Public Philosophy and Philosophical Publics: Performative Publishing and the Cultivation of Community

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Abstract

The emergence of new platforms for public communication, public deliberation, and public action presents new possibilities for forming, organizing, and mobilizing public bodies, which invite philosophical reflection concerning the standards we currently look to for coordinating public movements and for evaluating their effects. Developing a broad understanding of public philosophy, this article begins with the view of philosophy and intellectual freedom articulated in Kant’s publicly oriented writings. We then focus on the power of philosophical discourse to form and further articulate public bodies. Drawing on Dewey’s work, we discuss the role of philosophical discourse in the articulation of publics into self-regulated, sovereign entities. We conclude with an account of how publishing itself might come to play an important role in the practice of public philosophy in a digital age.

Keywords: Kant, public philosophy, Dewey, digital scholarship, intellectual freedom, community, self-determination, reason, public sphere, enlightenment, publishing

Introduction

Over the last decade, public philosophy has become an increasingly visible enterprise, yet no general consensus has emerged within the academy
concerning its overall value, its relationship to the philosophical tradition, or the proper standards for its exercise. For some, at least, this presents a troubling state of affairs. Academics who are attracted both to publicly engaged projects and to scholarly research face professional and institutional challenges in pursuing both. For others, however, this state of affairs is simply to be expected. The ways in which philosophy is practiced outside of the academy, in and with the public, seem bound to generate uncertainty concerning its academic status and value.

Instead of offering suggestions regarding how to establish meaningful academic consensus concerning public philosophy, we will here articulate a perspective from which the absence of such consensus is seen less as a lamentable deficiency and more as an important opportunity for investigating possibilities during a time of transition. The emergence of new platforms for public communication, public deliberation, and public action presents new possibilities for forming, organizing, and mobilizing public bodies, which invite philosophical reflection concerning the standards we currently look to for coordinating public movements and for evaluating their effects. What looks to many to be a time of crisis concerning public standards can well appear to philosophers of a certain mindset to be, instead, an opportunity to demonstrate some of the productive roles that philosophical discourses can play during the periods of upheaval that characterize the historical existence of even the most stable of cultural institutions.

The lack of consensus within the academy concerning the value of public philosophy is, roughly speaking, mirrored by a lack of consensus within the general public concerning the value of academic philosophy. This same state in relation to public opinion and support also characterizes many of the arts and sciences that share with philosophy both a common ancestry and a common reliance on continued public support for the kinds of institutions in which these practices are best able to thrive. Our hope is that new modes of broadly philosophical discourse allow us to model some traditional values in ways that can prove transformative in relation to the public bodies that are partially responsible for decisions that impact the future of the discipline.

A public body that incorporates the diverse methods, interests, and practices of its various members and, yet, is capable of self-determination, has to be one that is capable of reflective self-awareness concerning the range of its own values and the tensions that arise from its own internal standards. It also has to be sensitive to the values that form part of the self-awareness of the other public bodies with which it interacts. We maintain
that deliberation within these self-determining and other-regarding bodies can play its designated role only if it is characterized by certain freedoms—namely, freedom from the doctrinal constraints that, often rightly, attach to members of the various organizations that comprise them, and freedom to pursue questions about its own good, wherever they might lead, in an accessible and intellectually honest fashion.

Our perspective concerning freedom, public philosophy, and philosophical publics can be understood as a contemporary version of a traditional line of thinking that continues to resonate with many, despite the differences of time, place, and context that separate us from earlier proponents, and despite the general recognition that it is open to debate concerning many of its particulars. Although aspects of the view can be traced back to Socrates and Plato, we look to more recent historical figures, such as Kant and Dewey, and to more recent public scholars, such as Eileen Joy and Noëlle McAfee, in working out our view of the mutual dependencies between philosophical thinking and a vital public sphere. This view emphasizes the role that philosophy, broadly construed, plays in constituting publics capable of functioning as relatively autonomous, self-regulating, and other-regarding bodies.

Scholarly publication, on this model, can respond to the common criticism that it is an elitist endeavor by and for experts. It can also be an ecosystem of interrelated agents and processes in which complex functional bodies that can be motivated to act by appeal to public memory, public sensibilities, and public reasons are generated, organized, and maintained. The ecosystem is constituted through discursive practices that cultivate relationships involving features that are realizable across practices, such as the giving and taking of reasons, as well as the inclusion of a diversity of viewpoints within processes of pursuing practical interests that can be identified by each as being common to all.

In what follows, we present a detailed outline of this view of public philosophy and performative publication. We begin with a focus on a rather broad construal of the practice of philosophy. Here, we question some of the received wisdom concerning the relationship between philosophy and other arts and sciences, and then draw on aspects of the view of philosophy and intellectual freedom that Kant offers in his publicly oriented writings (Part I). We then turn to a focus on the power of philosophical discourse to form articulate public bodies. We see this power expressed, at least in intention, in Kant’s own public writings and explore its possibilities through some contemporary reflections on what Kant himself is and is not able to do in
his own historical and political context (Part II). Finally, we discuss the role of philosophical discourse in the articulation of publics into self-regulating, sovereign entities. Dewey provides us with some tools for articulating this role, and also points us toward some of the challenges we face in attempting to realize these aspirations in our current social and political contexts (Part III). We conclude with some reflections on the promises involved in maintaining the attitude toward public philosophy that we put forth here and provide some suggestions for informally testing the guiding assumptions of the model we develop.

