SECTION 39 – ON WHAT IS UP TO US, OR ON AUTONOMY

The account of autonomy, i.e. of what is up to us, includes first an investigation whether anything is up to us, for there are many who oppose this. (10) The second investigation is about what things are up to us, and over what we have control. The third is to discover the reason why the God who made us made us autonomous.

So let us resume and speak first about the first problem, and prove that there is something up to us from what even the opponents accept. They say that of everything that happens the cause is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, (15) or say that of everything that happens the cause is opposite this. (10) The second investigation is 'spontaneity' (αὐτόματον) from luck; Aristotle does not do so he re, but the later writers have clearly incorporated the distinction from what is due to chance with an argument by elimination of this type.

The account of autonomy, i.e. of what is up to us from what even the opponents accept. They say that of everything that happens the cause is either God, or necessity, or fate, or nature, (15) or luck, or spontaneity.13

But of God the work is existence and providence;

3 up to us' renders ἐφ' ἴμμιν, as previously 'autonomy' renders αὐτεξουσίου. See Bohzien (1998a), p. 355 and n. 73. and above, Introduction 4.c.

13 Streck (2005, 91–92) compares the lists at Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3.1123a33 and Anonymous, On Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics 149.33 and 155.19. Only Nemesius includes God among the causes. The anonymous commentary and Nemesius distinguish 'spontaneity' (αὐτόματον) from luck; Aristotle does not do so here, but the later writers have clearly incorporated the distinction from fate, Physics 2.5–6 in a typical piece of systematisation. Neither Aristotle nor the anonymous commentary includes fate, but for the apparent addition of fate to lists of causes attributed to Aristotle (and to Theophrastus) and deriving ultimately from Nicomachean Ethics 3.3.1123a33–33 one may compare Aëtius 1.29.2 and 1.29.4. (see Fortenbaugh's forthcoming commentary on Theophrastus fr, 593 FHS&G). Verbeke and Moncho (1975, 143) and Streck (2005,91–92) note a similar list (necessity, fate, choice, chance, spontaneity) attributed to Anaxagoras and the Stoics at Aëtius 1.29.7, in the context of the Stoic theory of chance as "a cause obscure to human reason." The list in Aëtius includes choice and excludes nature, since for the Stoics everything is in a sense due to nature, identified with fate. Neither pseudo-Plutarch nor Calcidius introduces their account of chance with an argument by elimination of this type. "What is up to us' and 'what is due to chance' are contrasted by Basil the Great, On the Six Days [of Creation] (Hexaemeron) 2.5 (PG 25 40 A).

14 What is up to us'] renders ἐφ' ἴμμιν, as previously 'autonomy' renders αὐτεξουσίου. See Bohzien (1998a), p. 355 and n. 73. and above, Introduction 4.c.
of necessity the process\textsuperscript{4} of things that are always the same;
of fate to bring to pass of necessity what is fated (for it too is a kind of necessity);
of nature birth, growth, decay, plants and animals;
of luck the rare and unexpected. For they define luck as the conjunction and (20) meeting of two causes originating from choice that bring about something other than what is usual, such as finding a treasure when digging a grave.\textsuperscript{5} For he who put the treasure there did not do so in order that he who found it would do so, nor did he who found it dig in order to find the treasure: rather, the former acted so that he could get it out when he wanted it, the latter in order to dig a grave. But something came to pass other than what both had proposed.

\begin{quote}
τῆς δὲ ἀνάγκης τῶν ἄλωσαντως ἐχόντων ἡ κίνησις: 

τῆς δὲ εἰμαρμένης τὸ ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δὲ αὐτῆς ἐπιτελέσθαι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴ τῆς ἀνάγκης ἐστὶ): 

τῆς δὲ φύσεως γένεσις, αὐξήσις, φθορά, φυτὰ καὶ ζώα: 

τῆς δὲ τύχης τὰ σπάνια καὶ ἀπροσδόκητα. [Mat 3:13]
\end{quote}

\begin{quote}
όρίζονται γὰρ τὴν τύχην τύπημαιναι καὶ συνδρομὴν δὲ αἰτίων ἀπὸ προαιρέσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐχόντων ὄλλο τι παρ' ἰπτερον ὠρύσσοντα θησαυρὸν εὑρεῖν. Ὑπὲρ γὰρ ὁ θεῖς οὗτωσ θείωσ εὑρεῖν, ὤντε εὐρῶν οὕτως ὤρυξεν ὡς εὐρεῖν θησαυρόν ὡλλ' ὁ μὲν ἵνα θελή ὀρύσσῃ οὔτε ὁ θεὸν ἔδωκεν τοῦτον ὡς τὸν θάφον ὀρύσσῃ, συνέπεσε δὲ ἄλλο τι παρ' ἰπτερον ὠρύσσῃ.
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{4} Or “movement.” If the reference is to the heavenly bodies, as it appears to be (and cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3 1122a23–26) locomotion is in fact the only process they can undergo.

