Horse Supply and the Development of the New Model Army, 1642-46
By Gavin Robinson

New Preface, 2016

Since this article was published, I have discussed some of the issues and evidence in greater detail, and properly engaged with Malcolm Wanklyn's anti-determinist arguments, in my book:

New research by me and other people has made me reconsider some points in the article. In particular, Tom Crawshaw's PhD thesis, Military Finance and the Earl of Essex's Regular Army: 1642-1644 (York University, Toronto, 2013) has proved beyond doubt that the finances of Essex's army were worse than ever in 1644. I was wrong to assume that the warrants for buying cavalry horses from the Smithfield dealers in the spring of 1644 were evidence of a general improvement in finances brought about by the excise and monthly assessment. The real significance of these warrants is that horses had become a very high priority for spending despite a general shortage of money in the army's treasury. Crawshaw's work also shows that there were very few cases of fraud among Essex's officers. Although I might have been justified in writing that there were 'many opportunities for fraud', it seems that they were rarely taken. Crawshaw has confirmed that Essex's army was well financed in 1642 and that the Propositions were very successful at first, as well as finding proof that another 11 troops of Essex's army did receive the £600 allowance to buy 60 troop horses: the list I found in TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 ff. 61-2 is confirmed by the account of the Propositions treasurers in SP 28/170.

I no longer accept my assertion that frontier areas were 'bled dry' of horses. My later analysis of Buckinghamshire parish accounts shows that relatively few horses were
claimed to have been seized by parliamentary armies and that seizures continued throughout the war. See *Horses, People and Parliament*, pp. 124-5, 131, 140, 162.

I have recalculated the totals of horses listed on the Propositions based on a better transcript of the lists in SP 28/131. These figures supersede Table 1 in the original article and were the basis of the bar chart in *Horses, People and Parliament*, p. 43, Figure 1.1:

**Table 1: Horses listed on the propositions 1642-43**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Cavalry horses</th>
<th>Dragoon and draught horses</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1642</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>153</td>
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<td>July</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August</td>
<td>1584</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>772</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
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<td></td>
<td>November</td>
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<td>December</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>140</td>
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<td>1643</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>66</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>29</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>May</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3775</td>
<td>2489</td>
<td>6264</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iii (cavalry horses); TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iv (dragoon and draught horses)

The differences are mostly minor. The total of 3,014 cavalry horses listed up to the end of September is unchanged.
Abstract:

The debate over whether the creation of the New Model Army represented continuity or change in the supply systems of parliamentarian armies has suffered from a lack of detailed research on the Earl of Essex’s army. This article begins to redress the balance by examining the supply of horses and saddles to the armies of Essex, Manchester, Waller, and Fairfax in equal depth. Studying Essex’s army is vital to our understanding of the origins of the New Model Army. There was more continuity between the two than most historians have assumed, but there were also significant changes in 1645.

The creation of the New Model Army in the spring of 1645 has often been seen as a decisive point in the First Civil War. One of the reasons usually suggested for the army’s spectacular successes is that it was better supplied and financed than its predecessors. However, there is little agreement among historians over what, if anything, changed in 1645. The debate has suffered from inadequate comparisons

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1 I would like to thank Professor Peter Edwards and Dr Frank Tallett for commenting on earlier drafts of this article. This work is based on material from my PhD research which was generously funded by the University of Reading Research Board.
between the New Model Army and the three field armies from which it was formed: those of the Earl of Essex, the Earl of Manchester, and Sir William Waller. Historians who have researched the New Model in commendable detail have not put the same effort into finding out about its predecessors. Essex’s army has been particularly neglected, despite its obvious importance in understanding the origins of the New Model Army.

C. H. Firth was the first historian to examine parliament’s military administration and logistics in detail. Firth emphasised the New Model Army’s superior efficiency over both its opponents and predecessors, although he described the reorganisation of Essex’s army in March 1644 as ‘a sort of anticipation of the New Model’. Clive Holmes, in his [p. 122] thorough study of the Eastern Association, preferred to see an anticipation of the New Model in Manchester’s army, which ‘not only in its personnel, but in its centralized treasury, administration and supply system, foreshadows the New Model Army’. Holmes still argued that there were significant changes in parliamentarian military administration, but he placed them in Cambridge in 1644 as much as in London in 1645. In 1979, Mark Kishlansky took the idea of continuity much further, suggesting that, ‘in its essential features the New Model departed little from the armies it replaced, providing as much continuity and as little disruption as possible’.

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More recently, Ian Gentles offered a new assessment of the New Model Army which emphasized change over continuity, seeing significant innovation in the methods used to finance and supply the army. Arguing that this was an important part of the army’s success, he wrote that: ‘Based on prompt payment in cash, this new centralized system soon supplanted other schemes for equipping the army’.\(^5\) James Scott Wheeler took this view further, explicitly linking parliament’s reforms to the concept of the ‘military revolution’.\(^6\)

The debate so far has focused too much on the creation of the New Model Army in 1645 as the turning point, with comparisons based on a simple binary opposition between "before" and "after". This is inadequate because the period 1642 to 1644 was not a single synchronic moment. Each of the three field armies which later made up the New Model had different experiences, and their situations changed over time. This is particularly true of the Earl of Essex's army, which has too often been inexplicably ignored. This article offers a more nuanced view of the development of parliamentarian military administration and supply systems, using the supply of horses and saddles as a case study.