Part I: Philosophy Broadly Constrained

The primary aims of this first part are to direct our focus to a broad way of thinking about the practice of philosophy and to begin tracing out the results this way of thinking might have for understanding what public philosophy is or might be. Beginning with the many uses of the term “philosophy” commonly found within the university, we focus on a use that connotes a specific freedom that is enjoyed by faculty across the various arts and sciences. In addition to uniting a faculty that remains diverse in many equally relevant ways, this kind of freedom also represents one of the central commonalities between members of our somewhat closed (or even cloistered) academic communities and members of the broader social communities of which the academy is a part. As a result, a focus on philosophy broadly construed serves as a way of connecting academic freedom within the university to the more open, more publicly visible, and more publicly accountable networks in which academics and nonacademics alike exercise their social and political freedoms. This focus suggests that there are substantive relations between the practice of philosophy and the work required of a self-governing public, and that these relationships can become obscured by narrower, more rigidly disciplinary, ways of thinking about philosophy.4

1.1 The Free and Open Pursuit of Truth

Whatever particular questions, problems, or methodological norms are currently constitutive of the practice of philosophy qua academic discipline, philosophy can also be characterized, roughly and provisionally, as the free and open pursuit of truth. Such a broad and intentionally inclusive
characterization of philosophy is not intended to meet the standards of an essential definition. It serves to remind us, rather, that there is a common thread of philosophical inquiry that continues to unite the arts and sciences despite their autonomy as self-sufficient units within most contemporary universities.

There is a historical basis for this common thread revealed in the common origins of so many disciplines in the practice of philosophy. Many stories can be told about the genealogy of these various disciplines, how and when they emerge, and what led to their being recognized as distinct parts of the whole of learning. None of these stories, however, establishes that these disciplines’ breaks with the philosophical tradition have ever been clearly delineated and absolute. Whatever criticisms may be offered from one side or the other of cultural divides between philosophy and other disciplines, the continuities between these disciplines are as relevant as the breaks. We may understand the term “philosophy” as one that has been adapted to the needs of some disciplinary economies, yet is one that can still function just as much to describe how one is engaged within some discipline as it does to describe some specific discipline in relation to which one might form a scholarly identity.

There is a legitimate use of the term “philosophy” that refers us to the specific topics that we now associate with work supported by philosophy departments. This use, however, is as much the product of a contested history as are our current uses of terms such as “physics,” “biology,” “sociology,” “psychology,” “anthropology,” “classics,” and so forth, as ways to designate disciplines other than philosophy. The descriptive usage of these terms that we now generally take for granted arises out of the prior staking of value claims as to what people are doing and what they are not doing. As with other identity claims advanced from the first person perspective, it isn’t always clear whether they are reports of already established facts, declarations of independence, or more proscribed programmatic suggestions. The narrower way of construing the term “philosophy” in signifying disciplines distinct from philosophy, all arise within an historically and socially situated, yet also open-ended and ongoing, discourse concerning truth and knowledge.
situated discourse concerning truth and knowledge. This discourse itself can be identified as a *philosophical* discourse.

What is at stake in acknowledging this suggestion will differ from case to case. In the case at hand, we think the value comes in understanding what public philosophy is. Open-ended philosophical discourse should be promoted when we think about how to address issues of public concern. The most vexing challenges we face as conscientious members of deliberative public bodies cannot be grasped through the disciplinary discourses of biology, chemistry, political science, sociology, economics, or literary criticism, any better than they can be resolved through the analysis of concepts and the investigation of linguistic conventions. Whatever it may be that each of our academic disciplinary perspectives allows us to bring to the intellectual work required for responding to the public challenges we face, our actual contributions to this work are made as public thinkers. We enjoy a freedom from the absolute authority of any single set of doctrines. We are responsible to other members of the public for whatever authority we give to our own commitments and for whatever authority we claim for ourselves, within an open discussion. When contributing to the intellectual work of the public, we are all called upon to do so as philosophers in the broadest sense.

### 1.2 Historical Precedent for Philosophy Broadly Construed

One model for the use of the term “philosophy” is provided by Kant’s discussion of the structure and purpose of universities in a 1798 work entitled *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Kant is the first modern philosopher to make his living teaching courses at a university and writing books and essays addressed to a public of both academic and nonacademic readers. While he is best remembered in contemporary academic circles for works that even specialists find difficult to approach, his activities as a lecturer, a university administrator, and a public intellectual are guided by a conception of philosophical practice that is anything but rigidly scholastic.

In *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Kant addresses significant points of dispute that arise from his work as a public scholar who also functions within the contexts of the university and the Prussian state. In the first part of the work, he describes the philosophical faculty of the university in terms of the specific freedoms it enjoys; namely, freedom *from* the government-sanctioned doctrinal constraints that are placed on other
faculties in the university, and freedom to pursue the truth wherever it might lead in making a contribution to the world of learning.

In Kant’s account, the intellectual labor of the community of thinkers referred to as “the university” is divided among four faculties: theology, law, medicine, and philosophy. Each of these faculties is granted the power to admit students from lower schools and to confer the status of “doctor” on teachers who pass certain examinations. The central difference between the first three higher faculties and the lower faculty of philosophy has less to do with the particular subjects that occupy their members than with the authority exercised by the state in relation to those members through setting the curriculum.

The higher faculties exist to prepare students to take up official offices and other roles within the state. Their members are contractually bound to follow state mandates concerning the religious, legal, and medical doctrines that the ministers of state have decided are essential for ensuring spiritual, civic, and bodily well being within the state. These faculty members are under the command of the state, and they, in turn, are authorized to command their students’ compliance with these doctrines. This particular relation between the state, its doctrines, and the learned persons that are entrusted to indoctrinate subjects requires (1) that teaching be based on writings, (2) that these writings provide statutes, and (3) that these statutes have their sanction in the willful decree of an authority:

So the biblical theologian (as a member of a higher faculty) draws his teachings not from reason but from the Bible; the professor of law gets his, not from natural law, but from the law of the land; and the professor of medicine does not draw his method of therapy as practiced on the public from the physiology of the human body but from medical regulations.¹⁰

As subjects of the state seeking positions within the state, students are commanded to obey these teachings (or suffer the consequences). If they ask why they should obey, the only answer is one that makes reference to the will of the relevant authority. The biblical theologian takes the statutes that are found in the Bible, accepts that they are sanctioned by the will of God, and bases his teaching about what God requires of us on this text. There is nothing beyond the empirically given, or biblically revealed, and traditionally accepted fact of God’s command to which a biblical theologian could appeal for justification within this professional context.
According to the logic of Kant’s discussion, if dissatisfaction with this line of response prompts a student to search for something beyond this given, the student crosses over into asking questions that can be treated only within an area of study in which the members of the higher, theological, faculty cannot be assumed to have any special expertise. Each of the texts on which their expertise is based simply records and reports facts about laws and regulations. They don’t provide the reader, whether novice or expert, the reasons why these laws and regulations were decided upon in the first place.