\textsuperscript{5} The example is Aristotle’s (except that Aristotle has digging in order to plant rather than digging a grave; the change to the latter is presumably for heightened rhetorical contrast with the good fortune, though we may note that two MSS here have ὁ τὸν θείον ὀρύσσῃ rather than ὁ τὸν θάφον ‘ditch’ rather than ὁ τὸν θάφον ‘grave’: cf. Morani [1982] 39. Basil, Hexaenemon, has digging to make a well). Cf. Alexander, On Fate 8. But the doctrine of chance as the conjunction of two causes is distinctively Platonist: [Plutarch], On Fate 572zc, ‘it resulted from a certain concurrence of causes, each having come about with a different end in view’ Calcidius, On Plato’s Timaeus 159 192.17–19, ‘when two causes which have their origin in our intention come together in such a way that there happens not what was intended but something very different and unexpected, this is the sport of fortune’ followed by the example of buried treasure, and Boethius. Consolation of Philosophy 5.1. again of the treasure example, ‘it has its own proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of which seems to have produced the chance event’. Cf. Sharples (1991) 214–16; Streck (2005) 93–94.

10 what is usual] Literally, ‘what is natural:’
To the (25) spontaneous belong incidental occurrences to the inanimate or non-rational involving neither nature nor [113] skill.16

Under which then of these are we to include what occurs through men, if man is not the cause and origin of his actions? But it is not permissible to ascribe deeds that are sometimes evil and unjust to God; nor to fate, since what is fated (5) is among things that are always the same; nor to luck, for the deeds of men are not rare and unexpected; nor to spontaneity, for it is occurrences to the inanimate or non-rational that just happen.

It remains that the man who acts and makes is himself the origin of his own works and is autonomous. | 196

Moreover, if man (10) originates no actions, deliberation is superfluous.17 For what will be the
to the (25) spontaneous belong incidental occurrences to the inanimate or non-rational involving neither nature nor [113] skill.16

Under which then of these are we to include what occurs through men, if man is not the cause and origin of his actions? But it is not permissible to ascribe deeds that are sometimes evil and unjust to God; nor to fate, since what is fated (5) is among things that are always the same; nor to luck, for the deeds of men are not rare and unexpected; nor to spontaneity, for it is occurrences to the inanimate or non-rational that just happen.

It remains that the man who acts and makes is himself the origin of his own works and is autonomous. | 196

Moreover, if man (10) originates no actions, deliberation is superfluous.17 For what will be the
use of his deliberation if he is not master of any action? But to exhibit what is fittest and most valuable in man as superfluous would be an extreme absurdity.

Accordingly, if he deliberates he deliberates for the sake of action. For all deliberation is for the sake of action and because of action.

Further, where activities are up to us, there our actions (15) through the activity are up to us. But activities exhibiting virtue are up to us, so the virtues are also up to us. That activities exhibiting virtue are up to us is made clear by what Aristotle well says about the excellences of character,86 for what we learn to do through action, that we do by having learned. For by having learned mastery over pleasure we become self-controlled, and when we have become self-controlled (20) we master pleasures.

Ei toûn bouléitai, práxeis énuka bouléitai: pásâ gár boulh práxeis énuka kai dia práxin.

"Ετι οὖν αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν, τούτων καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν [Mat 315], δὲ αἱ κατὰ τὰς ἄρετὰς ἐνέργειαι· ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἄρα καὶ αἱ ἄρεται. 'Οτι δὲ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν αἱ κατ᾽ ἄρετην ἐνέργειαι δηλοῖ καὶ τὸ καλὸς ὑπὸ Ἀριστοτέλους λεγέται ἐπὶ τῶν ἢθικῶν ἄρετῶν· α γάρ ποιοῦντες μανθάνομεν, ταῦτα μαθόντες ποιοῦμεν κρατεῖν γάρ ἡδονῶν μανθάνοντες σώφρονες γινόμεθα· καὶ γενόμενοι σώφρονες κρατοῦμεν ἡδονῶν.

