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Animal Humanism: Race, Species, and Affective Kinship in Nineteenth-Century Abolitionism

Brigitte Nicole Fielder

In the antebellum United States, attempts to exclude nonwhite people from the category of the human illustrated why humanist arguments, such as the iconic antislavery question “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?,” became necessary to combat racism and slavery.

Figure 1.

“Am I Not a Man and a Brother?,” title page, *The Life and Adventures of Oaudah Equiano* (New York: Samuel Wood & Sons, 1829). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

As abolitionists were well aware and historians have shown, comparisons between people of African descent and nonhuman primates were often made in arguments meant to justify enslavement and imperialism.¹ Proponents of scientific racism held black people to be closer than white people to nonhuman primates in the Linnaean “Great Chain of Being,” closely intertwining hierarchies of race and species.² Countering the “animalization” of enslaved black people, abolitionist arguments frequently insisted on the humanity of the enslaved, often by likening them to free white people and answering the rhetorical question “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” with an emphatic “Yes.” Asserting the similarity of enslaved black people to free white people thus became a prominent tactic of abolitionist literature, which used this stipulated sameness as an assertion of interracial national kinship and an imperative for feeling across racial lines.

However, even as nineteenth-century discussions emphasizing the humanity of black people served as arguments against their enslavement, other abolitionist arguments employed animals as points of familiar reference, in cross-species comparisons that were also meant to garner interracial sympathy.³ Some abolitionist children’s literature, especially, deployed this strategy, using domesticated animals to mediate their readers’ sympathy for enslaved people. This model of sympathy, which is not dependent on articulations of sameness, is a more progressive model for affective sympathy and kinship because (unlike the other prominent models of abolitionist sympathy) it has the potential for promoting such affective relationships across acknowledged positions of difference.

Kelly Oliver has recently noted that stranded “Katrina dogs” received more sympathetic attention in US media coverage of Hurricane Katrina than African Americans similarly stranded in New Orleans, “seemingly because many white Americans can feel more sympathetically toward dogs than they can toward African Americans.”⁴ The problem Oliver and others have noted in this apparently misplaced sympathy lies in the question of whether this affective prioritization amounted to a valuation of dogs over black people. I contend that the problem is more complex than this explanation allows. The question of valuation, though legitimate, works against the abolitionist model of humanistic sympathy-through-sameness described above. Sympathy for nonhuman animals (particularly for nonprimates) is not dependent on sameness alone. Rather, I argue that this sympathy has more to do with notions of proximity or familiarity. If some white people felt more keenly for the dogs than they did for the African American people who were displaced by Katrina, this was not necessarily because they believed the dogs to be more similar to themselves than to black people. The problem is not that some white people

cared about Katrina dogs. It is that they did not also care about poor, African American people. To be clear, the prioritization of Katrina dogs over the human residents of New Orleans is a problem inflected by racism and classism. However, the widespread popular sympathy for Katrina dogs indicates that perceived similarity is not a prerequisite for sympathy, as many popular abolitionist texts assumed. For this reason, sympathy that can be transferred across species difference also has the potential to be transferred across racial difference, even though it was not in the case Oliver discusses.

In the antebellum United States, the apparent similarity of enslaved black people to free white people was most prominently emphasized through depictions of mixed-race heroes and heroines. Believing that their audience would find such characters inherently more sympathetic to their white (predominantly Northern) readers by virtue of their resemblance to them, popular abolitionist writers such as Lydia Maria Child, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and William Wells Brown employed mixed-race characters to garner white sympathy. The particular horror of “white slavery” in the enslavement of people who resembled white ideals of physical appearance, speech, and Christian education illustrated the potential danger of enslavement for people who believed themselves to be beyond the dangers of that race-based system.

While the enslavement of mixed-race (and especially visually “white”-looking) people was a reality of the “peculiar” institution, this tactic has been long critiqued for its model of how sympathy is conveyed. This strategy assumed that characters who more closely resembled white people in these ways were more likely to elicit sympathy from white readers than black characters who did not. Literary critics have rightly acknowledged the problem with a model of sympathy that made readers’ recognition of similarity or sameness a prerequisite for sympathetic affect.⁵ A more progressive model of sympathy would not depend on similarities but allow for sympathy’s transfer across positions of clear difference. This essay examines antebellum abolitionist literatures in which this more progressive model of sympathy—one that moves across acknowledged positions of difference—becomes possible. Emphasizing enslaved people’s humanity and their distinction from nonhuman animals was not abolitionism’s only way of referring to animals, and not all abolitionist arguments depended on a model of sympathy that necessitated the sympathizer’s similarity to the enslaved. Abolitionist children’s literature published between the 1830s and the 1860s, for example, often employed animals in comparison with—rather than in distinction from—enslaved black people, with an effect distinctly different from the comparisons of scientific racism.⁶ Although this strategy is also present in abolitionist literature for adults, in the abolitionist

children's literature discussed here, the affective rhetoric is prominent and clear, remaining in the foreground rather than existing as an accompaniment to other arguments against enslavement. I read abolitionist children's literature in which affective relationships are possible despite differences in race and species in order to show how this difference-based model of abolitionist sympathy worked against the more prominent sameness-based model.⁷

Unlike the prioritization of sympathy for mixed-race people, the model of sympathy present in these animal-focused abolitionist stories and poems for children is more in line with progressive notions of antiracism that appreciate difference, rather than call for its erasure. The fact that sympathy might sometimes be more easily felt across positions of difference than similarity (as in the case of the Katrina dogs) discounts what some abolitionist writers assumed about their white audiences. By examining this model of sympathy, we might be able to understand why many white Americans had more sympathy for dogs than for African American people affected by Katrina, while rejecting the racist notion that dogs were *necessarily* better able to elicit white sympathy. Additionally, understanding how sympathy may be conveyed across positions of difference opens up possibilities for both antiracist discourse and human-animal studies. When we ask for whom one can have sympathy, we must look beyond comparisons between beings, and the hierarchies that accompany them. I present abolitionism as one version of humanism, in its dependence on the category of the human for an ethics of interracial relations, arguing that comparisons of humans and other animals—primarily pets—have the potential for a more productive discussion of sympathy.⁸ Despite their failings, the texts I discuss present a model of sympathy that, by refusing to view difference as foil to sympathy, has the potential to resist hierarchies of race and species.

Abolitionists and Animals

Theories of scientific racism provide one prominent racialized use of animals, embedded in derogatory comparisons of nonwhite people with nonhuman primates, especially. Neel Ahuja laments what he has deemed “the conflation of race and species” in animal studies, which he claims “often assimilates racial discourse into species discourse, flattening out historical contexts that determine the differential use of animal (and other) figures in the process of racialization.”⁹ For nineteenth-century American readers, however, popular understandings of race were informed by theories of scientific racism, which rendered race and species never fully extricable from each other. The evocation

of species in racialized discourse does not simply “assimilate race critique into species critique, taking animalization as the generic basis of racism,” then, but is evidence of an overlapping discourse of difference, which simultaneously hierarchizes both race and species in a single “Great Chain.”¹⁰

The illustration comparing classical “Greek,” “Negro,” and “ape” profiles, from Josiah Nott and George Gliddon’s 1854 *Types of Mankind*, demonstrates the combined hierarchization of race and species in nineteenth-century taxonomies (see fig. 2).

Figure 2.