So, if a student were to ask questions about such matters, he or she would need to consult the lower faculty of philosophy. Philosophy faculty do not have access to some other book that contains other statutes and authoritative answers that are provided at a level that will satisfy the curious student completely. Their training, however, does qualify them to help the student see avenues open for pursuing such questions. Their pursuit requires the further exercise of the rational capacities that are evidenced by the student’s state of intellectual dissatisfaction with reliance simply on accepted facts.

The lower philosophy faculty doesn’t have the same elevated position of authority in relation to the state, or in relation to its students, that the higher faculties have. They are left free to investigate the claims of biblical theology through the use of reason, to appeal to the tradition of natural law in arguments concerning the status of the de facto laws of the land, and to engage in physiological investigations of the human body in considering its functioning and possible alternative methods of therapy. Members of the philosophy faculty are not commanded by the state to believe and to teach particular doctrines, and they do not command students’ assent to the doctrines they take up for consideration and study. They investigate claims using all available means; they give their assent freely to those claims that strike them as true; they speak publicly on their areas of study; and they invite others to evaluate their claims in a like manner.

According to this configuration of the university, the philosophy faculty is not comprised entirely of what we today tend to think of as philosophers.
It isn’t even comprised entirely of people who specialize in one or more of the areas of study in which Kant himself specializes. The subject matter itself plays little or no role in carving up the university at the faculty level. The philosophy faculty is comprised of learned persons who are free to teach what we now consider to be the arts and sciences in a critical fashion, without interference from the other faculties and from the government. They are the faculty that advance learning both through and beyond what they inherit from their traditions.

The philosophy faculty provides essential checks on the tendency of the other faculties to overstep the bounds of their state-certified learning and their state-mandated duties. They are also the members of the university community that are most closely aligned, in terms of their activities, with the pursuits of educated nonacademics:

In addition to these incorporated scholars, there can also be scholars at large, who do not belong to the university but simply work on part of the great content of learning, either forming independent organizations, like various workshops (called academies or scientific societies), or living, so to speak, in a state of nature so far as learning is concerned, each working by himself, as an amateur and without public precepts or rules, at extending and propagating [his field of] learning.11

The broader use of the term “philosophy” we have in mind when we think about public philosophy is closely related to this ongoing activity of freely pursuing truth, from wherever it is that one happens to be situated, and in open dialogue with whomever else may be interested in the issue. We believe that this activity is intrinsically valuable,12 but we also believe that the activity is capable of enriching public life when it is undertaken openly in, by, and with the public. One doesn’t need to have special training in metaphysics, epistemology, or ethics to engage in the practices of public philosophy. In fact, the conversation is far less wide-ranging and rich, not to mention far less productive of a identifiable service to the public, when participation is limited to specialists in these areas of study.13

As important as it may be to recognize this broader sense of the term “philosophy” within academic contexts, it is at least as important to consider that a great deal of this work continues to go on in independent organizations and in the lives of people we might think of as “scholars at large.” Whether they exist within contemporary analogues of eighteenth-century academies and scientific societies, or within contemporary analogues of the “state
of nature” vis à vis the world of “civilized” learning, there are numbers of people who embody and model for others the kind of free pursuit of truth that we are here identifying with philosophical discourse and the practices of public philosophy.

Part II: Performative Publication

The discussion of philosophy above leads us beyond considerations of political economies and cognitive geographies within academia toward a consideration of the relationship between philosophy and the public sphere. Starting with reflections on Kant’s seminal discussion of this relationship in his essay “What is Enlightenment?,” we move from a focus on the freedom of thought that characterizes philosophy to the freedom of action that characterizes sovereign and self-governing publics. Here, we draw attention to the power that publishing has to constitute public bodies that are animated by the spirit of self-governance. Making the results of philosophical investigations widely available is not simply a matter of disseminating ideas or providing a good or a service to individuals or groups. Publishing is also a way of engaging with the socially situated practices through which particular publics become articulated, grow in number and in strength, and become self-governing bodies.

2.1 The “Most Innocuous” Freedom

In his famous 1784 essay, “What is Enlightenment?,” Kant identifies the activity of enlightenment with a certain way of being public. After suggesting that enlightenment is liberation from self-incurred immaturity (Unmündigkeit), Kant goes on to write:

For enlightenment of this kind, all that is needed is freedom. And the freedom in question is the most innocuous form of all—freedom to make public use of one’s reason in all matters.

This statement itself is, of course, a public use of Kant’s reason.

Published in the December 1784 issue of the Berlinische Monatsschrift in response to a question—“What is Enlightenment?”—Johann Friedrich Zöllner had posed a year earlier in the same journal, Kant’s essay in fact performs the argument it articulates.
Kant argues that enlightenment involves the free public use of reason by using reason in public. The performative dimension of Kant’s essay can be discerned in the way he connects the public use of reason to the very activity of enlightenment itself: “the public use of one’s reason,” he writes, “must be free at all times, and this alone can bring enlightenment to mankind.”

However, precisely how free Kant’s own use of reason was, despite his status as a member of the faculty of philosophy, is worth considering; for the central distinction around which the essay is organized, that between public and private uses of reason, seems itself to have been necessitated by constraints placed on public writing by the Prussian monarch, Frederick the Great.

