Analogical Animals: Thinking through Difference in Animalities and Histories

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ABSTRACT: This essay takes up practices of comparison and analogy between human populations and animals that have been so problematized in discussions of J. M. Coetzee’s work. Through readings of Derrida and Haraway alongside German novelist Uwe Timm’s *Morenga*, it argues that analogical structures function as simultaneous differentiations and de-differentiations that allow for both similarities and differences to emerge. Far from collapsing differences, analogical thinking in Timm’s novel allows for specificities to emerge, rendering the broad, generic category of *the animal* far more complex.

In 2005, the College Board, which administers high school students’ most dreaded exam—the SAT—dropped one of its most challenging sections: analogies. *New York Times* journalist Adam Cohen decried this move, pointing out that “[w]e are living in the age of the false, often shameless, analogy.”¹ Examples of this shamelessness include conservative activist Grover Norquist’s comparison of the estate tax with the Holocaust and Enron’s Kenneth Lay’s analogy between attacks on Enron and terrorist attacks on the United States. These types of misleading analogies operate as “the dominant mode of public discourse,” and thus, Cohen argues, “the ability to tell true analogies from false analogies has never been more important.”²

2. Ibid.

Analogies for Cohen—and many others in the humanities and sciences—are about logical thought. They are “the core of cognition” and rest at the center of building philosophical, scientific, legal, and political arguments in establishing the boundaries of knowledge and pushing toward new discoveries and perspectives. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising that analogical thinking has gotten such a bad rap in animal studies, an emerging interdisciplinary field of scholarly, activist, and artistic work that studies animals and human/animal relationships, with a focus on “questions of representation and agency” as literary scholar Susan McHugh notes. These questions, as one of animal studies’ leading figures, Cary Wolfe, argues, are not just about paying attention to animals; they are fundamentally about “destabilizing or throwing into radical question the schema of the human” and the humanist traditions that structure Western cultures.

Analogical thinking, many suggest, is humanist in its orientation and often uses human standards, histories, and practices to understand nonhuman entities and lives. For activists and scholars like Carol Adams (1995) and Donna Haraway (2008), among others, analogies collapse differences and efface the particularly located material and historical interactions that produce the lives and deaths of animals. Analogies are thus said to contribute to generic thinking about animals. Yet, analogies can also set the stage for more rigorous comparisons through which the specificity and historicity of different animalities might emerge. In what follows, I aim to show that analogical thinking is not merely about equating the terms of analogy; rather, it is about thinking through similarity and difference. I first examine Jacques Derrida’s uses of analogies in The Animal That Therefore I Am in showing that analogy is at the heart of his move


from the singular, generic “animal” to the multiple, heterogeneous “l’animot.”

After examining Derrida, I turn to Haraway’s *When Species Meet* and its approach to animal pain and death in science laboratories in critiquing the “killability” of instrumental, “faceless” animals. My discussions of Derrida and Haraway set the stage for my subsequent reading of the German novel *Morenga*, an account of German colonialism in South-West Africa at the turn of the twentieth century, published by Uwe Timm in 1978. The animals and animal deaths in Timm’s novel are a far cry from the calculated animal deaths in laboratories and slaughterhouses, but they are examples of large-scale exterminism. In reading Timm’s novel, I critically reassess analogical thinking when it comes to both animals and people: the tendency to liken colonial subjects to animals, the tendency to liken animals to children, the practice of describing animal deaths, particularly in the food industry, as genocides or holocausts. *Morenga*, I show, offers examples of analogical thinking that work multidirectionally to articulate a wide range of plural animalities and histories. My analysis of *Morenga* grounds my argument that analogy is crucial to finding nonhumanist ways of thinking about, narrating, and interacting with animals.

Animal studies has long been engaged in complicating generic understandings of the *animal*. One of the major sources for this work is Derrida’s *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, a collection that articulates the concept of *l’animot*. A play on the French words *animal* and *mot* (word), *l’animot* is central to Derrida’s critique of the Western philosophical tradition’s homogenized, monolithic use of the term *the animal* to stand in for any nonhuman creature. *L’animot*, a homophone for the plural *animaux*, is “an irreducible living multiplicity of mortals” that includes humans and catalyzes Derrida’s move away from the singular, generic *l’animal* and its traditional opposition to *the human.*

One of the central tensions in Derrida’s writing, which is crucial to thinking about analogies and animals, is that between *differentiation* and *de-differentiation*. Derrida’s *l’animot* is a move to de-differentiate humans and nonhuman animals; at the same time, it works towards differentiation through multiplicity. This tension is staged through analogy in Derrida’s text—albeit through a cautious analogy that draws attention to the plight of animals in systems of mass extermination (farming, industry, science, and so on)

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operating on an unprecedented scale. Derrida explains that in the face of these practices of violent “subjection,” people tend to “do all they can in order to dissimulate this cruelty or to hide it from themselves in order to organize on a global scale the forgetting or misunderstanding of this violence, which some would compare to the worst cases of genocide.” He goes on to note that “[o]ne should neither abuse the figure of genocide nor too quickly consider it explained away.” In other words, although this analogy is illustrative, Derrida cautions against using human genocide as a framework for understanding “the contemporary plight of animals” both because this move potentially undermines the histories and specificities of human genocides and provides an un-situated, facile explanation for the lives and deaths of animals in industrial societies.

From this cautionary note, he moves on to explain the “annihilation of certain species” through the quintessential analogy to Nazi genocide:

As if, for example, instead of throwing people into ovens and gas chambers (let’s say Nazi) doctors and geneticists had decided to organize the overproduction and overgeneration of Jews, gypsies, and homosexuals by means of artificial insemination, so that, being continually more numerous and better fed, they could be destined in always increasing numbers for the same hell, that of the imposition of genetic experimentation, or extermination by gas or by fire.

Derrida’s invocation of this analogy is hypothetical (“as if”); it is also a reversal of the traditional analogy. It conditionally reimagines the Holocaust through late-twentieth-century practices vis-à-vis animals in order to portray the ways in which animal extermination is not like the Nazi Holocaust. Here, Derrida thus both cautions against analogical thinking and recognizes its usefulness in pushing philosophical thinking about and with animals.

His use of the analogy between industrialized animal practices and the Holocaust stresses the fact that analogies have two terms. Thus, a comparison between animal extermination and the Holocaust operates in two directions: likening animal extermination to the Holocaust and likening the Holocaust to animal extermination. As Derrida’s inversion of the traditional order of the analogy shows, animal extermination in industrial cultures is, in some significant ways, not at all like Nazi practices during the Holocaust. In this way,
Derrida shows us that analogical thinking is very deliberately not about equating the terms of analogy, but rather about thinking multidirectionally through difference in a context of potential similarity.