Josiah Nott and George Gliddon, *Types of Mankind* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippencott, 1854). Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

In this brand of scientific race theory, made popular in the United States by writers such as Nott, Gliddon, Samuel Morton, and Louis Agassiz, references to animals in racialized discourse were not mere metaphor. Rather, this “animalization” of racial others speaks to the very construction of race as a concept, that is, as a mode of difference akin to differences in species. As this illustration suggests, nineteenth-century scientists entertained questions of whether racial differences constituted species differences. The ideology of chattel slavery, therefore, depended on a theorization of racial difference akin to speciesism, marking nonwhite people as evolutionarily different from white people.¹¹

The rhetoric of scientific racism shows us why conventional humanist arguments were necessary to reframe ideologies of racial difference. By comparing the racial other to the animal other, human rights could be more easily denied within Enlightenment scientific and philosophical hierarchies that prioritized the category of the human. Abolitionist texts responded to the racialized animalizations of scientific racism, invoking animals instead to articulate humanist arguments about race and emphasizing the categorical difference between slaves and animals.

Abolitionist arguments about enslaved people’s humanity had two main parts. The first was a simple articulation of humanity: slaves are not animals, but people. This point registers most iconically in the Josiah Wedgwood antislavery medallion, but was also present in abolitionist children’s literature of the antebellum period. A conversation from *The Young Abolitionists; or Conversations on Slavery* (1848) illustrates this point with a child who asks, “The slaves are people, mother, are they not?,” and a mother who replies, “Yes, they are men and women.”¹² The mother’s expansion on this yes genders enslaved people as “men and women.” By adding gendered specificity to the categories slaves and people, she hints at the fact that enslaved people are not a homogeneous group. This gendering therefore signifies individualization. While the categories men and women might create a problematic binary, the extent to which enslaved black people were denied claims to any positive associations of masculinity and femininity indicates how recognizing enslaved people as “men and women” was a significant, humanizing gesture.

The second humanist abolitionist argument indicated animalization as a particular mistake of enslavement: the American system of chattel slavery, by definition, treated people *as though* they were animals, and this was one of its many moral problems. Scenes in which the conditions of enslaved people are compared with those of livestock abound in abolitionist literature, with the implication that humans ought not to live under the same conditions as animals and ought not to be similarly commodified. In one popularly circulated

example, Sojourner Truth recounts that she and other enslaved people were relegated to “sleeping on those damp boards, like the horse, with a little straw and a blanket” and that later, when sold at auction for the sum of one hundred dollars, that “she [had] an impression that in this sale she was connected with a lot of sheep.”¹³ Children’s abolitionist literature made similar comparisons, as can be seen in an analogy from Ann Preston’s antislavery collection, *Cousin Ann’s Stories for Children* (1849). “Tom and Lucy: A Tale for Little Lizzie” narrates the sale of a black, enslaved girl:

Her master took the trader’s gold;—
Such wicked things they do;
Just like a calf was Lucy sold,
Though she was good as you.¹⁴

The poem seeks to break down racial hierarchies in comparisons that would treat a black child “like a calf” (i.e., saleable), instead comparing enslaved black children to free white children. “Tom and Lucy” makes this comparison a matter of valuation, telling its readers that Lucy “was [as] good as you” and implicitly indicating the problem of her sale by assuming that its readers would recognize the immorality of selling white children like themselves.

To counteract the prominence of racist comparisons between animals and nonwhite people, abolitionist literature was fairly saturated with examples like these. It therefore seems that comparisons of enslaved people with animals might counteract the abolitionist project of humanizing the enslaved. Common household pets, however, offered a point of recognition for Northern, white, child readers, most of whom were likely to have had little or no interaction with either enslaved or free black people. Because pets had become common by the nineteenth century, certain kinds of domesticated animals—most notably cats, dogs, and birds—were familiar to many middle-class white children.¹⁵ I turn next to the rhetorical moments in which abolitionist texts emphasize similarities between animals and the enslaved, a genre in which animals and enslaved people appear interchangeable. I am concerned with how comparisons of animals and enslaved people can mediate across, not simply substitute for, lines of race and species. But first we must examine the possibilities and limits of substitution.

A commonly held belief that still persists about animal cruelty is that it might easily slip into violence toward humans. In the antebellum period, this belief resulted in similar—sometimes simultaneous—instruction of children in kindness toward animals and people.¹⁶

Children's literature against animal cruelty and children's abolitionist literature are related both historically, through the overlapping social movements for abolitionism and animal welfare in the United States and England, and generically, in their shared sentimental approaches to evoking readerly sympathy.¹⁷ Before the animal welfare movement reached full speed in the late nineteenth century, the similarities of abolitionist and animal welfare rhetorics were visible in antebellum texts that emphasized the relation between how people treat animals and how they might treat other people.

An episode in Harriet Beecher Stowe's 1852 novel *Uncle Tom's Cabin* illustrates popular beliefs about the connections between cruelty—and sympathy—toward animals and the enslaved.¹⁸ We observe this in Stowe's model of white, Northern, middle-class womanhood, Mrs. Bird. While Mrs. Bird was "generally the most indulgent and easy to be entreated of all mothers," we read that "still her boys had a very reverent remembrance of a most vehement chastisement she once bestowed on them, because she found them leagued with several graceless boys of the neighborhood, stoning a defenceless [*sic*] kitten."¹⁹ Stowe does not recount this episode to explicitly promote animal welfare but rather to illustrate Mrs. Bird's capacity for interracial sympathy. Her sympathy for the kitten provides a partial explanation for her sympathy for Eliza Harris, an enslaved woman who has emancipated herself and her son, Harry, whom Mrs. Bird harbors in defiance of her legal obligation (by virtue of the Fugitive Slave Act) to assist in their reenslavement.

Mrs. Bird's protection of the kitten and of Eliza and her son are rendered comparable by the juxtaposition of these similar reactions to "anything in the shape of cruelty."²⁰ While pairing Mrs. Bird's sympathy for the kitten and for the enslaved indicates both her similarly directed humanity and the shared histories of the antislavery and animal welfare movements, it also serves as an example of abolitionist comparisons of enslaved people and animals. Although elsewhere Stowe's text prioritizes mixed-race characters such as Eliza and Harry as particularly able to garner white sympathy by virtue of their resemblance to white people, the episode of Mrs. Bird and the kitten does not suggest that her sympathy for the animal is dependent on this kind of likeness to herself.

Stowe's juxtaposition of Mrs. Bird's interspecies and interracial sympathy was not unique in the nineteenth century. The logic of this kind of literature, as Colleen Boggs explains, allows "animals [to] mediate liberal subjectivity" through a "didactic ontology" invested in "the practice of teaching children how to be human by teaching them to be humane."²¹ A similar example of this ontology in abolitionist children's literature is Mary Martha Sherwood's 1831 *The babes in the wood of the New World*, which depicts a child's similar

instruction in kindness toward dogs and slaves. The child narrates an adult's preparation for seeing enslaved people for the first time: "Then they told me that I should see some people behaving very cruelly to them [slaves], but that they hoped I would try to shew [*sic*] them every kindness in my power; and my aunt Lucy reminded me of the blow which she had once given me because I had hurt a poor dog."²² Here previous instruction against hurting a dog is meant to show that unkindness to slaves is similarly immoral (and, perhaps, that it would be similarly punished).