The supply of horses was very important to early modern armies, which used large numbers of mounted soldiers and relied heavily on horse drawn transport. The


establishment of the New Model Army included over 8,000 horses. A constant supply of horses was needed to replace losses from disease, exhaustion, and theft, as well as battle casualties. The attrition rate in the New Model Army from June 1645 to June 1646 was around 63 per cent for cavalry horses and 78 per cent for the dragoons. The supply of horses could not be increased quickly in response to increased demand. The gestation period of a horse is one year, a further three to four years were required before it was old enough to be broken in, and it would not be fully mature until the age of five or six. Despite this problem, there is compelling evidence that there were enough horses in England to meet the demands of armies on both sides. Imports of horses during the First Civil War were negligible, suggesting that there was no need to rely on foreign suppliers as there was with arms. Peter Edwards has shown that horse breeding was increasing in England and that before the outbreak of civil war there was a large export trade. Exports declined during the wars as armies absorbed the available supply, but increased again in the 1650s, and in 1657 all restrictions on horse exports were lifted. That 30 per cent of the military cases heard by the Indemnity Commission involved prosecutions for taking horses suggests that there were many horses in civilian hands, but that taking them by force could often be more trouble than it was worth. The challenge faced by military administrators was finding a reliable way of gaining possession of the horses that the armies needed.


11 Gentles, *New Model Army*, p.130.
Parliament started raising an army in June 1642, even before the Earl of Essex was appointed Lord General in July. Despite the passing of the Militia Ordinance, little attempt was made to mobilize the militia cavalry. Most effort was put into raising new regular cavalry units. This process began on 9 June 1642 when parliament passed an ordinance outlining a system commonly known as the propositions. The ordinance invited parliament’s supporters to advance money, plate, horses, and arms. This was ostensibly a voluntary loan with repayment promised with 8 per cent interest. A central treasury was set up at Guildhall to receive the money and plate. Money was issued from the treasury by warrant of the Committee of Safety or the Lord General to pay soldiers and buy equipment for the army. Included in this was the purchase of more than 3,000 horses. Around 70 cavalry troops were created, and each one was allowed £354 to buy 22 horses and equipment for its 11 officers. Horses for the Lord General’s life-guard were bought for £15 each, but this troop was unusual, being composed of 99 gentlemen armed as cuirassiers. Colonel John Browne was paid £3,000 to mount the 600 dragoons in his regiment.


13 For example see The National Archives of the UK (TNA): Public Records Office (PRO) SP28/1A ff. 61, 70-73, 85, 94, 183.

14 TNA: PRO SP28/2B, part iii, f. 522.

15 TNA: PRO SP28/1A f. 164; TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 f. 62.
Some cavalry troops received an allowance of £600 to buy horses for their 60 troopers in addition to the mounting money for the officers. Only one warrant for this allowance has survived, issued to the Earl of Peterborough in September 1642. Up to 11 other troops might have [p. 124] received this allowance, but the surviving records are ambiguous. Captains of the cavalry troops raised for Lord Wharton’s planned expedition to Ireland had received £1,035 each ‘for one months advance for him and his under officers and for the levying of 81 horses for his troop’. This force of 500 cavalry was added to the Earl of Essex’s army in July 1642. Since mounting money, whether for troopers or officers, was always issued from the treasury to the captain of the troop or colonel of the regiment, it is difficult to discover where they bought the horses and how far the allowances reflected actual market prices. There were many opportunities for fraud. Captain Alexander Douglas was found to have received his allowance of mounting money twice, by getting warrants from the Lord General and from the Committee of Safety.

The majority of the new cavalry troops raised for Essex’s army did not receive the £600 allowance to buy horses for the troopers. Instead they were mounted on horses received directly from civilians through the propositions system. The part of the

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16 TNA: PRO SP28/2A part i, f. 65.
17 TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 ff. 61-2.
18 TNA: PRO SP28/144 part x, f. 1.
20 TNA: PRO SP16/503/62 f. 62.
system which dealt with horses was as centralized as the treasury. John Smith and Thomas Richardson were appointed commissaries for listing and valuing the horses brought in to Moorfields by citizens of London and from surrounding counties. Although residents of London and its suburbs probably brought in their horses to Moorfields in person, people from further afield took their horses to the Deputy Lieutenants of their county, who listed them and then delivered the horses and lists to the commissaries in London. In some counties, horses were listed and issued by local commissaries without passing through Moorfields, but these were small exceptions to what was generally a centralized system.

From October 1642, dragoon and draught horses were also listed. There are no records of any of these draught horses being delivered to the army until November 1642. A consignment of 80 draught horses from London was delivered to the artillery train at Worcester on 3 October 1642, two days before the commissaries began listing draught horses on the propositions. These are the only state owned draught horses known to have been in service before Edgehill, meaning that most of the draught horses would need to be hired or temporarily impressed from the countryside. This could partly explain the difficulties encountered in moving the train during the Edgehill campaign. A further 524 draught horses were delivered to the army between 9 November 1642 and 26 January 1643. Even this was only [p. 125]

Table 1: Horses listed on the propositions 1642-43

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21 TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iv, front cover of book.
22 TNA: PRO SP28/262 part iv, ff. 438-9.
23 TNA: PRO SP28/143 Account of Anthony Fastolfe, f. 30.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Cavalry horses</th>
<th>Dragoon and draught horses</th>
<th>Total</th>
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<td>1642</td>
<td>June</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July</td>
<td>505</td>
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<td>505</td>
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<td>August</td>
<td>1585</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>1585</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>771</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>540</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>November</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>2042</td>
<td>2178</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>December</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1643</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>38</td>
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<td>February</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>66</td>
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<td>April</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>3767</td>
<td>2546</td>
<td>6313</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Sources: TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iii (cavalry horses); TNA: PRO SP28/131 part iv (dragoon and draught horses)

half of the number of horses required by Essex’s artillery train. The deficit continued to be made up by hiring and impressing draught horses.