 فلا إذا استعمل الروية والفكر، فإن كان ليس إليه أن يفعل شيئًا من الأعمال، إذ كانت كلًا لوية إذا تكون من أجل فعل، فإن كان ليس إليه أن يختار وليس له أن يفعل فلا حاجة به إلى الروية والفكر وأفضل شيء للإنسان وأكرمه الروية، ومن أقبح الأشياء أن يقال إن أفضل ما للإنسان وأكرمه شيء فيه لا تعود عليه منه منفعة ولا معنى له وهو فضل لا يحتج إليه.

إلى فإن كان الإنسان يريو، فإنما يريو من أجل فعل، لأن الروية إذا تكون في الفعل ومن أجل فعل، وأيضًا فإن الأشياء التي فعلها إلينا، فإن الأعمال التي تتم عن تلك الأعمال إلينا وإلينا أعمال الفضائل،87 والتي تتم عن تلك الأعمال إلينا وإلينا أعمال الفضائل، هي الأشياء التي إذا فعلها إلينا، فإنا أن الأعمال الفضائل إذا إلينا فلم نستطيع أن نفعلها، فقد يدل على ذلك ما قاله أرسطوتليس في كتابه في الأخلاق، وأجاد فيه، وذلك أن قال إن الأشياء التي إذا فعلناها عالّناها هي الأشياء التي إذا تعلمها عالّناها، فإنا إذا تعلمنا مع اللدّات، صننا أفعًا، [227] وإذا صننا أفعًا، فصنا اللدّات.
One may also put it this way; all agree that it is up to us to practice and train; but practice is master of our dispositions, for custom is second nature. But if practice is master of disposition and practice is up to us, then so is our disposition: where but our dispositions are up to us there our actions in accordance with our dispositions are also; for our actions [114] contribute to our dispositions. For he who has a right disposition will act rightly, he who has a wrong one wrongly: so it is up to us to be righteous or unrighteous.

Encouragement and advice make clear that some things are in our power. For nobody encourages a man not to be hungry or thirsty or to fly; for these things are not up to us. (5) So it is clear that things to which there is incitement are up to us.

Further, if nothing is up to us laws are superfluous; but every society naturally uses some laws, knowing that they have the power to do as the law says, and the majority of societies...
record gods as their lawmakers, as the Cretans do Zeus and the Lacedaemonians Apollo.

So a knowledge of what is up to us is naturally inbred (10) in all men. The same as the above is to be said about blame and praise and everything else that disproves that everything happens by fate.

SECTION 40 – CONCERNING WHAT THINGS ARE UP TO US

It has been sufficiently proved that certain things are up to us and that we are in control of some actions. It remains to say what things are up to us. (15)

Accordingly we say that in general everything that is done by us intentionally is up to us (for it would not be said to be an intentional action if the action were not up to us), and without qualification whatever is followed by praise or blame and in regard to which there is

ἐπιγράφεται νομοθέτας, ὡς Κρῆτες μὲν τὸν Δία, Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ Ἀπόλλωνα. Φυσικῶς ἄρα πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ γνῶσις τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν συγκατέσπαρται. Τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ τούτοις ῥητέον ἐπὶ τῶν ψόγων καὶ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀναιρούντων τὸ καθ' εἱμαρμένην πάντα γίνεσθαι. | [Mat 317]

40 – περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινὰ.

"Ὅτι μὲν ἐστὶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν τινὰ, καὶ ὅτι κύριοι πράξεων τινῶν ἐσμεν, αὐτάρκως ἀποδέδεικται. Λοιπὸν δὲ εἶπωμεν τίνα ἐστὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

Λέγομεν τοίνυπ ἐν γενικῶς πάντα τὰ δι' ἡμῶν ἑκουσίως πραττόμενα ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἑκουσίως ἐλέγετο πράττεσθαι, τῆς πράξεως οὐκ ἦν ἐφ' ἡμῖν· καὶ ἁπλῶς οἷς ἕπεται ψόγος ἢ

الباب الأربعون في الأشياء التي إلينا أن نفعلها

أما أنه إلينا أن نفعل أفعالاً باختبارنا وان مستلون على أفعالنا، فقد تبين بما فيه كفاية. وقد بقي علينا أن نبين ما الأشياء التي إلينا أن نفعلها باختيارنا.