This story, like Stowe's episode, indicates that both animals and enslaved people might be read as objects of readerly sympathy and that both inspired similar action. In this respect, the rhetorics of abolitionism that promote the freedom of certain kinds of animals and those promoting the freedom of enslaved people look remarkably similar. In effect, enslaved people and captive animals become interchangeable in certain stories. To illustrate the extent of this interchangeability, it is worth noting that, while some abolitionist stories (like Stowe's and Sherwood's, above) present instruction in how one ought to treat animals as a model for learning to treat the enslaved, others used abolitionist rhetoric to indicate how one ought to treat certain animals.

With the historical connections between abolitionism and animal welfare in mind, it is easy to understand how the cause against animal cruelty appropriated the genres and rhetorical structures of abolitionism. However, explicitly abolitionist literature for children already contained the roots of animal welfare literature in its common slippages between enslaved people and captive animals. This slippage is apparent in another poem from Preston's *Cousin Ann's Stories for Children*, about a young boy keeping a squirrel as a pet. "Howard and His Squirrel" reads as an anti-animal captivity story framed by the explicitly abolitionist language of slavery and freedom:

But Howard thought he should not like
 A little slave to be;
 And God had made the nimble squirrel,
 To run, and climb the tree.

 A bird or squirrel in a cage
 It makes me sad to see;
 It seems so cruel to confine
 The creatures made so free.²³

In Eliza Cabot Follen's *Hymns, Songs and Fables, for Children* (1831), more explicitly abolitionist texts such as "Remember the Slave" and "The Little

Slave's Wish" are accompanied by the "Soliloquy of Ellen's Squirrel, on Receiving his Liberty;—Overheard by a Lover of Nature and a Friend of Ellen." The squirrel tells Ellen that

The thought that you have set me free,
That I can skip, and dance like you,
To your kind, tender heart, shall be
As pure a joy as e'er you knew.²⁴

The idea that certain kinds of animals ought not to be kept captive abounds in Northern antebellum children's literature, and the similarities between abolitionist and anti-animal captivity stories make texts like this one and Follen's "Billy Rabbit to Mary," also included in this volume, look very much like other abolitionist writing. Presented as a letter written by a self-emancipated rabbit to the child who had tried to domesticate him, Billy Rabbit muses on his joyful freedom:

To him, who a hole, or a palace inhabits,
To all sorts of beings, to men, and to Rabbits,
Ah, dear to us all, is sweet Liberty,
Especially, Mary, to you and to me.²⁵

While these poems might very well be read as animal welfare literature, they have been commonly regarded as abolitionist texts.²⁶ The animals in these poems stand in for, or appear interchangeable with, enslaved people: their condition of captivity alludes to the similar condition of enslaved African Americans in the 1830s and 1840s, although they contain no direct reference to or representation of enslaved people. "Howard and His Squirrel" appeared in the same collection alongside "Tom and Lucy," implying that, while some animals might be sold "like a calf," others are wrongly held captive. Follen's "Soliloquy of Ellen's Squirrel" and "Billy Rabbit to Mary" were accompanied by "The Little Slave's Wish," in which an enslaved boy compares his condition with that of animals who are free, wishing he was a bird, a butterfly, or a deer, rather than an enslaved person.²⁷ These poems' publication in an abolitionist collection and their clearly abolitionist rhetorics indicate not only the relatedness of the animal welfare and abolitionist movements and their respective bodies of literature but also constitutes a slippage between the two. Put simply: these poems read like other abolitionist texts, but slaves have been replaced with animals.

Moreover, similarities between how animals and enslaved people appear in these texts rendered stories about kindness to animals and kindness to enslaved

people *uncomfortably* similar.²⁸ As Leslie Ginsberg acknowledges, children's stories about the emancipation of animals also countered proslavery arguments that sentimentalized relations between slaveholders and enslaved people figured as beloved pets.²⁹ Still, comparisons of people and pets also risked reinscribing racist arguments about enslaved people's dependence on white benevolence and the necessity of interracial stewardship.

A story by Louisa May Alcott in the juvenile periodical *Our Young Folks* illustrates these problems. In "Nelly's Hospital" (1865), a young girl endeavors to nurse sick or injured animals. The story is reminiscent of Alcott's *Hospital Sketches* or the well-known "My Contraband / The Brothers" (1863), as Nelly frees a black fly from a spider's web:

Nelly had heard much about contrabands, knew who they were, and was very much interested in them; so when she freed the poor black fly, she played he was her contraband, and felt glad that her first patient was one that needed help so much. Carefully brushing away as much of the web as she could, she left small Pompey, as she named him, to free his own legs, lest her clumsy fingers should hurt him; then she laid him in one of the soft beds with a grain or two of sugar if he needed refreshment, and bade him rest and recover from his fright, remembering that he was at liberty to fly away whenever he liked, because she had no wish to make a slave of him.³⁰

Later we learn that "the winged contraband had taken Nelly at her word, and flown away on the journey home."³¹ While young Nelly's play seems innocent enough, there remains something unsettling about the comparison of a black fly—an animal generally considered a pest—and a black "contraband" soldier. Still, the comparison inserts into this story an antislavery sentiment that seems extraneous to the text, but on which Nelly's treatment of the fly is predicated.

"Nelly's Hospital" displays an attitude toward creatures found in the wild similar to the stories of Preston's and Follet's freed squirrels and rabbits: the belief that animals, like people, ought not to be held in captivity against their will. At face value, these comparisons do not evoke the necessarily derogatory associations that scientific theories of racism create through their hierarchical taxonomies of humans and animals—or, at least, they do not seem derogatory to the same extent. In these stories, neither animals nor nonwhite people are portrayed negatively, exactly, though both serve as vehicles to instruct the assumedly white, middle-class children who read these depictions. Such animal-human comparisons function within the space between abolitionism's tendency to insist on the necessity of white benevolence for emancipation and, as "Nelly's Hospital" suggests, the project of positioning animal welfare as the next frontier of white, middle-class social justice movements.

Animal–Human Mediation

These uncanny resemblances between stories about animals and abolitionism were not lost on nineteenth-century readers. On the contrary, some abolitionist texts depended on these resemblances to make comparisons very different from those of scientific racism. Rather than reduce nonwhite people to the lower status of animals, they used the particular status of beloved animals—family pets—to compensate for what they viewed as a potential failing of white, Northern sympathy: the inability to feel across racial lines. While some of the most popular antebellum abolitionist writers have been criticized for their use of mixed-race characters to garner sympathy from white readers who may or may not have been incapable of sympathizing with dark-skinned African American characters, some abolitionist writers did not rely on enslaved characters' resemblance to white readers for sympathy. Not simply displacing figures of enslaved people and replacing them with anthropomorphized animals (as Ellen's Squirrel and Billy Rabbit do), the stories discussed below used the familiarity of family pets to mediate readers' sympathy across lines of both race and species.