However enlightened a leader he may have been for his time, in 1784—the year in which Kant’s essay appeared—Frederick was unequivocal in forbidding private persons from expressing public judgment:

A private person has no right to pass public and perhaps even disapproving judgment on the actions, procedures, laws, regulations, and ordinances of sovereigns and courts, their officials, assemblies, and courts of law, or to promulgate or publish in print pertinent reports that he manages to obtain. For a private person is not at all capable of making such judgment, because he lacks complete knowledge of circumstances and motives.

It is perhaps no surprise, then, to find Kant carefully charting a distinction between the private and public uses of reason. The former, contractual in nature, is said to be subject to higher authority, while the latter is deemed free in the broadest, though “most innocuous” sense. By the free public use of reason, Kant meant: “that use which anyone may make of it as a learned person [Gelehrter] addressing the entire public of the world of readers [vor dem ganzen Publikum der Leserwelt].”

However, the constraint on Kant’s free use of reason in the essay can be felt in the way he attempts to open space for the free expression of educated people even as he reassures those in authority that such freedom is “most innocuous.” In fact, the most poignant indication that his free use of reason is itself constrained is perhaps this superlative insistence that the freedom associated with it is the “unschädlichste,” the “most innocuous,” form of freedom.

The statement itself can be taken as a rather eloquent performative contradiction: Kant’s public declaration that the public use of reason is “the
most innocuous” demonstrates the very real power it has. The superlative is hyperbolic, and the hyperbole gives clear voice to the tacit recognition that free communication can have powerful undermining effects on the absolute authority of the monarch. Even if, as seems to be the case, Kant’s focus in the essay is on the well-being of the subjects of the Prussian state, and specifically on the conditions under which it can most effectively mature, still Kant’s strong emphasis on the harmlessness of the free public use of reason signals his own recognition that the state itself might see in it a threat to its well-being.21

Kant is a savvy thinker who understood that some things are better left unspoken in a world ordered by a monarch whose absolute authority seems to have been precisely what enabled him to allow people to “argue as much as you like about whatever you like.”22

Even so, however, it is worth emphasizing that in speaking publicly to open a space in which the reading public could mature into a genuine deliberative public, Kant engages in a transformative public philosophical practice.

In advocating in public on behalf of the practices of enlightenment, Kant himself continued to speak as the chair of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. Holding a chair in the Faculty of Philosophy, he, unlike the clergy of whom he speaks in the essay, would not have been required to relinquish his private contractual obligations in order to make public use of his reason. Indeed, Habermas cites a 1729 directive from Frederick himself enjoining all chaired professors of the faculties of law, medicine, and philosophy to take turns submitting to newspaper editors “a special note, composed in a pure and clear style of writing” designed to inform the public of useful truths.23

But truths, however “useful” to a monarch, can have powerful transformative effects. Indeed, at the end of the essay, Kant recognizes the transformative power of the free public use of reason:

Thus when nature has unwrapped . . . the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to think freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby becomes capable of freedom in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, who is now more than a machine, in keeping with his dignity.24
Putting his words into public practice, Kant sought to open a space in which a world of readers might, over time, cultivate the habits of thinking and acting capable of holding even the government accountable.

### 2.2 Seeding Publics from a World of Readers

In his own essay on Kant’s “What is Enlightenment?,” Foucault ascribes to Baudelaire a modern attitude that captures well the spirit of Kant’s public essay on enlightenment. For Baudelaire, according to Foucault, modernity is “an exercise in which extreme attention to what is real is confronted with the practice of the liberty that simultaneously respects this reality and violates it.”

Kant’s essay is not merely a performance of public philosophy, it is also the practice of a liberty that simultaneously respects and violates the political realities of its time. Its respect for the political realities of the eighteenth-century Prussian state can be heard in the way the text carefully opens a space for the free use of public reason by separating it from the private use of reason, which remains constrained by duties to the state into which a private person contractually enters.

The essay’s violation of these realities can be heard most poignantly at the end, when Kant suggests that freedom of thought might cultivate “in the mentality of the people” a freedom of action capable of transforming the very principles of government.

For all its appeal to the importance of the public use of reason, as itself a practice of liberty that respects and violates the political realities of its time, Kant’s essay is situated, as Kant himself recognizes, in an inchoate public sphere. In the essay itself, the nascence of the public to which the essay is addressed comes to language in two ways: first in the distinction Kant articulates between the “an enlightened age [einem aufgeklärten Zeitalter]” and “an age of enlightenment [Zeitalter der Aufklärung],” and second, in the way the essay speaks of the public use of reason addressing “the entire public world of readers [vor dem ganzen Publicum der Leserwelt].”

This latter formulation points to the beginning of an important transformation of the public sphere as it moved from being a space of public authority to one in which private citizens came together to form publics capable of holding public authorities accountable.

Habermas suggests the significance of Kant’s formulation when he writes that the “history of words preserved traces of this momentous shift.”
He goes on to mark the eighteenth-century as the time when this shift in the meaning of the public took place:

Until then one spoke of the “world of readers” (Lesewelt), or simply of the “world” (Welt) in the sense still used today: all the world, tout le monde. Adelung draws a distinction between the public that gathered as a crowd around a speaker or actor in a public place, and the Lesewelt (world of readers).29

Habermas points to the appearance of the word “Publikum” in eighteenth-century Germany, spreading from Berlin, as an indication that this new meaning of the public was gaining currency.

In speaking of the “public world of readers [Publikum der Leserwelt]” Kant brings something of this new meaning of Publikum to language even if he continues to speak of the Leserwelt. The text itself seems to articulate a new conception of the public.

Even if, as Ciaran Cronin rightly suggests, the manner in which Kant anticipates the liberal idea of the public sphere as a site for the creation and consolidation of public opinion is complicated by the peculiarly inscribed nature of Kant’s understanding of the “public” in his essay on enlightenment, still, it is not difficult to recognize that the essay itself goes some distance in seeding a public capable of gathering itself to hold governmental authorities accountable.30

Eileen Joy suggests the power publications have to seed publics when she writes that “publication” should be “understood not only as the primary vehicle for the dissemination of our thinking, but also as the production of actual publics, without which intellectual and cultural life cannot flourish nor be shared.”31

Such seeds must be cultivated, and much depends upon the soil into which they are planted. As a practice of liberty, Kant’s essay might be read as an attempt to seed a public the soil for which it had not yet been well prepared.