فقول: إن كل الأفعال التي تفعلها طوعاً فعلها إلينا، وذلك أنه لم يمكن أن يقال فيها إن فعلنا إياها طوعاً، لو لم يكن فعلها إلينا. وبالقول المطلق أقول: إن الأفعال التي يلحقها الحمد والذم والتي يقع عليها الأمر والنهي

[399]
encouragement and law; for this also was earlier shown to be so.21

All things involving soul and about which we deliberate are up to us in the proper sense: for we deliberate on (20) the basis that it is up to us to perform or not to perform the envisaged action. Deliberation was shown in what preceded to be about matters having an equal possibility. What has an equal possibility is that where we are able to do both the thing itself and its opposite.22 Our intellect makes a choice of this and it is the origin of actions, and these things have that an even possibility are the ones that are up to us, things such as moving and (25) not moving, being moved to act or not,23 trying or not trying to obtain what is not necessary, lying and not lying, giving and not giving, rejoicing and not rejoicing in what one should, and all matters in which virtue and wickedness are displayed. In these matters we are autonomous.

21Above, section 29 and the first part of section 35.
22Above, latter part of section 34. For the formulation in terms of its being up to us to do a thing or not to do it cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5 1113b6–11; Donini (1987) 1250–52 (who argues that the formulation in terms of doing the opposite, as here, is that of Alexander of Aphrodisias rather than of Aristotle himself); Sharples (2001a) 547–49.
23More literally, “having an impulse or not;” in the sense not just of having an initial inclination but of acting upon it. See above, n. 873, and section 35.
The crafts are also concerned with what has an even possibility; for every craft is concerned with the production of what may or may not exist and of which the origin is in the power of the maker, not of the product. For nothing either of the things that are eternal and exist of necessity, nor of those things that come to be of necessity, is said to come to be by skill, and also nothing that comes to be among those things that may be otherwise but has its productive cause in itself, as in the case of animals and plants, is said to come to be by skill. For they come to be naturally and not by skill.

But if the productive cause of the products of crafts is external to the products, who is the cause of the products of craft except the craftsman who produces them? For to produce them is up to the craftsman; so he is the origin and cause of what was done. So therefore skilled activity, the virtues and all actions involving the soul and reason are up to us.

24Streck (2005, 97) notes that the conflict with 34, 103.2–5 above is only apparent; here the point is that the crafts are concerned with what may or may not come about, there that, to the extent that they have fixed rules for bringing about the desired outcome, deliberation is not required.

With 115.4–10 Streck (2005,95–97) well compares Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4 1140a10–16, and notes that Nemesius says of plants and animals that they have their productive cause in themselves, where Aristotle speaks rather of their having their *principle* (*arkhê*); Streck suggests that Nemesius modifies Aristotle’s wording from a Christian perspective. He further notes that in their wider contexts the aims of Aristotle and Nemesius in the two passages are different; Aristotle discusses craft (*tekhnê*) in order to contrast it with action (*praxis*), while Nemesius wants to emphasise that both are up to us.
It was shown (15) earlier\(^{26}\) which sort of activities involve the soul. But most people, who think that autonomy is ascribed to every action, possession and chance, naturally discount the importance of reason; the most severe even introduce scripture into the argument such as ‘it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps’, 27 and they say ‘My good people, | how is man \(\text{[199]}\) accomplish what we have in mind. They say many such things, in ignorance of what is meant by ‘autonomy’.

For we do not have the power to be rich or poor, or always be healthy, or be naturally strong, or always be healthy, or be naturally strong, or even to rule, or in general to have any of the goods that men of sharper wit

---

\(^{26}\) Abrev., section 26.

\(^{27}\) Jeremiah 10:23. It is not clear who ‘the most severe’ are, but that the verse had been used in this way may also be suggested by the fact that Theodoret, writing some years later than Nemesius, argues that the following verses show that Jeremiah is not here speaking of autonomy: 28 a as if we could not accomplish what we have in mind. They say many such things, in ignorance of what is meant by ‘autonomy’.

感受到了吗？

\(^{28}\) Jeremiah 10:24. It is not clear who might be referred to; he also translates δριμύτεροι not by ‘men of sharper wit’, which seems too positive a characterisation for the context.
to do; for choice precedes every action, and not only action but choice also is liable to judgment.