Table 1 shows that the greatest numbers of cavalry horses were listed in the summer of 1642, and that contributions were in decline even before Edgehill. Dragoon and draught horses show a different pattern, with 80 per cent of horses listed in November 1642 and an even sharper fall by the end of the year. As contributions declined, the degree of compulsion in the system increased, but the figures clearly demonstrate that its effectiveness was limited. On 14 October 1642, the Commons resolved that any persons who did not contribute should be secured and disarmed, and ordered the Lord Mayor and sheriffs of the City of London to search the houses of several named non-contributors.24 From 29 November, Parliament taxed non-contributors at a rate of one

twentieth of their estates.\(^{25}\) In May 1643, this developed into the fifth and twentieth tax, administered by the Committee for Advance of Money.\(^{26}\) The threat of disarmament and assessment did very little to encourage people to list their horses. However, disarming of ‘delinquents’ provided another source of horses for Parliament’s army, as [p. 126] well as denying them to the royalists, since any horses fit for military service were taken along with arms. This process began in June 1642, when officials loyal to parliament began impounding horses which were being taken to join the King’s army at York.\(^{27}\) By September 1642 the definition of ‘delinquents’ was widening. Parliament issued instructions requiring Lord Willoughby and the Lincolnshire county committee to take ‘horses for service’ and great saddles, among other things, from all catholics and from anyone who was in arms against parliament; had sent money, arms or supplies to the royalists; had executed the commissions of array; or had subscribed to pro-royalist petitions.\(^{28}\) Soon after this, anyone who had not contributed sufficiently to the propositions was effectively treated as a delinquent. For example, on 24 October the Commons ordered that three men were to be imprisoned for refusing to contribute, and sent for two Norfolk clergymen ‘as


delinquents’ for failing to contribute themselves and for discouraging others from contributing.\(^\text{29}\)

In November 1642, requisitioning of horses went further beyond active opponents of parliament. On 15 November several people, including Thomas Browne, Maximilian Bard, and the horse dealer John Stiles, were appointed commissaries by Parliament and given the power to seize any horses in the City of London, and within five miles of the City, which had not already been listed.\(^\text{30}\) These horses were to be valued and listed, and the value was to be repaid in a similar manner to the propositions, if the owners were thought fit to be repaid. Fragments of lists which appear to be consistent with the activities of these commissaries and the disarming of delinquents suggest that at least 700 horses were seized in and around London from November 1642 to January 1643.\(^\text{31}\)

In 1642 the supply of horses was sufficient, but in the spring and summer of 1643, Essex’s army faced a new crisis. Parliament did not have a large or reliable source of revenue at this time, and resources were increasingly diverted from Essex’s army. In early 1643 units were detached from Essex's army to build up local and regional


\(^{31}\) TNA: PRO SP28/3A part ii, ff. 188-92; TNA: PRO SP28/5 ff. 227-30, 256-7; TNA: PRO SP28/144 part i, ff. 40-54; TNA: PRO SP28/237 unfol.
forces, including Waller's western army and Lord Grey's Eastern Association. The shortage of money had a particularly severe impact on the supply of horses, which became a very low priority for spending. This might [p. 127] have been the result of an assumption that horses could be procured in other ways. However, the propositions contributions no longer supplied enough remounts for the army and no new system had been created to take their place. The Sequestration Ordinance was largely irrelevant to horse supply. Horses were already included in the powers to disarm delinquents which had existed since 1642. The few horses mentioned in sequestration inventories from 1643 were of low value and were often described as too young, too old, or otherwise unfit for military service.  

The army had no alternative to arbitrary requisitioning of horses from any civilians who had them. This was not simply plundering by ill-disciplined soldiers. It was a military necessity sanctioned at the highest levels of the army. Essex used his powers as Lord General to issue warrants to his officers authorizing them to seize horses when they needed to. Ostensibly, delinquents were to be targeted, but standards of proof were not necessarily high and in any case there were few serviceable horses left on the estates of active royalists. Captain Lionel Copley admitted in his account that in June 1643 he had taken four horses in Marlow from ‘such as were reputed malignants’, by virtue of a warrant from the Lord General. When Copley's troop was first raised in the spring of 1643, his troopers were all mounted on horses which he had requisitioned in Norwich.  

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32 For example, TNA: PRO SP28/217A part ii, ff. 170, 205v.
33 TNA: PRO SP28/147 part ii, f. 299.
34 TNA: PRO SP28/258 part ii, f. 157.
as a symptom of endemic discipline problems, encouraging soldiers to take property from civilians often caused deterioration in discipline and created opportunities for corruption. For example, John and William Mayne of Waddesdon, Buckinghamshire, claimed that some soldiers, probably belonging to Essex’s army, took a horse from them and forced them to pay 10s. to get it back. This kind of extortion benefited the army as little as the civilian victims.

In practice, arbitrarily taking horses turned out to be surprisingly inefficient. Essex's officers found that power did not always grow from the barrel of a gun. In the heavily militarized frontier areas force could be persuasive enough, but these areas were bled dry by the demands of rival armies and garrisons. There were more plentiful resources in the secure hinterlands of London, the South East, and East Anglia, but these resources could not be exploited without at least some co-operation from local communities. In early modern England authority had to be negotiated through custom and precedent rather than imposed from above. Civilians were not always passive victims and had a variety of possible strategies for seeking redress when their traditional property rights were infringed, such as complaining to Parliament or the local county [p. 128] committee. Controversies surrounding horse seizure made it clear that "the parliamentarians" were not a monolithic organization. Disputes over property rights fed into existing divisions.

35 TNA: PRO SP28/150 part i, f. 39.

The activities of the commissaries appointed to take horses in London in November 1642 had resulted in so many complaints to parliament that their powers were revoked on 26 January 1643.\textsuperscript{37} The revocation was instigated by the Lords, and although the Commons Journal records that the House concurred with the Lords, this did not represent the views of all MPs. On 3 February the Commons resolved that 'this House did not assent to the Making of any such Ordinance'.\textsuperscript{38} The radical MP Henry Marten caused more trouble between the Lords and Commons in the spring of 1643, when Essex commissioned him to raise a cavalry regiment and authorized him to seize horses. To the annoyance of the House of Lords, Marten used his commission to take horses from the royal mews, Countess Rivers, and several other people who claimed special protection under parliamentary privilege. The Commons backed Marten against the Lords, twice resolving that he should not restore the horses taken from Countess Rivers.\textsuperscript{39} To Marten and his allies in the Commons, the Catholic Countess was an enemy of the state, but to the majority in Lords she still deserved their protection as the wife of a peer.