Shifting the metaphor, Dewey speaks still roughly 140 years later of an “inchoate public” that remains incapable of organizing itself until it becomes able to “canalize the streams of social action.” Here is the passage from The Public and Its Problems:

An inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies
which order their occurrence. At present, many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they cannot be said to be known, for they are not, by those who experience them, referred to their origins. It goes, then, without saying that agencies are not established which canalize the streams of social action and thereby regulate them. Hence the publics are amorphous and unarticulated.32

In her essay, “Public Knowledge,” Noëlle McAfee argues that Dewey has a three-pronged solution for the problem of an unarticulated public. First, the public “needs to understand the consequences and origins of its actions;” second, “public intelligence or knowledge needs to be cultivated,” and third, “people need to be reconnected with their local community where face to face verbal communication is possible, dialogical, and transformative.”33

Dewey’s invocation of canalization is itself a call for habituation, for the cultivation of a public aware of the consequences of its own actions; a public that does not simply feel, but perceives—a perceptive public. It is tempting to say that we are today no closer than the public of Dewey’s 1927 text, or even that of Kant’s 1784 public essay, and yet, perhaps we might continue to till the soil of a perceptive public.

Part III: Public Philosophy and Articulated Publics

In the previous section, we introduced Dewey’s solution to the problem of an unarticulated public. In this section, we will explicate Dewey’s argument and develop some of its consequences.

Before turning to the details of Dewey’s argument, it’s worth highlighting the relevance of Dewey’s work for questions of public philosophy. For Dewey, “there is no specifiable difference between philosophy and its role
in the history of civilization." In "Philosophy and Civilization," Dewey emphasizes the "concrete reality" of philosophy, identifying it as a response to past and present social conditions. This should not suggest that philosophy is merely a reaction to these conditions. Instead, as Dewey claims, philosophy can also be creative of the future, but only through its critical response to the past and present.

Beyond this general claim about the nature of philosophy, Dewey offers invaluable conceptual resources for articulating how publics can come into being, particularly in *The Public and Its Problems*. Dewey believed that his contemporary public was inchoate. On the one hand, this is a historical and contextual contention. Writing in the context of the rise of the "Great Society"—the result of rapid industrial and technological advances in the early twentieth century, Dewey perceived that social conditions had outrun inherited political conceptions, making it difficult for the public to recognize itself.

At the same time, the consequences of these developments yielded the very condition for the public's self-discovery. A public, for Dewey, "consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for." This situation produced an "eclipse" of the public. McAfee has an excellent articulation of this paradoxical situation: "widespread consequences of some human actions call a public into being (i.e., a public is a group affected by human actions), but when the problems become immense this public cannot find itself."

While we should not ignore the historical context of Dewey's problem, we believe it is still relevant today given the continuing technological developments of our own age. How then should an inchoate public respond to the threat of its eclipse?

Dewey was not alone among his contemporaries in diagnosing a shifting social and political landscape. In addition to the conditions of his time, Dewey's *The Public and Its Problems* was also written in response to Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* and *The Phantom Public*. Despite some overlap in their diagnoses, Lippmann and Dewey propose radically divergent solutions. For Lippmann, the "phantom" public requires a special group of experts for the management and control of social affairs. Unlike Lippmann, Dewey, who was more deeply committed to democracy, maintained that the public could manage itself, that it could be autonomous.
Along these lines, one of Dewey’s central claims in *The Public and Its Problems* is that the public’s self-discovery takes place through “continuous inquiry” and through the communication of the results of this inquiry:

A fact of community life which is not spread abroad so as to be a common possession is a contradiction in terms. Dissemination is something other than scattering at large. Seeds are sown, not by virtue of being thrown at random, but by being so distributed so as to take root and have a chance of growth. Communication of the results of social inquiry is the same thing as the formation of public opinion.37

This distinction between dissemination and scattering suggests what, for Dewey, is the problem of the public, namely, “the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion.”38 These two tasks, the communication of the results of “continuous inquiry” and the improvement of the means of communication return us to the question of public philosophy. Although Dewey does not use the term “public philosophy,” we believe that these two tasks not only resonate with the definition of philosophy introduced in this article but also articulate the two central tasks of the practice of public philosophy in a digital age.

However, Dewey’s concern is less with truth than with consequences. Throughout Dewey’s work, he discusses knowledge as knowledge of consequences of action and as a means to control these consequences as far as possible. McAfee refers to this in terms of “public knowledge,” which she defines “an understanding of how policies affect what people need and care about.”39 This may require us to specify further our working definition of philosophy. In this case, philosophy becomes inquiry for the sake of the knowledge of consequences and the control of these consequences.

Dewey valorizes local communities as a necessary condition for the development of publics. He writes, “In its deepest and richest sense a community must always remain a matter of face-to-face intercourse.”40 Dewey believed that local communities were being effaced through rapid technological development. Without a strong local community, he thought that the public would fail to find itself.41 To some extent, this concern applies today. But it also requires that we ask what constitutes a local community in the contemporary world. Dewey himself wondered whether it was “possible for local communities to be stable without being static, progressive without being merely mobile?”42 To what extent is the local still
A condition of community and what possibilities can we imagine for local communities today?

While we should not uncritically accept Dewey’s insistence on the local, we should read it as a challenge. Dewey interpreted the technological changes of his era as destructive of the “face-to-face” and “personal” relationships of local communities and therefore as an impediment to the development of a “great community.” Nonetheless, he maintained that the homogenizing tendency of technological progress might eventually allow for the re-cultivation of local communities. He invites us to imagine such a future, even though he may not have been able to envisage it himself.