Comparing anything to Nazi history, of course, relies rhetorically upon the absolute certainty that it is a horror that no one would condone replicating. To return to Cohen’s explanation of analogies, “[t]he power of an analogy is that it can persuade people to transfer the feeling of certainty they have about one subject to another subject about which they may not have formed an opinion.”\(^{12}\) In this case, Derrida invokes Nazi history to show that the processes behind animal reproduction, use, testing, and death are arguably crueler and more inhuman than Nazi practices vis-à-vis Jews; they are, in short, “alike in some ways and different in other ways.”\(^{13}\)

Derrida recognizes the emotional manipulation that such analogies perform and is quick to move out of “pathos” through an appeal to reason and common sense. “Everyone knows what the production, breeding, transport, and slaughter of these animals has become,” he writes.\(^{14}\) Instead of dwelling in material violence, he moves to the conceptual violence that inheres in collapsing the specificity of animals into the broad construction of \textit{the animal}. For Derrida, the physical and material violence that animals experience at the hands and machineries of human cultures is attributable to the nameless, faceless notion of the generic animal. Despite the crucial role that analogical thinking plays in Derrida’s arguments, scholars in animal and literary studies alike have tended to overlook it. This oversight is likely attributable to the fact that the analogy between the Holocaust and industrialized animal slaughter is one of the most contested in animal studies—for its “pathos,” in Derrida’s terms, and its usual association with human/animal “rights,” a hotly debated issue in the field.\(^{15}\)

Haraway has been one of the most outspoken voices against analogical thinking in animal studies, particularly in \textit{When Species Meet}, a book that examines a variety of human/animal encounters that produce animal deaths. Not unlike Derrida, she argues that it is not just killing animals, but making them killable as generic, faceless beings that is the central problem of the way the humanist tradition has constructed \textit{the animal}. In a chapter titled “Sharing Suffering,”

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  \item 12. Cohen, “An SAT Without Analogies Is Like” (above, n. 1).
  \item 13. Ibid.
  \item 15. The critique of rights-based discourse is now fairly widespread. One of the canoni-
she addresses animal suffering and death in laboratories that work to make discoveries to better human life. Haraway reframes animals in laboratories by approaching them not just as the useless victims of science, but as workers who are “response-able”: “People and animals in labs are both subjects and objects to each other in ongoing intra-action.”

This move is part of a larger project in animal studies to recognize animals as actors, if not agents in their own right. In the field, agency is considered to be “partial, local, limited” and situational for both humans and animals. Because agency and subjectivity are frequently functions of the traditional humanist subject, scholars have been deconstructing conventional humanist notions of absolute agency and subjectivity in arguing for the situatedness of agency, intentionality, and power. Thus, animal studies’ work about agency revolves around foregrounding “animals’ own novel forms of agency . . . [and] related abilities—in language, in reasoning” that are often obscured by humanist assumptions.

Haraway’s work highlights that animal objectification and oppression in the lab are the results of human unwillingness to see animals as able of response and interaction. As she writes, “instrumental relations of people and animals are not themselves the root of turning animals (or people) into dead things, into machines whose reactions are of interest but who have no presence, no face, that demands recognition, caring, and shared pain.” It is the assumption of unidirectional relations in the use of animals that ensures that they remain facelessly generic. For Haraway, as for Derrida and others, the discourse of “rights” for such human/animal relations is out of place because rights is a humanist discourse that effaces the specific modes of being of the animals who work with and for us. As Paul Patton notes in his contribution to Zoontologies, human/animal relationships are “hierarchical and communicative,” and as such are structured around “requirements and obligations [that]
are always specific to the beings involved.”

Given these structures, he argues (in the context of animal training) “that certain kinds of emphasis on equality in all contexts are not only misleading but dangerous.”

This line of thinking and argument among some scholars in animal studies has encouraged the development of two diverging movements: one group of activist, rights-inflected “critical animal studies” proponents follows in the footsteps of activists like Peter Singer and Tom Regan and the animal rights movement; another group of nonactivist scholars, wary of rights discourses and equality and often now considered to be engaging in “animality studies,” works in the tradition of Derrida, Haraway, and Wolfe. Animal studies remains an umbrella term for both branches of this recent animal-focused work.

For Haraway, the “answer” to unequal relationships between humans and animals is not to take animals out of labs. Her approach to lab animals underscores both the use-value of animals for science and the fact that giving animals a “face” is not about humanist notions of intrinsic value. She notes that “inequality in the lab is . . . not of a humanist kind . . . but of a relentlessly historical and contingent kind that never stills the murmur of nonteleological and nonhierarchical multiplicity.”

The suffering of animals is not human, but this does not mean that humans cannot share in animal suffering. Sharing suffering is about working with animals in ways that “never leave the practitioners in moral comfort, sure of their righteousness.” For both Haraway and Derrida, it is clear that animal suffering must be responded to and faced, rather than systematically effaced. Paying attention to asymmetries and differences is crucial, not to halting animal death, but to ensuring that animals become less “killable.”

As the Animal Studies Group (a collective of British scholars in the humanities) chronicles in Killing Animals, “[t]he killing of animals is a structural feature of all human-animal relations.” The vast array

24. Haraway, When Species Meet (above, n. 7), p. 77.
25. Ibid., p. 75.
of different forms of killing, and the meanings and taboos associated with them, highlights a point that Haraway also stresses: “[k]illing an animal is rarely simply a matter of animal death.”27 Some animals are more “killable” than others. Animals like rats, pigeons, and geese are often seen as “trash animals,” whereas the deaths of mammals (monkeys, cows, dogs) and other “charismatic megafauna” are frequently met with more horror and public outcry.28 Recently, for example, the February 2014 killing of a giraffe at the Denmark Zoo to prevent in-breeding provoked international outrage.