Around the same time, Colonel Walter Long was arousing hostility in the county of Essex, where the Lord General had sent him to requisition horses and collect tax arrears.\textsuperscript{40} The local authorities accused Long of taking horses from parliamentarian supporters and releasing horses for money, but Long blamed a rival group of horse takers sent by Lord Grey, arrested them, and took possession of the 30 horses they had requisitioned.\textsuperscript{41} Complaints to Parliament resulted in Long being recalled from Essex, but the 100 horses he had raised were ordered to London for military use rather than being restored to the owners. [p. 129]\textsuperscript{42}

Horse owners could also seek redress from the courts. In May 1643 the Commons heard that three men authorized to seize horses for Essex's army had been indicted at the Old Bailey for horse theft.\textsuperscript{43} Around 30 per cent of the military cases dealt with by the Indemnity Commission, set up in 1647 to protect soldiers and administrators from prosecution for acts committed in the course of their duties, involved horses.\textsuperscript{44} Sir


\textsuperscript{41} British Library, Egerton MS 2646 f. 188; British Library, Egerton MS 2651 ff. 138-139.


\textsuperscript{44} Gentles, \textit{New Model Army}, p. 130.
Robert Pye was pursued for many years by the owner of a horse he had taken in 1643, when he was a captain in Essex's army.\textsuperscript{45}

The overall impression of the first half of 1643 is of disorder and crisis, which contrasts sharply with the situation before Edgehill, when the cause was united and supplies were plentiful. Parliament was divided between factions and under pressure from the competing demands of civilians, courts, county committees, and rival military commanders. The armies were desperately short of men, horses, equipment, and above all money. Parliament needed armies capable of fighting the royalists, but also needed legitimacy. These needs did not conflict in 1642, because the demands of the army could be satisfied by voluntary contributions from supporters, and by seizing property from clearly identified enemies of the commonwealth. In 1643 the demand for horses could not be satisfied by either of these means. Parliamentarian leaders were faced with the problem of how to extract resources from civilians who were not actively hostile to the cause but were not willing to give up their property to help it succeed. When army officers infringed traditional property rights they alienated supporters and damaged Parliament's claims to legitimacy, and could find themselves summoned before Parliament and ordered to restore the horses they had taken. In May 1643 parliament responded to the numerous complaints by restricting the Lord General's powers to seize horses but this had little effect in practice.\textsuperscript{46} The requisitioning continued because however inefficient it was, there was no alternative source of supply. In July Essex complained that the county committees failed to

supply him with the horses he needed and that his cavalry was too weak to fight the royalists.47

The conflict of interests could not be completely reconciled, but in July 1643 Parliament reached enough of a consensus to attempt some reform of supply and finance. As well as introducing the excise, Parliament decided to raise a new 'flying army'. Appointing the Earl of Manchester to command it sidestepped the bitter rivalry between Essex and Waller, and their factions of supporters in Parliament, but Essex’s army was still left without an adequate supply of horses, and the focus on raising a new army would divert more resources. A letter from the council of war of Essex’s army claimed that the army was still short of horses, money, clothing, recruits, and arms, which ‘will be the destruction and overthrow of this army’.48 A few days later, the Commons resolved that money should be provided to buy 500 horses for Essex’s army at £10 each, but there is little evidence that this was put into practice.49

The ordinance to raise the flying army, passed on 25 July 1643, placed quotas on the counties under Parliament's control to provide a total of 6,500 horses, with riders and


equipment. The text of the ordinance contained some old ideas - militia cavalry and other existing local forces could count towards the assessment, county committees were empowered to seize horses, vague promises of repayment were made - but it implicitly left the county committees freedom to decide how to fulfil their quotas. In practice most counties implemented a system similar to the weekly and monthly assessments. The quota was divided between parishes, and each one would provide either horses or money to buy horses and equipment. For example, the parish of Thundridge in Hertfordshire delivered a horse worth £15.5s.6d. to Sir John Norwich, a colonel under the Earl of Manchester. A sum of £32.12s. was collected in Chelsea, Middlesex, to provide two horses. These horses were bought for £13.3s., with £12 put towards pay for the riders, and the remainder spent on saddles, helmets, swords, pistols, and holsters. The county committee in Essex sent an officer to London to buy horses towards their quota. He contracted to buy 60 horses at £10 each from the Smithfield dealer John Stiles, who required part payment in advance. Other horses were requisitioned from civilians to fulfil the Essex quota. Captain Nathaniel Rich took horses from several inhabitants of Essex parishes to recruit the Earl of Manchester's regiment, but this was done with the consent of the committee and Deputy Lieutenants, and the owners were often repaid the value of the horses at a later date out of the money assessed on the county. This shows that arbitrary seizures could work if there was enough of a local consensus and if the process was seen to be as fair as possible.