The Lamplighter Picture Book is an 1855 revision of Maria Susanna Cummins's 1854 sentimental novel *The Lamplighter*. *The Lamplighter Picture Book* reframed Cummins's novel (which is not generally viewed as an abolitionist text) for a younger audience and reoriented it toward an abolitionist cause. Composed of selections from Cummins's original text interspersed with antislavery poetry, the picture book centers on the story of young Gerty, who is orphaned, unloved, and abused by her guardian until a kindly, Christian lamplighter rescues her.³² The book's introductory stanzas first present the overarching abolitionist ambition of the text: "Not alone by little Gerty / Is the telltale muse inspired."³³ The story of Gerty's suffering is framed in parallel to the suffering of enslaved people, as an early poem asks that

Ye who sigh as from these pages
 Gerty's sorrows you may learn,
 Ne'er forget the bondman's sadness,
 Never from his pleadings turn.³⁴

Throughout the book, one reads about and sympathizes with Gerty, and in the accompanying poetry is invited to compare her position as an abused child with that of enslaved and self-emancipated people. Gerty falls just short of making this comparison, herself, in another poem, "Gerty in the Wood Yard," where we read,

At times a snow-white sail she spied,
 Far out upon the sea,
 And queried if a soul on board
 Was sorrowful as she;
 She knew not that there might be slaves,
 For freedom sighing or their graves.³⁵

Although Gerty does not know that the ships she sees may be carrying human cargo, the comparison between herself and these unknown passengers is implied, as the reader might surmise that the enslaved were, indeed, “sorrowful as she.” One might expect that the text’s initial comparison of the orphaned child to the enslaved person would continue, explicitly associating Gerty with enslaved black people. But no enslaved characters venture closer to Gerty than when she spies the “snow-white sail . . . far out upon the sea.”

Moreover, this cross-racial comparison is complicated by another—cross-species—comparison in the text. Also in the wood yard, Gerty first encounters the stray cats with whom she sympathizes and with whom the narrative also identifies her. The cats are described as “frightened looking creatures, who, like Gerty herself, crept or scampered about, and often hid themselves among the wood and coal, seeming to feel, as she did, great doubts about their having a right to be anywhere.”³⁶ Gerty’s position in relation to the cats—and the slaves, I will show—changes, when the kindly lamplighter, Uncle True, gives Gerty the present of a kitten. We read of her taking the kitten home, sheltering him, and sharing her food with him despite the danger in which this puts Gerty vis-à-vis her guardian. Gerty comes to cherish her pet, but he is soon killed when her guardian flings the kitten into a pot of boiling water. Glenn Hendler’s analysis of this scene in Cummins’s original novel is indebted to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s discussion of mediated sympathy. Hendler explains that, while “Cummins may have been asking the reader to pity the cat—briefly,” the animal merely mediates the sympathy meant for Gerty herself.³⁷ In the abolitionist version of Gerty’s story, though, the figure of the slave further complicates how that sympathy is mediated in the text.

The Lamplighter Picture Book presents interracial sympathy mediated through an animal as the story of Gerty’s kitten is reframed in abolitionist rhetoric. As in the novel, Gerty decides to keep the kitten, even though she knows she will have to struggle to feed him and hide him from her guardian. But the picture book transforms this act into an explicit reference to the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, as the poem “Gerty’s Little Kitten,” explains that

Thus kind are some good persons, oft,
 When slaves for aid are asking;
 Right deeds, they know, whate'er the law,
 Will make God's favor lasting.

And thus good people often give
 The fugitive a lodging,
 Ne'er fearing those, intent on gain,
 About his pathway dodging.³⁸

Unlike Ellen's and Howard's squirrels, and Billy Rabbit, this cat never actually stands in for an enslaved person, but exists as the victimized animal in an analogy that explains relations of sympathy. Gerty's identification with the cat—who is then identified with the fugitive slave—mediates white sympathy for black people through a supposedly more familiar sympathy with domesticated animals. Put another way, cross-racial sympathy, here manifesting in the desire to harbor the fugitive, is compared to a more familiar act of sympathy—the desire to care for a stray kitten.

Framed as an analogy, Gerty has sympathy for the kitten just as the abolitionist has sympathy for the enslaved. The logic of the abolitionist text demands that the reader take up this model: “and thus, good people often give / The fugitive a lodging.” The instructive nature of this poem is clear: young readers are meant to read the story of Gerty and her kitten, and transfer the sympathy that they share with her through the animal, to the racial other—an other whom the text simultaneously distances from its assumedly white readers, even as it mediates interracial sympathy. Regarding Gerty as a model for abolitionist sympathy, the reader is meant to identify with her in the text—though never with the cats or with enslaved people. Although Gerty is initially positioned as somehow “like” her fellow-sufferers, the cats in the wood yard and the sorrowful slaves on the faraway ship, she is soon transformed from the object of sympathy to its subject, repositioned as the giver rather than the elicitor of sympathy. Her sympathy is not dependent on this likeness in the text or the supposed likeness of the assumed readers to cats, slaves, or orphaned children, but is mediated through these various positions of difference. Through her relation to the kitten, Gerty becomes a model for readerly sympathy, aligned not with the enslaved but with the abolitionist.

The identification of the potentially abolitionist reader with Gerty works only as a parallel, analogous model though, rather than a literal one. Gerty does not show us how to be an abolitionist. Her sympathy remains one step away from sympathy for fugitive slaves, who appear in abstracted form in the

picture book's poetry but never enter into Gerty's narrative. The story compels the reader to take the abolitionist's position, which it presents in parallel to Gerty's position. Thereby, it presents slaves and kittens as similarly parallel. The kitten and the slave are not, however, interchangeable in this structure. *The Lamplighter Picture Book* does not quite go so far as to argue that slaves are like cats, but it does offer a model of sympathy that allows Gerty's story to function as a model for abolitionism. To understand this structure of sympathy, we must look to the story's assumptions about cross-racial and cross-species sympathy, and about how and to whom that sympathy might be transferred.

Domestic Proximity and Animal Kinship

Why do we need the story of Gerty and her kitten to convey abolitionist sympathy for the enslaved? The answer lies in the text's assumptions about its potentially abolitionist, assumedly white readers. Cummins's picture book shows that comparing the relative sympathy white people might have for animals and for African American people is not a new phenomenon. This model of sympathy is ruled by a similar logic to that which regarded the mixed-race characters of abolitionist literature as particularly able to garner white sympathy because of their supposed similarity to white people. However, in these comparisons between cats, enslaved people, and Gerty, we see objects of sympathy who are not dependent on the reader's supposed similarity to or identification with them. On the contrary, the reader is meant to feel for each of these figures despite his or her position of difference from them.

The presence of animals in this text helps us understand how this model of sympathy does not depend on sameness but works, rather, despite difference. Boggs notes the "double sense of identification and disidentification" with animals in literary narratives, writing that "because the animal is like them [people], they are asked to extend kindness, but the kindness they extend makes them human steward of the animal and marks their separation from it."³⁹ This is a more complex structure than stewardship, however. When animals are depicted as proximate to humans, familiar to them, or when their position as objects of sympathy is relied on to mediate sympathy between humans, that sympathy is figured across notions of difference, as both animal and human others are positioned as somehow proximate to, but not necessarily like, the sympathizer. What I call animal-humanist sympathy is dependent on this understanding of proximity, rather than distinction. A notion of domestic proximity may produce what Oliver calls "an ethics of relationality," allowing sympathy to be transferred across positions of "difference or alterity," rather

than necessitating “sameness” for ethical behavior.⁴⁰ We might understand certain animals as proximate to humans (though not necessarily “like” them) by virtue of their presence in domestic spaces. Relations between people and other animals can therefore be understood, in part, as constructed through their domestic proximity to one another, rendering them more likely objects of sympathy by virtue of their familiarity.