A passage in the gospel [116] makes this clear: 'Whosoever tooketh on a woman to lust after her hath committed adultery with her already in his heart', and Job made sacrifices to God on account of the wrongdoings of his children in their thoughts. For choice is the beginning of sin and of righteousness; for the deed is sometimes permitted by providence and is sometimes (5) prevented. For since some things are up to us and there is providence, of necessity both of these outcomes occur. For if they happened in only one way the other would not exist; but since what happens is of both kinds, sometimes the result will be as we choose, sometimes according to the word of providence and sometimes both.

But since providence is in a way general, in a way individual, (10) it is inevitable that the

práxeos, προαίρεσις ἡγεῖται, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἡ πρᾶξις ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ προαίρεσις ὑπόδικός ἐστι.

καὶ τοῦτο δὴλοι τὸ ἐν τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ· ὁ ἐμβλέψας γυναῖκα τοῦ ἐπιθυμῆσαι αὐτὴν ἐμευχαρίσεν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ αὐτοῦ· καὶ ὁ Ἰωβ υπὲρ τῶν κατὰ διάνοια τῶν τέκνων αὐτοῦ πλημμελημάτων ἔθυεν τῷ θεῷ. Ἀρχὴ γὰρ ἁμαρτίας καὶ δικαιοπραγίας ἡ προαίρεσις. Τὸ γὰρ ἔργον ποτὲ μὲν συγχωρεῖται παρὰ τῆς προνοίας, ποτὲ δὲ κωλύεται· ὄντος γὰρ καὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, οὔσης δὲ καὶ τῆς προνοίας, ἀνάγκη κατ' ἄμφω τὰ γινόμενα γίνεσθαι· εἰ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον μόνον ἐγίνετο, οὐκ ἢν τὸ ἕτερον. Μικτῶν δὲ ὄντων τῶν γινομένων, ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἀποβήσεται, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ τὴν προνοίας λόγον, ποτὲ δὲ κατ' ἄμφωτα.

Τῆς δὲ προνοίας πῇ μὲν κοινῆς οὔσης, πῇ δὲ ἰδιαζούσης, ἀνάγκη τοῖς καθόλου τὰ κατὰ μέρος γίνεσθαι γινομένων. 29Matthew 5:28. 30Job 1:5. 31For Nemesius' view that necessity and providence are incompatible see the Introduction, 4.d. For Nemesius, unlike the Platonists, the consequences of our actions are not inexorably determined once we have acted, but providence can intervene.
particular should be affected in the same way as the universal; for, if the surroundings are dry, bodies become dry, if not all in the same way, and if a mother lives an unhealthy life and is luxurious her children will in consequence be born with a poor bodily temperament and wayward in their impulses.3

So it is clear from what has been said that people may find themselves with an unfavourable bodily temperament either [200] through the general environment or through the preferred life-style of their parents or through themselves being damaged by luxuriousness, so that poor constitutions may sometimes be brought about from an intended beginning, and providence is not altogether responsible for such things.

So when the soul gives in to the bodily temperament and abandons itself to desires and anger, or is oppressed or puffed up (20) by chance circumstances, such as poverty or wealth, intended evil has existence. For the soul that does

The effects of bodily temperament on behaviour are emphasised by Galen, That the Faculties of the Soul follow the Mixtures of the Body (Quod animi mores); but they are already indicated by Plato, Timaeus 86–87, cited by Galen at That the Faculties of the Soul follow the Mixtures of the Body 6, 49.12–51.11 Müller (4.789–91 K).
not give in corrects and conquers the poor temperament, so that it alters rather than is altered, and sets its psychic dispositions into a good state by good behaviour and a favourable regime. So it is clear from those who do get things right that those who do not [117] do so err intentionally. For it is up to us either to go along with a poor constitution or to oppose it and conquer it. But the majority who use their poor constitution as an excuse, [saying that it is] the cause of their condition, ascribe their wickedness to necessity and not to choice, and therefore say that the virtues also are not up to us, a ridiculous (5) statement.

SECTION 41 – FOR WHAT REASON WERE WE BORN AUTONOMOUS?33

[That we have autonomy is the result of our rational nature. Man and the immaterial beings.]

It remains to say for what reason we were born autonomous. So we say immediately that autonomy enters in together with the rational