Dewey’s turn to the problem of local communities in the final pages of *The Public and Its Problems* is not animated by a naive nostalgia but by an inquiry into the possibility of communication. Consider, for example, his consideration of the distinction between the “fixed and frozen words of written speech” and “the winged words of conversation.” Dewey contends that the dissemination of ideas, knowledge, and information is most efficacious in conversation.

For these reasons, Dewey’s concern for the loss of the local represents, more importantly, the loss of opportunity for dialogue. We might read Dewey’s lament for the local as a challenge to imagine, or adapt, technology as a means for cultivating dialogue. It might also require us to re-envision what we mean by “local,” or at least what we mean by “community.” Finally, this insistence on dialogue, together with his claim that publics are formed through the dissemination of continuous inquiry, provides an outline, if only a bare one, of the task of public philosophy.

**Articulated Publics in a Digital Age**

With the proliferation of the Internet and the advent and evolution of online bulletin boards, forums, blogs, and online social networks, the colloquial meaning of “community” has expanded well beyond that of local, face-to-face interactions. Such Internet platforms enable communities to arise whose individual members may be scattered over vast geographical distances. For example, websites such as apug.org and http://apug.org draw together photographers from a wide variety of backgrounds, nationalities, and professional status to share and discuss their work, new techniques, materials, and equipment. Likewise, collaborative software projects such as
Ubuntu bring together designers, programmers, and sometimes users into a community focused on furthering the development of the project either through online interactions on forums, listservs, and IRC channels, or in face-to-face conventions at conferences and with local user groups.

Given the existence of such communities, we are hopeful that philosophical communities may emerge that are not limited by geographical or professional constraints, communities which could give inchoate publics the ability and opportunity to articulate themselves. For this to be possible, such communities would need to be philosophical not by professional affiliation but by the presence of the two freedoms of inquiry outlined above: the freedom from the government-sanctioned doctrinal constraints and the freedom to pursue the truth wherever it might lead. Such philosophical communities would need to be animated by a commitment to the two tasks Dewey identifies as critical to the self-discovery of publics: the communication of the results of “continuous inquiry” and the improvement of the means of communication.

There is now an abundance of online publications that serve as forums for philosophical discourse on issues of public interest, but such forums tend toward two extremes: they may be professional publications (such as academic blogs and journals) where the discussion of continuing inquiry and research takes place at such specialized levels as to be unapproachable by nonspecialist members of the public; or such discussions may happen in personal blogs or the web pages of popular news outlets—venues which allow for discussions to include most members of the general public but which nevertheless tend to lack the participation of academics and professionals versed in the latest relevant research. When specialists do publish in popular venues, perhaps in a newspaper column such as the New York Times' The Stone, they seldom participate in the resulting discussion. Moreover, discussions at online forums at either end of the spectrum commonly fall prey to fragmented conversations and unproductive behaviors such as trolling and hate speech.

A notable exception to the above is Ta-Nehisi Coates’s blog, yet while it succeeds in practicing public philosophy and assisting inchoate publics in articulating themselves as a community, Coates’s efforts highlight some of the risks inherent to the performance of public philosophy as a mode of publication in our times. Blogging for The Atlantic since August of 2008, Coates has spent years engaging a community of commenters that he would eventually give informal credit as collaborators on an award winning article. Yet this community was constantly threatened by trolls and bad-faith
commenters, requiring vigilant moderation in order to maintain civility and collegiality. In a recent interview Coates admitted that he has become exhausted by such efforts, and despite his successes, the community “never quite became what [he] wanted it to be [because he] never really figured out how to get people from different perspectives in a place without defaulting to these usual [unproductive] conversations.”52 Hence, while Coates's efforts give us reason to hope for the emergence of philosophical communities with the help of new forms of publications, they also remind us of the assiduous effort required to cultivate and maintain collegiality in the community. As such efforts become Sisyphean or are perceived as such (even if they are in fact successful) by those who undertake them, their abandonment can easily lead to the demise of the community as such.

While Ta-Nehisi Coates's efforts highlight some of the difficulties that must be faced when attempting to practice public philosophy even if one has the support of a major publishing venue, Yasmin Nair's public scholarship reminds us of the many difficulties that result from the current structure of academia and academic publishing.53 Following Nicholas Kristof’s op-ed in the New York Times, which called on scholars to write for the general public, Nair argued that not only are the requirements for tenure so onerous that they leave academics with little time to write publicly engaged articles, but the culture of nonremuneration for academic writing leads to the exploitation of the few scholars who do attempt to engage the public.54 Since academic journals do not pay authors for their articles, scholars often accept it as normal when nonacademic publishers offer little to no pay for their contributions, but Nair warns that such academics become “scabs” who undermine their own ability to gain a livelihood from their labor.55 Her arguments become more urgent when one sees that Nair herself is paradigmatic of the contemporary publicly engaged scholar, whose efforts to engage a community often go unrecognized by the traditional policies of academic tenure and promotion.56

Yet even if scholars wish to participate in public philosophy, there remains a noticeable shortage of venues (be they local or online) where members of the public may gather and form communities around the practice of philosophical inquiry: venues where the public use of reason is promoted and where the specialist will not only share research with the public, but will engage lay readers in conversation, become attentive to the community’s own inquiries, and ultimately collaborate with the community as it continues its inquiry. Although academic outreach programs such as the JCI Scholar’s Program, which offers college level seminars to inmates,
often meet these criteria and often assist in the formation of small local communities, we see in the practices of digital scholarly publishing an opportunity for the cultivation of more enriching and articulated publics.57

Taking advantage of these opportunities will, we think, require changes in the makeup and function of the roles traditionally ascribed to authors, editors, reviewers, and readers in the world of digital scholarly communication. It will no longer suffice for expert authors to merely communicate the results of their inquiries to an audience of experts. Neither will it suffice for those same authors to communicate their findings to a general audience simply by making highly specialized research intelligible to nonexperts—though this is no doubt an improvement with regards to the development of publics. Nor will it suffice for readers and reviewers to approach published texts as finished products to be endorsed or refuted, perhaps as opportunities to display intellectual superiority. Rather, we believe that inchoate publics will become articulated publics only when the practices of public scholarly communication are thoroughly infused with a spirit of collaboration and participation, so that authors and readers can engage in productive dialogues and ultimately become collaborators with regard to issues of public concern.