For Haraway, the use-value of many forms of animal deaths requires an emphasis on the “killability” of animals, and not just their deaths. The discourse of rights and its emphasis on intrinsic value obfuscates the “multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing . . . [and] the capacity to respond in relentless historical, nonteleological, multispecies contingency.”29 Rights discourses and their emphases on the humanist intrinsic value of animals often facilitate a distancing from real and immediate deaths and a covering up of death’s cultural necessity, which can increase the number and cruelty of animal deaths. As the Animal Studies Group points out, most animal rights and animal welfare movements “reinforce the taboos to ensure the normal invisibility of animal killing and to keep the implications of such killing even further from public consciousness.”30 For Haraway, the extermination of animals that the rights discourse is deployed to address is not a function of killing, but of making beings killable. “Perhaps,” she remarks, “the commandment should read, ‘Thou shalt not make killable.’”31 Part of this revision entails rigorously facing the inevitability of, and the responsibilities that come with, killing animals. To ensure dynamic, ethical relationships with animals, Haraway writes, “[h]uman beings must learn to kill responsibly . . . I do not think we can nurture living until we get better at facing killing.”32

27. Ibid.
31. Haraway, When Species Meet (above, n. 7), p. 80.
32. Ibid., p. 81.
This chapter of *When Species Meet* relies upon Haraway’s reading of J. M. Coetzee’s *Disgrace* (1999) and *The Lives of Animals* (2001), which both figure prominently in animal studies. They are a “touchstone” to the essays of Stanley Cavell, Cora Diamond, John McDowell, Ian Hacking, and Wolfe in their *Philosophy and Animal Life* (2008). Wendy Woodward’s analysis of southern African narratives in *The Animal Gaze* (2008) relies upon Coetzee’s works, which also appear in Wolfe’s *What Is Posthumanism?* (2010) and McHugh’s *Animal Stories* (2011). Coetzee’s books are a jumping off point for Anat Pick’s *Creaturely Poetics* (2011) and a primary inspiration for Kari Weil’s *Thinking Animals* (2012). Rare is the work in animal studies that does not contend with Coetzee. Haraway’s treatment of the novels is less extensive than others’, but is crucial to her discussion of killability—and to her critique of the use of analogies for thinking about animal death.

Although other scholars have discussed the layered nuances of Coetzee’s works in more complex terms, for Haraway, the difference between Coetzee’s novels lies in Elizabeth Costello’s uncritical embrace of the universalizing discourses of rights in *The Lives of Animals* as compared to the “face-to-face life with dogs and humans” portrayed in *Disgrace*, particularly in the context of characters escorting dogs to their euthanized deaths. Both books treat the intersections among racial histories, the subjection of animals, and the animalization of oppression. The self-righteous Costello, Haraway tells us, “inhabits a radical language of animal rights... She flinches at none of this discourse’s universal claims, and she embraces all of its power to name extreme atrocity. She practices the enlightenment method of comparative history in order to fix the awful equality

of slaughter. Meat eating is like the Holocaust; meat eating is the Holocaust.” The effacement of difference in such a position, for Haraway, perpetuates killability in its universalizing and totalizing language, which refuses to see specific human and animal lives.

Costello’s equation of meat consumption and the Holocaust is a reversal of Derrida’s invocation of that same analogy: instead of considering the terms of analogy as distinct and historically specific, Costello collapses meat consumption into the Holocaust. Although her comparative practices in Coetzee’s novels have garnered much critical attention, animal studies has largely ignored other possible forms of analogical thinking and comparison by privileging Coetzee’s character as the (negative) model for such thinking.

If Costello gives animal studies a crucial example of analogical thinking working in the service of universalizing discourses that flatten history and perpetuate generic notions of animal life and death, I want to turn now to a different novel that offers up analogical thinking that works multidirectionally to articulate a range of plural animalities and histories. Timm’s Morenga emerges from a different context than Coetzee’s novels, but it nonetheless raises some similar questions, particularly about the killability of animals and its relationship to analogical historical thinking and its potential values. In what follows, I provide a reading of alternative uses of analogical thinking about and for animals—one that is more in keeping with Derrida’s dialogic use of analogy in highlighting both similarities and differences between individual and collective animal and human lives and deaths.

The German novel Morenga, published in 1978 and translated into English in 2003, has held a significant place in German studies, but has not been read at all in the context of animal studies, despite the permeating presence of animals throughout the text.

41. This translation date coincides with the centenary anniversary of what Kristine Ziwika calls “two of Germany’s most bloody African episodes”: the first of which is the Herero war that Morenga addresses, and the second is the subsequent war in Tanzania. See Ziwika, “Undoing Germany’s Colonial Amnesia,” Deutsche Welle, September 15, 2004.
42. The single article in English that addresses the presence of animals in Morenga is Colin Riordan’s “‘Der Weg in die Zukunft’: Uwe Timm and the Problem of Political Ecology,” in Uwe Timm, vol. 1, ed. David Basker (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1999), pp. 66–81. It discusses the failure of ecosocialism in the novel, which Riordan claims to be a reflection of Timm’s own disillusionment with the student movements of the late 1960s.
Timm is a major contemporary German writer who has written historical novels, children’s books, and screenplays since the publication of his first novel in 1974. *Morenga*, a historical fiction about German colonialism in South-West Africa (current-day Namibia), was his third novel. Built on fragments of the veterinarian-protagonist Gottschalk’s diaries, historical and fictional flashbacks, and German and English military documents—the novel is noteworthy, in part, as a 2003 *New York Times Book Review* commentary by English writer Giles Foden notes, for its “lack of deep characterization”—that is, of course, of human characters. The main “character” of the novel, one might say, is “Germany’s little war” against the native Hereros, who revolted in 1904 under the leadership of the ambiguous figure Morenga. The novel covers a period from approximately 1850 to the end of the war in 1907.

Animals appear throughout the novel in each of the historical scenarios the book presents surrounding different human characters: Gottschalk, the veterinarian, who serves in the Herero war from 1904 to 1907; Gorth, the sheep-like missionary, who roams the protectorate in the 1850s; Klügge, the trader whose oxen drag a huge barrel of brandy across the desert to sell alcohol in various settlements in the 1860s; Treptow, the technophile land surveyor, whose work is facilitated by the draft oxen who pull him around the German territories in the 1880s and who plans to reroute the Nile through the Sahara to cause beneficial climate change. The novel jumps among these time periods frequently, with little tying them together other than geographic consistency, colonialism, and a genealogy of the animals who work with and for the humans from one time period to the next. It is this genealogy of human/animal relations in South-West Africa—invisible to the novel’s human characters—that structures the text. Although the human characters from the different historical periods in the plot are unconnected to one another, the animal characters across the time periods represented are related and bring the novel’s disparate historical moments and characters together.