51 TNA: PRO SP28/10 f. 46.
52 TNA: PRO SP28/166 unfol.
53 TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.; British Library, Egerton MS 2647, f. 84.
54 TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.
The levies were a moderate success, but the results were less impressive than originally intended. The county of Essex fulfilled its quota of 500 cavalry very quickly, despite being subjected to an extra levy to raise 1,000 dragoons for the Earl of Manchester in August.\textsuperscript{55} This success was attributable to the fact that the Essex committee provided the horses in advance rather than waiting for the assessment to come in. Other county [p. 131] committees were unable or unwilling to do so. Significant arrears were recorded in Middlesex, and on 1 September the Deputy Lieutenants were given the power to imprison defaulters.\textsuperscript{56} The Kent and Surrey committees failed to put the ordinance into effect immediately and received a stern reminder to do so on 13 September. A letter sent to the Hertfordshire committee on the same day acknowledged that the county had met part of the quota but demanded that the outstanding arrears be made up.\textsuperscript{57} The situation was complicated in August 1643, when the Earl of Manchester was appointed to command the Eastern Association in place of Lord Grey. Initially, Manchester was to remain commander of the entire flying army, but supporters of Essex and Waller in Parliament began to demand a share of the horses for their armies. Waller had lost most of his western army at the battle of Roundway Down in July. The remnants of his cavalry were quartered in Middlesex for the rest of the summer and saw little action. In August, Waller sent

\textsuperscript{55} Bodleian Library, Tanner MS 62/1b, f. 285; Firth and Rait, \textit{Acts and Ordinances}, i, 245.


several of his officers into Hertfordshire with warrants authorising them to requisition horses for his army.\textsuperscript{58} Meanwhile, the Earl of Essex was still short of horses. When his army marched to relieve Gloucester in August, it was reinforced by Colonel Harvey’s cavalry regiment from the London Militia.

On 12 August 1643, the London Militia Committee ordered Captain Charles Gheste to take up 1,000 horses towards the quota of 1,500 set on London and Middlesex, and deliver them to Waller.\textsuperscript{59} One month later, the Commons ordered that all the cavalry raised in the counties south of the Thames should be placed under Waller’s command, pre-empting his appointment to command the Southern Association on 4 November.\textsuperscript{60} About the same time, the Earl of Essex was given the remainder of the horses to be raised in Hertfordshire, Middlesex, and Buckinghamshire.\textsuperscript{61} By this time Manchester had already had most of the horses that these counties would contribute, leaving the Lord General with arrears that were difficult to collect, if they came in at all. It was May 1644 by the time that the parish of South Mimms delivered its two outstanding horses to Sir Robert Pye, a captain in Essex’s army, whereas they had already paid

\textsuperscript{58} TNA: PRO SP28/9 f. 390; TNA: PRO SP28/155 unfol.; TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.

\textsuperscript{59} Calendar of State Papers Domestic (CSPD), 1641-3, p. 476.


£18.6s. to Captain John Alford of Manchester’s army in August 1643.\textsuperscript{62} Alford had received all of the horses and money assessed on Harrow [p. 132] in 1643.\textsuperscript{63} In Buckinghamshire the collection of arrears for the Lord General was not put into effect until December 1643 and proceeded slowly. The collectors for the Chiltern hundreds later recalled that not many horses were brought in.\textsuperscript{64} Captain Richard Grenville eventually received 20 horses for his troop between February and June 1644.\textsuperscript{65}

The flying army as originally planned never came into existence, but the levies gave Manchester's army a strong force of cavalry while also allowing Waller to rebuild his army and providing at least some remounts for Essex. The project proved that negotiation was more effective than brute force, but also demonstrated the limits of co-operation that could be expected from county committees and local communities. The greatest limitation of the ordinance was that it made no provision for replacement horses once the new cavalry had been raised. County quotas continued to be used to raise horses into 1645, but they were not an adequate source of supply on their own.

Major reforms were implemented in the spring of 1644 which set the pattern for parliamentarian supply and finance for the rest of the war. Robert Scawen was placed in charge of a new committee to oversee the finance and supply of Essex's army. John Adamson has drawn attention to the important role which Scawen played in the
administration of both Essex's army and the New Model.\(^{66}\) Parliament attempted to provide constant funding for Essex's army by creating a new monthly assessment, which Wheeler described as 'the prototype for the monthly assessment passed in 1645 to support the New Model Army'.\(^{67}\) In order to re-equip the army without waiting for the assessment money to come in, Parliament took out a £20,000 loan from the City of London, secured against future excise receipts.\(^{68}\) For the first time since 1642, it was possible to buy large numbers of horses for the army. In March 1644 an advance payment of £1,000 was made to the Smithfield horse dealers John Stiles, Harvey Conway, and Richard Clough, who were contracted to supply 1,000 troop horses at £9 each, followed by several more instalments in April and May.\(^{69}\) However, purchases were not sustained at this level for the rest of the year, even after Essex's army had suffered heavy losses in Cornwall. The system of quotas assessed on counties was still used to supply draught horses. In April 1644 800 were demanded from the counties under Parliament's control, with reimbursement promised at a rate of £7 per horse.\(^{70}\)

The committees of Essex, Hertfordshire, and [p. 133] Surrey were active in providing horses but other counties had to be reminded again and probably failed to bring in their full quotas.\(^{71}\) In May 1644, Essex's artillery train only had around 600 state owned draught horses, with nearly 500 hired and impressed horses making up the


\(^{69}\) TNA: PRO SP28/14 part ii, f. 243; TNA: PRO SP28/14 part iii, ff. 292, 327, 362, 387; TNA: PRO SP28/15 part i, f. 110; TNA: PRO SP28/15 part ii, ff. 139, 156.

\(^{70}\) CSPD, 1644, pp. 114-5.
deficit. All of these horses were handed over to the royalists when the army surrendered at Lostwithiel in September 1644.

The Eastern Association was also reformed in early 1644. Parliament authorized a monthly assessment on the associated counties, to be paid into the new central treasuries at Cambridge. This money allowed the Cambridge committee to buy horses for Manchester’s army, but their system was very different from Essex’s army. Commissaries were sent out to buy horses directly from civilians rather than going through dealers. The most prominent of these commissaries was Lieutenant Russell, who was issued with several thousand pounds from the Cambridge treasury in the early months of 1644 to buy horses for the army. The commissaries appear to have organized their own private sales, and rarely visited horse fairs.

Although the Cambridge committee operated a centralized system, the treasury sometimes issued money to army officers to allow them to buy horses for their troopers, as was the case with Essex’s army in 1642. These sums ranged from the £12 due to Captain Valentine Walton for two horses he had bought in March and April

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72 TNA: PRO SP28/146 f. 183.