Since, as Amy Kaplan has shown, domestic spaces have national implications in the nineteenth century, proximity works on multiple geographic scales in these stories.⁴¹ The characterization of domesticated animals as familiar, here, might also be understood as familial—that is, as figured in affective kinship relations or through larger notions of national kinship and belonging—by virtue of their proximity to humans in domestic spaces. In the dual understanding of the word *domestic*, which renders the home a microcosm for the nation, we see how certain kinds of animals figure as members of a (white) American national family. The iconic presence of cats and dogs in nineteenth-century depictions of white, middle-class domesticity illustrates this point.⁴²

If we put aside notions of sameness and difference in *The Lamplighter Picture Book* in favor of notions of domestic proximity, we see that domesticated cats appear here closer to Gerty than enslaved people do. Rather than assume that sympathy must be conveyed across notions of perceived sameness (as abolitionism’s “whitewashed” mixed-race literary figures are often employed), this text assumes that sympathy is more easily conveyed across positions of domestic proximity that render cats familiar to Gerty and, presumably, to the (white, Northern) readers of the picture book. Gerty and the kitten are not simply “like” one another in the text, but they share domestic spaces. This is true in the literal sense of Gerty’s respective physical proximity to the cats in the wood yard and the slaves “far out upon the sea.” Further, Gerty’s and the cats’ physical proximity to one another and their similarly precarious positions of “seeming to feel . . . great doubts about their having a right to be anywhere” locate both the child and the cats on the margins of this domestic space, but still within a frame that might be recognizable to the reader.⁴³

As *The Lamplighter Picture Book* blurs differences between interspecies and interracial relationships, it suggests that the proximity of potentially abolitionist white readers to familiar, domesticated animals—like cats—is closer than their proximity to enslaved people. The analogy “Gerty is to the kitten as the abolitionist reader is to the fugitive slave” works because of the assumed familiarity of this first pairing. Put another way, the act of caring for a pet kitten is assumed to be familiar to the book’s readers, and therefore it serves as a suitable, recognizable model for how white people ought to act toward enslaved or self-

emancipated people, who may be less familiar. If, as *The Lamplighter Picture Book* and the case of the Katrina dogs assume, white sympathy is mediated more easily across species than race, it seems that this sympathy is necessarily limited. Mediating cross-racial sympathy through familiar domesticated animals figures racial others and animals in parallel relations to white people, rendering enslaved black people sympathetic to white people—rather ironically—only in the historical familiarity of their subordinated domestication. In one sense, the often paternalistic rhetoric of abolitionism retains hierarchies of both race and species in the subordination of both animals and enslaved, black people to white people.

However, when we more closely examine the model of sympathy provided by Gerty and her kitten, we find a relation not simply dependent on either likeness or subordination but forged out of proximity and familiarity, opening up a more progressive model for ethical behavior. When we take into account nineteenth-century theorizations of race and difference as (literal or metaphorized) differences in species, we cannot pose animal difference as necessarily outside “the possibility of ethical relations.”⁴⁴ The blurring of lines between animals and humans in nineteenth-century texts calls into question the differentiation itself. As arguments for racial hierarchy are also dependent on the hierarchization of humans over other animals, when we call into question the nature of animal–human difference, the comparison of animals and nonwhite people is reframed.

The animal-mediated interracial sympathy of *The Lamplighter Picture Book* models a form of humanism that is dependent on the nonhuman as referent. The animal referent in this model of animal-mediated interracial sympathy (i.e., the cats in this text) is not simply posed in opposition to humans but figures in proximity to both the white human sympathetic subject and to the nonwhite human objects of sympathy (i.e., slaves). The shared sense of their mutual marginalization facilitates Gerty’s association with her pet kitten, for

The child loved “Kitty” all the more
Because she was in danger,
And braved Nan’s wrath some milk to gain
To feed the little stranger.⁴⁵

Gerty’s own othering sets her apart from the text’s other white characters. In fact, Gerty is compared only to the cats and to enslaved black people in the picture book. Her marginalized position makes the transfer of sympathy across positions of difference a necessity, as Gerty is not “like” any other human char-

acters. While animal-mediated sympathy may indicate a limited sympathy in the sense that the animal is positioned as somehow necessary for facilitating interracial sympathy, this model of sympathy is also not dependent on notions of sameness for ethical behavior, but allows sympathy to be transferred across acknowledged positions of difference—that is, even to a “stranger.”

Gerty’s ability to sympathize across difference therefore offers a more progressive model for interracial and interspecies relationships. Insofar as they evoke sympathy across acknowledged positions of difference, I argue, domesticated animals are familiar, rather than similar here. They also figure as potentially familial in their relations of care and belonging in shared domestic spaces. Proximity seems to be one marker of relationality, in which sympathy—and possibly feelings of kinship and belonging—might be mediated across difference. The case of Gerty and her kitten is one example of such relationality to animals. The relation of Gerty to the kitten is not simply one of speciesist domestic subordination but, in her similar state of subordination, one that more closely resembles ties of affective kinship. We might view the kitten Gerty cares for as her sole kinship relation at this point in the text. The kitten is a fellow-creature whom she welcomes into her domestic world with the hope for love and companionship—importantly, in the absence of any such sentiment from her human guardians. In this, the familiar and the familial are blurred within the shared domestic space that Gerty and the kitten both inhabit.

Understandings of familial belonging are doubly relevant here because they also reflect on nineteenth-century discourses of race and slavery. In John Neal’s short story “The Instincts of Childhood” (1842), we read an animal–slave comparison that is essential to the story’s abolitionist argument and that hinges on parallel models of family. Closely resembling the narratives of “wild” animals such as squirrels and rabbits kept as pets and then given their liberty, stories about children who decide to free birds from cages also abound in nineteenth-century children’s literature. In Neal’s story, young Margaret keeps a family of birds in cages, where she believes they have everything they could need or want. However, because she has placed the father bird in a cage separate from the mother and babies, the birds are upset, though she fails to recognize why. Her father asks how she would feel were he separated from their family, and she understands the connection. She wonders, though, who would take care of the birds if she did not. Her father explains that the birds can care for themselves, or else God will provide for them. Margaret ultimately frees the birds.

Later, Margaret’s parents are complaining about an enslaved woman who is distraught because her husband has been sold away. Margaret makes an easy connection to the earlier conversation about the birds and points to the cage.

Her father then makes a paternalistic argument in support of slavery: black people are better off enslaved than having to take care of themselves. Finally, Margaret asks, “Who feeds the young ravens, father? Who takes care of all the white mothers, and all the white babies we see?” to which he replies, “I know what you are thinking of, but then—there’s a mighty difference, let me tell you, between a slave mother and a white mother—between a slave child and a white child!”⁴⁶ Although Margaret is persistent, her father remains unconvinced at the end of the story.

What Margaret learned about the birds has unintentionally taught her something about enslaved people. Although her father is unwilling to make the connection between caged birds and enslaved people, the daughter uses this connection, hinging on the father’s initial comparison of the birds to their own white family. What the daughter realizes, with her true child-abolitionist instincts, is *not* simply that slaves are like birds but that, when it comes to questions of freedom and captivity, both birds and slaves are like white people, and that the model of family with which she is familiar might be applied to both.