Readers learn about this animal genealogy when Gottschalk is called to the aid of a cow, whose unborn calf is stuck in the birth canal, and he surgically removes the calf to save the cow. After the bloody procedure, Gottschalk asks one of the native African men to repeat the cow’s name, and we learn the following:

This passage highlights several points about the animals in *Morenga* and the humans who work with them. First, it stresses the fact that this “animal history” is unknown and unknowable to the humans in the novel, including Gottschalk, the character portrayed as caring the most about animal well-being. Timm’s novel predates the emergence of animal studies, but, as this passage suggests, it raises some of the challenges that animal studies scholars have addressed surrounding the notion of “animal history.” As Erica Fudge notes in her essay “A Left-Handed Blow: Writing the History of Animals,” one of the difficulties with conceiving of animal history is the fact that animals are “inarticulate” and therefore cannot leave documents behind. Any animal history is, therefore, by definition a history of human perceptions of animals. Fudge and other scholars suggest that “the history of animals . . . is impossible” as such.45

Despite this impossibility, scholars insist on the need to write the history of animals in the interests of working toward reconceptualizing the human. Fudge writes that “[t]he inevitable centrality of the human in the history of animals . . . need not be regarded as a failing, because if a history of animals is to be distinctive it must offer us what we might call an ‘interspecies competence’; that is, a new way of thinking about and living with animals.”46 This “new” pathway must lead to the end of a simple opposition between human and animal and to surrender notions of human exceptionalism and intrinsic value. Indeed, Fudge’s more recent monograph, *Bru-*
tual Reasoning: Animals, Rationality, and Humanity in Early Modern England (2006), argues for the centrality of animals in conceiving of the human and of human reasoning in the early modern period. The book exemplifies the inseparability of human and animal history. The presence of animals in historical and literary texts is not just figurative, she argues, and reading animals literally is about taking them seriously and “recovery[ing] animals from the silence of modern scholarship.”47 Human history in this work is inextricable from animals, and, likewise, animals are “recoverable” through human texts.

The animal history posited in Morenga is obviously channeled through the text’s human author, but the novel’s history of animals portrays them as both literal and figurative actors in human lives and texts. The animal histories in the novel provide an alternative to other forms of narrative structure and logic. For Morenga, as a historical fiction, narrative does not function chronologically, nor is it structured around human characters, events, and their relationships; instead, the novel multidirectionally envisions ways of telling history and stories through animal genealogies. What emerges is a decidedly nonlinear narrative that revolves around layers of different kinds of human/animal relationships and their specific asymmetries. Different animals and their histories in Morenga work toward envisioning different narrative structures, perspectives, and ways of narrating the past. As McHugh notes in Animal Stories, “other creatures become important not as supplements to human subject forms but rather as actors . . . shaping . . . a range of other narrative forms.”48

In narrating a story through animal genealogies, Morenga points to the limitations of traditional linear, humanist narrative structures. Timm’s novel is a testament to the fact that there is always more going on than humans can see or know. Yet, despite this ignorance, Morenga makes clear that human action is conditioned by a wide range of choices that have ethical and material ramifications for people and animals. Although Gottschalk is unaware of the history of the animals he comes into contact with, he nonetheless treats Soft-Mouth as an individual being with specific characteristics, including a name and a distinguishing appearance. Moreover, he is one of the few characters who does not treat her as “killable,” in Haraway’s terms. He cares enough to save her life, unlike most of the other Germans in Morenga. One of the other veterinarians,

Dr. Haring, comes upon Gottschalk performing the life-saving procedure on Soft-Mouth and asks: “What’s the point of all this bloody mess. . . . Why not just let the cow die?” Haring notes that as an “experiment,” the medical procedure is “quite interesting,” but it otherwise seems unnecessary. Speechless, Gottschalk can only reply: “The cow would have died.” This scene underlines the difference between the cow’s easy killability to Haring when compared to Gottschalk’s and the Hottentots’ clear regard for the animal as a life worth saving. For Gottschalk, this regard is about the cow’s intrinsic value, but for the Africans, it is about the cow’s practical value: the animals are usable currency.

These different stances vis-à-vis animals carry over to how the Germans and Gottschalk treat the native Africans. Morenga draws attention to the fact that the killability of animals, which translates into the killability of colonial subjects, is at the heart of the colonial mindset. Gottschalk, however, does not understand this from the beginning, even though the analogy and proximity between the Africans and animals are clear from the outset. Shortly after Gottschalk arrives in the German protectorate, he encounters two fenced areas—one of which contains cattle, and the other, captive natives:

The cattle were a pitiful sight, totally emaciated, many injured by thorns or bullets, with festering wounds. Bodies of dead animals lay scattered everywhere. The stench of carrion filled the air.

A large area next to the kraal had been enclosed with barbed wire. Sentries were posted in front with fixed bayonets. Beyond the fence Gottschalk could see people, or rather skeletons, squatting—no, something halfway between humans and skeletons. They huddled together, mostly naked in the piercingly hot sun.

Gottschalk is told that this fenced area is “our concentration camp.” On the fence hangs a sign that reads “Don’t feed the animals.” One of his first tasks is to find out why the cattle are dying. As becomes apparent, the cattle and the enclosed women and children are starving to death. Gottschalk initially believes the situation to be “an administrative oversight on the part of lower-level bureaucrats,” but he comes to find that it is a plan of systematic extermination.


50. The term Hottentot, used throughout the novel, is a deprecating, racist one that Europeans have used to refer to the Khoikhoi people of southern Africa. I use the novel’s terms throughout this essay for the sake of consistency and clarity.


52. Ibid., p. 18.
The extermination is obviously based on the assumption that the natives are not humans; therefore, they are animals and so killable. As Etienne Balibar observes, “every theoretical racism draws upon anthropological universals,” which take as their starting point the fundamental difference between humanity and animality. From the beginning of the novel, the native Africans are marked as animal-like, and more often than not, interchangeable with animals. Many of the German officers, for example, relish making the veterinarians oversee the execution of native prisoners: “When the rebel was lying on the ground, Schwanebach ordered the veterinarian [Gottschalk] to make sure the baboon was dead.” This interchangeability of the native Africans and animals, however, is also one of the ways in which the distinction between animality and humanity becomes destabilized.

Within the first forty pages of the novel, Gottschalk is told that the Africans are bestial and their women sexually “fantastic... completely immoral, total animals,” but soon he begins to notice that the Europeans themselves resemble animals. A general’s child is described as “black and hairy as a monkey.” As the war drags on, the German soldiers are compared to animals in their listlessness. In the historical flashbacks, Missionary Gorth looks like a sheep: “And not just any sheep, but, as rumors flying about the country for weeks had suggested, a fleecy Merino, which was still rare in this region. Was it his long chin, or the narrow bright eyes, or his slightly wavy, crinkly hair? As the stranger greeted the waiting Hottentots with a gentle smile, his face became even more markedly sheep-like.” In another flashback, the brandy-trader Klügge is an “elephant.” Gottschalk sees the German generals as dogs: their mustaches and attentive gazes reminding him of pointers. On the frontlines, those same generals become rabbit-like, “darting back and forth.” At one point, Gottschalk himself is compared to a frog.