For this to be the case, authors will need to engage public audiences not as experts whose authority is beyond question, but as highly educated community members who are as willing to listen to feedback and engage in conversation as they are eager to share their research. Authors may find their research enriched by such engagement by the community, and they may even find their role transformed into that of a co-author. As a consequence of such transformative encounters between authors and readers, published articles need to be seen as representing research in progress, not finished products merely to be consumed and judged. For if readers and authors are to become co-investigators, the philosophical worth of a publication will lie at least as much in the conversation it sparks and the public it cultivates as in the ideas it generates and the results it uncovers.

Readers, for their part, will need to cultivate habits of collegial response in the wake of their newfound opportunity to engage the authors earlier in the scholarly process. While it is crucial for members of a public (however
inchoate it may be) to engage and contribute to research on matters of public concern, fruitful engagement will require the development of habits and virtues constitutive of collegial behavior. As a cursory glance through the comments section of most online news articles will reveal, while readers are eager to offer feedback or engage other readers in dialogue (sadly, authors are mostly absent from such conversations), many such conversations fall prey to trolling, hate speech, or disagreements which prove unresolvable due to lack of collegiality of the commenters. Efforts to avoid such traps should be directed so as not to transform the sites for dialogue into echo chambers, where commenters only reply to views they already endorse and thereby stall the productivity of the dialogue.

Encouraging the collegial collaboration between readers qua co-inquirers, authors, and peer reviewers (whose work may serve to further collaboration if it is open and publicly accessible) will thus arise as a new editorial responsibility. We suspect that there are numerous ways in which this new editorial responsibility may be fulfilled, but here one's choices will have profound impacts on the format of the publication. Moreover, Ta-Nehisi Coates's experience should serve as a strong reminder of the arduous nature of such important work. Yet however one fulfills this requirement, our suspicion is that the publication will be most successful in articulating communities into publics if all participants, including editors, see themselves as members of that community.

In short, we need to recognize the role that publishing plays in the practice of public philosophy. In order to perform that role, academic publishing practices need to prioritize community building and collegial engagement between authors and readers qua community members. The current trend to shift academic publishing toward open access is a step in the right direction, but unless platforms are developed that encourage productive public dialogue between all actors in the publishing practice (authors, reviewers, editors, and readers) any work published in such venues will be impoverished because it will be cut off from the public life that lends it relevance. Without such dialogue, publications will remain incapable of performing what may be their highest calling: the articulation of communities into publics.

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NOTES

1. In 2008, the American Philosophical Association (APA) established a Committee on Public Philosophy and gave it the charge “to find and create opportunities to demonstrate the personal value and social usefulness of philosophy” (http://www.publicphilosophy.org/mission.html). Two years later, that committee partnered with George Mason University’s Center for Global Ethics to convene a meeting at the Pacific Division of the APA. In that meeting, several eminent philosophers and a range of other interested parties discussed the value of public philosophy and together came to the recommendation that a Public Philosophy Network (http://publicphilosophynetwork.ning.com) be formed. That network was formed over the course of the year following that meeting, and it has since grown to include nearly nine hundred members, having hosted regular national conferences since its founding. Further, the Pennsylvania State University in collaboration with Michigan State University, has received over $750,000 in funding from the Mellon Foundation to create and develop the Public Philosophy Journal (http://publicphilosophyjournal.org), a public space for accessible and rigorous scholarly discourse on challenging issues of contemporary public concern.

2. Like so many other developments in the first decades of this century, the rise of public philosophy appears to have generated a space in which our traditional standards are brought into question by sustained reflection on, among other things, the shifting social and economic realities to which we seek to apply them. For an overview of the current state of public philosophy, see the helpful discussion provided by Weinstein, “Public Philosophy: Introduction.”

3. One of the most salient features of public philosophy would seem to be its refusal to accept that the disciplinary standards and norms that have currency within contemporary academic philosophy are definitive of the practice of philosophy itself. From the standpoint of those doing publicly engaged work outside of the academy, the proof of its philosophical legitimacy is not something that has to be secured beforehand in a way that will generate consensus among those who maintain some level of personal or professional skepticism.

4. Subsequent parts of this essay will elaborate on the point of connection between philosophy and the public that we begin to identify here, raise some critical questions, and offer some suggestions concerning the possibility of public philosophy in a digital age.

5. That is, the careful intellectual historian will generally find at least some discrepancies between what the overall historical record indicates actually happened during some time period or event that is identified as a crucial turning point, on the one
hand, and what it is that we continually report to ourselves about the significance of that time period or event, on the other.

6. For example: epistemology, value theory, metaphysics (topics); skepticism, other minds, relativism (problems); rationalism, empiricism, pragmatism (methodologies). These are just a few of the contested ways that one can make a first cut in categorizing what we now understand as the discipline of philosophy.

7. In the introduction to his course on physical geography (AA, 9: 21–27), Kant discusses various concepts of philosophy and distinguishes between the kind of scholasticism that was common among both Aristotelians and Wolffians in eighteenth-century German contexts, on the one hand, and the more worldly oriented philosophy that would be done in that course of lectures, on the other. The latter way of doing philosophy was explicitly aimed at preparing students to take on roles within the broader public sphere, and not at training them to become academic philosophers. For a discussion of the pedagogical elements of Kant’s philosophy see Munzel, “Kant on Moral Education, or ‘Enlightenment’ and the Liberal Arts.” For a lengthier discussion of the relation of his lectures on physical geography and anthropology to his moral philosophy, see Munzel, Kant’s Conception of Moral Character.

