soundtracks.
33. Terra is owned by Grupo Globo, and UOL is owned by Abril and Folha (Lash and Lury 2007:18).
34. Special thanks to Michael Silvers for sharing this information with me.
37. Felipe Llerena, interview with author, June 7, 2010. Llerena clarified that when pre-paid consumers realize how much they are paying, "They get pissed off and they don't buy songs anymore. A lot of people don't realize that they need a data-plan."
38. Truежone downloads are ringtones that are embedded with digital samples of audio files with a considerably higher quality than earlier versions of ringtones. They are also known for having DRM (digital rights management) embedded in the files.
40. The Brazilian census figures available from ABEP (Brazilian Association of Research Companies) takes into account material wealth, education, and common goods. Classifications fall along a lettering system that corresponds to possessions (house, car, television, etc.), education, and median income. The highest classes are in the A level, while the most destitute are in the E level. Most people in Brazil are C or below. AB households make a minimum of R$4,807 per month. The range for C is from R$1,115 to R$4,806 per month, and D is between R$268 and R$1,114 per month. E describes people who make less than R$268 per month.
42. Felipe Llerena, interview with author, June 7, 2010.
43. Ibid.
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