• Applied relativism and Davidson's arguments against conceptual schemes

    Author(s):
    Lajos Brons (see profile)
    Date:
    2011
    Subject(s):
    Analytical philosophy, Philosophy
    Item Type:
    Article
    Tag(s):
    Donald Davidson, Conceptual Schemes
    Permanent URL:
    http://dx.doi.org/10.17613/M6PM42
    Abstract:
    This paper argues that Davidson's argument against conceptual schemes fail against so-called "Applied Relativisms", i.e. theories of conceptual relativism found outside philosophy such as Whorf's. These theories make no metaphysical claims, which Davidson seems to assume. Ultimately, the misunderstanding (and resulting strawman argument) illustrates (the effect of) differences in conceptual scheme more than that it undermines it.
    Metadata:
    Published as:
    Journal article    
    Status:
    Published
    Last Updated:
    4 months ago
    License:
    All Rights Reserved

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