55. Ibid., p. 17.
56. Ibid., p. 54.
57. Ibid., p. 71.
58. Ibid., p. 89.
59. Ibid., p. 164.
60. Ibid., p. 180.
61. Ibid., p. 201.
As the Germans come to resemble animals, so also, as Gottschalk remarks, does “[t]he external distinction between soldiers and rebels . . . [begin] to blur.” 62 Animality is at first deployed as a means of distinguishing the Africans from the Germans, but animals and animalities become what we might call the “common denominator” between both sides. This is so not only because both sides resemble animals, but because they are both in relationship with animals in ways that are characteristically “human,” even as this category becomes unstable. Morenga paints worlds of unequal, asymmetrical relationships between humans and animals, among humans, and among animals. Animals are parents, children, patients; they are sources of labor, food, goods, and aesthetic pleasure. While the novel reveals the colonial structures of the Germans’ interactions with the Africans, it also underscores that both the Africans and Europeans are marked human in their structural relationships to animals.

Although all the human/animal relationships in the novel are marked by inequalities, they are not mappable in simple terms. The Germans do not categorically treat animals as killable, and the Africans do not categorically treat them as individual lives. Under many circumstances, the German army does consider animals to be killable, as in the case of Soft-Mouth. In a parallel situation earlier in the novel, one of the captains, unable to mount his wildly thrashing horse, calls Gottschalk for a diagnosis. The veterinarian finds that the captain is wearing cologne to which the horse is likely allergic. This display of animal individuality and sensitivity, perhaps agency, is a marker of insubordination and the captain has “the horse shot, as unfit for duty.” 63 Later, however, a corporal riding through enemy lines has his horse shot out from under him: “As he reaches the battery, his horse collapses beneath him. They count seven bullet wounds. He sits down and cries. He’s ridden this horse since the revolt began.” 64 In this scene, a horse’s death occasions a very different response, one that is arguably more dramatic than the response to the simultaneous death of an assistant adjutant in the same battle, which leaves the colonel “noticeably upset” though not bereft.

Likewise, the Africans who safeguard Soft-Mouth are not always animal custodians. When ostrich feathers become fashionable hat adornments in Europe, the native tribes in the Bethany area employ their fastest horses to chase birds to death so that they can barter feathers for European goods: “Why didn’t they simply shoot this

62. Ibid., p. 34.
63. Ibid., pp. 41–42.
64. Ibid., p. 69.
docile bird? As far as they were concerned, it wasn’t worth the powder.65 Only when the birds are near extinction do the tribes consider other methods of attaining the feathers. In addition, the Hereros and the Hottentots engage in cattle wars, stealing cows from each other, frequently killing them in the process. But, as a trader explains to Klügge in his laying out of economic principles, “[t]he Hottentot tribes had to be convinced to move from stealing when forced to for food, to systematic cattle theft on economic principles.”66

Among both the Europeans and the Africans, human/animal encounters and the outcomes they produce are a function of the multiple, sometimes simultaneous differing roles that animals serve vis-à-vis humans: as “technologies” of war (in the case of horses), as sources of aesthetic objects (in the case of ostriches), as currency (in the case of both ostriches and cattle), and as food (in the case of cattle). These specific roles sometimes render animals killable when they fail to serve their prescribed purposes, but they also render them valuable.

In addition to serving as technologies, animals inspire the creation of new technologies in the novel, thus catalyzing human “progress.” Gottschalk, for example, develops a model for cow dentures: “There was no good reason to slaughter a healthy cow that gave good milk just because it had lost a tooth, although he realized this hectic pace [of the war] was killing more cows than had been lost in the last ten years due to broken teeth.”67 However ironic and useless the dentures may seem, not unlike Gottschalk’s procedure on Soft-Mouth, the innovation strives to save animal lives that remain productive and valuable in a certain economy.

This economy is not exclusively human-centered. The cows, for example, have a kind of “companion-species” relationship with the Hottentots, much like the one Haraway describes between dogs and humans in *The Companion Species Manifesto* (2003)68 and her subsequent essay “From Cyborgs to Companion Species” (2004).69 As we are told fairly early in the novel, via Gorth’s lead ox, the human/cow

65. Ibid., p. 135. For an extensive historical study of the ostrich-feather industry, see Sarah Stein’s *Plumes: Ostrich Feathers, Jews, and a Lost World of Global Commerce* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010).
67. Ibid., p. 209.
relationship emerged out of mutual agreement: “Hurt-Knee . . . the ancestor of all Hottentots . . . crept up to a cow that was groaning with pain because she had a thorn in her hoof. Then he pulled the thorn from her hoof and asked her to give him milk for it. The cow, called Dotsy, from whom all of us now in the yoke have descended, said to herself: It’s good to have someone who can pull a thorn from my hoof, and so she agreed.”70 This story, like Haraway’s discussion of lab animals, portrays the cows as actors in the relationship, rather than as mere victims or tools. The relationship is similar to Haraway’s account of dogs’ history with humans—with agency resting with the dogs in initiating an exchange that evolved into a companion-species relationship.

Even in the companion-species model, however, the relationship between humans and animals is one of use-value: the cow approaches the human because the cow can use the human, just as the human can use the cow. Thus, while human/animal encounters produce asymmetrical relationships in which humans have a power of life or death over animals, this is not always the case, and each human/animal encounter bears its own specifically defined histories and circumstances. As Haraway remarks repeatedly, in all cases—even ones resulting in animal deaths—“[t]he partners do not precede their relating,” and the relating is never “finished.”71

The relationships between humans and cows are clearly reconfigured under colonialism through the cattle theft between the Hottentots and Hereros in the time of Gorth and Klügge, and later in the constant movement of the Herero uprising. The relationships between humans and ostriches are redefined several times in one generation, the animals going from being wild and mostly ignored, to becoming an overnight commodity, to being a kind of protected species. Human/horse relations are also in the process of transformation, as the Germans seek to introduce camels to the region. (Camels, among a number of other species, including pigs—introduced to southern Africa by Gorth—are not native to the region.) Gottschalk is charged with testing the feasibility of camel farming in the protectorate because camels can travel longer distances with less water than horses. However, as a lieutenant explains, other technologies, in addition to other animals, stand to redefine the status of horses: “Admittedly a man felt aristocratic on a horse, but in fact the animal was an anachronism, dependent on water, meadow and mood, not to speak of such unponderables as the mating urge. The automobile

71. Haraway, When Species Meet (above, n. 7), p. 17.
had no such whims. It’s ridiculous the way we run all over the place with these stubborn oxen. Think of the possibilities an airplane offers.”72 These evolving technological developments, histories, and relationships, as well as the differences between species and between different populations of the same species, expose the fact that the notion of a singular, generic animal fails to account for individual animal lives and for animal and human history.