The abolitionist political cartoon “Pointing a Moral” (fig. 3) provides a similar comparison of families, further evidencing the limitations of animal-human comparisons for abolitionist logic while also using the rhetoric of family for its ultimate humanist argument. The conversation accompanying the illustration reads as follows:

Little Sis—“*Oh, par, look how miserable poor Pussy is since you sent all her kittens away!*”

Par (who is an ardent Abolitionist)—“*Yes, my darling! Now you can form some idea of what the poor black slave’s mother suffers when her little ones are taken from her.*”

Little Sis (eagerly)—“*Does black peoples have all their little kittens taken away from them?*”

In short, the “moral lesson” exposes the fundamental problem of the equation “kittens are like slaves” by showing that slaves do not have “all their little kittens” but their human children “taken away from them.” If we are to take selling enslaved children as worse than dispensing with a cat’s kittens (which this humanist argument assumes is the case for its potential readers), the example that this father gives his child is logically insufficient, in a way that the proto-abolitionist child recognizes. The lesson here is that enslaved people are less appropriately compared to cats than to white people. This text also outlines the difference between human and animal families: cats are to kittens as human mothers are to human children.

What the child’s articulation of this difference explains, and what the mother in the background of the image also suggests, is that slave families

Figure 3.
 "Pointing a Moral," *Frank Leslie's Budget of Fun*, No. 62, May 1863.
 Courtesy of the American Antiquarian Society.

are not, in fact, just like cat families but like white human ones. The cartoon assumes the similarity of human families to one another across racial lines, which can, perhaps ironically, be shown by comparison with animal

families. If we are to grasp the moral, which demands that we think of cats and enslaved people differently, we must also assume some degree of homogenization among human families. The mother in the background reminds us of the more appropriate equation: the relation of enslaved, black mothers and their children is equal to that between free, white mothers and their children. This equation requires a more radical realization than the first, and this realization is the subtext of the lesson. The fundamental assumption here, of course, is that we ought to prioritize human children over kittens, and the resounding reason for this prioritization has to do with perceptions of kinship, that is, who counts as family.

Abolitionist articulations of humanity were sometimes paired with more specific definitions of who counts as family, as abolitionists extended arguments about enslaved people's humanity to imply notions of Christianized or national kinship with free, white people. The question "Am I Not a Man and a Brother?" is a rhetorical one. By answering yes, we also must take into account its conjunction of humanity with kinship—the phrase a "man AND a brother" suggests not only recognition of humanity but membership in some form of universally construed national or human family. As Follen has it in an 1846 poem from *The Liberty Cap*, this condition of belonging in kinship is sufficient for inclusion in the category of humanity:

He asks, Am not I man?
 He pleads, Am not I a brother?
 Then dare not, and hope not you can
 The cry of humanity smother.⁴⁷

Similarly, the idea of Christian kinship shared across racial lines is assumed by most abolitionist rhetoric. As *The Slave's Friend* (1838) asks and answers, "What! *is* the slave a brother or sister to those who hold them in bondage? Yes. All men are the children of God."⁴⁸ This argument about brotherhood or sisterhood is as much an articulation of religiously or nationally construed familial obligation as it is a response to pseudoscientific theories that pose racial differences as differences of species.

After Charles Darwin's publication of *On the Origin of Species* in 1859, the British anatomists Richard Owen and Thomas Henry Huxley deliberated about evolutionary relatedness. Their main debate during the early 1860s concerned the comparative brain structures of humans and apes, and the question of what differentiated humans from other primates.⁴⁹ The poem "The Gorilla's Dilemma" from *Punch* (1862) takes up arguments about humanity and brotherhood, in a demand to assess evolutionary relatedness in terms of kinship relations:

Say am I a man and a brother,
 Or only an anthropoid ape?
 Your judgment, be't one way or 'tother,
 Do put into positive shape.
 Must I humbly take rank as quadruman
 As OWEN maintains that I ought?
 Or rise into brotherhood human,
 As HUXLEY has flatt'ringly taught?

For though you may deem a Gorilla
 Don't think much of his rank in creation,
 If of feeling one have a scintilla,
 It glows to know "who's one's relation"—
 Apes and monkeys (now crowding by dozens
 Their kinship with us to have proved),
 Or an OWEN and HUXLEY for cousins,
 Though, it may be, a little removed.⁵⁰

In short, Huxley supported Darwin's theory of common descent and the transmutation of species on the basis of similarities in brain structures among primates, while Owen argued for the separateness and uniqueness of humankind.

"The Gorilla's Dilemma" conflates notions of evolutionary proximity and kinship, falsely positing that brotherhood necessarily follows from humanity. Scientific race theory is embedded in the evolutionary debate, as the question of one's "rank in creation" applied to the scientific taxonomies of writers like Nott, Gliddon, and Thomas Henry Huxley, whose theory of evolution also included nine classifications of race and the belief that "Negroes" were evolutionarily located somewhere between apes and European people.⁵¹ In the context of evolutionary science, the question of "who's one's relation" is present not in spite of but because of an allusion to racial difference as also evolutionary. The poem later confirms this by asking "What are 'Cures,' Nigger-dances and jibes / To the black spider-monkey's contortions?" in a move that reminds us of other contemporaneous—and derogatory—comparisons of humans and animals.⁵²

This juxtaposition of race and species is rendered even more apparent by the appearance of "The Gorilla's Dilemma" on the same page of *Punch* as a short poem titled "Black Ingratitude." The latter is a commentary on abolition and racism, and ends with the line "Our black friend's much more Free than Welcome."⁵³ Despite "Liberty's benignant spell," abolition fails to fully include black people in white structures of national and familial belonging.⁵⁴ While "The Gorilla's Dilemma" juxtaposes differences of race and species, its ultimate inconclusiveness ("Had I better be monkey or man, / By enlightened self-interest's suggestion? / Say you-for hang me, if I can") leaves the question of animal-human kinship unanswered, and unsurprisingly so, given similarly inconclusive discourses on race, humanity, and kinship.⁵⁵

The overlapping discourses of nineteenth-century scientific and social justice debates on race and species and the shared, fuzzy spaces within which differences in each were defined do not necessarily indicate that these differences are of the same kind or degree. However, the shared rhetorics of similarity and social obligation in race and species discourse show how these categories were

similarly conceived in nineteenth-century literary and scientific conversation. Another poem from *Punch* inspired by scientific evolutionary theory, “Monkeyana” (1861), also alludes to the iconic abolitionist question “Am I Not a Man and a Brother?” and is as inconclusive as “The Gorilla’s Dilemma” in its answer.⁵⁶ More emphatic than the details of the scientific debate this poem outlines is the accompanying image that brings abolitionist rhetoric to bear on evolutionary science.⁵⁷

Taken apart from the poem, this image might be read as racist commentary just as easily as evolutionary commentary about species difference.

Figure 4. “Monkeyana,” *Punch*, No. 40, May 18, 1861. Courtesy of the Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

The visual and associative anthropomorphism of the illustration is accompanied by a reference to humanity and kinship, as the gorilla's sign poses a similarly rhetorical question to that of the antislavery medallion, with a slight syntactical difference ("Am I" rather than "Am I Not"). This rhetorical difference suggests that a negative answer might follow more easily here than from the abolitionist image, hinting—in contrast to the coupling of humanity and kinship in "The Gorilla's Dilemma"—that the inclusion of nonhuman primates in evolutionary proximity to humans does not, in fact, necessitate their inclusion in notions of human kinship. This proximity—unlike that of Gerty and her kitten—may not be sufficient for humanist notions of kinship. If this is its evolutionist assumption, one wonders what the image suggests about race.