74 TNA: PRO SP28/24 part ii, ff. 187, 213, 229, 270; TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iii, ff. 283, 301, 309; TNA: PRO SP28/25 part iv, f. 547.

1644 up to £1,100 for 110 horses to recruit Cromwell’s regiment on 22 July 1644. At £10 each these were the most expensive troop horses known to have been bought by the Eastern Association, but prices paid by the commissaries were generally lower than those charged by the Smithfield dealers. The 52 horses bought for the troops of Captain Bethell and Major Wild at Huntingdon in April 1644 averaged around £6 each, as did the 115 horses bought for Sir John Norwich’s regiment in July. The Eastern Association commissaries often got lower prices than were charged by London dealers, but their wages and travelling expenses need to be taken into account, as well as the costs of moving horses from the scattered places of sale and feeding them before they were delivered to the army. Most of these costs were absorbed by the Smithfield dealers and could partly explain their higher prices. Since the dealers bought horses all over the country before the war, the difference in price cannot necessarily be attributed to regional variations.

[p. 134]

The records of the Cambridge treasury are not complete, but they suggest that purchases of horses declined in the autumn of 1644, despite the need to replace losses from the year’s campaigns. This was perhaps a symptom of a general financial crisis in the association. The Cambridge committee supplemented its purchases by setting quotas on the associated counties in 1644. In September dragoon horses were sent to Huntingdon for the use of Manchester’s army, including 100 from Norfolk and 30

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76 TNA: PRO SP28/27 part i, f. 153; TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iv, f. 518B.

77 TNA: PRO SP28/24 part ii, f. 185; TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iv, ff. 503-5.


from Hertfordshire.\textsuperscript{80} Officers of Manchester’s army continued to requisition horses from civilians when necessary, particularly outside the associated counties, but this was much less common in 1644 than in 1643. Inhabitants of Oundle, Northamptonshire, claimed that Manchester’s soldiers had taken two horses worth £11 on their return from York in 1644.\textsuperscript{81} Nevertheless, the Eastern Association was generally successful in maintaining an adequate supply of cavalry horses. Manchester’s army had nearly 4,000 cavalry in service by September 1644, significantly more than the 2,700 (including 400 reinforcements from the London Militia) that Essex had mustered before he marched into Cornwall.\textsuperscript{82}

Unlike the Eastern Association, the Southern Association was never given the power to set up its own treasury, and so the association committee was never able to buy horses for Waller’s army in the way that the Cambridge committee did for Manchester’s army. However, significant purchases of horses and saddles were made at county level. Charles Bowles, a commissary employed by the Kent committee, bought large numbers of horses for Sir Michael Livesey’s regiment. The Smithfield dealer Thomas Crossman supplied 251 troop horses at £8 each between August 1644 and April 1645. Bowles mentioned buying more horses in Smithfield, but he also bought horses directly from private individuals in Kent and Surrey at various times.\textsuperscript{83}

This shows a mixture of the contrasting approaches taken by Essex's and Manchester's

\textsuperscript{80} TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.; British Library, Add MS 22619, f. 206.

\textsuperscript{81} TNA: PRO SP28/173 unfol.


\textsuperscript{83} TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, ff. 65-6.
armies, but overall the numbers of horses purchased in the Southern Association were smaller than for the other field armies. Quotas continued to play a larger part in supplying Waller's army. In December 1643, Parliament ordered the Southern Association to raise 500 horse to form a new cavalry regiment under Sir Richard Grenville. The middle division of Surrey paid in £100 towards the quota in January 1644. The association committee was also able to negotiate quotas with the constituent counties. In May 1644, the associated counties were required to provide 500 draught horses, but in return Waller agreed [p. 135] that no horses would be taken by his officers without the owners’ consent. Although Waller repeatedly ordered his men not to take horses without permission, problems with horse seizing and associated abuses continued. The Southern Association was much less successful at maintaining a field army than the Eastern Association. In September 1644 Waller claimed that he had no more than 800 cavalry and 150 dragoons, and that there were no draught horses available to move his artillery.

In the spring of 1645, all three field armies were amalgamated to form the New Model Army. Crucially, finance was also consolidated, with a single monthly assessment on all counties under parliamentarian control to be paid into the central

85 TNA: PRO SP28/300 part iii, f. 727.
87 CSPD, 1644, pp. 476–7, 489.
treasury in London. As in the previous spring, the City of London provided a loan to cover the cost of re-equipping the army, this time £80,000 secured on future assessment revenues. Robert Scawen was placed in charge of the new Army Committee and drew on his experience with Essex's army in developing a supply system. As always, there was a pressing need for horses. Although the troops from the old armies probably brought the cavalry close to its projected establishment of 6,000 (with up to two thirds drawn from Manchester's army), many new horses were needed to replace those worn out by the previous years’ campaigns. Scawen chose to build on the system from Essex's army rather than adopt the Eastern Association system.

Contracts were made with a small group of Smithfield dealers: John Stiles, Harvey Conway, Richard Clough, Peter Everard, and Percival Stanley. From April 1645 to August 1646 they supplied around 6,700 horses for the army, costing over £46,000. These horses were delivered to John Smith and Thomas Richardson, the same commissaries who had dealt with the thousands of horses donated to Essex's army in 1642, who then issued them to army officers, keeping very detailed records.

Other sources of supply provided no more than a few hundred cavalry horses during this period. Arbitrary seizures were not completely eliminated - at least two Northamptonshire residents claimed to have lost horses to Fairfax’s army in June

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90 For the definitive account of these dealers’ careers and influence on the horse trade see Edwards, *Horse Trade*, pp. 77-103.

91 TNA: PRO SP28/140 part vii; Edwards, 'Supply of Horses', p. 64.
1645 - but they were exceptionally rare. With sufficient numbers of remounts being sent from Smithfield at regular intervals there was little need to take horses from civilians. A quota of 1,056 draught horses was placed on the counties in the spring of 1645, but this proved more successful than in 1644 as payment was allowed to be deducted from the monthly [p. 136] assessment. This was only a temporary measure, and by September the Smithfield dealers were supplying all of the army's draught horses.