In all of these different histories, Morenga portrays many different forms of animality emerging from specific contexts and relationships. These different ways of being animal evolve not only in relationship with humans, but also in relationship with other animals of the same and different species. Oxen emerge from cattle, as the novel recounts; ostriches are chased down by horses; camels come in to be tested against horses. Animalities emerge in states of friction, to use Anna Tsing’s term, between and within species. Tsing’s use of friction defines the ways in which natures and cultures “are continually co-produced in interactions”—“the awkward, unequal, unstable, and creative qualities of interconnection across difference.”73 Her friction posits a postcolonial, biocultural account of global connection; for Tsing, as for Morenga, “history” as such is always multiple, emerging through multiple stories and species that intersect with and define one another.

In this historical sense, the animal is never separable from the human. Furthermore, these multiple animalities that are simultaneously within and parallel to Herero, Hottentot, German, Boer, and English human populations become a mode of telling history from multiple perspectives—histories of movements and relationships. What constitutes “humanity,” then, emerges in and with all of these animal narratives and analogies—and is equally fluid and open to redefinition. It is no accident that by the end of the novel, the human/animal divide is so ambiguous that animals have become humanlike: Gottschalk’s camel, for instance, “groans like a man” as it is shot down.74 In telling specific histories—stories that give animals “face,” to use Haraway’s term—Morenga portrays animals becoming human, in much the same way that humans come to resemble animals in their lack of “characterization,” to return to Foden’s observation.

In their self-conscious effort to define the human, necessarily against the animal, the novel suggests that humans continually land

back in the inseparability of humanity and different, plural animalities. In this dynamic, humanity itself is not only difficult to define, but necessarily heterogeneous—another set of historically and materially constituted relational animalities. For Morenga, as for Derrida and Haraway, both the human and the animal are categorical ways of seeing that disregard and devalue life as fixed and killable. The human and the animal, indeed, wind up having little to do with individual humans and animals, whose actions and relationships do not, in practice, conform to the fixity of these categories. Colonialism as a system lays bare these discrepancies through relationships that are simultaneously asymmetrical, violent, co-dependent, temporary, co-constitutive, productive, painful, and sometimes beautiful. In such a system, all the participants, regardless of species affiliation, share in different humanities and animalities in the specific, relational contexts in which they are continually redefined—sometimes by choice, but frequently not.

At stake here is not just species difference, but a process of simultaneous differentiation and de-differentiation between and within species. In the novel, animals and humans become increasingly alike, even as their particular names, stories, purposes, geographies, and so on emerge, defining them in ways that move beyond the generic human and animal. Categorical, racist, and species-based differentiation is supplemented through a different kind of differentiation, one that accounts for individual names, physical features, experiences, histories, relationships. Although the human/animal divide does not exist in some absolute way, the differences among human specificity, cow specificity, ostrich specificity, camel specificity, and so forth matters; it is a difference of historicity, location, and embodiment, and is not a difference limited to different species, but to different populations within those species as well. As Morenga notes at one point: “A Hottentot rebel’s horse has nothing in common with a policeman’s nag in Berlin.”

Getting at that specificity, the novel suggests, is only possible through juxtaposition, comparison, analogy. Morenga uses analogies between humans and animals, between different time periods (the German colonial period and Nazism), between different landscapes to make sense of a world that is constituted by encounters between different worlds. Analogy is the mode in which simultaneous differentiation and de-differentiation occurs because analogy troubles the difference between its terms and thus can force them into further refinement. For example, although Gottschalk begins the novel

75. Ibid., p. 126.
by saying that the South-West African landscape is “like the [German] Harz Mountains, but totally denuded and wrung dry,” this comparison gives way to the recognition that German thoughts and language do not match the southern African landscape: “Gottschalk brooded over the fact that one’s thoughts and words often failed to match the landscape, like pieces of luggage that proved impractical once they had been dragged along. For a time Gottschalk had the crazy idea of learning a new thought form from the landscape and the natives, one that would help him see everything differently.”

Here, the questionable analogy between South-West Africa and Germany, which at first effaces difference, ultimately pushes the differences between the landscapes into higher relief, calling for a new language and form of thinking. Analogy gives way to comparison, defining a mode of perception in which seeing through likeness is also about seeing difference.

The practice of analogical thinking—be it in comparing racial others to animals, animal slaughter to the Holocaust, or in comparing different historical periods—is controversial from the perspectives of human rights and of defining an ethical relationship to animals. Haraway argues against analogical thinking as collapsing “all of man’s others into one another.” Thus, she argues in favor of activist Adams’s notion of intersectionality from Neither Man nor Beast: Feminism and the Defense of Animals, which also opposes analogical thinking: “From a humanocentric perspective of oppressed peoples who have been, if not equated with animals, treated like animals, the introduction of animals to resistance politics suggests that, once again, even in resistance humans are being equated with animals. But again, this is a result of thinking analogically, of seeing oppression as additive, rather than comprehending the interlocking systems of domination.” As a feminist activist, Adams urges an intersectional view that does not take oppression of any one group as separable from other systems of oppression. For her, separability is the grounds of analogy or comparison.

Animal studies scholarship, even while displaying ambivalence toward analogical practices, on principle opposes the “humanocentric” perspective that Adams adopts in advocating for intersectionality—the perspective from which animality is lesser, lower, or simply

76. Ibid., p. 35.
77. Ibid., p. 199.
78. Haraway, When Species Meet (above, n. 7), p. 18.
79. Adams, Neither Man nor Beast (above, n. 6), p. 84.
bad; indeed, it points to that humanocentrism as a position to avoid. For many scholars in animal studies, the oppression of animals is the root cause of other systems of oppression. In her article “What Is Wrong with (Animal) Rights?” Kelly Oliver, like Adams, looks at the ways in which women have historically been compared to animals and then notes:

If women’s subordination is in part justified by comparing them to animals, then perhaps one reason why women’s liberation has continued to meet with resistance and continued to bump up against the “glass ceiling” is because of our attitudes toward animals and the deep patriarchal associations between women and animals. . . . Until we address the denigration of animals in Western thought, on the conceptual level, if not also on the material economic level, we continue merely to scratch the surface of the denigration and exploitation of various groups of people, from playboy bunnies to prisoners at Abu Ghraib who were treated like dogs as a matter of explicit military policy.80

I quote Oliver at length because this argument is often galvanized as the raison d’être for animal studies. If we can “fix” that oppression, we can fix them all. Oliver, like Morenga, clearly appeals to analogical thinking about oppression, even as she later points out that the discourse of rights is flawed because it depends on likeness between beings as a precondition for rights: “Just as feminists have asked why women have to be like men in order to be equal, we can ask, Why do animals have to be like us to have inherent value? The notion that man is the measure of all things is precisely the kind of thinking that justifies exploiting animals, along with women and the earth, for his purposes.”81 Here, too, even in affirming difference, Oliver uses analogy to extend what has been true of feminist arguments to animals.