8. Parts of the book had been written up to five years earlier, but Kant withheld them from publication due to political pressures. For a discussion of the context of the production of this work, see Mary J. Gregor’s introduction to Kant, The Conflict of the Faculties.

9. He also defends the faculty against the charge that the exercise of these freedoms is harmful to the state, and articulates some of the particular differences between the powers and obligations of the higher faculties (theology, law, and medicine) and those of the lower faculty (philosophy).


12. This holds at least for some people, who take pleasure in the activity itself and for whom the activity provides orientation, focus, balance, and fulfillment. We are not in a position to claim that there is intrinsic value for everyone in the pursuit, whether they happen to recognize it or not, but we don’t need to be committed to the universality of the value in order to maintain that there are some people for whom the value is intrinsic.

13. We are in no way disparaging the kind of scholarly discourse that is limited to specialists in these areas. In fact, one of the issues we confront in articulating and advocating for a view of philosophy broadly construed is that many of those who present themselves as being open to this broader and more inclusive conception appear not to be similarly open when it comes to including philosophy more narrowly construed within it. We purposely refrain from motivating interest in the project of public philosophy through polemical contrasts between it and the kinds of practices one is likely to find in philosophy departments in contemporary American universities. It is clearly the case that certain styles, starting points, and views are underrepresented within individual departments and within the professional discipline as a whole. However, we don’t see any direct correlation between relative level of representation in the profession and relative (intrinsic or extrinsic) value. This blocks the inference from $x$ is relatively under-
represented to \( x \) is of lower value, but it also blocks other inferences, including the one from \( x \) is relatively overrepresented to \( x \) is of lower value.

14. James Schmidt has rightly suggested that for Kant, the enlightenment is an activity as opposed to a period of history. See, Schmidt, “The Words We Have Lost.”

15. Unmündigkeit literally means dependence, but it is also a legal term designating a “minority,” i.e., one who is under age. See, Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 52.


18. Kant, AA 8, 73 (55).

19. Cited in Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 25. The alleged ignorance of the public has long served to legitimize authoritarian politics. Emphasis in original.


21. In fact, this perceived threat provides the occasion for Kant’s defense of the rights of the philosophical faculty, and of the public use of reason more generally, in the Conflict of the Faculties.

22. Kant, AA 8, 37 (55). Cronin suggests that the “unprecedented militarization” of society and absolute rule of Frederick allowed him to be tolerant of the free expression of ideas. See Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 67.

23. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 25.

24. Kant, AA 8, 41–42, translation from Cronin, 78. The reference to the human being as “now more than a machine” is a clear reference to L’Homme Machine (1747), a work written by the eighteenth-century French materialist, Julian Offray de La Mettrie. Frederick the Great provided refuge for La Mettrie in Berlin after he was forced to flee the Netherlands. For more on La Mettrie and for an English translation of L’Homme Machine, see Mettrie, La Mettrie. Emphasis in original.

25. The Foucault Reader, 41.

26. The issues here are complex, and Cronin does a nice job of navigating them. See Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 54–60. James Schmidt emphasizes that “[p]rivate uses of reason take place in a sphere of contractual agreements where individuals alienate their talents to other for the purpose of advancing common goals.” See, Schmidt, “The Question of Enlightenment.”

27. AA 8, 41–42.

28. Ibid., 40 and 37, respectively.

29. Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 26. This gesture to the history of words might itself be called legomenological in the sense that it finds in the manner in which things are said access to the nature of a particular phenomenon. (For more on legomenology, see Long, Aristotle on the Nature of Truth, 7).

30. Cronin, “Kant’s Politics of the Enlightenment,” 54. The gesture toward “seeding” here is designed to evoke the last paragraph of Kant’s essay.


34. Dewey, LW3, 5.
36. Ibid., 147.
37. Ibid., 345.
38. Ibid., 365.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., 369–70.
44. Ibid., 371.

45. The theoretical background for this argument is developed more thoroughly in chapter 5 of *Experience and Nature,* “Nature, Communication and Meaning.” In this chapter, Dewey identifies communication, as opposed to expression, as the heart of language (141). He argues that language comes into being within the context of community, in particular in situations of mutual assistance and direction (139).

46. This task is consistent with Dewey’s discussion of meaning and essence in *Experience and Nature.* Dewey uses as an example the transformation of the meaning of “jurisdiction” from a geographical area to the power to act (LW1 155–56). This example might also serve as the basis for a critique of Dewey’s discussion of the local in *The Public and Its Problems,* licensing us to imagine a new form of locality.

47. Projects such as the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (http://social-epistemology.com) have had commendable success in initiating and maintaining productive dialogues between researchers and academic readers, but the technical level of the articles makes it unlikely that nonspecialists will engage in the conversation.

48. This is not to disvalue the inquiry performed by nonspecialist members of the public, but rather to stress that research carried out by specialists is a great asset to a public’s self-articulation.


50. Ta-Nehisi Coates’s blog can be found at http://www.theatlantic.com/ta-nehisi-coates.


53. Yasmin Nair’s blog can be found at: http://www.yasminnair.net.


55. Ibid. See also “On Writers as Scabs, Whores, and Interns, and the Jacobin Problem,” Yasmin Nair, December 10, 2013.

56. Without a stable academic appointment to support her scholarship, and faced with publishers who expected her to write for free, or for little pay, Nair now requests subscriptions (priced at $2, $5, or $10 a month) from the readers of her personal blog. While it remains to be seen whether Nair’s subscription model will be successful, her case reminds us of the challenges that face academics who wish to engage an inchoate public
57. The JCI Scholar’s Program can be found at http://www.prisonsscholarsprogram.com. These ideals and this vision animate our own work in developing the Public Philosophy Journal (http://www.publicphilosophyjournal.org) as one such place where an enriching and articulated public might be cultivated.

WORKS CITED