The standard price of £7.10s for a troop horse was lower than the £9 which the same dealers charged for horses for Essex's army a year before. The prices of most commodities bought by the Army Committee in 1645 were lower than they had been in previous years. This has led Ian Gentles to believe that Scawen's committee drove 'good or even hard bargains'. In the case of horses, Scawen and his committee were not necessarily in a position to dictate terms as the cartel of Smithfield dealers had a tight grip on the horse trade. As was the case in 1643 and 1644, the dealers demanded and got advance payment. Most other contractors were not paid until after they had delivered the goods. Even more unusual was the one month monopoly on the purchase of horses suitable for cavalry which was granted to the dealers by order of Parliament in April 1645. This suggests that there was hard bargaining on both sides, and that the Army Committee could not have everything their own way. In Bulstrode

92 TNA: PRO SP28/172 unfol.

93 Firth and Rait, Acts and Ordinances, i, 653-5.

94 Gentles, New Model Army, p. 42.

Whitelocke's opinion ‘the state was cozened’ by the contract.\textsuperscript{96} This statement should be treated with suspicion because of Whitelocke's political bias, but it still disproves Gentles's assertion that there were ‘not even any allegations of profiteering’.\textsuperscript{97} However, there is no record of any other dissent, and the prices paid were not excessive. From July 1645, advance payments stopped and the dealers were paid soon after delivery in the same manner as other contractors. Since the committee was not dictating lower prices, and the supply of horses could not have increased in direct response to wartime demand by 1645, the only explanation for the fall in prices is that horse breeding had been increasing before the war. The time needed to breed and rear working horses - four or five years from conception to military age - meant that supply during the First Civil War was determined by pre-war economic trends.

Horses are obviously different from weapons and equipment because they are living creatures. This, and the ubiquity of horses in the English economy, perhaps led parliamentarian soldiers and administrators to treat the supply of horses differently from the supply of other commodities. Alternative methods of supplying horses were tried in 1642-43 and all ultimately failed. By 1644 it was apparent that in terms of procurement horses were no different from any other item that the armies required: the most efficient way to get them was to pay cash to specialist suppliers.

[p. 137]

Compared to horses, the supply of saddles changed less from 1642 to 1644, but more in 1645. Because cavalry saddles were specialized military equipment there was no


\textsuperscript{97} Gentles, \textit{New Model Army}, p. 42.
viable alternative to buying them from specialist manufacturers. Around 1,000 saddles were donated through the propositions, but most of these were civilian types only suitable for dragoons. Only 13 were described as 'great saddles' for use by cavalry. London saddlers dominated the supply of saddles to most armies throughout the war. In 1642 an allowance of £150 was paid to every cavalry captain in Essex's army to buy saddles for their troops. Because the officers were responsible for buying the saddles, the saddlers are not often named on the warrants. By 1644 it was more common for payment to be made direct to the saddlers. Even in 1643, when money was short, saddles remained a high priority for spending. Several warrants issued for buying saddles in 1643 were paid very quickly, although the dates of delivery are unknown.98

London saddlers also supplied many saddles to Waller, Manchester, and other regional commanders. The Essex committee bought 90 saddles from John Gower, a London saddler, in August 1643, which were probably intended for the horses levied for Manchester's flying army.99 When the Cambridge committee took responsibility for buying saddles in 1644, John Gower was the biggest contractor, supplying at least 800 saddles for Manchester's army.100 Gower seems to have had a special relationship with the Eastern Association despite being based in London, as he was also a captain in Manchester's foot regiment.101 In the same year the Kent commissary Charles Bowles bought around 460 saddles in London, but in this case no single supplier was

98 For example TNA: PRO SP28/7 ff. 63, 82, 438; TNA: PRO SP28/9 ff. 228, 238; TNA: PRO SP28/264 f. 211.
99 TNA: PRO SP28/227 unfol.
100 TNA: PRO SP28/24 part iii, f. 298.; TNA: PRO SP28/23 part i, f. 14.
London saddlers continued their dominance of the trade in 1645, but Scawen's committee implemented a completely new procedure for buying saddles. The Army Committee made contracts with saddlers and authorized payment after the goods had been delivered, with most contracts being fulfilled within one week of being formalized. The Ordnance Office was given responsibility for receiving all saddles from suppliers and issuing them to the army. Previously it had been unusual for saddles to be issued from the Tower. Essex's army had received no more than 300 saddles in this way, all of these issues occurring between [p. 138] November 1642 and March 1643. Like the horse commissaries, the Officers of the Ordnance kept very detailed records. London saddlers delivered 9,379 new saddles into the Ordnance Office from April 1645 to April 1646, along with another 500 old dragoon saddles which had been sent for repair. Of these saddles, 7,960 were issued to the army from April 1645 to August 1646: a surprisingly high replacement rate. Most of the


102 TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, ff. 44, 47, 48.

103 TNA: PRO SP28/18 part iii, f. 303; TNA: PRO SP28/222 part i, f. 106; TNA: PRO SP28/231 unfol.; TNA: PRO SP28/130 part iii, f. 45; Edwards, *Dealing in Death*, p. 170.

104 TNA: PRO WO55/387 ff. 38, 42, 64, 78.

105 TNA: PRO SP28/140 part iii; TNA: PRO WO55/1663.

106 TNA: PRO WO55/1646; TNA: PRO PRO30/37/4. The figure includes Rossiter’s regiment.
New Model cavalry's saddles were described as 'troop saddles' and were probably different from the 'great saddles' used by Essex's army. It could be that these older saddles were being gradually replaced by a new design, or perhaps saddles were not built to last in this period.