Between Adams and Oliver, analogical thinking emerges as simultaneously necessary in moving beyond an anthropocentric point of view and undesirable in perpetuating comparisons that have been damaging to human populations. Oliver addresses this tension in discussing the problem with rights discourse. She notes that at some point, inevitably, the interests of different populations, be they human or animal, diverge, and it becomes impossible to guarantee rights to some people or animals without excluding others. To return to Gottschalk’s lifesaving procedure on Soft-Mouth, this dynamic is clearly at play. The calf must be sawed up—killed—and

81. Ibid., p. 217.
removed in order for its mother to live: both animals cannot be saved. The problem is further exacerbated because there is no way to determine which way, which choice is “right.” Oliver notes that the hazard lies in “assuming that we can calculate the incalculable, that we can decide the undecidable, that we can be certain about what is just, fair, equal, or right.”82 The debate over analogical thinking and its appropriateness in both animal studies and postcolonial studies is always caught between loyalties.83

This tension highlights what Derrida’s use of analogy, as we saw earlier, exemplifies: analogy is multidirectional and therefore is never only about similarity. The multidirectionality of analogy is, indeed, one of the ways in which it is intersectional, in Adams’s terms. Analogies between historical periods are not the same as comparisons between racialized human populations and a universal idea of the animal. While most scholars treat all analogical thinking as issuing from the same general precepts, historical analogies (between, for example, contemporary animal slaughter and the Holocaust) create trajectories different from analogies between a human population and a fixed notion of the animal. Historical analogies are what we might call “vertical,” even when part of their effect is to collapse the difference in time between their terms. And analogies that animalize populations are what we might call horizontal, even though the animalization of certain human populations entails a notion of “backwardness,” as if those racial Others issued from the past. The vertical is implicated in the horizontal and vice versa, but the two forms of analogy are not the same. This multidirectionality is what makes analogical thinking a layered form of intersectionality.

The analogies in Morenga attest to the overlaps between vertical and horizontal analogies, all while also pointing to their differences. The analogical animals in the novel lay bare the intersectional trajectories of oppression. Gottschalk’s encounter with the German
“concentration camp” upon his arrival in the protectorate exemplifies a horizontal analogy in the juxtaposition of the starving animals with the native peoples who are “halfway between humans and skeletons.”\(^{84}\) It also exemplifies a vertical analogy in the use of the term *concentration camp*—a term that clearly refers to a future beyond the novel’s historical scope, even though, as *Morenga* tells us, the concentration-camp notion comes from the British Boer War in South Africa (1899–1902).\(^{85}\) This vertical analogy, based in a historical recycling of a term, points to the inherent role of analogy in history by virtue of language and terminologies that get reused. This “problem” of language is one that Derrida’s coining of *l’animot* also raises, highlighting the ways in which words and their associated conceptual baggage often use us as much as we use them.

*Morenga* never has to make many historical analogical gestures because analogy is inherent in the language: in the term *concentration camp* and the theoretical racism that the novel lays bare over and over again. In addition to compiling different historically based fictional accounts surrounding different characters, *Morenga* contains a range of reproductions of historical documents that showcase the theoretical racism behind colonialism and other oppressions. For instance, there are several pages of official correspondence from the Archives of the Government of German South-West Africa in which officials debate the proper means and methods for flogging Africans (rope or hippo-hide whip?). One von Doering writes the imperial government in Windhoek, in 1906, as follows:

I wish . . . to suggest considering whether it might not be deemed appropriate to approach the Colonial Division of the Foreign Office with a suggestion to the effect that the hippo-hide whip be replaced as a means of punishment by a return to our traditional rope. . . . The blows of a hippo-hide whip almost inevitably tear gashes in the skin, and precisely in an area which is hardest for others to see, and particularly difficult to see for the injured man. It is therefore extremely difficult for the man who has been flogged to care for himself. . . . Flogging with a rope is a far different matter. . . . The consequences aren’t nearly so severe, they are milder, more humane and yet of more lasting pedagogical effect.\(^{86}\)


85. In *Hitler’s Black Victims* (New York: Routledge, 2002), Clarence Lusane furthers this history: “The phrase ‘concentration camp’ was first used by the Spaniards in their colonizing of Cuba, then was anglicized by the Americans, and employed again by the British during the Boer War” (p. 50). The Germans then adopted the term, first for the Herero in the early twentieth century, then for the Jews during the Nazi era.

Such passages exemplify both the very material considerations of colonial power and their connection to structures of pedagogical humanistic thought about what constitutes humane treatment (in this case, torture) of “inferiors.” These moments of theorizing the hierarchical violence inherent in humanism suggest that Timm’s narrative seeks to remind German, European, and ultimately international audiences that, as Pick articulates in *Creaturely Poetics*, “a resuscitation of humanism in the post-Holocaust task of remembrance is neither possible nor desirable.”\(^{87}\)

*Morenga* highlights the fact that humanism is and was a root cause not only of the Nazi Holocaust, but of many historical holocausts and practices of extreme violence because it is always engaged in seeking to pedagogically elevate “inferior” populations. Humanism depends on the constant reproduction of hierarchies, inequalities, and violence, and the project of “remembrance,” for Timm, is one that must look beyond the horizon of the recent past to see the inseparability of humanism and mass violence against both humans and animals. Thus, in the novel’s purview, *intersectionality* might be redefined as a modality of analogical thinking and comparison through which different oppressions, histories, and ways of being are invariably implicated in one another. Whereas for Adams one of the problems with analogical thinking is the fact that it posits separable terms/forms of oppression, for *Morenga* it is *inseparability* that grounds analogies between humans and animals and between different historical moments. The constant intertwining of modes of vertical and horizontal analogies highlights the intersectionality of oppressions—and humanism’s role in maintaining them.

Analogy, even when not explicitly drawn, is always present. Beyond the novel’s use of the term *concentration camp*, the only other analogy between German colonialism and the Holocaust comes in the form of several repeated warnings that Gottschalk receives for dreaming up his future in South-West Africa. “The Prussian army has no room for Jews or dreamers”\(^{88}\) other Germans tell him. Pascale Grosse has pointed out that scholars in Germany and the United States did not begin connecting German colonialism and the Holocaust until the late 1980s: “The scale of the Holocaust overshadowed previous events.”\(^{89}\) Since then, studies of German colonialism have provided counterarguments to exceptionalist views of the Holocaust—in terms of its scale and horror, as well as the exceptionalism of

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89. Pascale Grosse, qtd. in Ziwika, “Undoing Germany’s Colonial Amnesia” (above, n. 41).
Jewish experience during World War II. The planned extermination of the Herero from 1904 to 1907, which killed 50,000—leaving little more than 10,000 Herero in all of Africa—bears obvious resemblances to the Holocaust; but while that analogy may be a starting point for Morenga, it is not the novel’s end.