These forceful examples of intertwined discourses of race, species, and kinship demand not only that we acknowledge their shared historical discourse but that we rethink the function of difference defined by this discourse. The abolitionist texts discussed above illustrate the limitations of humanist rhetorics that depend on familiar animals to evoke cross-racial sympathy. But they also allow us to reevaluate the role of similarity and difference for producing sympathy—and even feelings of kinship and belonging. This reevaluation demands an alternative model of sympathy that deprioritizes notions of sameness, acknowledging that even humanist sympathy can function across relations of alterity.

Notes

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1. See Winthrop Jordan, "The Apes of Africa" and "Negroes, Apes, and Beasts," in *White over Black: American Attitudes toward the Negro, 1550–1812* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 28–32 and 228–34. Thomas Jefferson's discussion of "the preference of the Oranootan for the black women over those of his own species," arguing for the fundamental importance of racial difference, is one prominent example (*Notes on the State of Virginia* [London: John Stockdale, 1787], 230).
2. Carl Linnaeus's 1735 text, *Systema Naturae*, was revised throughout the eighteenth century, and his system of taxonomy was the basis for many other systems of scientific classification that followed.

For a brief history of scientific racism in the West, see Ali Rattansi, "Beyond the Pale: Scientific Racism, the Nation, and the Politics of Colour," in *Racism: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 20–44.

3. Different kinds of animals register differently in conversations about race and species, however. Comparisons between enslaved people and "wild" creatures who were sometimes domesticated (such as birds, squirrels, and rabbits) do not suggest the same things as comparisons of black people with nonhuman primates (the most common comparison in scientific theories of racism) or with livestock (whose condition of labor was often likened to the condition of enslaved "chattel"). Further, humans' experiences of animals are often heterogeneous and racialized encounters. See Sara E. Johnson, "You Should Give Them Blacks to Eat: Waging Inter-American Wars of Torture and Terror," *American Quarterly* 61.1 (2009): 65–92. Critiques of the philosophical binary constructed through the human–animal distinction are useful, but in the texts I discuss, the specificities of both animals and humans seem more important than this binarism, even where it exists. By acknowledging both the specificities of species and the heterogeneity within them, I mean to resist making broad claims about "the animal" or "humans."
4. Kelly Oliver, "Ambivalence toward Animals and the Moral Community," *Hypatia* 27.3 (2012): 4.
5. Sterling Brown is generally cited as the earliest literary critic to discuss mixed-race characters used to garner white sympathy in nineteenth-century literature. See *Negro Poetry and Drama*, reprinted in *The Negro in American Fiction* (Washington, DC: Associates in Negro Folk Education, 1937), 133; and *Black and White in American Culture*, ed. Jules Chametzky and Sidney Kaplan (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1969), 339. Later critics who note this problem include Carolyn L. Karcher, "Rape, Murder, and Revenge in 'Slavery's Pleasant Homes': Lydia Maria Child's Antislavery Fiction and the Limits of Genre," in *The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America*, ed. Shirley Samuels (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 72; Werner Sollors, *Neither Black nor White yet Both: Thematic Explorations of Interracial Literature* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), 223–25; and Eve Allegra Raimon, *The "Tragic Mulatta" Revisited: Race and Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Antislavery Fiction* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2004), 14–15.
6. I turn to abolitionist children's literature in particular because, as Deborah C. DeRosa acknowledges, its rhetorical strategy is to present sentimental or affective antislavery arguments that still allow for the politicization of sentiment. See Deborah C. DeRosa, *Domestic Abolitionism and Juvenile Literature, 1830–1865* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 10. DeRosa argues for the predominant use of three main images in domestic abolitionism: the victimized slave child, the abolitionist mother–historian, and the young (white) abolitionist. I want to add another image to this framework: the victimized domesticated animal, who is used similarly to the victimized slave child, though with a difference. Not necessarily replacing the figure of the victimized slave in these texts, the relationship between animals and slaves is complex and exhibits a more progressive model of sympathy than that evinced by the mixed-race characters so prominent in popular abolitionist literature for adults.
7. The abolitionist children's literature I discuss all falls within the realm of what DeRosa calls "domestic abolitionism," antebellum literature written primarily by Northern, middle-class white women for Northern white children. DeRosa discusses white women's authorship of abolitionist children's literature in her introduction to *Into the Mouths of Babes: An Anthology of Children's Abolitionist Literature* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005) and in the first chapter of *Domestic Abolitionism and Juvenile Literature, 1830–1865*.
8. My use of the term *humanism* highlights a prioritization of the human—often critiqued by animal studies theorists—rather than the philosophies of either religious or secular humanism. I situate my discussion most closely in conversation with human–animal studies in its focus on the relationship between human and nonhuman animals, or with what Michael Lundblad distinguishes as "animality studies, a field distinguished from animal studies in its prioritization of questions of human politics . . . in relation to how we have thought about human and nonhuman animality at various historical and cultural moments" ("From Animal to Animality Studies," *PMLA* 124.2 [2009]: 497).
9. Neel Ahuja, "Postcolonial Critique in a Multispecies World," *PMLA* 124.2 (2009): 557–58. While Marjorie Spiegel's study *The Dreaded Comparison: Human and Animal Slavery* (New York: Mirror Books/I.D.E.A., 1997) has often been cited in discussions of race and species, this text does little more than juxtapose particular instances of oppression without regard for the very specific contexts

in which they occurred. Although Spiegel evokes very basic similarities between the enslavement of African Americans and the oppression of certain kinds of animals, I am more interested in connections that pay close attention to historical and geographic contexts and discuss relations between different kinds of oppression without simply equating them. Texts that acknowledge and analyze the nuanced relations between the oppression of animals and people and the important heterogeneities at stake in both of these generalizing categories include Linda Hogan, *Dwellings: A Spiritual History of the Living World* (New York: Norton, 1995); David Nibert, *Animal Rights/Human Rights: Entanglements of Oppression and Liberation* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002); Nigel Rothsfels, *Savages and Beasts: The Birth of the Modern Zoo* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002); and Timothy Pachirat, *Every Twelve Seconds: Industrialized Slaughter and the Politics of Sight* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011).