Unlike the horse trade, the saddlery trade was not dominated by a small cartel: around 25 individuals made contracts with the Army Committee. The saddlers were not in any position to win the kinds of concessions which the horse dealers were granted. Saddlers never received any advance payments, although they were usually paid in full within two weeks of delivery. Ben Coates is right to point out that few contractors had an opportunity to make a large profit from the war. While Henry Henneker fulfilled contracts worth £300 between April 1645 and April 1646, Francis Joyner made only £34 in the same period, and this is not profit but revenue before costs are deducted. Furthermore, the depression of trade probably reduced demand from civilians, so that supplying the armies was a substitute for normal trade rather than an additional opportunity.  

Above all, prices of saddles and arms were very low by 1645, but this was not caused by the Army Committee forcing prices down. Coates more realistically suggests that 'increased output led to falling prices during the 1640s'. The English arms industry could not cope with the sudden spike in demand at the outbreak of war in 1642, leaving the gap to be filled by imports. By 1645, arms production had expanded sufficiently, and as supply approached demand, prices fell. For example, the price of a musket halved from 20s. to 10s. between 1642 and 1645.  

Saddlery manufacturing was slightly different, in that London already had a


large capacity to satisfy civilian demand, but cavalry required specialized types of saddle which were not found in everyday use, so saddlers could not fall back on existing stocks. Although saddles did not have to be imported to the same extent as arms, there was still a spike in prices early in the war as saddlers struggled to meet the demand from Essex's army. Table 2 shows a clear continuous trend of falling saddle prices throughout the First Civil War. This trend does not coincide with political developments at [p. 139] Westminster, administrative reforms, or the fluctuating state of the treasury. The most likely explanation is a steady increase in supply.

There was a very different pattern in the price of harness for draught horses. This remained stable at around 12s. from 1642 to 1645, falling to 10s. in December 1645. Again this is best explained by supply and demand. Unlike arms and cavalry saddles, draught harness for military use was no different from that for civilian use, meaning that production could continue as normal, and existing stocks could be sold to the armies. There was also much less demand for draught harness. Essex's artillery train never had much more than 600 state-owned draught horses. Even the New Model only had around 1,000 draught horses compared to 6,000 cavalry, and bought 2,000 sets of harness compared to over 9,000 saddles. The supply of harness to Essex's army was dominated by John Munnings, but by 1645 he was only one of several suppliers, suggesting that more competition in the market encouraged a reduction in prices towards the end of the war. Harness makers were mostly based in the suburbs of London rather than in the City itself.\(^\text{110}\) Like the saddlers, they were never paid in advance but usually soon after delivery. There was less change in the system for

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\(^{\text{110}}\) TNA: PRO SP28/140 part iii; TNA: PRO WO55/1663.
handling deliveries and issues, since the Ordnance Office had been responsible for horse harness since before the outbreak of war.

The supply and administration of the New Model Army in 1645 was very different from Essex's army in 1642, but it should now be clear that a binary opposition between before and after the new modelling is completely inadequate. Kishlansky's view that nothing changed in 1645 and Gentles's view that everything changed are both oversimplifications. There were significant changes in 1645: the field armies and the monthly assessments were unified, the supply of equipment was more centralized, record keeping improved, and finance was made adequate and sustainable for an unprecedented period. However, these changes all followed on from the reforms of the previous year, which were at least as significant. A committee led by Robert Scawen, a monthly assessment, a loan from the City, and a large contract with the Smithfield horse dealers were recurring themes in 1644 and 1645. Everything was

Table 2: Cavalry saddle prices 1642-46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Price</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great saddles (Essex's army)</td>
<td>1642</td>
<td>45s-50s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1643</td>
<td>30s-50s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1644</td>
<td>20s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Troop saddles (New Model Army)</td>
<td>1645</td>
<td>15s-18s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1646</td>
<td>15s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Warrants in TNA: PRO SP28/1A to SP28/43; Contracts in G. I. Mungeam, 'Contracts for the Supply of Equipment to the New Model Army in 1645', *Journal of the Arms and Armour Society*, 6 (1968), pp. 53-115.
more efficient in 1645, but this was an incremental development rather than the radical change which Gentles suggests. The difference between Essex's army in 1643 and Essex's army in 1644 was much greater than the difference between Essex's army in 1644 and the New Model Army in 1645. However, this was not a process of linear progress. Essex's army was better supplied and financed in 1642 than it was in 1643. More horses were bought for cash before Edgehill than in the whole of 1643. With the propositions, Parliament had an effective and successful centralized system which supplied enough horses and money to build a powerful army. This system should not be dismissed on the teleological grounds that it failed towards the end of 1642. If Charles I had been defeated as quickly as he had been in the Bishops' Wars then the system would have served its purpose. Any expectations of a quick decision would have been confounded by the end of 1642, but this was not inevitable.

In order to sustain the war effort after 1642, Parliament had to find a way of exploiting the potential resources in the areas under its influence, and this proved to be surprisingly difficult. Taking property by force was bad for military discipline, undermined Parliament's claims to legitimacy, damaged the economy, and ultimately failed to provide what was required. Authority could not be imposed from the top down. Parliament needed at least some co-operation from property owners in order to succeed. This was just as true of the monthly assessments as it was of the propositions. Both declined when the local authorities and population lost enthusiasm for them.¹¹¹ Bargains with contractors were also compromises reached by mutual consent. The balance of power was different in the markets for different commodities.

¹¹¹ The monthly assessment was increasingly in arrears from January 1646. Wheeler, *World Power*, p. 189.
and this influenced the outcome of negotiations, but ultimately most of the prices paid by Parliament's armies throughout the war were decided by market forces. At times the parliamentarian war effort was paralysed by the conflicting interests of various groups, but through negotiations in Parliament a workable compromise emerged. The system of cash payment backed by regular taxation was acceptable to enough of the people for long enough for Parliament to win the war. The development of a sustainable supply system did not make victory inevitable, but it at least made victory possible.