Instead, the uses of analogy in the novel are indicative of the impossibility of a singular, species-specific narrative of history. Historical juxtapositions between the times and animals of Gorth, Klügge, Treptow, and Gottschalk destabilize the centrality of any one of the periods, and also points to the inseparability of and intersectional relationship among the present (Gottschalk’s era), the past (Gorth, Klügge, and Treptow), and the future (the Holocaust). But even though different historical periods are inseparable, differences among them emerge. None of the periods map onto each other. The missionary, mercantile, and settler periods of colonialism are all different, but they all connect to the Herero war and past abuses informing the native revolt without relating in a simply causal way.

History in Morenga is analogical, because it is multidirectional, intersectional, and relational, much as different animalities are intersectional and relational and so simultaneously similar and different. While Morenga might well agree with Haraway’s position that “[d]ifferent atrocities deserve their own languages, even if there are no words for what we do,” its answer to the question of whether we should compare animal slaughter to the Holocaust might not be as categorical as Haraway’s and Adams’s. Indeed, it seems more in line with Derrida’s use of the analogy between animal extermination and the Holocaust: a staging of an encounter that draws likeness, as well as significant difference through multidirectional comparisons.

As we saw in the earlier example of Gottschalk’s comparison of the African landscape to the Harz Mountains of Germany, analogies in Morenga serve as preliminary definitions of relationships and ways of understanding when we may not, indeed, have words for what we do or see. Gottschalk’s later position of seeking to learn from the land and its people a new thought and language indicates a significant, perhaps even radical departure from his earlier analogical mode, at least in terms of his understanding of the African landscape. Analogical thinking about animals, however—defined by animals resembling humans, as well as humans resembling animals—permeates the novel through to its end. As we have already seen, these analogies function as mechanisms of de-differentiation, while


also performing differentiations between specifically characterized animalities and histories.

Analogical thinking, Morenga shows, is not necessarily a thinking without difference, or a thinking that collapses difference; rather, it can also be a way of thinking through differences so that the end-point is neither boundless difference nor complete equation. The “end” is a much more ambiguous stance. Animals are neither animal nor human, and they are both animal and human. The present is neither the past nor the future, and both past and future. But these terms are also not the whole story. Specific, individual animals are many more things than merely animal or human can account for, just as each particular time period or moment is always also quite different from any other time. Such a view might be intersectional in Adams’s sense, but only from the standpoint that the intersectional is also always-already implicated in the analogical—in fact, it emerges through it.

The categorical ambiguity that rests in this kind of intersectional analogical thinking emerges out of taking animals seriously—as historical actors whose lives and stories constantly intersect with human lives and stories. But it also emerges out of taking literature seriously—as a form of narrating histories and lives from multiple perspectives that might not otherwise be available in, say, philosophical or biological writing. Literary analogy recognizes both the difficulty of drawing clear-cut lines between species and historical periods and the necessity of doing so. Morenga’s analogical animals, indeed, constantly raise one of Oliver’s central points: How can we be certain where the line falls between these like and unlike beings, times, things? We cannot be, and analogical thinking in literature, Morenga shows, can allow us to dwell in ambiguity without a clear answer. That ambiguity is perhaps truer to history and animals—human and otherwise—whose lives and realities are always emerging in layers of relationality.

What animal studies may uncover with greater urgency and force than any identity-based field that studies oppression and different definitions of humanity is the uncertainty underlying all of our very human categories that name both real, lived differences and imagined ones. The project that Derrida, Haraway, and others have pursued in complicating the generic human and animal relies upon critical approaches to language and conceptual figures. These figures point to the need for simultaneous differentiation and de-differentiation that collapses generic, categorical universals in favor of specific, located animalities and relationalities. Analogies are crucial to the possibility and the process of descriptions that might be faithful
to the living entities that people the planet. The question, then, is perhaps not should we compare—humans and animals, meatpacking and the Holocaust, and so on—but rather what comparisons can we best think, see, and speak through, as well as in?

As Cohen’s lamentation of the College Board’s elimination of analogies from the SAT reminds us, analogical thinking is a foundational cognitive function, one that provides pathways for understanding new and different perspectives through comparison. Indeed, despite its contested role in animal studies, analogies have often structured the field’s framing of its work.92 Their function as a mechanism of differentiation and de-differentiation makes them crucial figures for scholars in the field. The potential values of analogy in literary texts like Morenga may also point to the crucial role of literary studies in animal studies more broadly.

As I hope to have made clear, analogical practices need not be read or practiced in the tradition of Enlightenment comparative history that Haraway so criticizes in Costello’s equation of meat consumption with the Holocaust. Indeed, Morenga’s multidirectional analogical animals exemplify decidedly nonhumanist comparative practices that put pressure on the categories and histories that humanism and humanist thought take for granted in order to open up ways of maintaining simultaneous similarity and difference. Much as animal studies has worked to deconstruct singular, generic understandings and approaches to the animal, so too should scholars, literary and otherwise, pay heed to the fact that not all analogies and analogical practices function in the same ways or toward the same ends. Analogies are, in this sense, like animals and animalities—specifically, historically and contextually defined creatures that draw out both similarities and differences in the terms and contexts they bring together. This simultaneous similarity and difference is the true potential and value of analogical thought to animal studies, and, indeed, to the public sphere.

It is not just, as Cohen notes, that analogy is about logical, rational thought without which the American public might not be able to recognize “false analogies”; it is, rather, that all analogies are both true and false in some ways that it is our task to discern. It is true that industrialized animal practices are like the practices of Nazi

92. Haraway’s work, from the cyborg to the companion species, is deeply figurative and metaphorical in ways that overlap with Morenga’s uses of analogies. Wolfe has also taken up Derrida’s analogy between the Holocaust and contemporary animal slaughter. See, especially, Donna J. Haraway, “Introduction: A Kinship of Feminist Figurations,” in The Haraway Reader (above, n. 69), pp. 1–6; and Wolfe, Animal Rites (above, n. 15), p. 190.
concentration camps; it is also true, as Derrida’s use of that analogy reveals, that Nazi concentration camps were not like contemporary industrialized animal practices. Those simultaneous, seemingly contradictory truths are what make analogical thinking—about animals, humans, and histories—useful in recognizing the always-already unstable and uncertain natures of human understandings and knowledges of ourselves, animals, and the many other life forms that constitute the worlds we inhabit.