10. Ahuja, "Postcolonial Critique in a Multispecies World," 558.
11. This understanding of racial difference can be seen, for example, in Arthur de Gobineau's discussion in *The Inequality of the Human Races*, trans. Adrian Collins (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1915; original in French, 1853–55), 23–35, 205–12.
12. Jane Elizabeth Jones, *The Young Abolitionists; or Conversations on Slavery* (Boston: Wm. E. Edwards, 1848), 5.
13. See Sojourner Truth's 1850 narrative, as recounted to Olive Gilbert, *The Narrative of Sojourner Truth*, ed. Margaret Washington (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), 4, 14.
14. "Tom and Lucy: A Tale for Little Lizzie," *Cousin Ann's Stories for Children* (Philadelphia: J. M. McKim, 1849), 17.
15. For a history of pet keeping in the United States, see Katherine C. Grier, *Pets in America: A History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006); and Grier, "Animal House: Pet Keeping in Urban and Suburban Households in the Northeast, 1850–1900," in *New England's Creatures: 1400–1900*, ed. Peter Benes (Boston: Boston University, 1993), 108–29.
16. These connections were made, for example, in texts written for mothers' instruction of young children. See Mrs. [Lydia Maria] Child, *The Mother's Book* (Boston: Carter and Hendee, 1831), 6–8; and Mrs. [Lydia] H. Sigourney, *Letters to Mothers* (Hartford: Hudson and Skinner, 1838), 37–40.
17. For a discussion of the historical relations between the antislavery and animal welfare movements (including prominent participants in both movements, such as Henry Bergh, William Wilberforce, Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Lydia Maria Child), see Diane L. Beers, "A Movement Takes Shape: The Origins of Animal Advocacy," in *For the Prevention of Cruelty: The History and Legacy of Animal Rights Activism in the United States* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 19–38. American writers such as Stowe and Child wrote both abolitionist and animal welfare literature for adults and children. For a discussion of the similar historical connections between children's welfare and animal welfare, see Susan J. Pearson, *The Rights of the Defenseless: Protecting Animals and Children in Gilded Age America* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
18. While Stowe's novel is most often discussed as a text read by adults, Barbara Hochman argues that *Uncle Tom's Cabin* may also be counted among abolitionist literature for children, both for its many adaptations for younger children as well as in its original form. See *Uncle Tom's Cabin and the Reading Revolution: Race, Literacy, Childhood, and Fiction, 1851–1911* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2011). For discussions of Stowe's novel as abolitionist children's literature, see especially pages 21–22 and chapters 4 and 7.
19. Harriet Beecher Stowe, *Uncle Tom's Cabin* (New York: Norton, 2010), 72.
20. Ibid. For a discussion of Stowe's use of animals in her postbellum children's fiction and how this might help us understand the race and gender politics behind her writing, see Jennifer Mason, *Civilized Creatures: Urban Animals, Sentimental Culture, and American Literature, 1850–1900* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), 95–118.
21. Colleen Glenney Boggs, "Emily Dickinson's Animal Pedagogies," *PMLA* 124.2 (2009): 536.
22. Mrs. (Mary Martha) Sherwood, *The babes in the wood of the New World* (New York: Mahlon Day, 1831).
23. Ann Preston, "Howard and His Squirrel," *Cousin Ann's Stories for Children*, 13–14.
24. Eliza Follen, "Soliloquy of Ellen's Squirrel, on Receiving his Liberty;—Overheard by a Lover of Nature and a Friend of Ellen," *Hymns, Songs and Fables, for Children* (Boston: Carter, Hendee, and Babcock, 1831), 34.

25. Eliza Follen, "Billy Rabbit to Mary," in *Hymns, Songs and Fables, for Children*, 41.
26. See DeRosa, *Into the Mouths of Babes* and *Domestic Abolitionism and Juvenile Literature*. The overlap between abolitionist and animal welfare texts can also be seen in places in which enslaved people are depicted as being kind to animals, as evidence of their humane goodness. Preston's Tom and Lucy, for example, "never hurt the butterflies / Nor pelted frogs away." See Preston, *Cousin Ann's Stories for Children*, 17.
27. Follen, *Hymns, Songs and Fables, for Children*, 69–70.
28. In addition, the logic of these stories implies a similar misdeed in keeping human beings and only certain other kinds of animals captive (i.e., they were not written about more commonly domesticated pets, such as cats and dogs). Hence such stories leave hierarchizations of species intact, raising questions about which kinds of animals ought not to be held captive and which may. Rabbits and squirrels are generally not deemed appropriate pets in these poems, and the freedom of birds was widely promoted, but we might surmise that most nineteenth-century readers felt differently about more commonly domesticated animals. For a more extensive history of specific pets and how common they were, see Grier, *Pets in America*.
29. See Lesley Ginsberg, "Of Babies, Beasts, and Bondage: Slavery and the Question of Citizenship in Antebellum American Children's Literature," in *The American Child: A Cultural Studies Reader*, ed. Caroline Levander and Carol J. Singley (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 85–105.
30. Louisa May Alcott, "Nelly's Hospital," *Our Young Folks*, April 1865, 272.
31. *Ibid.*, 275.
32. DeRosa argues that Sarah Josepha Hale was possibly the author of the poetry in *The Lamplighter Picture Book*, also revising Cummins's text for a younger audience. See *Domestic Abolitionism in Juvenile Literature*, 52–53. Because the author of the poetry is unclear, and for the sake of simplicity, I have chosen to refer to the picture book's author as Cummins. For more on the publication history of *The Lamplighter Picture Book*, see Susan S. Williams, "Promoting an Extensive Sale: The Production and Reception of *The Lamplighter*," *New England Quarterly* 69.2 (1996): 179–200.
33. Maria S. Cummins, *The Lamplighter Picture Book* (Boston: John P. Jewett, 1856), 3.
34. *Ibid.*, 4.
35. *Ibid.*, 8.
36. *Ibid.*
37. Glenn Hendler, *Public Sentiments: Structures of Feeling in Nineteenth-Century American Literature* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 4.
38. Cummins, *Lamplighter Picture Book*, 10.
39. Boggs, "Emily Dickinson's Animal Pedagogies," 536.
40. Kelly Oliver, *Animal Lessons: How They Teach Us to Be Human* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 21.
41. My bipartite understanding of the simultaneity of the domestic spaces of the home and the nation derives from Kaplan's notion of "Manifest Domesticity." See Amy Kaplan, *The Anarchy of Empire in the Making of U.S. Culture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005).
42. Mason discusses such a domestic scene in *Civilized Creatures*, 13–16.
43. This text positions both the child and the cats as needing protection from adult violence.
44. Oliver, *Animal Lessons*, 5.
45. Cummins, *Lamplighter Picture Book*, 10.
46. John Neal, "Instincts of Childhood: A Dialogue in Two Parts," in *The Anti-slavery Picknick*, ed. John A. Collins (Boston: H. W. Williams; New York: American Antislavery Society, 1842), 22.
47. Eliza Lee Follen, *The Liberty Cap* (Boston: Leonard C. Bowles, 1846), 9. The differently gendered alternative to this question, "Am I Not a Woman and a Sister?" was also posed. See American Anti-Slavery Society, *Slave's Friend* 3.6 (1838): 1.
48. *Slave's Friend*, 1.
49. Owen and Huxley's argument was part of an ongoing debate known as the "Great Hippocampus Question." For a discussion of the intricacies of their dispute, see Christopher E. Cosans, *Owen's Ape and Darwin's Bulldog: Beyond Darwinism and Creationism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).
50. "The Gorilla's Dilemma," *Punch*, October 18, 1862, 164.

51. See, for example, Josiah Nott, George Gliddon et al., *Types of Mankind, or Ethnological Researches based upon the Ancient Monuments, Paintings, Sculptures and Crania of Races, and upon their Natural, Geographical, Philological and Biblical History* (Philadelphia: Lippincott, Grambo, 1854); Thomas Henry Huxley, *Evidence as to Man's Place in Nature* (Edinburgh: Williams and Norgate, 1863); and Huxley, "On the Geographical Distribution of the Chief Modifications of Mankind," *Journal of the Ethnological Society of London* 2 (1870): 404–9.
52. "Gorilla's Dilemma," 164.
53. "Black Ingratitude," *Punch*, October 18, 1862, 164.
54. Ibid.
55. "Gorilla's Dilemma."
56. "Monkeyana," *Punch*, May 18, 1861, 206.
57. While this choice of slogan could be no coincidence, it is worth noting that Josiah Wedgewood, the activist associated with the antislavery medallion's production, was the grandfather of Charles Darwin.